


VIGIE

STRATEGIC AND PROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS BULLETIN



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
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EIFORCES IN A MOANING TREND



The Director General of the International School of Security Forces (EIFORCES), Brigadier General MOHAMADOU HAMADICKO, gave the ghost on July 31, 2014 at the Val-de-Grace Army Hospital in Paris, after a protracted illness. On this sad occasion, VIGIE, in the course of the publication of its second edition, pays tribute not only to his first ever Publishing Manager, but to the illustrious states, army and family man he was.

General HAMADICKO, now of blessed memory, was admitted to the combined Military Academy (EMIA) in

1969 and graduated in 1972 as a National Gendarmerie Officer. Having the crave for more knowledge, the Officer he was at that time, attended so many other training courses, which eventually permitted him to profoundly explore the domains of Judicial Police, Law Enforcement, Public Safety and International Relations... These courses will latter on constitute the armature of the broad expertise and solid professional career he had tantamount to his patent know-how and personal qualities.

After his accession to the rank of Colonel, Mohamadou HAMADICKO was appointed Defense Attaché at Cameroon's Embassy in Rabat, Morocco. He became Brigadier General by virtue of the Presidential Decree of 11 March 2011. On the same day, another presidential decree appointed him Commander of EIFORCES. Since 2013, General HAMADICKO became the first ever Director General of this Institution of advanced security and strategic learning; a position he held until his death on July 31, 2014.

Accordingly, the Centre for Research and Documentation of the EIFORCES (CRD / EIFORCES) through VIGIE, the administrative and the technical staff, trainees, not leaving out associate researchers, salute the memory of a humane, rigorous and honest personality that he was, and expresses their recognition of his endeavors.

General, may your Soul rest in perfect Peace!.

CONDOLENCES OF THE DEFENSE FORCES

"The Minister Delegate to the Presidency of the Republic in charge of Defense regrets to announce the death of Brigadier General Mohamadou HAMADICKO, Director General of the International School of Security Forces (EIFORCES), which occurred this day, July 31, 2014, after a protracted illness at the Val-de-Grace Military hospital in Paris.

On behalf of the Head of State, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the Minister Delegate at the Presidency in charge of Defense addresses to the family of the deceased, so affected in this trying moment, its condolences and the compassion of the entire grieved Defense Forces.

The program of the funeral will be announced later."

(e) MEBE NGO'O Edgard Alain

EDITORIAL

ECCAS vision 2025...

In the Declaration of the 13th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), held in Brazzaville in October 2007, the Heads of State and Government proclaimed that their Community will be committed to "transforming ECCAS, at the 2025 horizon, into an area of peace, prosperity, solidarity and into an unified economic and political space." To achieve this goal, the General Secretariat was in charge of the implementation, monitoring and coordination of the said Declaration on border security in Central Africa. These included the compilation and continuous analysis of the relevant literature to the nature and extent of cross-border criminal phenomena, in a bid to support oriented programs of fight against these ills.

For this to be possible, the ECCAS has the utmost task to reshape clear border lines between the States of the Community by enabling the demarcation of boundaries so that they should be perceived as gateways for a new dynamic in the process of social and economic integration and the strengthening of peace through the promotion of confidence-building measures between States and populations. Moreover, the establishment of a zone of peace and co-prosperity in Central Africa would be a major contribution to the sub-regional integration and the



Pr Wullson Mvomo Ela
Head of the Centre for Research and Documentation
EIFORCES

stability of the Continent. Whence the draft Border Program (ECCAS-BP) implemented by ECCAS, which fits into the broader framework of a hemispheric Frontier Program initiated by the African Union (AUBP).

This initiative, and many others, however, have not yet been able to manage or to curb down the rampant insecurity that has developed in the border areas of Central African States. Poorly established, badly stated, often not demarcated and thus porous, borders have gradually become a free land for illicit trafficking of all kinds, and for a well organized crime network. From the Eastern Front marked by the instability of the Central Africa Republic to the Western Front affected by the Boko Haram menace, the issue of border insecurity is explosive

in Central Africa. Nowadays, this phenomenon has been deteriorated by the illicit trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), whose silent sources are transnational criminal networks and other entrepreneurs of insecurity.

Understanding, from the perspective of a strategic approach, the phenomenon of insecurity in border areas in general, and issues specific to terrorism and the proliferation of SALW in Central Africa, appears here to be the terms of reference of the basic concern of the trans border security file. But first, let us grab some EIFORCES news items.

EIFORCES IN BRIEF



EIFORCES	Missions
The EIFORCES is a public institution under Cameroonian law, with legal personality and financial autonomy.	Providing training and facilitating research in the areas of Security and Peace Support.
Location	Types of Training
Siège social : Yaoundé/Ngousso	Preparation of the Security Forces Staff Diploma (SFSTD) Preparation of Higher Security Forces Studies Certificates (HSFSC).
Organic texts	Structure
Decree No. 2008/179 of May 22 2008 laying the basis of the EIFORCES Decree No. 2012/307 of June 25 2012 on the organization and operational modality.	<p>A Board of Directors chaired by the Minister of Defense.. Members: the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of State in charge of the National Gendarmerie, the Delegate General for National Security, the representatives of the Presidency of the Republic, partner countries and international organizations (UN, European Union, African Union, ECCAS, ... UEMOA).</p> <p>A General Management. Headed by a Director General working with an Assistant Director, Technical Advisors, Directors, and Heads of Divisions...</p> <p>And Advisory bodies.</p>

EIFORCES, «A tool at the service of Peace and Security of the African Continent»

TRAINING COURSES FOR TRAINERS IN PUBLIC ORDER

The seventh and eighth Training courses for trainers in Public Order have closed its doors on July 18, 2014 at AWAE during a ceremony presided over by Police Commissioner DOUM-NDONGO Patrice, Deputy Director General of the EIFORCES. In effect, the colorful ceremony marked the end of eight weeks of dense and intense study which permitted to increase the number of public order trainers to 36.



The training of Trainers in Public Order (TTPO) is meant for Subordinate Security Officers drawn from EIFORCES partner countries on a triple objective:

- The enhancement in operational command of security units called upon to maintain order inside and outside National borders in time of peace, crisis or conflicts;
- The transmission of training skills in order to form and train units to provide them with an operational capacity to meet up with the security challenges of the moment;
- The composition of a team of trainers intended to maintain and develop the doctrine of public security, in conjunction with other training center at the international level especially in the area of research.

For eight weeks, forty Officers-participants from 17 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, namely : **Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Congo Brazzaville, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea Conakry, Mauritania, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Senegal, Togo and Cameroon,**

were confined to a study program divided into six(06) modules : public security; intervention and its operational characteristics; operational dexterous intervention; communication; pedagogy; teaching skills; peacekeeping operations and international humanitarian and Human Rights.

In addition to the mental strain sustained, students had to undergo, almost on a daily basis, physical activities of the highest order, in a bid to build mental strength and endurance in the minds of these Operational Chiefs.

Despite their risky nature, these activities were supervised by strict security measures, and the personal integrity of the teaching staff is backed up by the Charter of Responsibility of the trainer's corps. In that regards, the trainers have once again demonstrated professionalism, dedication and loyalty; qualities unanimously lauded during the closing ceremony and which, should inspire the new laureates in the execution of their future task.

Thirty six out of the forty recipients made it through. This trainer's course took place some weeks after the International EUPST AWAE 2014 Exercise. It marks the complete air lift and worldwide recognition of the EIFORCES. /.

EIFORCES AT THE HEART OF THE "EUPST AWAE 2014" EXERCISE

In an African context within which on one hand, attacks are becoming more complex, requiring the putting in place of multidimensional Peace Support Operations (PSO) and the second strategic objective of an operational African Standby Force yet under implementation on the other, Cameroon and the European Union have recently organized the second African session of the project named "European Police Services training 2011-2013" (EUPST) project in AWAE CAMEROON, under the auspices of EIFORCES, the French Cooperation Security and Defense, the AU and ECCAS. This exercise took place in two phases: from March 24 to April 4, 2014 for the first, and from 14 to 25 April 2014 for the second. In total, over 555 participants drawn from the Police and Gendarmerie forces of nineteen (19) Francophone African countries and five (05) European countries, as well as experts and observers from international and non-governmental organizations (UN, EU, AU, ECCAS) took part in this session. Thus, in a bid to throw more lights on the relevance and content of the (EUPST) project, the VIGIE Bulletin met with Colonel ENGOLO ELLA Thomas, Director of the said exercise.

Hello sir! On behalf of the VIGIE Bulletin, I am honored by your presence at this interview!

Hello! The pleasure is mine!

Colonel, can you briefly explain the origin of this "EUPST AWAE 2014" exercise and how it came about?

As a reminder, the "European Union Services Training 2011-2013 (EUPST)" is based on the implementation of a training program conducted by a consortium of Police services of the European Union, seeking to build professional Police capacities in the management of civilian crisis. It is destined for Police and Gendarmes serving in the EU and countries outside the European Union.

The "EUPST Awae 2014" Exercise consisted in the putting in place of a mission meant to consolidate political process, mastermind violence and sustain humanitarian actions in the context of stability. The exercise was based on a theme inspired by the CARANA exercise extracted from scenario 5 of the doctrine which is constituent of the main problems encountered in the current African crisis: territorial claims or secessionist, terrorism, ethnic and religious clashes, resource management problems, illicit trafficking, arms trafficking, etc. In short, it is a multinational preparatory exercise for a multidimensional mission associating: a military Staff of the Police Component built up as a replica of that involved in Peace Support Operations in Africa; a Formed Police Unit (FPU) in charge of ensuring public order, protecting civilians,



Colonel ENGOLO ELLA Thomas

Director of Studies EIFORCES

Director of the «EUPST Awae 2014» exercise

personnel and equipment of the mission. This FPU was associated to a Police Specialized Element (PSE) in judicial matters, high risk interventions, close protection, recognition of ambushed areas and destruction of explosives etc.



What were the objectives of the "EUPST AWAE 2014" exercise?

In a nutshell, this intensive and unprecedented exercise seek to enhance the professional capacity of PSO. Apart from this overall objective, several specific objectives were set aside for this session including : contributing to the operationalization of the "AAF" through the enforcement of the capacity of the Police Component of sub regional forces; promoting interoperation capacity of Formed Police Units in multidimensional PSO; promoting the development of common operational standards; boost the knowledge of participants in the conduct of multinational and multidimensional Peace Support Operations ; In short, familiarize the personnel of the Police Component with the political, diplomatic and judicial environments, suitable for any mission on Peace Support Operation, as well as their necessary relations with the civil society and humanitarian organizations.

Let's talk a bid about the preparation and conduct of the exercise. What do you have to say about the organization and planning of "EUPST Awae 2014"?

The "EUPST AWAE 2014," exercise, is an organization put in place comprising: **a General supervision** placed under the High Authority of the Minister Delegate at the Presidency in charge of Defense, a Board Chair of the EIFORCES, assisted by Mrs. SSD / CGN and GDNS; **a coordination entity** placed under the Authority of Brigadier General, Director General of the International School of Security Forces (EIFORCES); assisted by Police Commissioner, Deputy Director General of EIFORCES; Lieutenant-Commander Chief of the Military Secretariat and the Chief of Battalion; **an exercise management team** structured in poles, units and pools, charged with planning, coordinating and ensuring the proper conduct of the exercise.

After the agreement by the Government of Cameroon to host the second session of the African EUPST, planning instructions of this international exercise were presented and authorized during a reset meeting held in January 2013 in Yaoundé. It was during the said meeting that the participants decided to baptize this exercise "AWAE 2014", from the name of the town chosen to host the final maneuver. Like most exercises of this nature, the phase of implementation was preceded by a short cycle of planning and preparatory activities comprising the building up of the exercise proper and the drafting of various related documents, preparatory formation of a Constituted Police Unit (CPU) and a Special Police Element (SPE), an educational seminar for trainers of the Military Staff, and a meeting to reschedule the direction of the exercise with experts of the AU , ECCAS and of the EU in Yaoundé, Addis Ababa and Brussels.



What about the final maneuver?

With regards to the exercise proper, it was divided into two identical phases of two weeks duration each. The only major difference between these phases was that participants were not the same all the time on the site of the EIFORCES in AWAE from 24 March to 4 April and from 14 to 25 April 2014. Each phase was marked by two simultaneous exercises: an exercise on how to conduct a CP (PCX) and a field training exercise. The first week was devoted to theoretical and practical training, as well as exchange of better practices in order to strengthen cohesion and improve interoperability in anticipation of the activities of the second week. The second week placed participants in the conditions of a Military Staff as well as of field exercises.

Can you further develop the content of each phase?

Of course! **The theory phase** of the exercise intended for the senior staff was focused on CP presentations, exchange of experiences on various topics, run by experts and prominent university lecturers and officials of the Police and Gendarmerie (introduction to peacekeeping, structure of Military Staff police Component, issues and challenges relevant to conflicts, International Police in PSO; the management of displaced and victims of conflict, Human Rights and protection of civilians etc.). likewise, reinforced by a Specialized Police Element (SPE), the FPU was versed on missions and techniques such as tactical response , maintenance and restoration of law and order in PSO, control unarmed enemy, identification and arrests, International Humanitarian Law, close protection in danger zones etc.. The break time in between the two weeks, was marked at every stage by a tour in the city of Yaounde.

During **the practical week**, the exercise was a simulation of the initiation of a Police Component under UN mandate, replacing or enhancing the local Police to manage perturbed public order of low to average magnitude, the fight against organized crime and the management of a CP. It was aimed at returning to a controlled situation and looking forward to working with state actors and Non-Governmental



Organizations deployed on the engagement area. In a stabilized environment, Police and Gendarmes working in a Military Staff situation and a PFU coupled to a SPE, agreed to carry out a multidimensional mission to support peace through the Police Component. Maneuvering under the supervision of the management of the exercise and under the watchful eye of the not less critical sight of African and European observers and evaluators, various incidents and situations permitted participants placed at various posts, to be schooled on how to plan and conduct an operation very close to reality. Similarly, participants of the field exercise organized within the FPU were attached to a Specialized Police Element throughout the period, surveyed the entire exercise transformed into a theater of crisis. That is how the Constituted Police Unit, together with the Specialized units of the SPE worked among others, on the discovery of mass graves, the interposition between communities, Democratic crowd management, humanitarian escorts, arrests of juveniles or exfiltration of prisoners ... The presence of international observers and evaluators gave a particular image to this exercise.

On the eve of the end of the exercise, a VIP day was organized on May 24, 2014. It gave an opportunity for participants to present the immediate results of this exercise in terms of expertise. A roundtable talk was equally held under the theme: **"The challenges of post-conflict transition in internal armed conflicts in Central Africa."**; animated by academics of the highest order and experts in security matters,

An initiative of this magnitude had to mobilize significant human and financial resources! Can you, sir, tell us something about this?

To simulate the exercise, significant staff and resources have been mobilized, and a variety of facilities to house the barracks and command posts were made at Awae. Regarding the budget, it should be noted that the activities of preparation and the final maneuver were funded by the EU through France and Cameroon. Finally, it is important to note that during this exercise, social activities were carried out to the benefit of the surrounding communities, including health coverage to gendarmes and policemen as well as to the civilian populations (with the opening ceremony of the new medical Centre), as well as significant financial resources provided to some administrative authorities to meet certain needs.

What conclusion can be established at the end of the exercise "EUPST AWAE 2014"?

We must acknowledge the massive turnout of this year. All countries of the European consortium and African countries whose applications were taken into consideration were present. This engagement is an eloquent testimony not only of the irrefutable reliability enjoyed by Cameroonian security forces in general and, EIFORCES in particular, but also of their great interest in the activities related to the maintenance of peace by the international community nowadays. In terms of





added value, this exercise was an excellent framework for exchanges between different actors at different levels on security matters. On this occasion, the basis of a reflection on the doctrinal evolution of Police management of PSO was defined. It is **"the AWAE spirit"**, to borrow the expression from Deputy Admiral, Director of Cooperation for Security and Defense at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during his speech delivered during the closing ceremony.

But we do not claim to have met all expectations, as they were numerous. However, it has been an opportunity for us to notice the complexity of PSO. That said the challenge which is that of EIFORCES, is to take advantage of the lessons acquired from such an exercise. In our humble opinion, EIFORCES has been enriched at the end of the day; an exercise that already has the merit to have been organized and to have brought together so many policemen and gendarmes of various nationalities to share their experiences.

Considering the present challenges posed by current African crises, "EUPST AWAE exercise 2014" is of great importance in the quest of answers to identified problems. Therefore, considering the putting in place of a Command Post (CP) engaging a Formed Police Unit (FPU), which combines specific capabilities of destroying explosives, criminal investigations and interventions, we can say that this EUPST training session, has been pertinent in terms of the different missions executed by the Police Component of PSO. It has permitted Police and Gendarmes to better understand the psychology of crowds, and how protesters act. They have equally learned to better control a theaters of operation.

What can we retain in a nutshell?

I think the following points summarize the EUPST 2014 exercise: **1)** the high level of participation achieved, from several countries of different African sub-regions, is a visible indicator that regional integration is on the move; **2)** this exercise has proved that operational arts are still a major challenge for Police Components, and has highlighted the complexity of the task ahead; **3)** good ownership and a true professional capacity, states should work on prerequisites, because training should



precede practice; **4)** the strength of Trained Police Units through integration of appropriate specific capabilities, insofar as these can safely cover the wide spectrum of tasks of the International Police.

This maiden experience can be considered as a master piece realized by the EIFORCES. That is why participants expressed the wish to repeat such an exercise. This call from the bottom of the heart was supported by a powerful statement made by the head of EUPST European Union project in his speech during the closing ceremony, solemnly announcing the commitment of this international institution to further forms of cooperation in the field of peace and security in Africa in general and, in Cameroon and EIFORCES in particular. In response, Mr. SED / ACVG, on behalf of Mr. MINDEF / BC EIFORCES, reaffirmed the commitment of Cameroon to continue this fruitful and multidimensional cooperation with the EU.

Thank you sir!

Thanks for your concern !

Interview conducted by
NGOBO ATEMENGUE Cécile Annick
Diplomate / Minrex



CENTRAL AFRICA: EIFORCES AT THE HEART OF THE PROMOTION OF PEACE AND STABILITY

At a time when Central Africa is spanned, since a number of years, by conflicts that undermine peace and set the population under insecurity, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), is investing in the creation of a large pole of Chief Executive Officers fit to be deployed in Peacekeeping Operations.



The training seminar for Policy makers and civilian managers, Police and Gendarmes, of the strategic level in multidimensional Peace Support Operations was recently held in Yaoundé-Cameroon from 26 May to 8 June 2014, within the **"Peace Facility Program"**.

This course seeks to train high ranking officials from the Gendarmerie, Police and members of the Civil society, having the aptitude permitting them to be effectively deployed in Peace Support Operations both in Central Africa and in the world. Specifically, this training of multidimensional policy makers and think-tanks of the strategic level in security related matters, permitted these participants, generally intervening at the strategic level and meant to assume high level responsibilities in the framework of a mission or within a Regional Military Staff component, to get acquainted to the environment of

Peace Support Operations(OSP); to master the keys to understanding and analyzing issues in the sub-region and to have a perfect mastery of strategic and operational planning methods.

The representative of the ECCAS, Réal Romuald MBIDA, head of the integrated ECCAS Training SERVICE-COPSCA (Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa), said that the seminar was initiated to train managers apt to implement the policies of promotion and consolidation of peace and stability in Central Africa. It was therefore a question of training high ranking staffs, in the conception, planning and implementation of COPAX policies.

It is all about ECCAS working in collaboration with EIFORCES, under the umbrella of Brigadier General Mohamadou HAMADICKO (CEO of EIFORCES),

contributing to training managers in the conception, planning and in the implementation of the policies of peace and security in Central Africa, based on the experiences gathered on the field during Peace Support Operations, so frequent in our sub-region or elsewhere.

This training which ended on June 8, 2014, was an occasion for important exchange of experiences between the seminarians for the emergence of a common vision of PSO. Then, participants received their certificates with the hope that they will serve as ambassadors of this course in their respective countries. Drawn from ten Central Africa ECCAS member countries (**Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sao Tome& Principe**), at the end of this seminar, they are capable of assuming topmost responsibilities at the strategic level within the framework of a mission or Military Staff component. They have been fully versed on the environment of Peace Support Operations (PSO). Henceforth, they possess the keys to understanding and analyzing issues of the sub-region and are trained on how to conduct strategic and operational planning methods.

In his address during the launching ceremony of this course on May 26, 2014, the Secretary of State at the Ministry of Defense, in charge of the National Gendarmerie, stressed on the fact that "this meeting, placed under the supervision of the International School of Security Forces (EIFORCES) of Yaoundé takes place in the framework of an **Extensive Contribution Program of the European Union through the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Peace Support Operations**"; at a moment when many conflicts affect the peace and stability of African countries in general and Central Africa in particular, in time to recall, as Jean Baptiste BOKAM rightly puts it, the manifest resolve of the Head of State Paul BIYA, to maintain peace and stability in Cameroon and even beyond the borders of his country. In this wise, on the occasion of the 42nd celebration of National Unity of Cameroon, celebrated last 20 May, his Excellency Barack OBAMA, President of the United States of America sent a message to congratulate his Cameroonian counterpart his Excellency Paul Biya, President of the Republic of Cameroon, for the efforts He makes in the maintenance of peace and security in Africa.



EIFORCES : A PEACE AND SECURITY COLLECTIVE TOOL FOR THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

Prepare Enforcement Officers, Senior Executive civilian and military officers (Gendarmes, Police) to assume the functions of command, to the missions of internal security in the context of Peace Support Operations as well to assume the functions of Military Staff within the Groups of Security Forces remains an ambitious challenge for the EIFORCES.



The International School of Security Forces (EIFORCES) aims primarily at strengthening the operational capacity of the Police Component while contributing to the consolidation of regional stability and security governance at the continental level. To achieve this goal, the EIFORCES has established herself as a center of excellence for training and research in the related areas of homeland security and Peace Support Operations (OSP).

The EIFORCES, a school for advanced learning in the related areas of homeland security and Peacekeeping Operations :

Training center of an international vocation, The EIFORCES provides multidisciplinary and integrated lessons, run by two divisions: the Division of Basic Education and the Division of Higher Education.

The Division of Basic Education offers three types of training: preparation to second level operational

command enhancement internship ; preparation to the **Formed Police Units (UPC / Formed Police Unit - FPU) training course and the trainer course in Public Order.**

The second level operational command enhancement internship aims at providing training and building up the capacity of subordinate Officers drawn from security units to acquire new operational capabilities in the field of Public Order (public security and restoring order to the Advanced Course Operational Command second level objective, even during insurgence situations). **The course on Formed Police Units (FPU / Formed Police Unit) is a pre-deployment Training on Peacekeeping Operations** destined for police and Gendarmerie units. As for the **trainers course in Public Order**, it dwells on the acquisition and control of occupational and operational intervention techniques, with a view to develop a pool of trainers who can teach " public Order " standards. thus, 12 courses were organized to the benefit of 200 Public

Order trainee-trainers.

As concerns the Division of Higher Education it prepares for **the Security Forces Staff Diploma** on the one hand and the **Certificate of Higher Security Forces Education** on the other.

The preparation for the **Security Forces Staff Diploma** is a curriculum centered around 3 areas of study namely: the Environment of the Staff Officer, the Assistant Operational Staff and interdepartmental general knowledge. This degree is designed to prepare students to occupy Officer Positions within a Security Forces Military Staff (Police and Gendarmerie) basic or multidimensional (national and international level) in 20 weeks. Since 2013, three courses (one is in progress) organized under the EIFORCES saw the participation of 52 students from 15 African countries. The preparation for the **advanced Security Forces Certificate** in turn, is a superior curriculum that includes four fields of study: the continental collective security of persons and property, the operational command of a group of forces, strategic and operational levels planning, and finally, specific knowledge of the forces. It is sanctioned by a Master's degree in Homeland Security issued in partnership with the International Relations Institute of Cameroon (IRIC). Extended to over 40 weeks, related lessons prepare officers to occupy positions of command within the components of Security Forces, Peace Support Operations and Military staffs. The first batch consisting of 12 officers trainees from 7 African nationalities, will graduate in late July 2014.

Continuous and practical course within the EIFORCES :

The EIFORCES is also distinguished by the empirical lessons she provides in its yet completed AWAÉ site. This is the case with the exercise "EUPST AWAÉ 2014," which was held from March 24 to April 25, 2014. Initiated by the European Union and carried out in collaboration with the African Union and ECCAS, the said exercise involved an intensive training designed to develop the mastery of common standard procedures in the context of operating the African Standby Force (ASF).

The affirmation of EIFORCES as a sub-regional, continental and international research-oriented Centre :

In view of its upward influence, EIFORCES organizes international seminars and conferences to deepen and stimulate reflection on topics related to Support Peace Operations. The first ever International Colloquium on the theme "**THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MAINTENANCE**

OF PEACE OPERATIONS IN AFRICA: RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW AND PROSPECTS" was held at the Yaoundé conference Centre from 5 to 6 December 2013. The **African Review on International Security (ARIS)**, whose maiden edition is being edited, is specially devoted to the publication of the Proceedings of the said International Symposium. It also gave the opportunity to the EIFORCES's Centre for Research and Documentation to present to the public, the inaugural edition of the Bulletin on Strategic Analysis and Forecasting (BSAF) called "VIGIE." In a central file on the theme of "**moto-taxis: a social phenomenon, vector of insecurity?**" The (SPAB) problematizes a phenomenon that has established itself as one of the major concerns of our times in terms of internal security in Cameroon.

The strength of EIFORCES :

Infrastructures: Created by Presidential Decree No. 2008/179 of 22 May 2008, EIFORCES is a Public Establishment temporarily located at the NGOUSSO neighborhood in Yaoundé. The EIFORCES built infrastructure is located at the heart of the Awaé subdivision in the Mefou-Afamba Division, about fifty kilometers south-west of Yaoundé. It covers about 42 hectares and boasts of impressive facilities and amenities.

Partnerships: EIFORCES maintains a multidimensional cooperation with various countries and organizations such as the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Canada and COESPU in Italy, as well as with international organizations and agencies (ICRC, UNHCR ...). This school has also been elected as member of the FRANCOPOPOL at the end of the 3rd International Congress of this organization, held from 15 to 17 November 2013, at Mons in Belgium.

Funding: The budget of the EIFORCES is supported by the State of Cameroon backed up by other partners (EU, AU, ECCAS) and donor countries (France, USA, China, Japan) most of which are already members of the Board of Directors of the EIFORCES .

In sum, EIFORCES affirms itself by nature and destination as an unprecedented institution in the world in the domain of higher education second degree police components.



By Squadron Chief Auguste ONGOLO,
Unit Head of Documentation
Centre for Research and Documentation
EIFORCES

EIFORCES : OPENINGS AND PARTNERSHIPS FOR THE RISE IN POWER OF A CENTER OF EXCELLENCE



Responding to the invitation sent by his counterpart, the Head of the Centre for Research and Documentation (CRD) of EIFORCES Professor Wullson Mvomo ELA, undertook from 18 to 22 March 2014, a mission to the Research Center for Saint-Cyr Schools Coëtquidan in France (CREC).



This mission was in line with the roadmap focused on the rise in power of the EIFORCES, as defined by the late Director General, Brigadier General Mohamadou HAMADICKO.

Coming on the heels of the mission of August 2013 accomplished at the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) in Vicenza, Italy, the visit at the CREC was meant not only to explore the possibilities and methods of setting up some partnership arrangements with sister institutions, but also to acquire standards and international practices inherent thereto.

From the point of view of contacts made and exchanges, the mission carried out in Coëtquidan, was quite beneficial.

The Research Centre for Saint-Cyr Schools claims a long and rich experience, and has already demonstrated a perfect mastery of the production of knowledge through the elaboration, conduct and implementation of programs of basic and applied research.

In the same vein, the CREC conducts a sustained activity in the organization of scientific exchange (seminars, colloquia, and workshops), writing reports, notes and studies on contract basis. It also seeks to support study and research in the framework of assistance for mounting projects and monitoring of research and studies, supervision of theses and dissertations, expertise and evaluation of research results and studies as well.

This extensive experience can only go a long way to encourage the CRD / EIFORCES, eager as this institution is, to rely on the international credibility and scientific know-how of the CREC, in order to design and expand a training engineering of its own, oriented towards research and production of specialized teaching modules.

Integrate into research networks: an imperative for the Centre for Research and Documentation (CRD) of EIFORCES

Given that the CRD is still a new-found establishment and, looking for an identity in conducting basic research, for its real expansion, the Centre for Research and Documentation (CRD) of EIFORCES must rely on patterns drawn by the brotherly Centers in the like of the CREC whose fame is international. This would in turn serve as a push for the adoption of a research policy based on security problems faced by African Security Forces in general and those of Central Africa in particular.

In such a perspective, it is necessary to foresee the development within the CRD / EIFORCES, of articulated competences in the main: African Security pole; the division of peacekeeping; geopolitical conflicts and, the Global Action of Security Forces.

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INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War has led among other consequences, to a praxeological mutation of conflicts. Yesterday, mainly interstate, these have been located through its dramatization in intrastate frameworks opposing in most cases infra-state groups to the state; generally on the basis of identity claims. Undeniably, the conflicts of the postmodern era do not in general implicate neither conventional actors, nor even so-called conventional weapons according to the United Nations' apprehension. From the 1990-2000 decade, Africa in general and Central Africa in particular, became the epicenter of this form of conflict that culminated in the wars of Rwanda.², the former Zaire and Burundi. This is a true consecration of change that has occurred in the paradigmatic order of war and conflicts. Moreover, the fundamentally asymmetric configuration of the said conflict, beyond conventional means, according to the theory of reciprocal actions developed by Karl Von Clausewitz, reinforces the use of Small Arms and light weapons (SALW) ³, easily transportable and easy to use but, with a deadly ability that has motivated Koffi Annan, former Secretary General of the United Nations, to assert that SALW are "weapons of mass destruction." One can therefore, understand the importance of their role in the development of terrorism, threat that Central Africa appears to be a particularly fertile ground for violent irruption of rationalities identity. Just like the attention that crystallizes be it regional, be it international coalitions, which enforces this complex security environment, like those mobilized in the fight against Boko Haram.

Despite the measures taken by the members of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to achieve a self-centered co-development based on the triptych "Peace, Security, Stability", conflicts persist, entrepreneurs of insecurity continue to thrive in the border areas and weapons there are still the subject of illegal trafficking. However, initiatives succeed not only to secure the border areas, whose vulnerability is proven within the ECCAS space, but also in order to fight against criminal violence and terrorism that feed the proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW. The proposed Frontiers program of ECCAS, based on the principle of the Frontiers Program of the African Union (AU), the establishment of a Regional Coordination of the United Nations Strategy for the fight against terrorism and SALW in Central Africa, efforts have indeed been made. But in view of the continued degradation of the security situation in the border areas of Central Africa, what is thus left of their relevance?

The purpose of the following trans-border security File is precisely to establish the factors governing the rise of cross-border insecurity in Central Africa for a better understanding of the said threats, as well as a treatment, at coupled strategic and operational plane, adequate and therefore effective. / -

¹ According to the UN classification, conventional weapons are listed under seven categories: 1) battle tanks; 2) armored combat vehicles; 3) the large caliber artillery systems; 4) combat aircrafts; 5) attack helicopters; 6) warships and 7) missiles and missile launchers.

² Rwanda was part of ECCAS until his retirement in 2008.

³ Even though the international definition of these weapons poses problems, notably due to that some powerful states do not intend to associate to these weapons, their ammunition, parts and components, the Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms of small caliber, ammunition and all parts and components that can be used for their manufacture, repair and assembly, called the Kinshasa Convention, gives one that applies to this sub-region.



AN APPRAISAL OF THE BORDER SITUATION IN CENTRAL AFRICA

Anxious to contribute in overcoming the handicap representing the imprecise nature of common borders with Member States, the General Secretariat of the ECCAS held a meeting in September 2007 in Yaoundé (Cameroon), preceded by another of experts and a ministerial conference aimed at analyzing the causes and major events of regional insecurity, before paving the way to better address them.

Considering the recommendations of the Ministers at their 13th Conference (October 2007), the Heads of State and Government instructed the General Secretariat of ECCAS to develop an action plan setting out measures to engage to pursue agreed objectives. It is on this basis that this entity has initiated the preparation of a Draft Border ECCAS (DB-ECCAS) Program. Its Main goal is to help create a climate of peace, security and stability among the Member States, as well as strengthen socio-economic integration in Central Africa. More specifically, it has to reduce significant and lasting conflicts and insecurity, which are major obstacles to cross-border cooperation and regional integration.

Two main direct results are expected notably the delimitation and demarcation of the boundaries area of the ECCAS on one hand, and the scheme and effective implementation of a framework for cooperation in the management of security zones of border member countries on the other.



Reading through the configuration of borders in Central Africa

In view of the BP-ECCAS, an inventory prepared by the General Secretariat in December 2008 on a sample of borders of member countries of ECCAS, identified a number of trends and similarities that emerge from the observation of the realities at the borders, beyond the geographical, economic and socio-political characteristics of each zone. During the meeting of experts of Member States in Libreville on 21, 22 and 23 May 2009, guidelines were adopted, amended and submitted to the 14th Conference of Heads of State and Government held in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo in June 2009.

a. Borders often poorly defined, poorly established and not-demarcated

The inviolability of borders inherited from colonization, agreed in principle by the OAU member states after independence, today raises operational questions because of the imprecise nature of border limits. These were established on geographical, topographical and sociological bases poorly controlled during the colonial era, and there have hardly undertaken clarification works, confirmation and markups on the field during the last fifty years. This imprecision is aggravated by the combined effects of climate on the topographic effects, which are rampant in the sub-region (drain in some areas, heavy rainfall, etc.). Contestation of borders plots surveys, especially in areas rich in natural resources, so many in Central Africa. In addition, in areas where border insecurity prevails, the defense and security forces elements of either side can extend their missions beyond their national borders, taking advantage of the imprecise nature of the boundary.

b. Infrastructure and border management services deficit

This deficit is reflected in:

- The lack of means for border management at the local level (very small border posts, absence of certain services (health), non-existing or outdated equipment, lack of staff etc...)
- Lack of coordination of national agencies involved in border management in each state (police, intelligence, immigration, water and forests, health, etc.).
- The lack of qualified personnel responsible for border management;
- The presence of a redundant regulation in some areas, incomplete in others, which relevance and application have not been appraised for long;
- Endemic corruption of border services;
- Lack of cross-border cooperation between homologous services, both locally and centrally.

Improving the quality of border management, (including equipment, training, structuring services), the development of synergies between the member countries and the sharing of responsibilities between central and local level, therefore is a major challenge for ECCAS.

c. The deficit in infrastructure and cross-border cooperation services

Many border areas of the ECCAS, undeniably areas of potential prosperity, could have a catalytic effect on regional economic integration. This is the case with borders located in areas of concentration of rural and urban populations such as the region of the "Three borders" Zone-Doussala (Ndendé-Gabon) and Dolisie (Congo) separated by river NGONGO or the East Zone of the DRC-Rwanda-Burundi. This is also the case where a large borders differential development at both sides can have a ripple effect on the least developed area (Garoua





Boulaï/Cameroon, R Bouar/RCA). These exchanges are eased by the ethnic, linguistic and cultural proximity of populations located for the vast majority at the internal and external borders of ECCAS. Economic and social interactions therefore develop spontaneously, based on old solidarities. Infrastructure and services enabling these trade flows to flourish and produce their development potential which are gradually emerging. If efforts are noteworthy (construction of roads and bridges, facilitation initiatives and joint management of transport and trades such as roads, markets in the area of the "Three Borders"), they remain sectorial and must be densified.

d. Endless insecurity

Insecurity is constant at the level of internal borders and, more importantly, outside of ECCAS. Multidimensional and complex, insecurity ranges from simple scraps in the region of the "Three Borders" (Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea), to the activities of known armed and organized groups (militias in eastern DRC, "highway robbers" along Chad-Cameroon-CAR rebellions in northern CAR, eastern and southern Chad border, poaching in areas of natural parks, maritime piracy and trafficking of all kinds in the Gulf of Guinea etc...). This insecurity result in violence against persons, massive and recurrent movements of refugees and displaced persons, or a significant risk of destabilization of States and their institutions. The efforts to curb insecurity at the frontiers

although certainly beneficial, they remain insufficient as compared to the magnitude of the problem. A regional strategy for long-term prevention aimed, firstly, at anticipating emerging threats and, secondly, at eradicating the founding causes of insecurity, constitute a breakthrough.

e. The challenge of natural resources located at the border areas

Natural resources of Central Africa, as well as the desires they arouse, are well known and a factor of conflict on several planes:

- The illegal exploitation of resources to finance armed groups (the case of eastern DRC);
- The risk of interstate conflicts in areas where resource deposits are located on either side of an unmarked border (petroleum Gulf of Guinea, mining areas bordering the DRC, Angola, etc.).
- Impoverishment of local populations and impoverished border areas due to misuse of resources and poor distribution of dividends obtained;
- The deterioration of the environment (illegal logging and large-scale poaching in forest areas and parks).

Concluding Remarks

The development of uncontested and pacified borders is essential to the progression of regional integration leading to the economic development of Central Africa. The ECCAS BP contributes to this goal. It is equally vital that for the member states to materialize their political will through the implementation of technical, human and financial resources and, acceptance of a greater transparency in the sharing of information on the management of border flux. In addition to the determination to assure the proper management of frontiers by ensuring their effectiveness and complementarily. In fine, an integrated border approach, seems to be the suitable means to generate the synergies indispensable for the putting in place of such policies.

Note Project border program, presented at the workshop in Libreville 21-23 May 2009;

Notes Consultant - Expert, African Group for International Studies AGIS - Yaounde (Cameroon);

Notes "DEFINITION OF BORDER", G. COSQUER - IGN France INTERNATIONAL;

NOTES REGIONAL WORKSHOP ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BORDER PROGRAM OF THE AFRICAN UNION.

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BORDER THREATS (PROSPECTIVE REVIEW)

The 3rd Gendarmerie Region covers a surface area of about 6,500 km² and has a population of nearly 7,000,000 inhabitants. It is limited to the East, by Chad and the Central African Republic and to the West, by the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The main threats identified therein revolve around rural crime (highway robbery, cattle theft and abductions of nationals); Urban crime (various violations of the Security of persons and property), and cross border crime (arms trafficking, kidnappings of foreign nationals for ransom). However, these boundaries are increasingly becoming critical areas, where the crime wave is growing exponentially, at the verge of the socio-political and security situation in neighboring countries. This is particularly the case in the East, with the instability of the Central Africa regime, and in the West, with the existence of the Boko Haram nebula. The following lines explore the spectrum of threats, as well as the measures envisaged by Defense Forces in general and, the National Gendarmerie, in particular to tackle the threats.



I- Sector by sector decryption attempt in connection to the threats found along these two borders

In accordance with the established border lines, geographical position or interstate proximity, border threats vary and manifest themselves in different prisms. In the West, arms trafficking and abduction of expatriates for the sake of ransom are essentially linked to the existence of the Boko Haram nebula. At the East, border crime, is characterized by the incursions of rebels, moved amongst

other reasons, by the struggle for survival; reckoned to be unprofessional in security matters. This is due to the instability of the CAR regime, subjected since March 2013 to an unsuccessful coup attempt after the resignation of its initiator (Michel Djotodia).

The Western Front

The border between Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria, whose mapping stems from the scramble of Africa after the Berlin Conference of 1884, reflects in terms of the common geopolitical configuration of the two states,



the same characteristics between Cameroon and Nigeria; including the northern parts occupied by populations of Sahel-Sudanese origin, Muslims in majority and the southern parts with populations of Bantu origin predominantly Christian, when they are not animists. This geographical propinquity coincides, politically with a reality of a social and institutional setting in Nigeria, loyal, de facto, to a rotation of power between the so-called Southerners (Bantu) communities and those called Northerners (Hausa) as an option of change at the helm of the state. The accession to power by Goodluck Jonathan, after succeeding "constitutionally" to OumarouYar'Adua who died in the exercise of his functions as President of the Republic, appears to be the political fracture between the North and South of the country. Indeed, some (Northerners) believe that others (Southerners) would have upset the unwritten conventions of rotation, yet applicable to the proper running of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The Boko Haram phenomenon would draw more benefits from these socio-political and institutional readings of Nigeria as a religious fundamentalism prove.

The threats identified at the west side of the 3rd GR border can be summed up in the triangular mechanism, whereby the stake are scrambled and entangled depending on whether it has to do with a seller, a buyer, an agent or a collector, to the detriment of the affirmation of the security sovereignty of Cameroon. The issue of ensuring security in this area (the area of the Far North in general, and the Logone and Chari in particular) therefore is pertinent in terms of the preservation of a part of the territory of the Republic, affected by border activities jeopardizing peace and tranquility.

The Eastern Front

The surroundings of Cameroon is a source of instability at the level of the borders. At the East side of the 3rd GR, an attempted coup having sanctioned the first months of 2013 in CAR, brought to the limelight the disorganization of the (Seleka) movement which nevertheless had, as with the wave of the hand, swept the Republican Army faithful to President François BOZIZÉ at that time.

Going from the northern border part with Chad, the entry of the rebels in the South of RCA in general, and the capital Bangui in particular, came along the way to bring (back) sociological and geographical cleavages of a RCA under "reconstruction" after years of political instability due to autocratic powers, and a myriad of military coups haven weakened the social stability of the country. In this way, the Seleka rebellion, of which the Nordic connotation is ascertained, was quickly perceived at the South side of the RCA as an identity assault bringing back the ethno-regional split that subsist between Northerners and Southerners at the backdrop of power-sharing.

After their taking of power in March 2013, the social and security situation deteriorated rapidly due to the lack of professionalism of the Seleka elements, lack of control, and most importantly, the economic situation of the country. In fact, the latter, having been unable to adapt to the change, gave a free room to all types of assaults, extortion and dispossession of goods perpetrated by the members of the rebellion. In the context of this generalized disorder, in which the people of the South had felt as being



taken apart by the Northerners, is included the devoted attitude of the overthrown former President's partisans (anti-Balaka) camped in remote areas, trying to reorganize to face the rebels from the north. Such a configuration of prolemogemous factors (clashes between ethnic groups at the backdrop of religious linen), the act of renunciation of the supreme power by the initiator of the coup, the establishment of an International Force to carry on the disarmament of militia, was likely to envisage incursions along the Cameroonian border. This, under the circumstances of the right to shelter, but also, due to the strategic retreat of combatants in search of landmark, or daily food.

Threats to the eastern border depend therefore on the capacity of the Cameroonian Defense and security Forces to contain both the influx of people fleeing the violence, as combatants and ex-combatants seeking benchmarks, mite, or seeking reorganization. Thus, thousands of people who rushed towards the eastern border pose a potential



threat to both national security (because not recognizing each other well, despite the presence of UNHCR) and overall stability of the host regions which might have to deal with potential riots from the same refugee camps. Meanwhile, armed men could be infiltrated from the RCA through criminal networks that already exist in the areas of Mayo-Rey (Toubo), new affiliates crime can undermine people and their goods moreover.

II - On the measures to curb the threats

In such a context, the Defense and Security Forces should adopt a permanent proactive posture.

The Western Front

The harm and its sources already known, the Boko Haram phenomenon, although recognized as not being "Cameroonian" as such, deserves at least to be "tackled" somehow if we want to preserve the territorial integrity and security of Cameroon. Boko Haram, whatever its ambitions (political or religious) remains, in our view, a terrorist organization that uses crime in all its forms to exist, survive and exert more violence. Cameroon, which has often expressed its solidarity to the Nigerian Federal Government, cannot serve as a base to back up an organization that calls into questioning the fundamental principles of the rule of law. It was so during the war of secession of Biafra (1967-1970) during which Cameroon was in favor of a strong and united Nigerian Federal Government, against any division.

Fighting Boko Haram in Cameroon is therefore, not systematically tracking down as an exercise within the right of prosecution of persons suspected to belong to this nebula, but rather circumventing the transit area of armaments, putting up actions to detect all networks enabling or facilitating the passage of weapons and ammunition to Nigeria. This obviously requires the intensification, of the prospective and operational intelligence, controls along the borders, the densification of the Armed Forces and Police in the region in general, in view of harassing to dissuade or denounce those

which might risk taking part in the business of arms trafficking. Similarly, one could envisage a better protection of foreign nationals identified in the area, as it is established that the abduction of even an expatriate is a considerable financial war treasure for "enemies" who will in turn have the means to shake up the security system in place, and to relativize the effectiveness of some of its components.

The current approach seems to fit into this logic, with the creation of new units in the Army, the Gendarmerie and the National Police. It is the same in terms of human resources, which it is hoped that the recruitment recently launched in the ranks of both regular and Special Forces, will permit to reinforce the components.

The Eastern Front

Because of the presence at the border of Cameroon of CAR armed men in quest for means of survival, the threats can be more pernicious at the east. More increased Military and Police vigilance is necessary. The latter deserves to be much more than doubled as the synergy between Police Forces and the populations remains weak. Again additional military and police presence is necessary not only to control most of the border by deterring the hot heads, but also by framing the UNHCR officials in the management of refugees gathered in improvised camps.

Conclusion

The western and eastern borders of our area of command are subject to threats which have to do with arms trafficking and abduction of expatriates for ransom and, with the West and Central African rebel incursions (Seleka and anti-Balaka) to the east. To these threats which are global nowadays, one can add the influx of refugees that are sources of instability and the new arms trafficking network caused by the deterioration of security in CAR. Faced with these threats, the general watchword seems to be summed up in alertness (greater territorial control military and Police) and densification of the intelligence apparatus to detect all networks of various trades. Only these measures can guarantee efficiency, if they are implemented and could permit a more autonomous control of our borders. /

Colonel ESSOH Jules César
Commander of the 3rd Gendarmerie of the North
Region,



MILITARY APPROACH TO THE PROTECTION OF BORDERS

In a context marked by the emergence of global risks and threats, governments require a higher level of security at their borders to safeguard internal security. The expansion of security ideology due to the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States of America (USA) has since led to a more pronounced use of the national military for surveillance and protection of terrestrial, maritime and air boundaries; most often for the purpose of dissuasion against a beam of threats perceived as omnipresent and changeable. The Vigipirate France Plan and the USA Patriot Act are just manifestations of the safe reflex, which resulted in the creation of real ensuing military fronts at the borders. Subject to restrictive cost, arms and security industries accompanied States in this trend by offering hand-key technology solutions for the monitoring and detection of threats close to the borders. From one continent to another, this can be explained by the need to counter the rise or the appearance of various cross-border threats. Subsidiary in the past, military intervention in the monitoring and securing the boundaries of the territorial space of the state is, as written by Mialisoa Randriamampianina, "a recent panel becoming a priority in the policy of Defense and Security because of the scale of some dangers that are ever-present as nuclear threat and terrorism". In such a context, it is not quite an exaggeration to consider the advent of a "border army". Moreover, when the very notion of borders seems undermined by the triumphant forces of globalization, regionalization, cybernetics space and the propensity of certain powers in violation of the principles of external intervention enacted by the International Law, it is useful to reflect on the real or virtual boundaries of states and the adequacy of strategies and the means of Armies. This, in the framework of control and effective protection of areas of sovereignty whose boundaries seem increasingly shifting or uncertain.

What are the new faces of border threats that justify the use of military protection mechanisms of land, sea and air borders? What still, are the theoretical and empirical issues rose by the military approach to border security? Thorough analysis state that, borders constitute a new kind of front which at varying levels use military detection mechanisms adapted to terrestrial, sea or air origin of ever-changing threats.



I. Origins of military deterrence

The multiplication and diversification of border threats have close ties with the increased migration flows generated by globalization, unequal distribution of wealth, ideological and cultural clashes and the advent of new information technologies and communication (NTIC). International terrorism, trafficking (drugs, arms, human beings, smuggling), poaching and maritime piracy are some of the new forms of border insecurity in the 21st century. These phenomena are very often the result of an association of individuals or groups motivated by the perspective of an enrichment, political claims (armed rebellions, secessionist movements) or religious beliefs (fundamental sects).

The raison d'être for the recourse to the army to face these threats lies first and foremost in the terror and the destabilization potential suggested by the organization, resources and procedures, now used by the actors of transnational insecurity. These actors do not only have sophisticated arsenals that rival with those of the armies, but it is not uncommon that the first challenge the responsiveness of the second, launching military offensives in a more extensive approach or least asymmetric.

Thus in 2012, the State of Cameroon has had to resolve to permanently mobilize a national Special Army Forces unit to defeat a network of heavily armed poachers. From Sudan, this criminal gang conducted assaults in the BOUBA NDJIDA reserve for many days in the north of the country, killing a hundred of elephants and taking their tusks. Similarly, in order to meet the ambitions of incursions or destabilization of established gangs in neighboring countries, many States generally deploy troops at the border.

In such circumstances, military intervention is justified both by the need to prevent or eliminate a threat, but also by the need to reassure people from the grip of fear about a real or imminent danger. The use of men dressed in military outfit can be seen here as both a psychological, technology and tactical mechanics to respond to the magnitude and nature of the risk.



II. Mechanisms of border protection by the army

Military protection of land borders combines human resources, techniques and tactics in order to prevent any intrusion or affect the integrity of the national territory by land. At the human level, the elements assigned to this mission are usually from the Army, Gendarmerie or any specialized unit of the army. The most common method is the introduction of screening points (checkpoints) along the land borders. These compulsory waypoints offer the advantage of combining the use of a physical barrier with the presence of the military in order to allow a systematic control. But the presence of checkpoints is inherently limited in space and their avoidance is the goal that every entrepreneur of border insecurity does.

Based on the means and security designs specific to each state, this classic device is often completed by the building of a set of artificial barriers (barbed wire, walls, trenches, electric fences, etc..) at the border line, the arrangement of natural barriers (rivers, hollow or mountainous terrain, etc..), the use of electronic surveillance (cameras day and night vision, occupancy sensors, acoustic sensors, drones, etc..) or deployment of patrols or helicopter. Certainly, the use of technological solutions helps to optimize the surveillance of land borders with regard to opportunities. But the combination of this device with the presence of men in military uniforms has the advantage of ubiquity and mark the territorial sovereignty of the state for the purpose of deterring any attempt from hostile external origin.

Anyway, securing land borders of states by military means has its limits. Indeed, despite the importance of technological and human resources deployed by the U.S. military, the US-Mexico border (about 3200 km), is the one that knows more passes and attempted crossings.

Military protection of maritime and river borders

is a task assigned to the Navy. It covers the surveillance of territorial waters (12 nautical miles from the coast) and maritime or inland ports. The objective here is to ensure the presence of the state at sea, to enforce its sovereignty in the maritime and fluvial space and defend the territory against any threat from water. To varying degrees, the immigration control, control of illicit maritime traffic and preventing armed attacks from water are among the main challenges of national Marines today. Depending on the resources available to each state, the

monitoring of the water includes checkpoints (checkpoints) at ports and docks, maritime patrols (frigates, ships, submarines, etc.) and detection instruments (radars, sonars, etc...). The coverage of the navigable space is made on the basis of a preset surveillance zones and a rational programming of the Navy.

When piracy is rampant on the African coast and threatens the stability of North-South trade, it is clear that some Marines of African countries are struggling to cope with this new challenge due to the obsolescence of their equipment, the obsolescence of their legal framework for intervention and the low inter-state cooperation. However, in this context, the mission of securing the maritime space should include mutatis mutandis the detection and prevention of threats to national and international interests in transit through the territorial waters as offshore.

Given the numerous challenges (economic, commercial, political, ecological, cultural) inherent to maritime safety, the need to strengthen protection missions entrusted to national Marines should be accompanied by an enrichment of their strategies and operational resources, but also a further cooperation between states in sub-regional, continental and international levels.

Military protection of air space is in turn linked to the traditional concept of air defense, that is to say, the need to respect the sovereignty of States in the national airspace and to defend the territory against any air threat. Statutory mission of the Air Force, protecting the airspace takes shape in the deployment of a device consisting of men, instruments and flying military aircraft (fighters, specialized helicopters, drones etc..), whose mission is to roam and watch the sky in order to deter any external or internal attack and ensure aviation security.

The attacks of September 11, 2001 was made possible by the hijacking of civilian aircraft, and then used as weapons of mass destruction. We are witnessing a worldwide extension of the missions of the Military air force, in addition to the traditional air defense (to counter any external attacks), now include aviation security (ability to prevent and respond to any hazardous event occurring in flight). In France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and the United States of America, the possibilities of intervention of the Air Force are no longer limited to aircraft for a military threat, but are extended to all aircraft using the national airspace. Furthermore, for general safety requirements, government authorities have also created restricted or prohibited airspace in order to protect at all times and in all circumstances or temporarily some sensitive sites (nuclear power plants, defense installations, cities major).



Conclusion

Whether to protect land, sea and air borders, the complexity of the task requires varying degrees of military expertise. Symbolic demarcation zone of transfer and transgression whose safety is the concern of states, the border now poses the question of delimitation and demarcation, real or perceived in a global context marked by border disputes, territorial interference, constant redefined geostrategic space and virtualization of territories. This questioning of the classical notion of border is not unconnected to the advent of a "military border" concept designating this new power of the military to embody and transcend conventional boundaries of sovereignty state; sometimes according to his power, sometimes at the discretion of the importance of specific missions that commissioned advocacy, citizens and the territory of the country. The recent deployment of foreign troops in the Central African Republic to evacuate their nationals illustrates the projection capability beyond the national territory, often in violation of the principles of international law. Obviously, protection of borders by the armed forces gain legitimacy since it takes into account the rule of international law, the perception of its opportunity by the people who are the intended beneficiaries, and especially the human where the least is the freedom of movement goods and people. Moreover, the effectiveness of military action on the forehead operation depends fundamentally on the role of intelligence and the implementation of a multidimensional good faith cooperation between neighboring states. Indeed, a strap against external threats is for neighboring States is to know and anticipate each other reciprocal venoms that poison their harmonious cohabitation.



Colonel AWOA Nicodème
and Freddy MONNEYANG

SAFE APPROACH TO BORDER PROTECTION IN CENTRAL AFRICA

On February 19 2013, the town of Dabanga, located at the border between Cameroon and Nigeria, witnessed the shocking rapt of the Moulin Fournier family by fellows who claim a posteriori to belong to the Boko Haram sect. The same scenario was repeated in the trend of Father VANDENBEUSH in November 14, 2013 in the Far North. During the same year, in TOKCTOYO, a Cameroonian town located at the border with the Central African Republic, a superintendent of Police NGANDO NDALLE was killed in cold blood by suspected CAR gunmen, whose irruptions into Cameroonian territory was in violation of the borders laws. Similarly, the exclusive economic zone and territorial waters of Cameroon within the framework of the MONTEGO BAY 1982 Convention Law of the Sea became the laboratory of piracy and maritime crime in cross-border approaches. Also, intermittent closure of the Cameroon Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, CAR borders, which is motivated by abuses and other trades that have been ongoing eloquently illustrates the complexities of securing borders, be it spatial, sea or land!

Yet it is difficult to live in isolation that is to say, in a state of complete closure of borders. We can no longer live alone in "preservation of self" as CHEIKH AMIDOU KANE considers it in his "Adventure Ambigüe" In any case, it inevitably raises the question of whether Central Africa, under the security decay of its borders, do not undergo the boomerang effect of a free yet still embryonic circulation. In other words, are there strategies to secure borders in Central Africa? Strategies if there are, are they effective? What are they? What about the future of borders?



Foundations of the security crisis along the border lines

Ideological and cultural foundations

- Globalization postulates the suppression of barriers, the opening up of spaces, interculturality and interdependence. These are values that exacerbate porous borders. This is the meaning of the concept of "global village" developed by Marshall McLuhan. This is more a clash of civilizations in that it amplifies migration. There are imports and export crops background competition lifestyles;
- The legendary "Bantu" hospitality feeds the permeability of borders, and when these spaces are interspersed with gaps, insecurity builds his bed.

The natural foundations

- The isolation of some countries (Chad, CAR) can trigger migration and weaken borders. Countries of the African hinterland are naturally inclined towards states with a coastline and usually have cultural and identity trajectories contrary to those of the host or transit territories. These hinterland countries generally have the routine and habit of war, anything conducive to the outbreak of hostilities at the slightest adversity border;
- The desertification of certain areas can also cause transhumance and movement of populations to countries with more welcoming climate;
- The search for natural resources also appears as a potentially polemogeneous factor.

Strategic foundations

The belligerence and soaring of refugees: Conflict-armed, regardless of their territorial expression spectrum, have a high propensity to transnationalization. The exodus of refugees being a tangible prove. In fact, the avalanche of refugees at the borders makes them to be a privileged citadel of insecurity. And in this case, Cameroon hosts refugees and asylum seekers from neighboring countries, including CAR, Nigeria and Chad. The Cameroon of today offers hospitality to more than 100,000 people within the jurisdiction of the Office of the United Nations for Refugees (UNHCR). Thousands of others are in families.

The principle of free movement and its boomerang effect: Increasingly, the notion of free movement becomes less a Community principle than a subterfuge which relies on people wanting to cross borders for purposes which, after a close look, are derogatory to the security standards. Moreover, many expatriates do not hesitate to fraudulently acquire Malian nationality to have "carte blanche" or free access immigration to Cameroon. Knowing that it is expressly provided in Article 3 of the cameroono-malian² 1964 Convention on the free movement that "... any national of a Contracting Party may freely enter the territory of the other State, including travel, establish a residence there in their choice, and exit without being subject to any visa or residence permit ... ". The daily practice of immigrants reveals the instrumentalization of this ambitious and unifying framework. In all this normative system, the free flow of human causes tides at borders and is likely to generate difficult cohabitation and forceful infiltration. Recorded incidents at the border that Cameroon shares with Chad, Gabon, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea is eloquent of this, therefore justifying the unintentional expulsion at either side of such boundaries.

The instability in neighboring countries diffuses into the sub-region and weakens the state borders. In the northern part of Cameroon, the border is the preferred breeding ground for the Islamic Boko Haram sect. In the East of the country, "Antibalaka" and "ex Seleka" flood the border with security threats. The insecurity in Chad resulted in that which prevails in CAR. Similarly, instability in Rwanda has influenced that of the Democratic Republic of Congo through their borders.



Factors relating to the unmarked and imprecise boundaries: the ambiguous nature of the borders amplifies the difficulty to control and secure them. The border area shared by Cameroon and Nigeria in Mamfe or Amchide for example, has no tangible benchmarks and, mutatis mutandis, fall prey to expatriates. Controlling the coast is still difficult, maritime spaces a challenge. In the half of the last decade, the coasts of some Central African countries have been the scene of several hijacking of hostages for ransom sake.

Global warming also tends to remove some natural limitations, making it unlikely securing territorial boundaries.

The economic argument relating to the search of resources: The boundaries are violated for profit and mercantilist goals. The practice of smuggling has much to do in the instability of orders in Central Africa. Borders are places of trade. For proof, just go to Fotokol, Kye-Ossi, AbangMinko'o etc.. As an illustration, some immigrants flock to the east of Cameroon because of mineral resources therein, (gold, diamond etc..), Even in violation of borders lines.

Sociological and identity issues

Several major ethnic groups are established in more than one country at a time or on both sides of the border, anything likely to promote human trafficking and migration in the sub-region. The MBAYA for example are present in both CAR and eastern Cameroon. The "Banyamulenge" are both in Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC. The "Hausa" and Kanuri are present in Nigeria and Cameroon's northern border. These large tribes have the habit of cohabitation and are expected to move for family visits, including violation of the Boundary.

The institutional and organizational argument

Human, material, logistic and structural means are deficient at the borders. The enrolment in terms of the armed forces, are ridiculous, even infinitesimal, whether at the level of National Security, Gendarmerie, or defense Forces. Consequently, it becomes very difficult to pacify the borders amidst glaring lack of defense staff. Beyond the very limited number of control units, it should be noted, with regret, that apparatus for the detection and monitoring are archaic and therefore contradictory with modern methods; despite efforts by the Powers that be. Weapons that are used to protect the borders are not only anachronistic and antediluvian, but mostly ineffective and inappropriate to threats that are usually large enormous. To this can be added the lack

of probity and specialized training of actors to secure borders, with people cultivating the love of lucre and the frantic search for money. However, some palliative measures do exist to deal with the dissemination of 'border insecurity in Central Africa.

The foundation of the security crisis at the borders

Mechanisms of border security can be envisaged across Central Africa in terms of bipolarity because they incorporate endogenous and exogenous approach dynamics.

Endogenous dynamics

It is supported by a set of national instances having a mandate to serve, individually or subsidiary, in the security of borders. The Cameroon mechanism, which is interesting in several respects, includes:

- **National Security** with territorial divisions that are Frontier Posts, Police Units in charge of Emi-immigration, Police Units for Airports, Ports, the Special Police Units in charge of Intelligence, Territorial Surveillance Antennas and Public Security Units, found at the borders (Decree No 2012/540 of 19 November 2012 organizing the General Delegation for National Security);
- **National Gendarmerie** and its territorial components (Decree n° 2001/181 of 25 July 2001 organizing the National Gendarmerie);
- **Army** in its air, sea, land components;
- **General Directorate of External Research** and its decentralized antennas;
- **The Rapid Intervention Battalion**;
- **Cameroon Customs and its territorial divisions** (CEMAC Customs Code No. 5/001-UEAC-097-CM of 03/08/2001);
- **National Boundary Commission of Cameroon** established by Decree No. 85/305 of 7 March 1985, restructured by Decree No. 2001/208 of 27 July 2001 bearing the reorganization of the National Boundary Commission;

Exogenous dynamics

This involves measures taken at sub-regional, continental and international levels.

INTERPOL

On November 12, 2013, an agreement falling within the dynamics of promotion and border security in Central Africa was signed between INTERPOL and CEMAC. This normative material, which provides open



access to INTERPOL tools and services to six key border Central African countries signatories of a treaty, was jointly signed by the President of CEMAC Pierre Moussa, and the Secretary General of Interpol, Ronald K. Noble. This agreement is intended to connect 40 CEMAC crossings to I-24/7 INTERPOL's secured Police communications network.

THE COPAX

Created by the Protocol of 24 February 2000 and came into force in January 2004, the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa not only has to elaborate and implement the relevant provisions relating to non-aggression and mutual assistance in matters of Defense but more, to be involved in tackling of the security crisis at the borders.

THE FOMAC, is a subset of COPAX, it is actually the technical body.

What prospects to consider?

Optimization strategies for border protection must follow all guidelines. From the National Security point of view, it would:

- revise upward the number of units existing at the border;
- equip the units in sophisticated detection equipment, false documents, drugs or weapons;
- extend biometrics at border crossings;
- equip units with modern and heavy weapons to counter any possible threats;
- specialize officials called to serve in these areas;
- create operational units likely to respond to possible attacks or armed aggression;
- multiply intelligence which will work both in peacetime and in times of crisis;
- prescribe honesty and loyalty to officials who will servethere;
- regroup some units and Services to curve harassment;

- be in a state of constant vigilance;
- multiply motorized and foot patrols along the borders.

Strategically, it is necessary and urgent :

- strengthen collaboration between all agencies involved in intelligence gathering;
- avoid the pursuit of "stardom" between the services concerned;
- develop cohesion in action by involving local communities and traditional authorities in the pursuit of operational intelligence;
- strive for materialization and delimitation of borders with Chad, CAR and Equatorial Guinea;
- strengthening by training and adapting equipment and means of Defense Forces installed at the level of our borders;
- reawakening the National Boundary Commission reorganized in 2001 but which has existed since 1985;
- modernize conventional control systems and monitoring;
- extend video surveillance systems at borders.

It is clear from the discussion that has been conducted that the safe atmosphere at the boundaries of the sub-region is a major preoccupation. A host of factors has fueled this chaotic atmosphere. Also, the permanence of conflicts in this part of the Gulf of Guinea makes it unlikely unstable. Yet, it is undeniable that the protective mechanisms at such boundaries though inadequate as they can be, are set up with, following observation, the security deployment of Forces of law and order, the Defense Forces and all other services involved in this process. In addition, it is beyond dispute that border security is a crucial issue for peace in the sub-region, and consequently, for economic development. It would be unrealistic to consider development without the prior sine qua non peace and security. It is therefore the duty of the States concerned to optimize, in the direction of modernization, their normative, strategic and operational arrangements for securing borders. Otherwise, Central Africa could plunge in a kind of "wild society" fully described by Thomas Hobbes in his "**Leviathan**", or in the temptation to return to absolute sovereignty. / -



Dr Jean Louis MESSING
chief superintendent
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BOKO HARAM: AUTOPSY OF A TERRORIST THREAT AT A TRANS-REGIONAL SCOPE

For about five years, events in Nigeria have been marked by armed attacks and bombings, which gave this country, the image of an "African Afghanistan." These acts are essentially the result of a criminal group, Boko Haram, shortlisted by the U.S. State Department as one of the most feared terrorist organizations. If an exact summary of loss of life and damage caused by this sect is difficult to establish today, it seems necessary to mention some acts attributed to this cult listed, notably the attack against the UN headquarters in Abuja in August 2011, the removal of some 223 high school students¹ in April 2014 in northern Nigeria, as well as successive abductions of the Moulin FOURNIER family in February 2013, three religious personnel and ten Chinese in May 2014 in the Far North of Cameroon. Against the resistance of this organization towards the Nigerian army strong as the case can be, and considering its extension to neighboring countries of Nigeria, the Heads of State of Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria, Benin and Niger met at the Elysee Palace on May 17, 2014, in the presence of representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and the United Nations. After the meeting, those present decided to combine their efforts to combat and officially declare war against the faction. This approach raises questions about the level at which the Boko Haram threat is at affecting Nigerian neighboring countries like Cameroon. What is the available literature on this organization? Can we strategically circumscribe it? These are the main elements of the problem that structures this reflection, itself, elaborates that a good knowledge of the Boko Haram threat is vital to the conception and implementation of appropriate and effective measures for long term control.



¹ It should be noted that on May 24, 2014, the media reported that the number of women and young girls abducted in northern Nigeria since April 2014 increased to more than 300. This information is not refutable, insofar as some places in this part of Nigeria seem to be under the control of the Islamist sect.



Genealogy of the Boko Haram threat

Even though several countries are at war against Boko Haram today, the level of knowledge about the sect remains insufficient. This is visible even in Nigeria where the group has emerged, blurring the lines of an effective strategy.

Boko Haram was born in 1995 in northern Nigeria, in an environment marked by a strong dominance of Islam as a religion and lifestyle. It seems necessary to recall that this region has seen in the past, two jihadist movements and sermons, which will later form the base of its socio cultural and historical root. It is first of all, the Jihad of Ousman Dan Fodio launched in 1802, and whose conquest dominated the three present regions of Cameroon and northern Nigeria. Later, a similar movement was born in 1980, under the leadership of Alhaji Marwa Mutatsine. Baptized Mutatsine, this movement carried out attacks against any one whose behavior was against the requirements of the Koran. Traces of its last expansion date as far back as 1983. This movement influenced the population to the level enabling the emergence of another group called "Shabab Muslim Youth Organization" in 1995 which was transformed to become Boko Haram. Until 1999, the Group remained silent. It will later be strengthened after the takeover of its helm by Mohammed Yusuf, whose role was very important in the radical change of the group and its opening to other terrorist networks².

Yusuf Mohammed was not well educated³. He abandoned his studies at the secondary level, preferring, as in most Nigerian families to follow the Quran

teachings in harsh conditions. He adopted a radical vision of Islam after his stay in Niger and Chad. Establish in Maiduguri in 2001, he created a group named after him Yusufiyya, whose members were carrying out targeted attacks. It is more precisely in 2002 that a Committee of Sheikhs (Muslim clerics) appointed Mohammed Yusuf cult leader who would later on name the sect Boko Haram. His basic idea was not to believe in Western scientific theories. He refused to believe that "the earth is round" and that rain is the result of water evaporation, paradoxically he could not deprive himself of the luxuries of Western technology⁴. In 2004, the sect established a base in a village in northern Nigeria. This base was willfully baptized, "Afghanistan". In the same vein, in 2008, a group of school youths, claiming publicly it belong to Boko Haram launched terrorist attacks saying they are "Taliban". After the death of Mohammed Yusuf in 2009, he was replaced by the number two of the sect, Mohammed Shekau. He continued to lead the group with the scale we know today.

Literally, the word Boko is a distortion of the word Book, used here for education, but also for the Western culture. Haram in turn means, in the jargon of Islam, that which is illegal or prohibited. The conjunction of these two words in turn means "Western culture is unlawful". The basic idea is that we should banish all that is vector of Western culture. However, the name that the group rather prefers it be called is Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'a wati wal-jihad, that is to say, people committed to the propagation of the teachings of the Prophet (Muhammad) and Jihad⁵. It seems to better reflect the philosophy highlighted by the latter. Indeed, the Group

² Al Ajayi, "Boko Haram and Terrorism in Nigeria: Exploratory and Explanatory Notes" Global Advanced Research Journal of History, Political Science and International Relations, Vol.1 (5), p. 103-107, July 2012.

³ About the personality of Mohammed Yusuf, read Abeed Salaam, "the Psychological Make-up of Muhammad Yusuf" Boko Haram: Anatomy of Crisis, e-International Relations, Bristol, October 2013, pp.46-52

⁴ Freedom C. Onuoha, "Boko Haram, Nigeria's Extremist Islamic Sect" Al Jazeera Center for Studies, February 29, 2012.

⁵ A. I. Ajayi, Op cit.



intends to replace the modern state with a traditional Islamic state⁶ in which Sharia will be the Law in force. That notwithstanding such an Islamic philosophy, it should be noted that geopolitical reasons largely explain the emergence of the Islamic sect in northern Nigeria, including marginalization and poverty, sources of deep hatred against the West⁷.

Nebulous terrorist cross-border connections

Apart from the estimated 500,000 members recruited mainly in Quranic schools, the followers of Boko Haram are difficult to identify and of diverse backgrounds. This real but nebula existence is characteristic of the original Boko Haram home base (Nigeria) where leaders are nevertheless known, and constitute one of the forces conduct the attacks, including those in Cameroon.

In January 2013 Abu Mohammed Ibn Abdul Azeez considered by the Nigerian Government as one of the leaders of Boko Haram declared a cease-fire on behalf of the sect, on the basis that negotiations have been concluded with the Nigerian Government.

Immediately Aboubakar Shekau, the genuine leader of Boko Haram, disassociated himself from this statement, emphasizing to his followers that Abu Mohammed was an impostor. A few weeks later, deadly attacks rocked several Nigerian cities, evidence that Boko Haram had no link with the latter. This demonstrates both the lack of knowledge on Boko Haram⁸ on the part of the Nigerian

authorities, but also gives the impression of a political bargain.

In a bid to explain the evolution of this sect, without providing compelling evidence, some have speculated on links that exist between Boko Haram and political elites in northern Nigeria. The explanation would be the failure by President Goodluck Jonathan to respect the pact of rotation between the Muslim of the north and the Christian of south at the top of the state. Some political leaders think deliberately that Muslim political elites of the North are behind Boko Haram in a bid to set chaos in push President Goodluck Jonathan out of power. Meanwhile, most

personalities in northern Nigeria deem inappropriate the military-centered struggle fight against Boko Haram implemented by the Government as strategy. They believe that this sect is supported by Southern elites, with the objective of militarily attack the northern states and silence the entire Northern Nigeria⁹. This testifies the fact that Boko Haram is difficult to circumscribe by the Government.

In addition, Boko Haram is believed to have strong connections with other Islamist groups and would have members in many countries including Cameroon, with real nuisance capacity. In 2004, Mohammed Yusuf established links between his group and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (SGPC) in Algeria, which later on became ALQAEDA of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), notably in terms of training of its members in combat and in the use of explosives. It was also revealed that forty million Naira were transferred to the accounts of Boko Haram, from Algeria¹⁰. To this sum must be added nearly 500,000 Naira per day collected by the organization as contribution of its members¹¹. This gives them significant resources, reinforced by recurrent abductions ransoms.

Also, experts fear an expansion of Boko Haram throughout the Lake Chad Basin, in terms of recruitment process. Indeed, one of the factors in this expansion could be the link between its leaders and religious leaders of the countries in which they had Koranic studies. Mohammed Yusuf for example, could have had connections with Chad and Niger.

From the above statements, Boko Haram is a real threat to all the countries neighboring Nigeria. Difficult to identify

⁶ Ali S. Yusufu Bagaji, Shaibu Etala Moses, Elijah E. Ogbadu and Jafa'aru Garba Sule "Boko Haram and the Recurring Bomb Attacks in Nigeria: Attempt to impose Religious Ideology through Terrorism" Cross-cultural Communication, Vol. 8, No1, 2012, p. 33-41.

⁷ Jean Ziegler partly explains the violence in Nigeria by poverty, with a large population living in poverty alongside elite minority

who monopolized the oil revenue. Read about it, Jean Ziegler, the hatred of the West, Paris, Albin Michel, 2008.

⁸ Hakeem Onapajo "Why Nigeria is Not Winning the Anti-Boko Haram War" Boko Haram: Anatomy of Crisis, e-International Relations, Bristol, October 2013, pp.53-59.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ A. I. Ajayi, op.cit.

¹¹ Judeo for Adibe, Boko Haram "What do we Really Know about Boko Haram?" Anatomy of Crisis, e-International Relations, Bristol, October 2013, pp.09-15.

despite an attempt to sketch the robotic portrait of its members¹², they could have infiltrated the state apparatus. Of all the countries neighboring Nigeria, Cameroon is one of the most exposed to the Boko Haram threat.

A serious threat to Cameroon

Its close links with the socio-historical Nigeria, the porosity of its borders coupled with the existence of an agreement on free movement applied by the two countries, expose Cameroon to the Boko Haram threat. In Nigeria, the organization emerged from a historical context marked by jihad. In all religious movements born in Nigeria, it should be noted that the northern part of Cameroon was systematically integrated into the strategy of the different actors. Thus, the Islamization of this part of the country has been a fundamental argument used by Ousman Dan Fodio, as well as Alhadji Marwahad with his pine for the present day Far North of Cameroon¹³.

Moreover, Boko Haram recruits in Koranic schools whose rules submit learners to endurance in the face of poverty. These schools, for those based in Nigeria, also recruit students from neighboring countries, including Niger, Benin and Cameroon¹⁴. Although such Koranic schools do not exist in large numbers in Cameroon, they spread via the former trainees who were educated in Nigeria, some of which have taken part in the door to door practice of seeking the assistance from the population. These potential followers form the basis of the intelligence system of Boko Haram. The Reflection which arose from the attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram in Cameroon is tantamount to her ability to mobilize a large number of heavily armed and trained fighters and trained combat on techniques. Obviously, most of these fighters would be temporal in Cameroon. They might even be Cameroonians, or foreigners in possession of identity documents issued by Cameroonian authorities, in defiance of regulations.

In addition, ethno cultural similarities are a source of confusion between Cameroonians and Nigerians in border areas. Cameroonian families were separated by artificial borders inherited from colonization. In this sense, they would then have all the facilities to operate regardless of border barriers. This may explain the perfect mastery by Boko Haram of the geography (landscape) of



Cameroon that its members exploit at their wish. It is noteworthy to stress on the withdrawal of the State, during discussions on the demarcation of the Cameroon-Nigeria border, particularly along the Darack area. In this context, the go zone that Boko Haram has carved in Nigeria in which the control of the Federal Government is almost non-existent could extend to border communities in Cameroon.

Moreover, in terms of hypothesis, the relevance of the Boko Haram threat in Cameroon goes beyond the recruitment of local populations, and highlights the involvement of certain elites of the North. The questions raised on why some abductions were not claimed by Boko Haram although attributed to them contains some pertinence and, could implicitly raised an alarm on the existence of a Cameroonian Boko Haram subsidiary, who choose ransom as a source of funding. Thus, it reflects the intention exhibited by Islamist organizations, to recruit on an ideological basis before establishing strong connections.

In short, the war launched against Boko Haram is in response to the evolution of this terrorist group. However, for Cameroon to maximize the destruction of this criminal group, it seems necessary, beyond the military option, to adopt an integrated approach that brings the local populations in close collaboration with the Government...



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¹² Some authors believe that the followers of Boko Haram wear long beards and red or black sails. Freedom C. Onuoha, Op cit.

¹³ Sean M. Gourley, "Linkages and AI between Boko Haram QAE Da: A Potential Deadly Synergy" Global Security Studies, Summer 2012; Vol.3, No.3.

¹⁴ Freedom C. Onuoha, op. cit.

THE PROBLEM OF THE PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)¹ are considered for over a decade, as a threat to peace and international security because of their uncontrolled proliferation² and misuse in the world. They are included as the eighth category of conventional weapons listed in the Register of Conventional Arms of the United Nations in favor of the adoption on April 2, 2013, of the Treaty on the Arms Trade (TAT) by the UN General Assembly. Easy to use, low cost, these arms are very available nowadays and are considered to be among the main threat to human security in Central Africa³. What are the manifestations of this threat and how to deal with? This is the question that the subsequent developments would attempt to answer.

General characteristics of the proliferation of SALW in Central Africa

By its cross-border nature and because of porous borders, the proliferation of SALW in Central Africa undermines peace and security of the states of the sub-region. Indeed, of the 875 million SALW in circulation in the world, 650

million of which is held by civilians (approximately 75% of the known total)⁴ near 5 to 6% of this deadly arsenal would be in Central Africa⁵. Moreover in the world scale, uncontrolled movement and abusive use of SALW cause at least 500,000⁶ deaths per year. However, in the Democratic Republic of Congo alone, between 1990 and 2004, SALW have killed more than 3.5 million people⁷, that is to say,

¹ 38 UNREC 2011: the Kinshasa Convention, Article 2.a. United Nations Publication p.1. "Any portable deadly weapon (individually or collectively) propelled, launching a projectile, a bullet or a shot by the action of an explosive or is designed to expel or may be readily transported for that end, excluding ancient arms of small caliber or their replicas ... (these) do not include in any case, those manufactured after 1899.

² Proliferation here, in the first place, refers to excessive growth of firearms by volume or mass, and quality or kind. In this case, we are talking about horizontal proliferation. Moreover,

proliferation also means the indiscriminate increase in number of actors (state or non-state) holding gun. In this case, we talk of vertical proliferation.

³ UNREC 2011: Kinshasa Convention, Article 2.Q. United Nations publication, p.3 This is the geographic area covering all 11 Member States of the Standing Advisory Committee of the United Nations in charge of security issues in Central Africa: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Chad.

⁴ Small Arms Survey 2007, p.39

⁵ Owona Alima (Kizito Marie) 2007: The proliferation and illicit circulation of SALW in Central Africa: a study of the phenomenon and critical analysis of control mechanisms, University of Yaoundé 2, p.8

⁶ Beullac Lazarus and Krempel, Jörg. 2006: Small Arms: syndrome of a world in crisis, Paris, L'Harmattan, p.4

⁷ Dramane Bouko (Chabi): The circulation of SALW in West Africa: contribution to a study in disarmament, University of Abomey-calavi, p.3, www.memoireonline.com



between rebellions movements and international firearms traffickers. In sum, the main feature of the proliferation of SALW in Central Africa is that it is largely coming from the numerous armed conflicts witnessed by the sub-region, on the one hand, and the inability of states to introduce good practices to control transfers of firearms, management and security of stockpiles on the other. In Central Africa and around the world, the proliferation of SALW prolongs fighting and intensifies armed violence delaying the socio-economic and political development of states. The harmful presence of these deadly weapons create a real vicious circle where insecurity increases the demand, and where the supply of SALW creates more insecurity reciprocally with priceless costs in human lives.

Impacts of the proliferation of SALW in the development of Central African States.

Proliferation of SALW has many adverse effects on the development of Central African States. As an example and at a strictly political and institutional level, the proliferation of SALW essentially cost the embrittlement and even the collapse of states, lawlessness, militarization of the civilian population¹¹, the twisting of political processes and democratic ideals and the criminalization of power¹². The current crisis in the Central African Republic following the coup led by the Seleka rebels is a perfect illustration. In addition, the uncontrolled proliferation of SALW in Central Africa has serious consequences on the fundamental rights of the human person¹³, including civilians not taking part in hostilities. Indeed, the misuse and the massive presence of these weapons favors so to say, the violation of economic, social and political rights of the people.

Violation of the right to housing, health and education

Buildings, houses, factories, etc... for civilian use, were destroyed during fighting in many conflicts in Central Africa¹⁴. Affected populations were left without roofs,

nearly three times the current population of Gabon. Earlier in the same country, that is to say between 1998 and 2001, armed conflict had already made nearly 2.5 million deaths⁸. Those killed were mostly civilians⁹, including women and children. On this bleak picture, one could also add many injured, maimed, displaced and countless refugees. Given the human drama it causes, it should be noted that the proliferation of SALW in Central Africa is largely favored by intra-state conflicts of political succession that are developed in the sub-region. According to John Kazembe, "these conflicts oppose various social groups, whereby one has the control of the military. The group against the power in place will arm itself according to its means and inevitably turn to cheap and easily obtained weapons. The political group in power will respond by setting up a network of civil defense to deal with the armed rebellion. Hence the creation of paramilitary groups and militias close to the government as in Rwanda or Burundi, and large quantities of SALW purchased by the Government¹⁰. These are therefore the situations that are the basis of the excessive number of SALW present in the Sub Region. This is even truer that the weapons used in such conflicts are easily found in another, because of the porous borders coupled with the absence or weakness of state systems of management and securing stockpiles, as well as complicity or existing connections

⁸ French High Council for International Cooperation, 2005: Reducing the impact of traffic in small arms on development: how to implement, Paris, p.7

⁹ Persons not or no longer participating in combat, and that should be protected as prescribed by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977 taking direction.

¹⁰ Kazembe john: From the issue of SALW control and suppression of illicit traffic in SALW in Central Africa, www.memoireonline.com

¹¹ The process of militarization of civilian population means that the groups involved have decided to create between them a balance of power through arms and systematically abandon the field of political discussion and negotiation.

¹² In Rwanda in 1994, the power in place proceeded to the distribution of knives and firearms to civilians

¹³ Rape and sexual violence against women, including those pregnant and those who are not mature, likely to even refute the humanity of the victims.

¹⁴ Angola, DRC, Chad and Rwanda.



becoming de facto, the most vulnerable, because they were directly exposed to other attacks because of lack of shelter to hide. Hospitals were also damaged because of attacks that have thus prevented from being operational, and provide the necessary assistance to civilian populations in need. However, what is true for residential homes and hospitals are also true for schools, which by nature, are considered by the International Humanitarian Law as "civilian objects" which can not therefore be attacked unless they are used for military purposes.

Violation of the consumer's right and a decent life

In many conflicts in Central Africa, the proliferation of SALW has resulted in significant declines in revenues generally derived from Trade and Tourism¹⁵. Wildlife through the action of poachers of protected species, has negatively impacted the actions of gangs¹⁶. The flora is destroyed, while at the same time mineral resources¹⁷ and oil of the concerned countries are illegally exploited. This sometimes leads states to reallocate resources to other purposes other than development, especially when it comes to dealing with non-state armed groups fighting for power. In addition, wells, water pipes, tanks or water towers, pumping stations and water catchments have sometimes been destroyed

by prolonged and sustained attacks, as was the case recently in eastern Congo. Therefore, it is clear that disruption of the distribution of water increases the suffering of civilians. Meanwhile, the damages to the water supply systems entail serious risks of diseases such as diarrhea, cholera and other infectious diseases due to unsanitary conditions. During the clashes, electrical, and gas stations also suffer damages whose consequences were immediately felt by the population.

Violation of the right to free movement and circulation

Roads and bridges are often targets even if they are used by civilians. The damage caused by the attacks on the road network usually has a huge financial cost as the state and citizens must pay for it. The damage to roads and bridges often causes the interruption of supplies of food or drugs and various services to people. Left aside that, ports and airports were attacked by the belligerents.

National and sub-regional system of fight against the proliferation of SALW in Central Africa

To cope with the proliferation of SALW in Central Africa, stakeholders develop basically, two types of

¹⁵ The civil war in the mid-1990s in the Republic of Congo has caused a sharp decline in revenues from the sale of oil and the development of tourism activities in the country.

¹⁶ Chad, CAR, Cameroon, and to a lesser extent Gabon face this painful situation.

¹⁷ Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo too.

measures: institutional measures and normative measures. These measures are put in place to create a synergy between actions at national level, especially by the competent public authorities, and actions at the sub regional level, mainly by the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). Contrary to what happens for weapons of mass destruction¹⁸, where the legislation is aimed at completely eradicating such weapons, the fight against the proliferation of SALW in Central Africa is limited to the regulation and control of licit and illicit flows. This is to prevent LWSC transfers to unauthorized actors. This fighting option is based on the observation that SALW certainly cause damage in terms of security, but remain a source of huge revenues for producer countries. There can therefore be no question of stopping its manufacture or its production. Meanwhile, these weapons are also used for legitimate defense needs and national security recognized by the UN. Therefore, the control option seems to be the most relevant and most operational for the countries of the sub region, which began to develop a legislative and institutional framework for the fight at national and sub regional.

Normative framework

From 2003 to date, the strategy against the proliferation of SALW in Central Africa was ruled both at national and sub-regional level by several standards. At the national level, States shall progressively review and update their respective national laws on firearms¹⁹, as they proceed to the domestication of international instruments they have signed and ratified. National action plans on SALW are also developed or under development²⁰. Regarding the normative architecture in force at the sub-regional level, three authoritative texts are in force to date, namely the Priority Programme of Action (Brazzaville 2003) on the fight against the proliferation of SALW in Central Africa and the Kinshasa Convention on SALW and its Plan of Implementation both adopted in 2010²¹. In addition, ECCAS is currently undertaking the development of a Guide for the harmonization of national legislation on SALW that will trace the standards to be followed by national legislation to regulate SALW.

Institutional framework

At the institutional level, whether national or sub-regional dimensions, the application of standards



¹⁸ Nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and biological weapons

¹⁹ DRC, Burundi and Rwanda have adopted new laws on SALW.

²⁰ This is the case in the DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Brazzaville.

²¹ Ministers of ECCAS member states adopted in Brazzaville in 2003, that is, two years after the adoption of the Program of Action of the UN SALW Program of Action; priority control against the proliferation of SALW in Central Africa. It was until 2009, the reference text par excellence. In the same vein, a qualitative leap was made in 2010 with the adoption in Kinshasa by the Ministers of the Member States of the Committee of the Convention of Central Africa for the

control of SALW and their ammunition all parts and components that can be used for their manufacture, repair and assembly called "Kinshasa Convention". Thus, the sub-region moved from its eminently political base reference program what is known as the priority Brazzaville 2003 program, to a much more binding legal reference of which is the Kinshasa Convention 2010.

undoubtedly requires the putting in place of specific organs and the reinforcement of their technical capacity. Internally, each state seeks to gradually strengthen, as far as possible, the capacity of national law structures and the enforcement and management of security and defense issues on the fight against illicit trafficking of SALW. States also create more specific mechanisms and appropriate institutional arrangements to fight against the misuse of SALW, called "SALW National Focal Points" or "National SALW Commissions". At Community level, the Peace and Security Department of the General Secretariat of ECCAS has a SALW unit found within the Department for the Fight against crime. This unit has published and made available to the Member States, a Procedural Manual for the establishment of national Commissions on SALW in ECCAS space. Moreover, the SALW Unit strengthens through various seminars and workshops, the technical capacity of national institutions involved in the fight against the proliferation of SALW in Central Africa. Finally, more generally, it is this SALW unit that also assumes the role of coordinating the implementation of the Kinshasa Convention attributed to the General Secretariat of ECCAS by State Parties.

Conclusion

The proliferation of SALW in Central Africa is a major factor in the escalation of a culture of violence in the sub-region. LWSC are the weapons of choice in most armed conflicts that take place. These have disproportionate and lasting impact on the harmonious socio-economic development of countries in the sub-region. However, solutions to fight against this phenomenon are implemented at national and Community levels. These solutions are essentially normative and institutional. But interesting as they may be, they may not be relevant in the long term if they



continue to be accompanied by greater and effective involvement of civil society organizations (CSOs). It seems that the magnitude of the situation demands such cooperation, and the need to create reliable and secured public spaces in the sub-region is also required. This is also why the United Nations Program of Action of 2001, and other relevant texts on the subject adopted at continental and sub-regional gave priority to CSOs. In this vein, the mobilization of CSOs at the national and regional levels against the proliferation of LWSC should not be contradicted. There exists today an Action Network on Small Arms in Central Africa (CAANSA) which already works as CSOs with the General Secretariat of ECCAS. This means that CSOs in Central Africa do have a major role to play²². Therefore, it is useful to imagine that these CSOs, without losing their independence and specificity of their actions, must continue to be encouraged to integrate formal mechanisms for fight against SALW already implemented by States in the ECCAS space.

²² Members of the CAANSA could work for the dissemination of information on the scope and extent of the proliferation of SALW in their respective countries, by promoting targeted national policies in field campaigns, support projects, national or cross-border education for peace, democratic values, tolerance of differences, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and publications of data in their possession.

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THE PROBLEM OF THE FLOW OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN CENTRAL AFRICA: A PROSPECTIVE REVIEW OF CONTROL MEASURES

Awareness about the harms due to the circulation and trafficking of SALW in Central Africa was instigated by the Heads of State and Government of ECCAS at the beginning of the 2000s. These states have taken measures to build a sub region sufficiently freed from the weight of these weapons in the perspective of a Central Africa in peace, security and stability.

Policies limiting circulation of SALW

Before reaching the adoption in July 2001 of the Program of Action of the United Nations to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects, African states have tried to agree on a common position that they would present at the New York meeting. Known as the Bamako Declaration, taken in 2000. Following this Declaration and the adoption of the "PoA", the Central African States agreed to implement it in the ECCAS zone. It was during the 18th ministerial meeting of the Standing Advisory Committee of the United Nations in charge of security issues in Central Africa (Bangui August 2002), that it was recommended that a seminar be organized on the implementation of the Program of work of the United Nations ECCAS zone. Brazzaville (DRC) then hosted the seminar from 12 to 14 May 2003. The latter had the merit to clarify in the Program of ECCAS, the points on which actions should be taken at national and subregional level. At the national level, each country

had to establish a National Commission on SALW; collection and destruction of weapons; strengthening and harmonization of the laws and procedures for SALW; capacity building of security institutions in the control of SALW; promoting transparency through the establishment of registers and databases; promoting the role of civil society in the fight against the proliferation of SALW. On the sub-regional level, it was recommended a cross-border cooperation in the fight against the illicit traffic in SALW, and the establishment of a unit on SALW within the General Secretariat of ECCAS. All these aspects have now been taken into account by the Kinshasa Convention.

When the drafting of the COPAX Protocol in 1999 and its inclusion in the Treaty establishing ECCAS in 2000 took place, the Heads of State and Government gave it security and peace missions. This is among other things the mission of "works to promote cooperation in the areas of conflict prevention, early warning, peacekeeping operations, the fight against transborder crimes,



international terrorism, the uncontrolled proliferation and illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition, explosives and all other related materials "(Art. 6.a). Article 6 (c) provides that for its part COPAX "encourages Membership to any Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and use of landmines staff and chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, and ensure compliance with its relevant provisions. "It is therefore clear that the Heads of State and Government have largely taken the measure of the threat posed by the misuse of these weapons. It is this same desire that led them to seek the development of this legally binding instrument in the fight against SALW known as the "Kinshasa Convention"¹.

At the international level, the states of Central Africa are parties to legal instruments relating to the fight against the illicit circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons. Apart from the PoA in 2001, we may mention, for example, International Tracing Instrument, which was adopted in 2005, or the Treaty on Arms Trade 2013. These instruments and many others take into account the reality of Africa and recognize that Africa in general and Central Africa is particularly is vulnerable to penetration of the said weapons.

Operational aspects of the fight against the uncontrolled circulation of SALW in Central Africa

They can be of two main types: the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR).

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

This mechanism occurs in post-conflict or ongoing conflict as is currently the case in the CAR. Generally, the end of a conflict is a moment of, appeasement. This appeasement enables the putting in place of DDR



mechanism that is intended to bring together ex-combatants and disarm them and to find ways and means for their return to normal life. During this operation, the weapons from ex-combatants are recovered, identified, recorded and intended either to be destroyed or to return to the States stocks. It is the same for the ammunition. This allows a reduction in the number of weapons in circulation immediately.

This is often a partial operation, because people do not always deliver all the weapons in their possession. In some countries out of conflict in Central Africa, the process of collecting weapons was done by the state. This is the case of Angola, in the years 2007-2009, who established a three-phase process. First, it was necessary to educate and to explain to people the proposed transaction of weapons recovery. Then there was the phase of voluntary surrender of weapons, and finally the enforcement phase. Congo also made this collection of weapons on its territory at the end of the internal conflicts of 1993 and 1997. This was also the case with Burundi.

In the DRC, DDR programs have succeeded throughout the various peace negotiations that have marked the history of conflicts involving that country. Most often, these DDR rather produces slippages leading to the resumption of hostilities. This means that the DRC has become a reservoir of weapons of all kinds from either the old or different rebellions external support groups "negative forces"². We should expect a final peace settlement in this country in order to hope for the end of arms trafficking. These recycled weapons risk to be sold in illicit trade thereby also taking their harmful ability to neighboring countries.

In the Central African Republic, the disarmament is forced. This is a control military operation for the recovery of weapons from belligerents. We should wait for an appeasement to take place in order to really arrive at a more peaceful DDR. What is certain is that the weapons are currently taken out of the country in order to be secured in other neighboring states. This is where state responsibility lies in monitoring possible entry points of such weapons. As they exist, they can be used elsewhere. Anticipation is thus a must.

¹ UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament (Edited by): Central Africa Convention for the Control of Arms and Light Weapons, their ammunition and all parts and components that can be used in their manufacture, repair and assembly. In August 2011 www.unrec.org.

² Until the defeat and surrender of arms by the movement M 23 November 2013, Rwanda and Uganda have been indexed by the United Nations to support the rebellion.



The reform of the security sectors

The concept of security sector reform and security systems have redefined the traditional security to include not only the security and stability of states, but also the safety and well-being of their populations. This is why the concept of human security is the center. According to the Joint Organization for Economic Development (OECD)³, a security system includes the essential security actors (Armed Forces, Police, Gendarmerie Forces, Border Guards Service, Customs Service, Services of immigration, intelligence services and security, etc.). It also includes management agencies and security control (Ministries of Defense and Interior, financial management bodies, public complaints commissions, judicial and penal Institutions etc.), and the unofficial Security Forces. This mechanism is very interested in SALW control. In this sense, it encourages states to implement internal policies to effect this control. However, all of Central African States have policies in matters concerning the security systems. They just need to set on, the institutional level, organizations called by the Kinshasa Convention and the POA, "National Commissions on Small Arms and light Weapons"⁴. All these provisions are included in the Kinshasa Convention. States should therefore, for those who have not yet done so establish national committees because it is they who, according to this agreement, are responsible for performing the tasks that are advised by the OECD and the Kinshasa Convention. For now, some of Central African States, especially those who have not

experienced conflict, do not seem to understand the interest.

Reform of security systems is a holistic task. Apart from other issues that are related, that on SALW control proves its importance when arsenals are gutted in Libya, and the Islamists are trying to invade Central Africa as a new sanctuary for their activities. It is necessary to make appropriate arrangements. The situation in Central African Republic shows that SALW have used various sources (Sudan, Libya and certainly Nigeria where the rampant terrorist group Boko Haram exists). It should finally be noted that the reform

of the security systems falls within the broader context of governance. This allows the anticipation of research on opportunities for obtaining and use of SALW, as a form of political expression, because those who use it often do so for social, economic and even security claims.

The challenges for controlling the flow of light weapons and small arms in Central Africa

If tangible results are not visible today in the fight against SALW, there certainly are reasons for that. Two major cases are to be mentioned.

Political inertia

First there was the lack of political will of States. This determination should be manifested by the accession to international, regional and sub-regional legal instruments. The Central African States have expressed their willingness to be a Party to several of these instruments. However, these states do not often watch diligently to fulfill the obligations. Under these conditions, it often lacks an internal monitoring work to do. This is why many texts signed by states are ratified sometimes many years later. Since the Kinshasa Convention was adopted in April 2010 and open for signature from the 19th of November 2010, its entry into force is yet to be achieved. To do this would require that six instruments of ratification are deposited of the UN

³ OECD Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice. ISBN 978-92-64-037397, 2000.

⁴ Control of small arms and small arms advocated by the OECD includes:

- The development of laws, regulations and administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the production, export, import and transit of small arms of light weapons-
- the development of institutional structures of policy advice, research and monitoring;
- to improve the management and security of stockpiles of small arms of light Weapons, ammunition and explosives related programs, including stocks held by the police, armed forces and other forces

authorized by the State;

- destruction of light weapons and small of light Weapons, ammunition, explosives and other related deemed surplus to national security needs;
- awareness campaigns on small arms of light Weapons and collection programs and voluntary destruction of small arms of light weapons;
- the promotion of cooperation and information at regional and subregional levels to prevent trade, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms of light Weapons.

Secretary General, who shall be the Depositary. To date, only four states have submitted their instruments of ratification in New York. This results in the delay in the implementation of the Convention by States. They are bound by the obligation to say how they organize arms movements under the conditions laid down by the legislation they have adopted, signed and / or ratified⁵. This would ensure the tracking of movements under the provisions of the International Tracing Instrument in 2005. But without implementation, the situation on the field continues to deteriorate and the victims increase.

Therefore, the question is whether the States undertake to engage only to please the international community. To make the Kinshasa Convention effective, it implies that policies give it a real anointing. If this is not possible and if each state protects its information on this field, do not recover weapons at the same time they secure those used by their own defense and security forces, the challenge will not be upheld.

The harmonization of legislation within the sub-region

The current situation in the sub-region in the fight against the proliferation of SALW shows that policies were not sufficiently interested in the subject, particularly in the three countries that have hitherto not experienced major conflicts (Cameroon, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea). In these states, the internal institutional level does not permit the conduct of field activities according to some planning. These states lack national committees responsible for issues relating to weapons. This poses a problem because the weapons are still governed by very outdated texts, where they exist. There are countries where these texts hardly exist. However, these National Commissions act as interface with the sub-regional level that represents the General Secretariat of ECCAS. It is they who relay information both at the United Nations, at the General Secretariat of the Community. They also receive information, queries, provide statistics to the United Nations and the General Secretariat of ECCAS, recall the status of ratifications to States, etc... These National Commissions should prepare and propose not only texts that allow harmonization of national legislation with the international community and those instruments, but in doing so, they should form a network



of information sharing in the field.

It is this harmonization that will eventually enable to have common practices and work together on the official entry points of SALW, at the borders and beyond national and community borders. Countries should learn to work in synergy at the borders. This pulse should also come from policies developed and implemented at the sub-region.

Conclusion

The illicit circulation of SALW in Central Africa appears as a phenomenon related to conflicts and bad security governance. The political leaders of the subregion were quickly informed on the subject within the ECCAS space. This awareness has led to the emergence of a certain political will to wage a war against proliferation, circulation and trafficking of such weapons. This is why legal provisions have been made both at the international level and in the community. But it remains a significant problem due to the lack of the implementation of the measures taken at the political level. If it is at the political level that the will is manifested first, it is also, paradoxically, at the same political level that are found the main obstacles. We should therefore remove the mortgage on the implementation of commitments made at the international, regional and subregional levels. This is the field work that will minimize the scope of the misuse of SALW. This approach suggests that this issue be a genuine public policy, through the practice of the reform of security systems in the Central African States.

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⁵ Kinshasa Convention: Chapter II on transfers.

Summary

BORDER INSECURITY IN CENTRAL AFRICA

Table 1

Components	Professional status	Social status	Problems related to cross-border insecurity	Involvement in activities that generate insecurity	Involvement in cross-border crime
Entrepreneurs of insecurity in border areas	Mercenary or unknown status	Self-management through trade and other illicit trafficking	Claims and political violence or identity, fanaticism, poverty, seeking enrichment, rampant crime	Animator / Origin	Organizer / Enlisted
Refugees	Diversified/ Unemployment cyclical or permanent	Mostly insecure / Application Security	Threats to the integrity of persons and property, psychological and symbolic damages, issue of return to country of origin or insertion into the social fabric of the host country	Origin / victim / accomplice	Origin / victim / accomplice
Local populations of host countries	Diversified	Often precarious / Application Security	Alternating between hospitality and rejection of foreigners	Mostly victim / possible involvement as an actor insecurity / crime	Victim / accomplice / origin
The State, IOs, NGOs involved in border security	Concepteur/Régulateur des opérations de sécurisation ; instance d'organisation, de suivi du DDR/DDI...	Standards / bodies / security measures at borders	Deficit control and regulation of population movements, corruption, poor and non-legislative instruments harmonized sub-regional scale, extraversion funding mechanisms, inadequate procedures threats	Surveillance and monitoring police and military deployment of the security and defense, medical care and forensic victims, security cooperation, funding mechanisms for border security	Fight through criminalization; investigations; arrests; monitoring and controls, the intelligence forecast and operational deployment

Table 2

Strategic policy exclusions	Strategic Preferences	Strategic solutions
<p>1. Insecurity Contractors in border areas</p> <p>2. Refugees</p> <p>3. Border populations of host countries</p> <p>4. The State, IOs, NGOs involved in Securing Borders</p>	<p>1. Problems linked to border insecurity in Central Africa :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Insecurity Workers: Claims and identity or political violence, bigotry, poverty seeking enrichment, criminality - Refugees: Threats to the integrity of persons and property, psychological and symbolic damages issue of return to country of origin or insertion into the social fabric of the host country - Border populations of host countries: A mix of hospitality and rejection of foreigners - State / IO / NGOs involved in Borders security: deficit of control and regulation of population movements, corruption, poor legislative frameworks and non-harmonized at sub-regional level, extraversion of funding mechanisms, inadequate procedures adapted to threats <p>2 Involvement in activities that create insecurity.:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Contractors insecurity: Animator / Origin - Refugees: Origin / victim / accomplice - Border populations of host countries: Mostly victim / possible involvement as an actor insecurity / crime - State / IO / NGOs involved in securing borders: Surveillance and monitoring of police and military deployment of the security and defense, medical and forensic care of victims, security cooperation, funding mechanisms for border security <p>3 Involvement in cross-border crime.:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Contractors insecurity: Organizer / Enlisted - Refugees: Origin / victim / accomplice - Border populations of host countries: Victim / accomplice / origin - State / IO / NGOs involved in securing Borders: Fight through the offenses; investigations; arrests; monitoring and controls; the forecast information and operational deployment 	<p>1. National level : Reform of security sector through the implementation of a multisectoral and civil-military approach to global security governance. Strengthening of control and management of border flows and movements of people on both sides of the border; strengthening of state presence in border areas (police and military, customs and administrative personnel ...); adjustment of intervention and operational deployment depending on the nature of the threats modes; effective implementation of the commitments made at EU and international level etc..</p> <p>2. At the community level : harmonization of national production and relevant Community standards legislation; Intensification of police, judicial and military cooperation in border areas; education and sensitization of the population to the culture of peace and non-violence; developing exchanges of information in the forecast and operational information; Boundary determination, effective delimitation and demarcation of such boundaries; design and operational mechanisms of endogenous financing etc..</p> <p>3. Internationally : pooling security initiatives; mobilization of international donors and CSOs.</p>



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