

VIGIE

STRATEGIC AND
PROSPECTIVE
ANALYSIS
BULLETIN



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**The Multinational Joint Task Force,
for stabilisation of the Lake Chad Basin
Dynamics and Perspectives**



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

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A WORD FROM THE DIRECTOR GENERAL

EVERYTHING WITH EVERYONE

FOR THE RADIANCE OF EIFORCES,
INSTRUMENT OF PEACE, SECURITY AND
STABILITY IN AFRICA AND IN THE WORLD



By a delightful coincidence, 20th May 2018, a culmination of solemnities celebrating the 46th National Day of Cameroon, marks the end of the first term of the work load which H.E the President of the Republic entrusted in me as the head of EIFORCES. The mission of this institution being training and research, aiming to endow States and African Regional Mechanisms with human resource apt to effectively ensure Security and Peacekeeping, it is a distinct honour to present, as first publication of this period, a release of our Strategies and Prospectives Analyses Bulletin dedicated to the Multinational Joint Task Force which is presently engaged to reduce one of the worst security perils threatening Africa.

This expresses our determination to

**BG BITOTE André Patrice,
Director General - EIFORCES**

contribute to the debate, which includes doctrinal and above all to the construction action of capacities of the consolidation of African States and Interstate systems through the anticipation and the success on the security threats emanating or resurgent. Our training and work focus in effect on the preparation to face the main forms they take: spontaneous and manipulated riot violence; terrorist violence organised in small groups more or less reticulated; claimant violence of a rebellious nature; secessionism or irredentism organised in paramilitary fashion or in small groups. We will insist more and more on cyber criminality, cyber terrorism and other felonies and misuses of the electro sphere which are sometimes themselves types of threats, a times technics or vectors mobilised by each of the other types which are still to be manifested fortunately in hybrid form or interwoven as "pure" types.

To this effect, EIFORCES, Centre of Excellence of the ECCAS focused on its duty at the service of the consolidation of COPAX and its objectification perspectives of collective security in the gulf of Guinea, plays an enhanced role at the continental level. Together with the African Union, it undertakes the Presidency while hosting the Executive Secretariat in restructuring the African Association of Peacekeeping Trainers (AAPSTA). This entity mobilises all concerned parties in the production of new instrument, elaboration of new generation concept, the establishment of new practices of coordination, harmonisation and the standardisation of Awaiting African Forces. Well said, these perspectives inscribed in the rigorous application of the orientations of High Command aiming at consolidating the achievements to concretise the Vision of the President of the Republic of Cameroon, Founder of the School.

Together with my collaborators, I hope to follow up the procedure aimed at the certification of EIFORCES as a Centre of Excellence of the United Nations, and to enable it to operate at the best level of international standards. This networking is a priority to which we work together with our established partners such as; China, European Union, France, Japan to which EIFORCES just launched the implementation of one of the greatest Conventions of its history, the United States of America and many others.

Our efforts will have to result to the permanent establishment of EIFORCES, as a centre of Excellence in training, research and assistance in security strategic decision making in Cameroon and beyond. As a main bilingual institution of training in peacekeeping in Africa, will put forth the added value of EIFORCES to concretise a recognised level of excellence at the service of Africa and the world.

EDITORIAL

DYNAMICS AND PERSPECTIVES FOR A SUSTAINABLE STABILITY

True to its statutory mission of fundamental and applied research, and strategic and operational monitoring in the related fields of Homeland Security, International Security and Peace Support Operations (PSO), EIFORCES, through its Research and Documentation Centre (RDC), has already dedicated two previous publications, the 5th and 6th editions of VIGIE, its Bulletin of strategic and prospective analysis to the central theme of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin.

On the one hand, to grasp the phenomenology, and on the other hand, to measure the geopolitical, geo-economic and social impacts, in relation to the stability and functionality of the State, to which should be added an international symposium devoted to violent extremism in the Lake Chad Basin, co-organised in January 2016, with the African Centre for Training and Administrative Research for Development (ACTARD), based in Tangier, Morocco.

This approach is inscribed in a comprehensive and strategic logic, that is, the necessity to have the widest possible reading of the jihado-terrorist threat, associate



Pr Wullson Mvomo Ela
Head of Research and Documentation Centre
EIFORCES

all strategies and strategists, the old and the modern, in the cardinal consideration that the knowledge of the other (otherness) and of oneself (selfhood), as emphasized by SUN ZI in his metaphorical principles, guarantees "100 victories for 100 battles".

Among the concluding observations of these early studies, we can retain the following:

1- By its physical and psychological load, jihadist terrorism, more than the "heroic" and "idealistic" terrorism of the last centuries, is distinguished by its structural globalisation and its spatial wholeness. If the structural, temporal, globalisation of the threat accounts for sedimentation in the long duration of history, frustrations, extremism and illegal activities and proto-terrorists, to use the words of SAÏBOU ISSA, the spatial, zonal globalisation, proceeds from the nomadic nature of insecurity dynamics that move from one country to another in this underworld zone, truly "terra incognita", "intoxicated zone" at the intersection of Central Africa and West Africa.

2- The problem of refugees and internally displaced persons, one of the most humanly traumatic and

politically destabilizing consequences, participates, like that of armaments, in the "security and humanitarian dilemma" thereby contributes to the crystallisation of the psychological and dramatic impact of the phenomenon of terrorism.

In a nutshell, the most credible and long-lasting hypothesis regarding the fight against jihadist terrorism and violent extremism in the Lake Chad Basin and its stabilisation of this region, in a symmetrical approach to the nature and protean behaviours of the terrorist threat in a global perspective: "to a global threat, a global response", as so logically prescribed President Paul BIYA of Cameroon.

The choice to devote this 7th edition of VIGIE to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), is part of the essence, which is both epistemological and editorial, to subject this collective security tool to an analysis that is both evaluative and prospective.

Initiated on 20th January, 2015 in Niamey, Niger, in line with the Elysée Summit on Security in Africa of on 17th May, 2014 and validated by the African Union on the 31st January, 2015 at the Summit of Heads of State and Government, its political purpose is to secure and protect the Lake Chad Basin.

The final communiqué of the meeting of experts held from 5th to 7th February, 2015 in Yaoundé, for the elaboration of the Concept of Operation (CONOPS) for its operationalisation indicates the purpose: "to create a safe and secure environment in the regions affected by the activities of Boko Haram and other terrorist groups, with a view to significantly reducing violence against civilians and other abuses, including sexual and gender-based violence, in accordance with International Humanitarian Law and the United Nations due diligence policy; human rights."

While the balance of the military component undoubtedly accounts for a significant decrease in the number of attacks and their regularity, as well as the capacity of nuisance and the narrowing of Boko Haram's range, more still needs to be done with a view

to sustainably stabilise this critical region.

Conscious of this concern, the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the African Union, while commending the relevance and effectiveness of the Multinational Joint Task Force as a tool for cooperative and joint security between Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, and an interregional strategic and operational articulation model in the implementation of the African Standby Force (ASF), organized on the 3rd November, 2017 in Ndjamena, an international conference at which EIFORCES took part for the stabilisation of the Lake Chad Basin. This is, beyond the containment of the Boko Haram insurgency.

Issues related to the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration, Repatriation and Resettlement (DDRRR) of Boko Haram disengaged fighters, resettlement of displaced persons and refugees, the rehabilitation and improvement capacity of local institutions of the rule of law, reconciliation, psychosocial support according to specific needs in terms of gender and youth, were raised.

This broadening and deepening of the political and strategic objectives of the Force, in a perspective emphasized by the Head of the Research and Documentation Centre, intervening on behalf of the EIFORCES, now structures the mandate of the MNJTF.

The interest of the research carried by this 7th edition of VIGIE is the evaluation of progress made and progress to be made in the fight against BOKO Haram in the Lake Chad Basin. As it should be conducted elsewhere against the LRA at the junction of CAR, DRC and Uganda, according to the terms and principles of the 2006 United Nations doctrine of the global fight against terrorism. A doctrine whose strategy for Central Africa was adopted on the 27th November 2015, in Libreville, Gabon as part of the 41st meeting of Ministers of the United Nations Permanent Consultative Committee for Security in Central Africa (UNSAC), pending implementation.

EIFORCES EN BRIEF

EIFORCES

The EIFORCES is a public institution under Cameroonian law, with legal personality and financial autonomy.

Localisation

Headquarter : Yaounde/Ngousso

Institutional Texts

Decree n°2008/179 of may 2008 laying the basis of the EIFORCES ;
Decree n° 2012/307 of june 2012 on the organisation and operational modality.



Missions

Providing **training and facilitating re-search** in the areas of Security and Peace Support.

Structure

A board of Directors chaired by the Minister of Defence.

Members : the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of State in charge of the National Gendarmerie, the Delegate General for National Security, the Representatives of the Présidency of the Republic, partner countries and international organisations (UN, European Union, African Union, ECCAS, UEMOA...).

A General Management: Headed by a Director General working with an Assistant Director, Technical Advisors, Directors, and Heads of Divisions...

And Advisory bodies.

PARTNERS

Cameroon



China




USA



France



Japan



African Union



European Union



ECCAS



United Nation

EIFORCES EN BRIEF

TRAINING

Fundamental and Operational Level

Public Order

Formed Police Units Training
Training of Trainers in Public Order
Advanced Training of Operational Commanders
Protection of High Dignitaries
Neutralisation/Destruction of Explosive Devices

Judicial Police

Mobilisable Teams of Investigation Experts
Command of Operational Units
Accompanying Police

Intermediate Level

Individual Police Training
Trans-Level Seminars in Civil Protection and Governance

Strategic Level

Security Forces Staff Diploma
Higher Security Studies Degree

EIFORCES: «*A tool at the service of Peace and Security to the African Continent*»

APPOINTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE EIFORCES

Promoted to the rank of Brigadier General by decree N°2017/329 of 29 June 2017, BITOTE André Patrice was appointed Director General of the International School of Security Forces (EIFORCES) by another decree N° 2018/160, dated 21 February 2018.

After his appointment on 29 June 2017, Brigadier General BITOTE André Patrice officially resumed duties on 28 February 2018 at Awae during a ceremony presided by the Minister of Defence Joseph BETI ASSOMO. A solemn ceremony heightened by the presence of many members of government, those of the diplomatic corps, administrative authorities, religious and traditional.

In the annals of the EIFORCES, Brigadier General BITOTE André Patrice is the third Director General appointed to this high office by the President of the Republic, His Excellency Paul BIYA, Supreme Chief of the Armed Forces and the Security Forces. Before him, this honor fell to the late Brigadier General MOHAMADOU HAMADIKO on October 26, 2011, then General of the ESSOH Brigade Jules César 06 years later. Between the first two Director Generals, two interims were respectively assured by the Divisional Commissioners DOUM NDONGO Patrice and Mrs. OYONO née THOM Cécile (PH.D.)

During his inaugural speech, the Minister of Defence underlined the excellent job done by the outgoing Director General the BG ESSOH Jules César and welcomed the Brigadier General BITOTE André Patrice by addressing his best wishes of success to him in the continuity of the rise to power and international exposure of EIFORCES.

The MINDEF, while recalling the states of service of the illustrious nominee, underlined the qualities which won for him the confidence of the Head of State. The new Director General of EIFORCES is a hardworking man in eloquent states of service, coming from the National Gendarmerie, a corps in which he served with faith and commitment since his graduation from the Joint Warfare Military School, Yaoundé, [1990-1993 batch] "Exposure and Democracy". During a rich career, he acquired experience on the field very early in Douala and Yaoundé. He would then be promoted Director of Administrative, Financial and Land Affairs in the central services of the National Gendarmerie, then, Director of Budget and Equipment in the Ministry of Defence between 2016 and 2017. Before his appointment



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as Director General of EIFORCES, he occupied the functions of Central Director of Administration and of Logistics at the National Gendarmerie. Graduate of the first batch [2005-2006] of a Certificate of Higher Military Studies at the then Higher Joint Warfare Program of Defence, now known as the Higher International School of War, Yaoundé [ESIG], The Brigadier General BITOTE André Patrice is actually working on a theses in Strategy, Defence, Security and Conflict Management and Catastrophes at the University of Yaoundé II-SOA.

The new Director General, after assuming duty, declared that he would spare no effort to deserve the confidence of the Head of State. For this purpose, he hopes to rely on all his staff and all strategic partners of EIFORCES to carry out this delicate but exhilarating mission. He placed his action under the sign of a slogan revealing this dynamic: "together for the radiation of the EIFORCES".



THIRD JAPAN-UNDP-EIFORCES CONVENTION

On “Support for Building EIFORCES Capacities for Peace and Security Interventions”

In a security context marked by:

- The resurgence of Boko-Haran terrorist attacks in the Far North and the persistence of the humanitarian crisis with its cycles of refugees and displaced persons;
- The resurgence of violence in CAR which, with the influx of refugees, is fueling insecurity on the eastern border and in the Eastern region;
- The transition from “the Anglophone crisis” to a fifth-generation conflict characterized by the spontaneous spontaneity of several violent extremist groups, to which the state responds by the maintenance of order, seems to install long-term insecurity in the North West and South West regions;
- The organization of several elections in 2018 provided by the Cameroonian political system;
- Preparations and organisation in early 2019 of the African Football Cup of Nations.

These emergencies and their effects pose major challenges that can only be addressed by reinforcing the security capacities of Cameroon and the Central African Sub-region, on which EIFORCES, ECCAS’s centre of excellence, contributes to its construction.

In this context, which requires additional capacity and security measures, the 3rd Japan-UNDP-EIFORCES Convention, covering 12 months from March-April 2018, has as its main objective to contribute in meeting the immediate needs induced by the context. Through training for interventions in the areas of peace, internal and



international security, its also aims at supporting long term development of these capacities.

The commitment of the Japanese Government through this convention will contribute to the achievement of the objectives assigned to the EIFORCES, by the President of the Republic, His Excellency Paul BIYA, for peace, security and stability in Cameroon, Africa and the rest of the world.



BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE EIFORCES

FINAL COMMUNIQUE 1

The tenth ordinary session of the Administrative Board of the International School of Security Forces (EIFORCES), took place on Wednesday 28 March 2018 at Mont FEBE Hotel, Yaoundé, under the guidance of Mr. BETI ASSOMO Joseph, Minister Delegate at the Presidency in charge of Defence, President of the said Board. The Brigadier General BITOTE André Patrice, Director General of EIFORCES, outlined the issues of the agenda of the day.

After the approbation of the project of the day's agenda and of the minutes of the works of the 9th session of the Administrative Board, the Board repeatedly listened, examined and adopted the final performance report, the administrative account and the management account for 2016, the report of the Specialised Finance Controller and the temporary 2017 performance report to 31 December 2017.

Moreover, after congratulating the Brigadier General for the quality and clarity of the documents presented, the Board exulted him, the Director General to follow up the implementation of actions related to the recognition of the School as a centre of excellence of the United Nations and those aimed at ameliorating the effectiveness in the execution of its missions of training and research in order to amass the international credibility and radiance of the institution.

Done in Yaoundé, on the 28th march 2018

FINAL COMMUNIQUE 2

The Eleventh Ordinary Session of the Administrative Board of the International School of Security Forces (EIFORCES) took place on Wednesday 28 March 2018 at Mont FEBE Hotel, Yaoundé under the guidance of Mr. BETI ASSOMO Joseph, Minister Delegate at the Presidency in charge of Defence, President of the said Board. The Brigadier General BITOTE André Patrice, Director General of EIFORCES, outlined the issues contained in the day's agenda.

The Board listened, examined and adopted the report on the activities carried out between 1 September and 31 December 2017 and the 2017 performance project, presented by the Director General, as well as report of the Specialised Finance Controller.

In addition, the Board adopted the 2018 project. Centred on the continuity of the 2016-2018 action plan, it is sorted out in profits and expenses to the sum of 7.007.698.000 (Seven billion, seven million, six hundred and ninety eight thousands) FCFA as Commitment Authority and 6.857.698.000 (Six billion, eight hundred and fifty seven million, six hundred and ninety eight thousands) FCFA, as Payment Appropriations.

The Board congratulated the Director General for the quality and clarity of the documents presented and exulted him to follow up the actions aimed at ameliorating the image and credibility of EIFORCES.

Done in Yaoundé, on the 28th march 2018



TRAINING ACTIVITIES

As part of its statutory fulfillment missions, EIFORCES has organised several training courses at both higher and elementary levels from the period 1 January 2017 to 31 March 2018.

A – HIGHER EDUCATION

A distinction must be made here between long courses and so-called short courses.

1 – Long trainings

These are the Security Forces Staff Diploma (DEMFS) and the BESS (Higher Security Studies Certificate).

The seventh DEMFS, whose school started on October 17, 2017, is made up of 17 trainees from Cameroon, Congo Brazzaville and Chad, this 20-week course was closed by the MINDEF PCA of the EIFORCES Mr. BETI ASSOMO Joseph.

The fourth BESS currently in progress, which will end after 10 months, also began on October 17, 2017 and includes 13 trainees from Cameroon, Congo Brazzaville and Chad.

2 – Short courses

Three training courses founded mainly by Japan through UNDP were organized in two areas

a – Neutralization, Removal and Destruction of Explosive Devices (EOD 1 and 2)

It was organized from 24 April to 05 May 2017 and

brought together 41 participants from MINADT, MINFOF, MINFI (General Directorate of Customs), the National Gendarmerie, all serving in the two regions of the North and the Far-Nord grappling with the threat of the terrorist



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group BOKO-HARAM.

NEDEX 2 was organized from August 21 to September 1, 2017 and brought together 32 trainees from the same administrations and regions.

b – Protection of civilians (POC2)

It was held from May 29 to June 2, 2017 and brought together 46 staff from MINREX, MINJUSTICE, MINATD, MINAS, MINCOM and MINFOFL

B - BASIC EDUCATION

Several trainings were organized in this context thanks to the support of bilateral and multilateral partners: notably France, Japan, and the United Nations:

1. From February 20 to April 14, 2017, Training in Public Order (FOP 16 AND 17), (FOP UN) gathering 33 trainees of 16 nationalities France and Cameroon under funding;

2. From 05 June to 07 July 2017, 2nd stage of the Project Investigable Experts Teams (EPEI.2), bringing together 29 Cameroonian Police and Gendarmerie trainees, under Japanese and Cameroonian funding;

3. From 19 June to 07 July 2017, 11th operational command improvement course (PCO.11) involving 19 participants from 18 countries, financed by France and Cameroon;

4. From 18 to 29 September 2017, FOP1 refresher course with 17 participants from 09 countries, under France and Cameroon funding;

5. From 02 to 13 October 2017, training course for trainers in operational crossing, 09 Cameroonian participants of the National Security and the National Gendarmerie, financed by France and Cameroon;

6. From October 23rd to November 10th, 2017, the 1st Operational Crossing Instructor Course, gathering 20 participants from 11 countries, under French and Cameroonian funding;

7. From November 27 to December 15, 2017, 12th Operational Command (PCO 12) advanced training course, bringing together 16 trainees of 13 nationalities and financed by France and Cameroon.

8. From February 26, 2018 to April 20, 2018, 18th and 19th FOP,

gathering several nationalities under French and

Cameroonian sponsorship.



RESEARCH ACTIVITIES

ORGANIZATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM

On 24th and 25th May 2017 at ENAM, held an international symposium on **"Governance and Democratic Management of Crowds in Africa: Devices, Practices, and Transformational Challenges"**.

The symposium was organized jointly with the African Training and Research Center (CAFRAD)

SCIENTIFIC PRODUCTIONS

- Production of a news Bulletin on Strategic and Prospective Analyzes (BASP still called VIGIE)
- Production of 07 Notes of Weekly Conjunctures
- Production of Special Sheets

- Publication of the proceedings of the colloquium (in progress)
- RASI production (in progress)
- Purchase of books

MISSIONS OUTSIDE AND WITHIN CAMEROON

- Participation of the Chief of the RDC in the first conference on the regional strategy of stabilisation of the Lake Chad Basin.

This mission was used to strengthen the construction of the EIFORCES network and the consolidation of its partnerships. In addition, the themes were in line with the strategic intelligence mission assigned to EIFORCES.

- Participation of the Head of the Research and Documentation Center from the 05th to 07th September 2017, at the international



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conference organised by the Center for Strategic Studies in Defense and Security (CESDS) of Burkina Faso on the theme “security prospects in the Sahel-Saharan belt: which efficient and transformational strategies?”

- Participation of the Head of the Research and Documentation Center from 13th to 14th November 2017, at the Dotra International Forum on Peace and Security in Africa on the theme “Management of African Security Challenges” for the elaboration of an integral strategy on the fight against terrorism, maritime piracy, cyber crime for the reform of the security sector;

- Participation of the Head of the Research and Documentation Center from 04th to 08th December 2017 in Kigali, Rwanda, at the 44th ministerial meeting of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa;

- Research mission on the MNJTF at the headquarters of the LCBC in N'Djamena by the Head of the Research and Documentation Center;

- Then to Mora and Maroua in April 2017, also on the MNJTF;

- Research mission on the crisis in the South-West and North-West regions by Professor MVOMO and Dr BIEM.



ACTIVITIES RELATED TO INSTITUTIONAL RADIATION AND COOPERATION

1 - WORKING VISIT OF THE AFRICAN DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT COOPERATION, SECURITY AND DEFENCE AT EIFORCES

On Friday 13 April 2018 at exactly 11am at Ngoussou, the Director General of EIFORCES, Brigadier General BITOTE Andre Patrice, received Colonel MILLOT who is Deputy Director of Sub-Saharan Africa of the Department of Cooperation, Security and Defence (DCSD). This meeting, which was within the framework of the bilateral cooperation between France and Cameroon in terms of defence-security and security-development, contained questions on training in the domain of peacekeeping, the reinforcement of the rule of law and on internal security.

Colonel MILLOT, who accompanied the Attaché of Internal Security at the French Embassy in Cameroon, Colonel BONNEAU Thierry, congratulated himself for the greatness of this centre of excellence which is in the certification process by the United Nations and already illustrates itself in training and research in the domain of peace and security. Furthermore, he praised the strategic option Cameroon took to jointly train gendarme and police officers in an uncertain international context. Just before his goodbye handshake to the Director General of EIFORCES, Colonel MILLOT reiterated the willingness of France to

accompany EIFORCES in the accomplishment of its missions and the strengthening of its institutional capacities for a greater influence in Africa and in the world.

2- AFRICOM VISIT TO AWAE JULY 26, 2017

Within the framework of the exploratory visit to the EIFORCES campus at AWAE, on 26 July 2017, the heads of AFRICOM listened with keen attention to the presentation of Dr. Jean Eudes BIEM, researcher at the CRD/EIFORCES on the presentation of the school; its organisation; its training programmes, as well as its projects concerning UN certification notably the training of individual police officers at recognised standards and the organisation of the certification of trainers as well as the ongoing negotiations between the Department of peacekeeping operations of the United Nations and EIFORCES for other types of training relative to questions on the management of refugees and the protection of children.

3- VISIT OF THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE OF NIGERIA TO EIFORCES ON THURSDAY 24 AUGUST 2017

A delegation of the Army War College of Nigeria sojourned at the campus of EIFORCES in AWAE on Thursday 24 August 2017.

Guided by the Commander, Director of the Army War College of Nigeria, the 34 auditors schooling in this national school of a high level, visited the campus of EIFORCES at Awae within the framework of a field trip of a strategic level and exchange.

Received by the Brigadier General Jules Cesar ESSOH, Director General of EIFORCES, assisted by his DDG, Madam the Chief Superintendent OYONO THOM Cecile, as well as all of his collaborators, the strong delegation of 44 members made of 34 student police officers and 10 management staff, settled in the conference hall of EIFORCES to listen to the beginning, the DG of EIFORCES in his welcome speech. In a bid to provide an answer, the Major General, Director of this elite formation school of the Nigerian Land Force,



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unfolded the orientations of this meeting towards the establishment of a pedagogic platform of negotiation and exchange of the knowledge and knowhow mutually beneficial to these two institutions.

During their sojourn at EIFORCES, the auditors of the Army War College of Nigeria, were able to appreciate the vocation of the school to prepare the security personnel of the execution agent up to the mastery and conception framework, to the security missions, to the peacekeeping operations as well as the functions of the military staff up to the strategic level.

In addition, the trainees benefitted from a presentation on the theme: "PERSPECTIVE OF A SUSTAINABLE PEACE" presented by Dr. Jean Eudes BIEM, researcher at the Research and Documentation Centre of EIFORCES.

4- VISIT OF THE MINDEF OF GABON AT EIFORCES

Mr. Etienne MASSARD KABINDA MAKAGA, Minister of Presidential Affairs and of Gabonese National Defence sojourned at the EIFORCES campus- AWAE 06 November 2017

Within the framework of his working visit to Cameroon, the EIFORCES campus-AWAE was chosen amongst the major stops of **Mr. Etienne MASSARD KABINDA MAKAGA** during his tour on Cameroonian soil.

After arriving at the EIFORCES campus at AWAE in the afternoon of 06 November 2017 at 3:30pm, the delegation guided by **Mr. Etienne MASSARD KABINDA MAKAGA** was made of a parterre of personalities in which the Chief of Staff of Armies, the General of the Army Corps Rene Claude MEKA, the Divisional Officer of Mefou and Afamba, a delegation of central superior officers of Staff of Armies and the National Gendarmerie, the Mayor of Awae, religious and traditional authorities.

After the military honors due to this famous host accompanied by the SED / CGN Mr. Jean Baptiste BOKAM accompanied the delegation settled in EIFORCES' auditorium. The Director General of EIFORCES, on behalf of his staff, expressed his acknowledgement for the honour given to him through this working visit.

For the occasion, the Brigadier General Jules Cesar ESSOH seized the opportunity to make a brief presentation of the institution under his control and laying emphasis on the two main axes which constitute his mission as Centre of Excellence of the ECCAS which include: training and research. After presenting the statistics of the group of interns of fifteen African nationalities who are to this point

being trained at EIFORCES and most particularly those of Gabon to the great satisfaction of the Gabonese delegation, the Director General concluded his remarks with a presentation of on-going training offers in this Institution which consistently works towards peace, security and stability in Africa and beyond.

Thereafter, the Minister of Presidential Affairs and of Gabonese National Defence, while addressing the school staff, nevertheless laid emphasis on the expectations of the sister Republic of Gabon vis-à-vis Cameroon through EIFORCES in its noble and delicate mission of training security forces and experts in a particular context marked by a violent rise of fundamentalism and extremism in the sub-region. He equally wish the cooperation reinforcement in the domain of defense and security between our two brothers and friends States.

5 - VISIT OF THE CENTRAL AFRICAN MINISTER OF DEFENCE TO EIFORCES

The Central African Minister of Defence, Mr. Joseph YAKETE came to benefit from the source of expertise of EIFORCES in the domain of peacekeeping, in a particular context where his country is challenged by the restructuring of its security forces.

The management team of EIFORCES, under the leadership of the ADG DC. Dr. OYONO THOM Cécile, was committed to render the visit of the Central African Minister of Defence instructive as possible this at a time when the CAR is faced with major security challenges. The presentation of EIFORCES and the guided visit of the facilities were at the top agenda of the working visit.

In recalling the timely nature of this visit which comes "at a key moment of the history of the restructuring of the CAR and an induced mobilisation of the stakes of the sovereignty", the ADG emphasised on the school missions which works towards peace, security and development while making available to States well trained and qualified Staff according to international standards of security, thanks to a host of partners such as the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, China, France, Japan, etc. for this reason, EIFORCES is informed and ready to bring forth all its expertise and competence for the training and recycling in the domain of internal security.

The Central African Minister of Defence, Mr. Joseph YAKETE and his collaborators which include the Division General and general inspector of the Central African Army, Jean-Pierre DOLLE WAYA, hoped to find the tools susceptible to contribute to the resolution of the internal security problems in their country.

6 - EIFORCES AT THE LCBC IN CHAD

The Brigadier General ESSOH Jules Cesar, outgoing Director General of the International School of Security Forces, who was accompanied by Professor MVOMO ELA Wullson, Head of the Research and Documentation Centre and Colonel BIKELE Pierre Aime, Head of the Department of Higher Education of EIFORCES, participated in the first conference on the Regional Strategy of Stabilisation of the Lake Chad Basin, which took place in N'Djamena, Chad from 02 to 04 November 2017.

This conference which had the Hilton Hotel as its framework is the first in a series of conferences which at the end, have to generate a proposal of a regional policy applicable in terms of stabilisation in the zones affected by the terrorist group Boko Haram.

More specifically, this conference had the following objectives:

- The presentation of the actual situation and of activities carried out at the national and regional level by the State parties;
- The presentation of the regional strategies based on other experiences on the continent, including the presentation and adoption of a program project based on the orientations of the African Union on the regional strategy for the Lake Chad Basin;
- The presentation and adoption of projects of terms of reference on the creation of a technical working group for the elaboration of a regional strategy of stabilisation.
- The formulation of recommendations and the next steps for the second conference.

The opening ceremony was presided by the Chadian Minister of Water and Sanitation, representing the Chadian Prime Minister.

About two hundred participants, coming from African, European and Asian countries and of members of different organisations took part in this conference. The Minister acknowledged the weight of the goal to be achieved and invited the experts and participants to take up the challenge, taking into account the interests at stake, the extent of the questions to address and the legitimate expectations of the population of the Lake Chad Basin.

After the definition of the expectations and an overall view of the conference, this dense phase was animated

by experts and professionals from the United Nations, the African Union, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, Universities, and International Institutions, local authorities of the Lake Chad Basin and of the Civil Society.

The plenary sessions were based on the following points:

- The operational situation of the Multinational Joint Task Force;
- The influence and the strength of the challenges linked to the stabilisation of the affected zones;
- The role of gender in the prevention of violent extremism and in the fight against terrorism - progress, challenges and opportunities;
- Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration, Repatriation and Reinstallation [DDRRR] of surrendered Boko Haram combatants;
- Reinstallation of internally displaced persons and refugees;
- The implementation of the reinstallation of displaced persons and refugees in the Lake Chad Basin region;
- Reinforcement of the local capacities and consolidation of the resilience: governance, rule of law and reconciliation.

The discussions and exchanges were based on the pillars of the regional strategy which is on the decline in the following domains:

- The DDRRR for the surrendered combatants of Boko Haram;
- The reinstallation of displaced persons and refugees;
- The reinforcement of local capacities and consolidation of the resilience (governance, Rule of Law and reconciliation);
- The de-radicalisation.

These exchanges within the working groups produced strong recommendations in each domain considered.

Concerning the way forward for the elaboration of this regional strategy, the following measures were adopted:

- Creation of a working group;

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- Elaboration of terms of reference and a calendar for the development of the strategy by the LCBC and the African Union in coordination with the working group;
- The organization of a meeting of the working group by the LCBC and the AU within the closest deadline;
- Study of the proposals of projects of rapid impact to displaced persons and refugees by the LCBC and the AU.

At the end, the Chadian Minister of Water and Sanitation appreciated the work done by the participants and wished that the ongoing strategy of elaboration becomes an integrative project and takes into account the issue of transfer of waters to finally stabilise the Lake Chad.

The invitation of EIFORCES to this conference translates the consideration which our institution benefits from abroad. Besides the presence of the Director General, the participation of EIFORCES at this conference was applauded through the presentation of Professor MVOMO ELA Wullson, Head of the Research and Documentation Centre, whose pertinent intervention raised a lot of interest.

Moreover, this occasion was put in place to reinforce and consolidate the network of partners of EIFORCES. The themes addressed during this conference were in coherence with the mission of strategic monitoring which is given to EIFORCES through its Research Centre. The lessons to pick out came from these aspects:

- The military solution alone is not enough to address the causes leading to the deterioration of the situation in the Lake Chad Basin;
- The holistic perspective is the most susceptible way to resolve the present crises in the zone of the Lake Chad Basin;
- EIFORCES has to consolidate its experience and benefit from this platform to affirm itself as an actual think tank which contributes to the search for solutions to questions of peace and security in Africa.

The report of this workshop was prepared by Colonel BIKELE Pierre Aimé.

7 - APSTA : THE 23rd ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF IAPTC (INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PEACEKEEPING TRAINING CENTERS) HELD IN EGYPT IN SEPTEMBER 2017.

Considered nonetheless as a traditional meeting for the members of the International Association of Centres for Peacekeeping Training (IAPTC), this conference was organised by the International Centre for the Resolution of Conflicts, Peacekeeping and the Consolidation of Peace (CCCPA) of Cairo in Egypt. The objective cited by the participants of Fifty-Five (55) countries, one hundred and ten (110) organisations and close to two hundred and sixty-eight (268) personalities from far and wide, was to make this meeting a framework of adequate reflection, to really adapt the actions of peacekeepers to the more and more perceptible complexity of the environment of operations.

The Brigadier General ESSOH Jules César, Director General of the International School of Security Forces, assisted by Colonel BIKELE Pierre Aimé, Head of the Department of Higher Education of EIFORCES, took part in the 23rd annual conference of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres, from 11 to 14 September 2017 in Cairo, Egypt, on the theme: "Peacekeeping Integrated for Complex Environments".

This conference whose framework was at the Sémiramis Intercontinental Hotel was presided over by the Egyptian minister of External Relations, with principal objectives to:

- Suggest a forum of contact and discussions between diverse international organisations, centres and establishments of training, universities, reflection groups, researchers and other actors involved in peace training and operations of crises management;
- Share ideas and harmonise training programs and coherence with the evolution of tendencies and threats, in view of an exchange of good practices between practitioners;
- Ameliorate the pedagogy, methodology and the training practices;
- Create a common understanding on the dynamics and the current complexities in the environment of peacekeeping operations;
- Identify the good practices and share ideas on the approaches of new and contemporary training.

Since the dynamics of the operational environment has gone from the traditional concept of peacekeeping to the multifaceted and complex environment, the need to establish alternative competences has been a leitmotif,

so important that it was thought of in the recent research of the pedagogy and to align the teaching methods to the needs of the field.

After the definition of the attempts and a global view of the conference, animated by the experts and professional from the United Nations, universities, institutions of Peacekeeping Training and others, the initial phase went through two main stages which include presentations related to:

- The destiny of peacekeeping operations in a complex environment and the implications on the training;
- The new approaches of peacekeeping operations in terms of neurosciences while laying emphases on the link between the manner in which the brain treats apprenticeship and the discipline of the pedagogy and of the didactic method;
- The preparation of the Blue Helmets to complex environments in terms of political context, transition threats, risk evaluation, situation analyses and crises management;
- Leadership in complex environments in terms of selection, competences, development, performance and

evaluation.

The construction of bridges to succeed thanks to integrated approaches referring to persons, the protection of civilians and the commitment of the community and the youth with laying emphases on civilian-military relations and council police. Globally, the themes tackled during this conference showed proof of more utility and pertinence for the member States as well as for an adequate preparation of their staff in pre-deployment than in the scope of training of formators.

Practically, discussions, exchanges and sharing of experiences took place within the framework of group work, with a global debrief each time in the plenary session. The "ideas bazaar" session was one of the major points of attraction during which EIFORCES proved competence through a limelight presentation stand of the essence of its activities.

The closing ceremony gave an opportunity for a handover between Bosnia, who handled the presidency of the IAPTC up to this point, and Egypt who inaugurated its mandate at the Head of the Association. The next conference was announced from 01 to 04 October 2018 in Auckland, New Zealand.



8- APSTA ASSEMBLEE GENERALE HILTON

APSTA IN BRIEF

APSTA, the abbreviated form of African Peace Support Trainers Association or Association Africaine des Formateurs au Maintien de la Paix, is the African branch of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers-IAPTC (Association Internationale des Centres de Formations au Maintien de la Paix). Created in 2002, APSTA brings together almost all

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Centres offering Peacekeeping Training in Africa.

Its principal mission is to facilitate the development of African capabilities for peace and security thanks to the coordination, harmonisation, standardization and the support to the conception and implementation of training policies and research between its member institutions.

The following institutions actually have membership status of APSTA:

1. The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Differences (ACCORD) of South Africa;
2. The Regional Centre of Cairo for Training in Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) of Egypt;
3. The International School of Security Forces (EIFORCES) of Cameroon;
4. The Training Centre for Peace Maintenance (IPSS) of Ethiopia;
5. The Institute of Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) of the Addis-Abeba University in Ethiopia;
6. The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPSS) of Tanzania;
7. The International Training Centre for Peace Maintenance (ITCPM)
8. The Institute of Security Studies (ISS) of Pretoria in South Africa;
9. Koffi Annan International Peace Training Centre (KAIPTC) of Accra, Ghana;
10. The Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD) of the University of Accra in Ghana;
11. The Peace Support Operations Training Centre (PSOTC) of Malawi;
12. Alioune Blondin Beye School of Peacekeeping (ABBSP) of Bamako, Mali;
13. The National Defence College (NDC) of Nigeria;
14. The Peacekeeping Centre for Armed Forces (NAPKC) of Nigeria;
15. The Rwandan Police Academy (RPA);
16. The Regional Centre for Peacekeeping Training of the SADC (RPTC) in South Africa.

Copied from the IAPTC model, the structure of APSTA is divided into three functional segments; the highest being the General Assembly which meets annually.

The impetus and validation of the action is the Board of Directors, whose chairmanship is rotating by sub-region for one year. Since 07 September 2016, the date of the 14th Annual General Assembly (AGA) which held in Cairo, in Egypt, this Presidency was handled by EIFORCES redirected during the 15th AGA in Yaoundé on 4th and 5th October 2017.

The administrative and day to day management organ is the Secretariat which is autonomous and has a legal personality. APSTA, since 2008, is a technical organ of support to the African Union Commission in its role as head quarter of African Support Forces (ASF). In view of the development and reinforcement of ASF, APSTA plays a strategic council role at the Commission, Regional Economic Communities and their mechanism of coordination, as well as the member States.

In terms of AU/APSTA partnership, the activities of coordination, harmonization, standardization and support for the design and implementation of training and research policies have been prioritized for the benefit of the ASF and its partners. To this effect, APSTA has produced five manuals of standard in terms of the doctrine of the employment of Forces and the training of Forces in PSO, among which the Revised Harmonised Training Standards for AU Peace Support Operations (2015) and the Harmonised Training Standards for ASF Integrated Mission Planning (2016). To crown the journey, the last dated, the Manual of Harmonised Training Standards in Support of Integrated Missions of African Support Forces of the AU was launched on 17th February 2017 in Yaoundé.

The main challenge which APSTA faces actually and which is the reason for the Extraordinary First General Assembly which took place in Cairo from 11th to 14th September 2017, is survived by its Secretariat. Cameroon, in conformity with its diplomatic doctrine of presence and radiance, has done everything possible to overcome, during the last General Assembly, the decision to lead the Secretariat with the aim of giving it a diplomatic status. This process was initiated and closely followed by the Director General and the Deputy Director General of EIFORCES.

ACTIVITIES RELATED TO INFRASTRUCTURAL AND LOGISTIC DEVELOPMENT

In its ramp-up process, EIFORCES focuses on the development of its infrastructure and logistics, which are essential for the fulfillment of its training and research missions.

Thanks to the permanent support of the Head of State, His Excellency Paul BIYA and with the constant support of bilateral and multilateral partners. In particular: Japan, France, USA, China, the European Union, the ECCAS, the AU and the United Nations. During the year 2017 and during the first quarter, EIFORCES embarked in the process of construction and equipment through:

- Trainee Hotel with a capacity of 50 rooms;
- A water tower with a capacity of 3000 liters;
- The development of the shooting range;
- The construction of a gym;
- The layout of the kitchen.

All these activities unequivocally reflect the dynamism of EIFORCES and its determination to position itself in Africa and in the world as a reference centre for training and research in the field of peace operations and security.



Dr PASSO SONBANG Elie
Commissaire de Police Principal

&

Lt Col ONGOLO Auguste

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RESILIENCE AS A STRATEGY FOR THE MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE

By Basile Ngono

A polysemous concept, which has a pluridisciplinary usage, resilience has gotten the attention of different scientific communities for at least fifteen years. It is manifested by a system's capacity not to be weakened as a result of a shock of a major intensity. In as much as this constitutes a point of agreement, we can sometimes understand it from the character traits of a system which is said to be resilient, sometimes conceived as a procedure.

The principles of resistance and of rebound, inherent to resilience can be in echoed with those of irreversibility and sustainability, if we take into account different social, space and temporal scales. Resilience could also be seen as a sustainability vector, through the reinforcement of mechanisms permitting the avoidance of traumatic irreversibility, and which favours the intra and intergovernmental transmission of values. It is hence, the bearer of a certain ethic, particularly positive, through societal value choices which are the foundation of the rebound capacity after a traumatic shock.

Beyond this, its pluridisciplinary application and its polysemous character can aide in the description of phenomena experienced when a system (technical, human, organisational, economic, security and military), suffers a disorder, aims at finding a stable situation. Again, let's make a proposal to have a brief archaeological view of and a theoretical and methodological explanation for the structuring of the management of defense and security and this, at the service of the Multinational Joint Task Force, involved in the fight against the terrorist group Boko Haram.



Archaeological view of the concept of resilience

Resilience is derived from the Latin word *re*, prefix which means a backward movement and the verb *salire*, to jump. Initially, the word had two main meanings: to retract and to leap, to finally dodge a “problem” (an attack for instance) and to move backward, that is to the initial state. Since the XVII century, the Anglo-Saxon vocabulary uses *resilience*¹, first of all physically, to translate the measure of the resistance of a solid to shocks. In this instance, resilience constitutes the maximum impact that an object or a system can receive

before disintegrating².

The system or the resilient object is that which returns to its former state after a disturbance (shock or continuous pressure). It persists without qualitative change in its structure. To return to the initial equilibrium, it can all the same take some time. Resilience is therefore the time equally put in by the system to return to the original state.

In physical materials, resilience is then distinguished from persistence, which measures the constant state of a situation to that of a state of reference, and of resistance, which characterises system which remains totally unchanged under the effect of an external

¹ In French, the term *resiliere* evolved in this era towards the word *resiliation* (to retract, to withdraw from a contract).

² Jean Paul Mathieu; Alfred Kastler and Pierre Fleury, *Dictionnaire de Physique*, Paris, Masson-Eyrolles, 1991.



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disturbance. From there, the present participle of *resiliere-resilience* which receives, since the XVII century, a second meaning. Borrowing from the notion of jumping, it therefore designates the reaction after a shock that is to rebound.

Since the 1980s, the concept has been used in other disciplines. It notably spread to human and social sciences such as psychoanalyses, psychology and sociology. In medicine, it has improved psychiatry. Besides, bio-ecology and engineering sciences rapidly adopt it.

If in ecology and economy, the first researches give a relatively close definition to that proposed by the physical form of materials³, it is important to underline that in ecology more specifically, resilience “proactive” makes reference to the capacities of apprenticeship and anticipation on the future which societies are capable of providing for themselves⁴.

In Francophone countries, the introduction of the term resilience dates just as far back as the 1990s. Besides its French translation was difficult. In the vocabulary of psychology, it entails “the capacity of a person or a group to develop correctly, to continue to propel towards the future, despite destabilising events, difficult living conditions and usually severe trauma”⁵. More precisely, resilience is at the same time the capacity to resist trauma and to recover from it⁶.

On this basis, two principal axis have been progressively developed in social sciences: the first considers the personal characteristics linked to the resources belonging to every individual. The second postulates that resilience depends largely on the quality of links within a community⁷.

Dimensions and factors of resilience

Resilience also makes reference to resources developed by the subjects to tolerate and overcome deleterious consequences or even pathogens of traumas and live despite adversity, while keeping quality existence with less possible damages. A resilient procedure is put in place when people and/or groups are able to regulate the crises caused by a trauma, to curb the effects of the psychic and social disorganisation which result and to maintain a psychic and social (re)construction.

After trauma, the person (or group) affected will undertake a different type of development, called neo-development. Resilience is not situated in the continuation of life line or collective construction which will deny what is happening. The concept of resilience applied in psychology or in sociology does not rely on the idea – contrary to its decision initially physical – of a return to the initial state. A resilient entity is that which will know how to face particularly establishing events, by surmounting degraded conditions of existence and a sensible and durable modification (or even lasting) of its environment after the crises. One of the most complex aspects of resilience is that it entails a capacity, an approach but equally a result.

Resilience as a capacity

“Individual resilience is the capacity for a person to face, to develop and increase his/her competences in an adverse situation⁸”. Again, “resilience is the capacity to succeed to live and to be positively developed in a socially acceptable manner for the society, despite stress or an adversity which normally contains the grievous risk of a negative issue⁹”.

Resilience as an approach

“Resilience is the process of adaptation for people undergoing stress, in adversity, to changes and to opportunities which result to the identification and the enrichment of factors of production, be they personal or environmental¹⁰”.

³ G. A. Bonnano, “Loss, Trauma and Human Resilience: Have We Underestimated the Human Capacity to Thrive after Extremely Aversive Events?” *American Psychologist*, vol. 59, No 1, 2004, pages 20-28.

⁴ F. Berkes and C. Folke (eds), *Linking Social and Ecological Systems, Management Practices and Social Mechanisms for Building Resilience*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

⁵ Definition proposed by Michel Manciaux, Stefan Vanistendael, Jacques Lecomte and Boris Cyrulnik during the symposium “Around resilience”, 17 and 18 March 2007, University of Birzeit.

⁶ S. Tisseron, *La Résilience*, Paris, PUF, coll. Know how ?, 2007.

⁷ “Fundamentally, resilience is an intersubjective concept. Resilience can only be born, accrue and develop only in the

relationships of others” M. Delage, “Resilience dans la famille et tuteurs de resilience. Qu’en fait le systemicien?” *Thérapie familiale*, vol. 25, n°25, n°3, 2004.

⁸ J. M. Patterson, “Promoting resilience in families experiencing stress”, *Pediatric Clinics of North America*, vol. 42, 1, Feb. 1995, pages 47-63.

⁹ S. Vanistendael, *Clés pour devenir: la résilience*, BICE book, Geneva, 1996, p. 9.

¹⁰ G. E. Richardson, “The metatheory of resilience and resiliency”, *Journal of Clinical Psychology*, vol. 58, 3, March

Resilience as a dynamic approach:

Consisting of being well developed despite difficult living conditions or traumatising events;

Focusing on the interaction of internal potentialities of an individual and on environmental support;

Susceptible to being operationalized at a certain time and by certain specific results, according to the domain addressed¹¹.

As an approach, resilience is a phenomenon which implies the interaction of numerous psychological, relational, social or even environmental factors with the internal characteristics of the subjects (particularly the personality). For numerous authors, the under-skulled concept that competences and possibilities are latent in every individual (and so eventually useful to the benefit of groups to which they belong) and they have to try to update.

However, as per the thought which makes resilience a procedure, the confrontation with the extreme situation, if it is surmounted, has to be a permanent tool for the individual or the groups to be reinforced. To this effect: [...] *every extreme situation, which is a procedure for life destruction, encircles paradoxically a potential of life, precisely where life broke up. [...] what springs up invisibly helps to rebound into the test making the obstacle a springboard, frailty wealth, weakness a force and impossibilities a set of impossibilities*¹².

Resilience as a result

*"Resilience is never absolute, total, acquired once and for all [...] it is real depending on the circumstances, the nature of transformations, contexts and the stages of life according to different cultures*¹³

Resilience is based in particular on determinants, which also correspond to notions of psychology, psychoanalysis and sociology (such as those of altruism or trust), sometimes difficult to quantify. Basing measures to determine the degree of resilience of individuals and collectives is a goal considered by some authors as

illusory¹⁴.

In addition, one of the risks of considering resilience as a result is to "freeze" a situation: by identifying factors that reinforce the abilities of individuals and collectives to overcome "pathogenic" events and by developing measurement scales, some might consider that at a given level, these people and groups are definitely resilient (or conversely some will never be able to become one). But resilience is a dynamic process and scalable. This is a state that can not be acquired once and for all. It is in no case equivalent to no risk, or total protection¹⁵. The hazards of existence are always capable of calling it into question. More broadly, the resilience of an individual or group can only be truly assessed during events and after the crisis.

Community and Social Resilience

In a classic way, there are two types of resilience: intra-individual resilience, specific to the individual, and the inter-individual resilience, found at the family and community levels. Although these two forms are distinct, they are interdependent and complementary.

Several components of community resilience have been progressively identified. First of all, the presence of pro-social attitudes shared by group members allows it to solve problems collaboratively¹⁶. In particular, they facilitate communication within the group. Above all, these attitudes allow the group or its members to more easily utilise resources and social support from outside.

Then, the quality of the interrelationship between the members of the community appeared essential to many authors. Groups characterised by the maintenance of boundaries flexibility and permeable and benefiting from shared leadership promote the development of inter-individual resilience¹⁷. Moreover, the cohesion between the members of the group is essential for the latter to exist. On the other hand, groups and societies

2002, pp. 307-321.

¹¹ J. Lecomte, "What is resilience?" in Boris Cyrulnik, *dir, Vivre devant soi: être résilient, et après?* Revigny-on-Ormain, The Editions of the Journal of Psychologists, 2005, pages. 11-21.

¹² G. N. Fischer, *Le ressort invisible. Vivre l'extrême*, Paris, Le Seuil, 1994, p. 269

¹³ M. Manceaux, *et al. La résilience : résister et se construire*, Geneva, Social Medical Book, 2001.

¹⁴ Creating resilience indicators was probably more easily conceivable when it was designed as a return to a pre-existing state of crisis.

¹⁵ Current theories of resilience place more emphasis on flexibility in adjustment modes individual and collective, adaptive and defensive flexibility, and even creativity in protection processes.

¹⁶ See, for example, at the family level: Walsh (F.), "Foundations of a Family Resilience Approach", in Walsh (F.), ed., *Strengthening Family Resilience*, New York, Guilford Press, 1998, pp. 3-25.

¹⁷ Ibid.

marked by opposition to innovation and excessive centralisation of decision-making would be less resilient.

Resilience can therefore be analysed at different levels: individual, small groups (family, work colleagues ...), communities, communities and organisations (municipality, company ...), entire society. The mechanisms involved in dealing with serious or even dramatic events will not be exactly the same for each of them, nor the methods to strengthen them.

As for inter-individual resilience, the resilience of a society is indeed constituted of the interactions between very numerous material parameters (networks, information means, equipment ...), structural (importance of crisis management services ...), organisational (coordination, preparation ...) but also psychological and moral (values, trust, education and awareness of populations ...). It is evolutionary. From then on, it seems particularly difficult to model it.

"Resilience is at a time the capacity to resist a trauma and that to be re-established after the trauma".¹⁸ : "It is the resurgence of a type of development after a crash, a psychological traumatizing agony and on opposite conditions, in the memory, the representation of the wounds as a new organiser of I".¹⁹

Resilience is a multifactorial pathway derived from the interaction between an individual and his environment, comprising of internal variables of the person (personality, psycho structure, defensive mechanisms) and external variables (social environment, primary and secondary socialization). There are specific forms of resilience which are however particular and progressive for every individual. In this case, it is very difficult to generalise the idea of resilience that functions for persons and for particular social groups.

INDIVIDUAL RESILIENT FACTORS, SOCIAL AND OR COMMUNITY RESILIENT FACTORS

INDIVIDUAL RESILIENT FACTORS	SOCIAL AND OR COMMUNITY RESILIENT FACTORS
- Ability of resolving problems	- The importance of solidarity
- Autonomy	- High expectation
- Flexibility	- Active social implication
- The capacity to distance oneself from a troubled environment	- Social fluidity
- Social competence	- The opportunity to explain (syndicates, political parties, social platforms)
- Empathy	- Values of self-aid and social tolerance
- Altruism	- Diverse sources of support and peer resources
- Sociability, popularity (the capacity to awaken sympathy)	- Social community (schools, neighborhoods)
- Life projects	- Belonging to a religious or ideological community
- Sense of personal effectiveness	- Low unemployment rate
- Area of personal control (believe in their capacity to influence events)	- Low criminality rate
- The capacity to produce an introspection/ understanding of oneself.	- High level of health, training, leisure, and transport institutions.
- Good sense of identity.	

¹⁸ P.Y Corner, A. Ferran, C. Rastouil, I. Tuner, *The Principle of Resilience in France*, coll. "Military Researchers", No 4, Mont-en-Montois, La Fantscope, 2010.

¹⁹ S. Tisseron, *The Resilience*, op.cit.,

Debate on the Pertinence of Resilience for Defense and Security.

To face terrorism, which is the principal contemporary security threat with political goals in creating fear, resilience appears to be the cardinal option for the President of the Republic of Cameroon and his peers. In his directives²¹, he perceives resilience

²⁰ F. Coste, E. Nexon, *The Contribution of the Army in the Resilience of a Nation: human and organisation aspects*, Paris, Foundation for Strategic Research, 2011, p. 132.

²¹ See Paul Biya, Message of the Head of State on the occasion of the end of year 2015, and of the new year 2016, <https://www.prc.cm/fr/actuaites/discours/1611message-du-chef-de-l-etat-a-la-nation-a-l-occasion-de-la-fin-d-annee-2015-et-du-nouvel-an-2016> et Message of end of year 2017

under the prism of defense and civil security, as the capacity and will of the society and Cameroonian public forces to resist the dramatic attacks from Boko Haram terrorists, secessionists and the torments of economic crisis, thereafter, rapidly erect their normal functioning in acceptable social conditions. In a context marked with attacks on Cameroon, the making of such powerful and permanent political word, the President of the Republic of Cameroon seems to affirm as the figure head of resilience.

Nevertheless, we must not lose sight of the fact that, there are critical view points on the pertinence of resilience in the general and global context of defense and security. Resilience, which is a polysemous concept, is subjected to debate and it is necessary to consider the

of the Head of State to the Nation, <https://www.prc.cm/fr/actuaites/2622-message-de-fin-d-annee-2017-du-chef-de-l-etat-a-la-nation>, visited on 26th January 2018.



Medal awarding ceremony

identified limits by the critiques. What do we charge it with? What are the criticisms addressed to it in the ethos of Defense and Security? What is its real Pertinence?

One part of the criticism yields from the fact that, resilience comes from psychic and thus induce a mechanistic image of societies and the mental functioning of the actors of defense and security. But if it is originally true that the word resilience is used to mean elasticity and resistance, it is no lesser truth that the Forces of defense and security perceive it as a mean to rebound or straighten their efforts.

Another critique is based on the fact that under the covert of the concept of resilience, would apologise for better adapted, stronger and therefore, some Darwinian theses. Certain critiques give the impression that resilience is an imported concept from North America, inherited from the Bush doctrine of "war against terrorism", and that it will not be pertinent in a different cultural context.

In concentrating on the possibility to triumph in the face of the adversity, in the war that opposes for example, Boko Haram and the secessionists, the concept of resilience shows that wars and attacks and their consequences can be vanquished. Therefore, as a result, the study of resilience has moved from the capacity of resilience to that of resilience as a process. The research carried out for more than two decades by war strategists and security scholars, emphasis on the universalisation of resilience which is a fundamental human posture, an attitude of our common humanity. However, resilience needs to be contextualised in its application.

The less pertinent think resilience will mean an attitude in which our Forces will resist without looking for ways and means to eliminate the adversity. For the latter, if resilience will only mean the capacity of our Forces of defense and security to overcome the choc, will it not only be a facade virtue which will not contribute in any way to the resolution of the crisis.

There is nothing. The capacities and their construction beyond the conjunctures are at the heart of the analysis. The more the capacities, the lesser the vulnerability and the potential of the resilience to increase. As a result, resilience, far from being passive, is the will and capacity of a country, a society or public forces to resist consequences of an aggression or a major tragedy, and then to rapidly re-establish their capacity to function normally in a mode that is socially accepted.

Hence, for Joseph Henrotin²², resilience appears to be like an imperative strategic intercity, a major stake which is today necessary to be mastered not only by political, military and interior security decision makers, but by the entire citizens, whose personal resilience is at the last resort, the guarantee of that of the Nation. The critiques that are maybe legitimate questioning, remain more or less pertinent than the posture adopted by States and Forces on resilience, at the instance of the British who inserted it in their doctrine in 2003. The concept is therefor, very pertinent for the forces of defense and security. The Multinational Joint Task Force therefor have to develop resilience as a component to fight against terrorism, insurgency and other threats on stability in the Lake Chad Basin²³.

Resilience for the Multinational Join Task Force

The forces of defense and security of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, are engaged in multiple operations against terrorism, against insurgency, and or against instability, in which light, taking into consideration this context is a necessary element for the pacification and the strategic drive. Resilience hereby appears to be an imperatively strategic necessity. It equally appears to be a major stake that needs to be mastered not only by the political, military and public security decision makers, but equally by the entire population, whose personal resilience guarantees that of the Nation as a last resort.

In a world trapped by vulnerability and where no country is no longer safe from acts of terrorism and natural disasters, resilience appear to be a strategic shield that requires a permanent adaptation facing the emergence of new flaws and threats. Hence, it should be come the topic of predilection for the political leaders of the Economic Monetary Community of Central Africa (EMCCA), who rely on the Multinational Joint Task Force.

In the military and security spheres, resilience is considered to be a corolla means for dissuasion and reinsurance in the global framework of security for the MNJTF. Seven elementary requirements to be considered and established as evaluation criteria in this context are;

²² See *Resilience in Antiterrorism: The Last Shield*, Sceaux, L'esprit du livre editions, 2010.

²³ Joseph Henrotin, "Resilience or How to Combat Terrorism", *History and Strategy*, No 20, December 2014- February 2015.

The guarantee for the continuation of public forces and essential public services.

Resilience of energetic procurements.

The aptitude of effectively managing the unchecked movement of persons.

The resilience of food and water resources.

The aptitude of managing a large number of victims.

The resilience of communication systems.

Resilience of transport.

These seven requirements cover the entire spectrum of the most challenging crises and scenarios that should be considered or implemented by the supervisors of the MNJTF. More so, to contribute to the reinforcement of the resilience of countries of the EMCCA sub-region and the MNJTF, some reflection lines are envisaged. Notably, the paramilitary preparation, the mutualisation of intelligence structures, the reinforcement of the cooperation with the African Union and historic partners, as well as the cooperation with partner countries.

The Multinational Joint Task Force has to adapt with the new forms of vulnerabilities and threats that comes from non-State actors like Boko Haram. Resilience will remain an inevitable element for a collective defense and security of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC).

Conclusion

The tempo accelerates, geopolitical “surprises” are succeeding one another and the natural catastrophes occur at a faster pace. This malfunctioning of the physical and political world, has in sum, witness a relative break for some decades. This renewal challenges us on our ability to respond. In essence, it is the responsibility of the State to protect its population, but its resources are limited. The threats are many, uncertain, unpredicted or unthinkable. Institutional responses can not, or will not be able to anticipate the full spectrum of threats and risks satisfactorily. It is therefore necessary for our countries to enhance and suppress external choc of any magnitude. It refers to resilience, described in the White Book on National Defense and Security in 2008. This principle is limited to

the domain of organisations, but concerns the population as well; it calls it community resilience (*resilience nationale* for the franc-saxons). It contributes to the dissuasion of terrorist threats. It is part of community cohesion and equally contributes to it.

In order to build resilience, it will be necessary to be anchored on the media and education. The action of the former is complex and frequently ambiguous²⁴, because it raises “the question of the manipulation of information, in the context of constructed resilience”²⁵. But care needs to be taken: “usually, what we call public opinion is nothing else than the media”²⁶. This approach suggests an evolution of the Clausewitzian trinity, where the three poles would be the government, defense and security institutions, and the entire “population and medias”. The more it is approaching, the more the resilience of a given entity is important. Education is capital because, a constructed resilience is one of the strategic forms with less budgetary impacts. Security can not be bought, but it is conceived and perceived. In this perspective, resilience can be developed as a competence in security and defense schools.

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²⁴ Joseph Henrotin, *Resilience in Antiterrorism*, op.cit., p.84.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 87.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 89.

THE MULTINATIONAL JOINT FORCE, AS PEACE AND SECURITY TOOL IN THE LAKE CHAD BASIN

By Colonel NDOUGOU Hypolithe Jean

The activities of the peace and security components of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) have undergone a tremendous development in recent times. In line with the mandate of the LCBC, these activities aimed at promoting sub-regional integration, strengthen military cooperation among Member States and preserve peace and security in the Lake Chad Basin. Acting in a context characterised by the deterioration of the security situation of the sub-region, the new impetus given by the LCBC leadership has resulted to numerous initiatives and concrete actions aimed at appropriately addressing the significant terrorist threats in this area. In doing so, particular emphasis have been placed on the implementation of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), hence the development of its employment framework and the strengthening of its operational capabilities to combat the Boko Haram terrorist group.

Facing challenges of all kinds while expanding its field of action, the LCBC finds itself fully committed to the paths of peace and regional security. This reveals wishfully the visionary spirit of its founding fathers who had formulated its mandate. Through an analytical analysis of the activities carried out during the 2012-2017 period, it will be possible to measure the scope of the results obtained. For this, the period under consideration will be divided into three distinct phases. This corresponds chronologically to the conduct during a given period of time on a set of activities that contributed to the achievement of a specific objective. It will therefore be easy to perceive that, from April 2012 to April 2014, the LCBC first set out to reactivate the MNJTF. However, the implementation experienced serious difficulties since its creation in 1994 (I), and later on accelerated its rise in power while intensifying sub regional cooperation on security (II). Finally, it achieved a full operation Force, which came to put an end to the violence and terror which the Boko Haram insurgency wanted to set up in the Lake Chad Basin (III).



I- April 2012-April 2014: revitalisation of the MNJTF

The period from April 2012 to April 2014 was marked by the strong resolution of the LCBC leaders to revive the Joint Security Force they had decided to put in place since the 8th Summit held from 21th to 23th March, 1994 in Abuja. Thus, the politico-diplomatic efforts led to the decision taken by the Head of States and Governments during the 14th Ordinary Summit held on 30th April, 2012 in N'Djamena-Chad, was principally aimed at reviving the MNJTF. The decision was relevant in a comprehensive assessment of the current security situation, which indicated that the Lake Chad Basin was plagued by increased insecurity. The outbreak of cross-border banditry, illicit trafficking of persons and small arms, and poaching were all described.

The implementation of this decision resulted in the immediate convening of the first meeting of Defence Ministers and Chiefs of Defence Staff of the LCBC member States. This was held on the 8th May, 2012 in Niamey-Niger, in order to look for ways and means to give a boost to the Multinational Joint Security Force in the Lake Chad Basin. It should be noted that this meeting did not record the participation of Cameroon. The work began in Niamey to lay the foundations of the Force, formulate its mandate and defined the modalities. The issue of funding was raised during the 2nd meeting of Defence Ministers held in Yaoundé, Cameroon from the 15th-18th March 2014.

The success of this gathering resulted in the decision made public by Cameroon to join the MNJTF and deploy 750 strong battalion coupled with the appointment of a senior military officer from Cameroon to hold the newly created post of Military Adviser to the Executive Secretary of the LCBC. The decision of the Cameroonian government had far-reaching significance and triggered the rise in power of the MNJTF. In reality, this has been delayed for a long time. The establishment of this joint security force has not been realised since its creation by a decision of the 8th Ordinary Summit of the Heads of States and Governments of the LCBC held from 21th-23th March 1994 in Abuja. The implementation of this decision had equally come up against many obstacles, including the border dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria over the Bakassi Peninsula.

At that same meeting of Defence Ministers in Yaoundé, drafts of the name of the Force and its terms of reference were formulated. With regard to the terms of reference and as indicated in the Final Communiqué (p.2), the Ministers of Defence agreed on the following:

"The Multinational Force for Security in the Lake Chad Basin has as its mandate to: ensure peace and security in the Lake Chad Basin in order to guarantee the free movement of people and goods coupled with economic and social development". This is the permanent mandate of the Force, to be distinguished from the mandate specifically assigned to it in the fight against the terrorist group Boko Haram. In short, the resolutions taken during the 2nd meeting of the Defence Ministers have clearly given a new impetus to the peace and security activities of the LCBC. This context is marked by a return to trust between Member States, a better consideration of common interests and challenges, and a firm resolution to act together to face challenges. This new state of mind was to be decisive thereafter, as part of the fight against Boko Haram which gave a boost to the process of setting up the MNJTF.

II- May 2014-December 2015: intensification of sub-regional cooperation and the rise of the MNJTF

With the support of the international community, the commitment of the leaders of the LCBC to unite their efforts to provide a common and coordinated response to the security challenges facing their countries got to its climax in May 2014, when the MNJTF process was accelerated. In fact, the Paris Summit of the 17th May, 2014 on security in Nigeria gave a real boost to the general mobilisation against Boko Haram. Hence the multiplication of consultations and the elaboration of common intervention strategies and policies that led to the effective operation with its specific anti-terrorist mandate.

Thus, the period from May 2014 to December 2015 was marked by a multitude of activities and events that have essentially contributed to denser security exchanges between member States. This was to better structure the framework of their cooperation and to accelerate the establishment of the MNJTF. This resulted in the development of a concept of operation and the satisfaction of requirements in terms of human and logistical resources. The main activities and events that particularly marked the course of the period under consideration were as follows:

- The Paris Summit on Security in Nigeria on May 17, 2014, among other things, made it possible to set up a Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit (RIFU) and to set up a team of experts dedicated to the elaboration of a Defence strategy and for the fight

against the terrorist threat in the Lake Chad Basin.

- The 3rd and the 4th meetings of the Ministers of Defence, Chiefs of Staff and Heads of Intelligence and Security Services of the member States of the LCBC and Benin, respectively in Niamey and Abuja October 6 and November 25, 2014, were devoted to the development of joint measures against Boko Haram and modalities for the deployment of the MNJTF.
- The Extraordinary Summit of Heads of States and Governments of the LCBC and Benin held in October 7, 2014, in Niamey, Niger resulted in the leaders' firm decision to "fight Boko Haram in synergy wherever it is in the region".
- During a workshop held from October 14-18, 2014, in Yaoundé, they elaborated on the Strategy for the joint fight against the terrorist threat in the LCBC area. This strategy is rooted in the conviction that security and stability can only be achieved sustainably through an inclusive approach. This integrates a range of issues related to respect for human rights, the fight against poverty, youth

unemployment and good governance. Other emerging concerns such as the promotion of education, the protection of the rights of women and girls, and the involvement of women and civil society in conflict resolution efforts were also taken into account.

- The meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers of the LCBC member States and Benin in January 20, 2015, in Niamey, Niger, preceded the meeting on the implementation decisions of the Paris Summit. The results included the decision to change the MNJTF Headquarters from Baga Kawa-Nigeria, to N'Djamena- Chad. This goes along with the recommendation to the AU, to facilitate the development of the MNJTF Operation Concept for the fight against the terrorist group Boko Haram.
- The finalisation of the Strategic Concept of Operation of the MNJTF for the fight against the terrorist group Boko Haram was adopted during a meeting of experts held from the 5 to 7 February 2015 in Yaoundé. Convened by the AU in response to the request of the LCBC, this activity



was led by a committee of military and civilian experts drawn from the LCBC member countries, the AU and strategic partners including France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and the United States of America.

- The development of the Operational Concept (CONOPS) of the MNJTF operational level for the fight against the terrorist group Boko Haram was held from February 23-27, 2015, in N'Djamena. The operational CONOPS is as a result of the LCBC member States experts, Benin and with the assistance of the AU experts and strategic partners (P3).
- The CONOPS of the MNJTF was approved during an extraordinary Summit of the LCBC Heads of States and Governments and Benin held in June 11, 2015, in Abuja.
- The deployment in N'Djamena of the officers from the 5 Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) at the MNJTF (Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Benin) to constitute the Force Coordination Headquarters (July 31, 2015). This deployment marks the effective start of the activities while the provisional headquarters of the MNJTF was officially inaugurated in May 25, 2015, by Ambassador Smail Chergui, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security. The functioning of such a structure highlights the willingness and the adaptation of the deployed personnel drawn from various military cultures.
- The deployment and transfer of authority of national contingents under the command of the MNJTF (December 2015 - January 2016). The transfer of authority from the national troops assigned to the MNJTF became visible during the solemn ceremonies held in the PCs of the different Sectors (Mora for Sector 1, Bagasola for Sector 2 and Baga Kawa for Sector 3). This transfer enshrined the principle of a Force operating under the authority of a Commander, as part of a centralised command and control structure. It also obeys the operational control command principle (OPCON) established in the CONOPS.

Of all these events, the extraordinary Summit in June 11, 2015, in Abuja is far-reaching in terms of important decisions taken. For example, the approval of CONOPS involves a number of compromises on some sensitive issues. In short, CONOPS enshrines the principle of a multi-component force (military, police, and civilian), grouping national contingents under a single, centralised command, and operating freely within a well-functioning Operation Zone across States borders

with a clear and specific mandate to eliminate Boko Haram. In fact, the freedom granted to the Force to carry operations beyond the borders makes it possible to resolve in one way or the other the question of the right of hot pursuit, which has been a stumbling block between certain member States of the LCBC.

The extraordinary Summit in June 11, 2015, also clarified the main political and strategic orientations of the Mission, particularly with regard to its nature, its command structure and its support. At the command level, the Executive Secretary of the LCBC serves as the Head of Mission, and the Force Command is reserved for Nigeria until the end of the Mission, contrary to the initial principle of rotation.

Clearly, the development of exchanges and the establishment of a permanent dialogue between the governing bodies of the Member States have made the LCBC a crucial platform for consultation and a *pole par excellence* for sub-regional cooperation in the domain of peace and security. The approval of CONOPS, which marked the end of the planning process, the operations of the MNJTF and the deployment of its contingents, has enabled the LCBC to have a coherent set of forces able to engage effectively in the armed struggle against Boko Haram and other terrorist groups operating in this area.

III- The consolidation of the sub-regional integration in the domains of peace, security and the effective operation of the MNJTF (January 2016 - March 2017)

Structured on the momentum of solidarity manifested at both sub-regional and international levels in the fight against terrorism, LCBC's leadership has been involved in series of inter-state activities to consolidate the fight against terrorism. Sub-regional integration and the increase support from international partners in favour of the MNJTF from January 2016 to March 2017 were visible. The MNJTF operation was noted in the domain of the effective conduct and offensive operations against Boko Haram terrorists as part of the mandate entrusted to the Force.

In terms of inter-state activities, the LCBC organised several high level meetings. In addition, officials participated in numerous meetings with strategic partners. The main activities recorded on this plan are:

- The signing of the MNJTF Support Implementation Agreement (AMOS) in January 29, 2016, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This is a tripartite agreement bringing

together the AU, LCBC and Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). AMOS aims to establish the terms and conditions under which the AU will make available to the MNJTF additional support that it has mobilised from international partners on behalf of the Force. It cements the critical role that the AU is expected to play in mobilising the logistics support needed to strengthen the operational capabilities of the MNJTF. Furthermore with the understanding that troop support operating under the MNJTF banner is primarily the responsibility of the PCCs to the concept of Mission support.

- Participation in the Donors' Conference under the auspices of the United States in February 1, 2016, in Addis Ababa. This was under the effective chairmanship of His Excellency Idriss DEBY ITNO, President of the Republic of Chad and then Chairperson of the African Union. As a result of this conference, which was aimed to mobilise funds in support of the activities of the MNJTF, only the contributions of the United Kingdom, the European Union and Nigeria were registered. This was far from meeting the expectations. Also when taking into consideration the UN Security Council President's Declaration No. 15-12455 of September 2015, appealing international community to fund the MNJTF to support country efforts. The MNJTF was presented as a heavy burden for those countries whose economies were already suffering the effects of the prevailing economic crisis.

- Participation in the 2nd Summit on Regional Security (2nd SRS) from May 12-14, 2016, in Abuja, Nigeria. This Summit evaluated the progress made in the fight against the terrorist group Boko Haram since the Paris Summit in May 17, 2014, and formulated an action plan to address the worrying humanitarian situation in the Lake Chad region. As a strong orientation, the 2nd SRS formulated a new vision that now fully integrates, in addition to military operations, the humanitarian and development components in the fight against the terrorist group Boko Haram. Hence certain recommendations made on this occasion, such as the strengthening of the structure of the MNJTF and the organisation of a donor conference to raise the necessary financing for the non-military activities of the stabilization phase.

- The participation of the LCBC delegation in the 42nd United Nations Advisory Committee for Security Questions meeting in Central Africa (UNSCQA) from June 6-10, 2016, in Bangui, Central African Republic. Invitation to participate in this important meeting marked the recognition of the LCBC as a major factor in regional security scene.

Multiple activities of more or less operational nature have also been planned and executed as part of the

implementation mandate accredited to the MNJTF Mission. Among the activities carried out, which do not bear the seal of the Defence-secret, it is necessary to note from the outset the regularity of high personalities Defence meetings of the PCC. This was dictated by the operational necessities and management of the Mission. Thus, the session of the Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff held in April 1, 2016, in Yaoundé. This meeting was aimed to coordinate the activities of the MNJTF and to prepare for the very first large-scale joint operation led by the MNJTF in coordination with the national forces of the different countries, called "GAMA AIKI 1". Its main objective was to defeat the terrorist group Boko Haram in the localities along the Komadougou River in the border area between Niger, Nigeria and Chad to regain control. This operation was to be validated during the meeting of the Council of Defence Ministers convened for this purpose in May 4, 2016, in N'Djamena.

Great importance was attached to the success of the GAMA AIKI Operation which, despite difficulties, was finally launched in mid-June 2016 under the frequent pressure of Boko Haram who led a deadly attack on the Nigerian Forces in Bosso in June 3, 2016. As a result, there was a close monitoring of its execution, which led to the Special Meeting of the Armed Forces Chiefs of Staff Committee in July 7, 2016, at the MNJTF Tactical Command Post in Diffa, southern Niger. This base thus enabled the senior military authorities of the front-line countries (Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad) to evaluate the first phase of the GAMA AIKI operation and to examine certain questions relating to the management of the MNJTF. Such a meeting was instrumental in the conduct of the operation, as it defined the modalities for coordinating field operations between the MNJTF and the National Forces operating under the Special Operations implemented by each of them. (Operations EMERGENCE 4 and ALPHA in Cameroon, Operation N'GAA in Niger, Operation LAFIYA DOLE in Nigeria and Operation National in Chad).

The need to evaluate the results obtained by GAMA AIKI 1 motivated the holding of the Defence Ministers meeting in October 13, 2016, in Niamey. The Final Communiqué made public at the end of the deliberations stated that this operation had been successfully conducted. It was recognised that this success was due to the good coordination between the operational sectors of the MNJTF and the National Forces of the different countries. In spite of this satisfaction, based on the fact that the operation had succeeded in humiliating Boko Haram's combat capability by considerably destroying its human and logistical potential, the fact remains that the sect kept

important capacities in the recesses where it was entrenched. They constantly deployed suicide bombers, the laying of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and bombs, as well as other criminal methods of its tactical repertoire remained visible. This led to an evolution in the “war strategy” of the terrorist group Boko Haram. This evolution led to a return on its initial posture as an alternative strategy in favor of the stronger, making the gang to embark on isolated acts but with strong psychological impact. This return to the initial asymmetric strategy was a result of the ceaseless setbacks that the sect had undergone. It was equally their wish to engage in a conventional war following its territorial conquests and especially the impressive strengthening of its armament and logistics during the war in 2015.

In view of this new situation characterised by the persistence of terrorist activities, the meeting of Defence Ministers in October 13, 2016, in Niamey concluded the need to continue Operation GAMA AIKI. Thus, at the end of a certain period granted to the Commander of the Force for the planning of this second phase, the Ministers of Defence were to meet in December 20, 2016, in N'Djamena to validate the Operation GAMA AIKI 2. After its validation and the satisfaction of its needs in particular financial, GAMA AIKI 2 was launched in January 2017. It is necessary to note at this level the valuable financial contribution of Nigeria which had already made it possible to finance the installation of the MNJTF headquarters in N'Djamena and which, to this day, makes it possible to support the functioning of the General Staff and the conduct of the joint operations.

During this series of meetings, many decision making bodies were present who now operate under the Lake Chad Basin Commission, at least as regards the peace and security aspect. This is the case of the Armed Forces Chiefs of Staff, whose military technical expertise is essential for the assessment of situations, the formulation of the strategy and implementation measures, as well as coordination and monitoring of their execution. This is also the case for the Council of Defence Ministers, whose action is relevant for decision-making at the political level. These bodies come from the will of the LCBC Heads of States and Governments to have appropriate decision-making tools for peace and security issues. However, their legal existence should be formalised so that they can be an integral part of the organizational architecture of the LCBC.

Conclusion

Since 2012, the LCBC leadership has given new impetus to the activities of this more than 50-year-old institution by intensifying the activities of peace and security aspect of its mandate. Thus, in addition to the actions it conducts on a daily basis to promote development through equitable and sustainable management of the water resources Conventional Basin, the LCBC is thrust into the security arena in Africa. It asserts itself more and more as a privileged tool of collective security dedicated to the preservation of peace and security in the sub-region. In fact, the LCBC has successfully carried out diversified activities which have also contributed to the reinforcement of the military cooperation between the Member States of the LCBC and sub-regional integration. Clearly, a new state of mind now reigns between the leaders of the sub-region, characterised by trust and determination to work as a team to address common security challenges. This new impetus, crucial for efforts to fully render operational the MNJTF, reflects the firm resolves of the LCBC member countries to mobilise their means. This will help them to eradicate the scourge of terrorism embodied by the Boko Haram sect in the sub-region. The tangible results achieved on the ground of the fight against terrorism thus makes the MNJTF a remarkable experience from which one could draw useful lessons, or even draw inspiration in the future context on the management of various crisis situations in Africa.

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FMM IN 4 SECTORS



THE MULTINATIONAL NATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE: AN EFFECTIVE MODEL FOR AFRICAN STATES' APPROPRIATION AND RESOLUTION OF AFRICAN SECURITY ISSUES

By FOTUE KAMNE Rémie Bienvenue

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is offensive military instrument, set up by four member States of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad, Niger) and Benin to fight against the Boko Haram terrorist group in the Lake Chad Basin. Its implementation was officially formalised at the summit of Heads of States and Governments of the Member States of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and Benin held in Niamey, Niger on October 7, 2014.

As of November 25, 2014, this establishment received the full support of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) which, at its meeting on January 29, 2015, formally authorise its deployment for a duration of 12 months, which has been renewed. Severally, this kind of anointing Member States of the AU, which later gained the full support of the United Nations through its Secretary General, has enabled the MNJTF to gain the legitimacy to be engaged with determination in the fight against the Boko Haram terrorist group.



A delegation of the Peace and Security Council of AU visits the Multinational Joint Task Force

Boko Haram emerged in 2002 as a Salafist-inspired group calling for a more rigorous application of the sharia law in Northern Nigeria, denouncing social inequalities, corruption of elites and Western influence. This movement, led by Mohammed Yusuf, is based in Maiduguri, capital of the state of Borno, where he multiplies terrorist attacks against the population and symbols of the Nigerian State.

As of 2011, Boko Haram extended its attacks beyond the north eastern Nigeria, striking in particular the “bi-denominational” city of Jos and the federal capital, Abuja. A second attack in Abuja, two months after the first, targeting the UN headquarters in the city, was the first to attract international interests.

Taking advantage of the exile of most of its executives in 2009 and 2010, including Mamman Nur, considered the master minder of the attack against the UN, Boko Haram began collaborating with other Islamist organisations, including Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Somalia’s Shebab. At the start of 2012, Boko Haram’s actions gained intensity, benefiting from the flow of modern war weapons (rocket launchers, Kalashnikov-type assault rifles, etc.) from the Chadian and Libyan corridors, facilitated by their entry into international jihadist networks. On April 10, 2012, the movement extended its activities beyond the borders of Nigeria by attacking the small town of Amchidé in Cameroon located in the Far North of the country. In addition, during the first eight months of 2012, 786 violent deaths were attributed to Boko Haram against 679 dur-

ing the previous year.


Until then, although the various attacks perpetrated by this movement were unanimously condemned, no concrete action by the Nigerian government and international community was undertaken to stop Boko Haram. Territorial capture was marked by humiliating withdrawals of the Nigerian army and Boko Haram, haven taken control of a larger territory in the Borno State, gradually infiltrates the far north of Cameroon.

In May 2013, following the state of emergency decreed by the Nigerian authorities in the north-east of the country, the Nigerian army engaged in a major offensive battle thus inflicting significant setbacks on the movement and its expulsion from Maiduguri. Since then, the movement retreated to mountainous regions, particularly near the Cameroon border, on the outskirts of Lake Chad, and in the Sambisa forest.

As a result of this setback, Boko Haram, was now based in sparsely populated areas. By late 2013, this group organised numerous suicide attacks targeting the security forces or strategic objectives, particularly in Maiduguri. According to a UN agency, between mid-May and mid-December 2013, over 1,200 people were killed in Boko Haram-related attacks, a figure that does not include insurgents killed in military operations. In the first quarter of 2014, the number of victims continues to rise greatly getting to more than 1,500 people, according to Amnesty International. Majority of these are civilians killed by Boko Haram. For its part, Human Rights



THE MNJTF SENIOR STAFF PERSONNEL



Watch estimates that more than 2,000 civilians were killed by Boko Haram during the first half of 2014. The kidnapping in mid-April 2014 of 200 high school girls in Chibok in Borno State creates resentment from the international community who then came up with initiatives at the regional and international levels to fight against the movement.

The first of these steps was the Paris summit of May 2014, whose main aim was to find strategies at regional level to fight Boko Haram. The need for a regional and global approach is appropriate and urgent since the movement was gained grounds from Nigeria to Cameroon and back to Nigerian territories, gradually taking control of several Nigerian cities close to the borders.

This territorial extension goes hand in hand with a real increase in the number of victims from Boko Haram's actions. According to the Institute for Economics and Peace, in 2014 Boko Haram became the deadliest terrorist organisation in the world, responsible for the death of 6,644 persons, representing an increase of 317% from the previous year. In addition, it allegedly committed ten of the twenty deadliest terrorist attacks of the year that is eight in Nigeria and two in Cameroon. The estimate of a Nigerian NGO Security Network goes even further. According to her, Boko Haram is responsible for the deaths of about 9,000 people in 2014, the deadliest year since its creation. In addition, an additional 800,000 people were displaced by the conflict, bringing the total number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Borno State alone to more than two million.

It is in this context that, following the Paris Summit, the outline of a Force intended to bring a regional response to the actions of the Boko Haram group were elaborated. Well before the implementation of the initiatives taken at the Paris meeting and the effectiveness of the MNJTF establishment on the field of operations as part of a regional strategy, the States concerned had each set up an autonomous strategy of action, with specific national objectives. For Nigeria, the goal was to put a stop to the territorial conquests of Boko Haram and reclaim the localities under its control. Thus, it decreed the state of emergency in the north-east of the country and deployed a military contingent with the main aim to expel Boko Haram from some localities, especially Maiduguri considered by then as the main base of the movement.

For Chad, the goal is in twofold: to intervene in order to contain the threat far from its borders and to liberate Chadian trade corridors with Nigeria and Niger. Thus, Chad committed its troops on two fronts at the Cameroonian and Nigerian borders. At the border be-

tween Cameroon and Nigeria, Chad deployed a contingent of about 2,500 men. Starting from Fotokol, a Cameroonian border town, the Chadian army, unlike the Cameroonian forces, has the right to pursuit on Nigerian territory, which led to a resumption of a deadly fighting at the Nigerian city of Gamboru in the hands of Islamists. Chad was equally going to rally more troops with more than 400 vehicles on the Niger-Nigeria border, this alongside Nigerian forces.

Niger on her side until 2013 had opted for a surveillance strategy, with aim to contain the threat that was inexorably moving towards its borders, and to secure the Diffa region in the South-East of the country, a zone of Boko Haram withdrawal. An area where they recruit young combatants equally carries out trafficking and racketeering of all kinds to finance their terrorist activities. Also, Niger will adopt a combat strategy combined with military operations and economic blockade with the aim of fighting against the movement while cutting off its sources of financing and supply. In addition, a state of emergency was established with prohibitions on certain commercial activities. Military actions were carried out in the region of Diffa, this with the support of Chadian troops. A contingent of Nigerian troops was sent to northern Nigeria in the strategic city of Baga after parliamentary approval.

As for Cameroon, the situation was very special. Until 2013, it had adopted a posture of rejection and neutrality concerning the Boko Haram phenomenon. But as from the beginning of 2014, faced with the advanced situation, they witnessed series of violence from the attacks perpetrated on its territory by the group. The objective later became to safeguard the integrity of its territory and to ensure the safety of its populations in the zones attacked and throughout the Far North region of the country.

Cameroonian armed forces were immediately sent to border areas with Nigeria as part of the reinforcement measures and action intensification. 700 additional troops were deployed in June 2014 and 2,000 in August. The BIR-Alpha was created in 2014 and the operation Emergence 3, which later became Emergence 4, was setup the same year. In August 2014, the government proceeded with a military reorganisation, making the Far North the fourth joint military region and the fourth gendarmerie region. A gendarmerie legion was specifically created in Kousseri, several motorised infantry brigades, and the headquarters of the 41th Motorised Infantry Brigade (BRIM) transferred from Maroua to Kousseri. The army also fortified its equipments and multiplies its interventions granting assistance to the populations in the distribution of medicines, medical consultations, food and the construction of roads. The aim of

these was to reassure them and to create a climate of confidence between the army and the local population.

At the end of the different institutional and organizational arrangements, the MNJTF will later on take part in a regional initiative of the four member countries of the LCBC and Benin, who had a dual responsibility to the Forces already deployed. In some cases, it will complement and in other cases, she will join the national initiatives of the countries on the front line.

The concept of operation (CONOPS) of the MNJTF and the arrangements and control of its command was mainly as a result of the work of the military and legal experts' team which took place from the 5 to 7 February, 2015 in Yaoundé. This team included experts from the United Nations, the African Union, the European Union, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the Economic Community of Central African States, the Economic Community of West African States, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, Benin, France, Great Britain and the United States of America.

In accordance with CONOPS, the mandate of the MNJTF was to: create a safe and secure environment in areas affected by the activities of Boko Haram and other terrorist groups; to facilitate the implementation by the LCBC Member States and Benin the comprehensive stabilisation programs in the affected areas, including the full restoration of State authority and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees; to facilitate, within the limits of its capabilities, humanitarian operations and assistance delivery to affected populations.

The implementation of this mandate includes: conducting military operations to prevent the expansion of the Boko Haram terrorist group activities; to conduct patrols; to prevent any transfer of arms and support to the Boko Haram group; to search for and release all captives, including the 200 girls kidnapped in Chibok in April 2014; to carry psychological operations aimed at causing the abdication of Boko Haram members; and to take action in the areas of education, human rights protection and communication.

However, the MNJTF couple with the defence forces of the countries concerned and the possibility of bilateral arrangements cannot be considered as the exclusive structure on the fight against Boko Haram. Rather, they should provide a framework for coordination of their actions in order to multiply their impact. With regards to the field of intervention by the MNJTF, each contingent that constitutes its unit will be deployed within the borders of its national territory and will operate solely within its area.

In this regard, four sectors were defined. The n°1

sector command is located in the Cameroonian locality of Mora, the n°2 sector in the locality of Baga-Sola (Chad), the n°3 sector is positioned in Baga (Nigeria) and Sector n°4 base is established in the locality of Diffa (South-East of Niger). One of the specificities of these forces is the right to pursuit granted to the army to track the defaulters across the national territory of another State.

Institutionally, the MNJTF is under the main responsibility of the LCBC, including the Executive Secretary of the LCBC and the Heads of States and Governments, to which it reports on the implementation roadmap. Thus, with its Executive Secretary as Head of Mission, the LCBC ensures the political leadership of the MNJTF, along with the AU, which, as a strategic and technical partner, contributes to its smooth functioning. Without interfering in the operational activities of the MNJTF, the Executive Secretary of the LCBC works in close collaboration with the General Staff and the defence Force Commander who regularly informs him on any action undertaken in the field of operations.

The command of the Force whose headquarters is in N'Djamena, Chad, is under the Nigerian leadership throughout the duration of the mission. This decision, which has not suffered any challenge from other countries, reflects Nigeria's strong commitment to eradicate the Boko Haram phenomenon and its willingness to reaffirm leadership till the end. Operationally, this decision could be as recognition that the magnitude on the fight against Boko Haram is mostly taking place on the Nigerian territory. This then justifies why the command of the Forces should be under her leadership. However, the deputy in command is under Cameroon leadership.

The number of military, police and civilians officers to constitute the MNJTF has increased over time. By approval on January 29, 2015 the decision of the States concerned to deploy this Force, the AU CPS recommended a total might of approximately 7,500 military, police and civilian officials. Subsequently, during the meetings of experts organised in Yaoundé from February 5 to 7, 2015, the workforce was increased to 8,700 staff, then later to 10,000 following the declaration that followed the CPS meeting of March 3, 2015. Following the meeting of the Chiefs of Staffs of the countries contributing to the MNJTF Force, the total might of the national contingents will be brought to 11,150 workforce redistributed as follows; 3,750 for Nigeria, 3,000 for Chad, 2,650 for Cameroon, 1,000 for Niger and 750 for Benin.

At the end of the various institutional and organizational arrangements, the designation of its main leaders and the settlement of logistical issues, the MNJTF actually

came into the theatre of operations against Boko Haram towards the end of 2015. Nearly, 400 Elements of Sector No. 1 of the MNJTF made their first patrol on November 25, 2015 between Limani and Boundéri in the Far-North region of Cameroon. This first outing did not take place with ease. This is because a truck transporting troops bound on an improvised explosive device in the vicinity of Wambaché.

It was from February 2016 that the first major military operations were deployed in the scene of operations by the MNJTF. Four large scale operations which produced significant results were immediately highlighted. The operation called Arrow Five deployed from 11 to 14, February 2016 in the Nigerian locality of Ngoshe; the operation of 24, February 2016 in the locality of Kumshe in Nigeria near the Cameroon border, considered a rear base of Boko Haram; the operation named Tentacule of March 16, 2016 in the Cameroonian and Nigerian localities of Djibrili and Zamga; and the operation deployed from 10 to 16, May 2016 in the Madawya forest in Nigeria, jointly led by members of the sector No. 1 of the MNJTF, soldiers of the Cameroon operation Emergence 4 supported by the Nigerian army.

Subsequently, in June 2016, the MNJTF launched the operation called Gama Aiki, involving the coalition countries, this with the aim to destroy the last strongholds of Boko Haram. This operation led to action on several fronts such as the Niger / Nigeria border and around

the Lake Chad Basin. The entry of Nigerian soldiers into Nigerian territory at the end of July 2016 liberated border localities such as Damasak under constant Boko Haram attacks.

In the absence of complete information on all the actions deployed by the MNJTF and their real impact, some information in the area of "defence secrecy" for strategic issues could not be denied. However, it is undeniable to recognize that as soon as it came into action, MNJTF contributed significantly in improving the security situation in several areas around the Lake Chad Basin occupied by Boko Haram. During the first five months of 2016, its actions reportedly resulted in the neutralisation of at least 675 elements of Boko Haram, the arrest of 566 others and the dismantling of nearly 32 training camps and settings such as improvised explosive devices and mines factories. Nearly 4,690 hostages in the group were also released.

Despite the lack of accurate and comprehensive information on the human and material capabilities of Boko Haram, many well-informed observers claim that, less than a year after its establishment, the MNJTF reduced more than 80 percent the group operational capabilities. To date, Boko Haram does not control any major locality in the Lake Chad Basin area. Moreover, even during the climax of the crisis, Boko Haram has never taken control on any locality out of Nigeria. The group is no longer able to wage a conventional war



against the MNJTF or the National Forces concerned.

Boko Haram has thus been reconverted into a more stubbornly asymmetrical war and equally abandoned the use of heavy vehicles, armoured or not, in favour of motorcycles. Its fighters suddenly take advantage of the ecological environment for shelter and to regroup. Their attacks now almost exclusively targets civilians. These attacks are carried out by small groups, either against unprotected villages, or by activating in public places explosives they carry.

In sustaining the significant efforts of the MNJTF in its fight against Boko Haram, it is also important to note the contributions made by the various bilateral and multilateral partners of the LCBC and the countries concerned. These include the United Nations, the African Union, the European Union, France, the United States and Great Britain. These struggles were much more strategic and included support in the domains of finances and logistics, the training of specialised units and information researching.

It is remarkable that, in the domain of security crisis created by Boko Haram, there has never been a case notably in Africa where foreign forces or UN intervene in this field of operation. The States concerned have decided in the face of the wait-and-see attitude and the tameness of the international community, to apply leadership in this fight in a supportive manner.

Comparing the results obtained by the MNJTF and those obtained in recent years in other areas of operation in Africa by foreign forces, especially Western forces or United Nations peacekeeping missions, it is indisputable that the MNJTF has shown much more efficiency and has produced significant and palpable results in a very short time. Even though international organisations like Amnesty International have repeatedly denounced cases of torture on Boko Haram fighters coupled with the arbitrary arrests among civilian populations. It must be accredited that there has never been neither cases of abuses against the population nor operations that have caused considerable collateral damage in this sphere.

On the contrary, the whole world witnessed the consequences of the intervention of NATO troops in Libya

against the wish of the African Union this under France's leadership. In the Central African Republic (CAR), the mobilisation of more than 13,000 workforces by the United Nations under MINUSCA since 2013 has so far been unable to bring peace to the country. The central Government has authority in limited parts of the territory, while the rest is controlled by armed groups fighting daily. The disgruntlement of the Central African populations has been expressed several times through marches and demonstrations demanding the departure of MINUSCA.

Although in Mali, the French operation "Barkhane" made it possible to stop the jihadist's armed action towards Bamako during the capture and occupation of northern Mali, however, the action carried by the Chadian troops was decisive. They were the only ones to retreat the fighters in their entrenchments in the mountains and caves of northern Mali. Till date, the MINUSMA deployed in Mali by the United Nations with all the possible means has never successfully stabilised and brought peace to northern Mali. Divergent opinions on its effectiveness are more and more criticised and demand to leave in preference to an African Force.

It is in line with this vision that the G5 Sahel, a sub-regional organisation comprising five Sahel countries: Chad, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania, drew inspiration from the MNJTF experience decided to create the G5 Sahel Force. This force reflects the willingness of the States concerned to take over the leadership on the resolution of security issues in the G5 Sahel area. It thus indicates that the MNJTF experience paves the way, while suggesting for the future, a model of appropriation and resolution of African security issues by the African States themselves.

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THE MULTI-NATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE AND COUNTERING BOKO HARAM TERRORISM IN THE LAKE CHAD BASIN: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

By Kyari Mohammed,
Jude A. Momodu et
Saheed Babajide Owonikoko


Boko Haram started as a local insurgency against the Nigerian state and rapidly grew to become a regional transnational threat. The choice of border towns to proselytise and recruit was a major strategic move. Areas specifically targeted for early recruitment included Kanamma, Damasak and Geidam on the Niger border, and Gwoza, Bama, Banki, Gamboru and Ngala on the Cameroun and Chad borders. While most Boko Haram attacks were within Nigerian territory from 2009 to 2013, the insurgents had developed to become a major threat to all of Nigeria's neighbours by 2014.

Figure 1 below is an illustration of the spread and expansion of Boko Haram violence within and outside its Nigerian operational area. The red and black half circles portray the operations of Boko Haram, the various spots being places where Boko Haram had carried out attacks within Nigeria. While the red half circles signifies the magnitude of deadly attacks, the black halves represents the numbers of violent deaths caused by the sect. The biggest half red and half black circle on Borno State refers to the origin of Boko Haram in Nigeria while the grey area covering Yobe and Borno States signifies the strongholds of Boko Haram before 2009. The black arrows show the pattern and dimension of the spread of Boko Haram insurgency from Borno and Yobe States. These arrows indicate that Boko Haram is not only expanding inward into other states from Borno and Yobe states but also spreading to immediate neighbouring countries. While contiguous countries have been sucked into the vortex of Boko Haram terrorism, its influence is felt as far as Mali, Mauritania and beyond. Claims of formal links to Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL) remain proclamations more than formal relationships.



As a response to the security threat by Boko Haram both within and beyond Nigeria's borders, the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of the Lake Chad Basin Commission was authorized to confront the challenge. This paper examines the role of the MNJTF in that capacity by attempting to answer two questions. How well has this sub-regional collective security body responded to the challenge in its initial years of activity? What are its major challenges and how can these be addressed? This paper, therefore, critically examines the prospects and challenges of the MNJTF in curtailing the activities of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin. It also offers some suggestions on how to enhance the capacity of the regional force in effectively countering the threat.

Figure 1: Expansion of the Boko Haram terrorism



Boko Haram's Transnational Terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin area

Establishing a global Islamic caliphate seems to preoccupy contemporary jihadi organizations despite their varying degrees of commitment. Also, the claims by Boko Haram of links with such like-minded organizations as AQIM or ISIS remain symbolic in spite of all efforts. This notwithstanding, we consider Boko Haram as a transnational terrorist group, following Ezelebor and Owonikoko (forthcoming) who define transnational terrorism as "a form of terrorism in which the perpetrators, victims, audience or the entire activities of the terror group straddle two or more countries". In this perspective, the conditions under which terrorism can be termed to be transnational are as follows:

When terror incidents starts in one country but end in another. For example when a plane is hijacked in country A and diverted to country B.

If a terrorist group carries out attacks against the national interest of another country within their own home country.

When a terrorist group challenges regional or

international hegemony of a country by engaging in local violence, especially when the terrorist group sees that home as an extension of the regional, international or global political order.

If a terrorist group from another country carries out an attack in a country different than their own.

When the emblem, institution or organization associated with one country is attacked in another country or in the home country of the terror group because the targets are softer and easier to attack in the other country or the home country of the terror group than the original target country.

If a terror attack in the home country of the terror group is directed against citizens of another country.

Terrorist attacks against international organizations' personnel or property.

When membership of a terrorist group cuts across states or has a network structure that transcends states.

Boko Haram violence has satisfied most of the conditions above.

At the initial stage of the Boko Haram insurgency (2009-2013), countries within the Chad Basin region did not experience attacks. But sect members in these countries used them as safe havens, training camps, transit points for weapons, planning and strategizing for attacks against the North East region of Nigeria and recruitment of new members. Since 2012, Boko Haram heightened the scale of their violent attacks on villages and communities in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states in northeastern Nigeria, triggering a humanitarian crisis with numerous refugees and displaced persons, including the mass exodus of youths out of their villages and communities to other areas they considered safe. Some of these youths joined local resistant groups against Boko Haram such as Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), hunters and vigilante groups. This has significantly reduced Boko Haram's access to non-forcible youths for recruitment in Nigeria. and the group has since shifted attention to Cameroon. More generally, communities along the porous borders between Nigeria and its neighbours were used to smuggle weapons, as rear bases, and for planning attacks.

Following the crackdown on Boko Haram after their July 2009 uprising in Maiduguri and the killing of its leader Mohammed Yusuf and several key commanders, most prominent leaders of the sect relocated to neighboring countries to seek refuge among the local populace. The reluctance of neighboring states to get involved early in resisting the insurgency also aided the development of terrorism along the shores of Lake Chad. Thus Boko Haram commanders usually crossed borders at ease from onslaught of national military pursuit till the emergence of the MNJTF as counter terrorism outfit. Boko Haram tactically avoided antagonizing neighboring countries by not attacking and concentrating on Nigeria. This gave the impression to Nigeria's neighbors that Boko Haram was essentially a Nigerian problem that did not directly affect them, until military pressure on the terrorists by Nigeria and massive recruitment across the borders transnationalized the crisis.

Kidnapping of foreign nationals to finance their activities brought the government of Cameroon into the conflict in February 2013 with the abduction of the Moulin Fournier family at Waza national park. This was quickly followed a series kidnappings, including that of a French priest in November 2013. In 2014, two Italian priests and a Canadian nun were kidnapped, and then ten Chinese citizens. Furthermore, high profile and prominent local notables or family members were also kidnapped within this period.

The establishment of the MNJTF

The MNJTF is a multilateral security formation which comprises military and civilian personnel. Its establishment in support of security in the Lake Chad region did not start with the wake of Boko Haram insurgency. Its creation, which pre-dates Boko Haram, can be traced to the 1990s when palpable insecurity in the region occasioned by armed banditry, arms trafficking, border intrusion, among other security challenges along Nigeria's border with Chad, Cameroon and Niger necessitated the establishment of a military unit. It was then known as Multinational Joint Security Force (MNJSF). The idea to create such a security force was mooted by the Nigeria's Head of State, General Sani Abacha (1993-98). It was originally headquartered at Baga, a fishing settlement in the Kukawa Local Government area of Borno State. The initial mandate of the security force was to: conduct military operations, check banditry and facilitate free movement of people in the Lake Chad Region. Nigeria, Niger and Chad were the troop contributors at inception. However, it remained unassertive and ineffective regionally, as only Nigerian troops were usually on the ground.

At the 14th summit of Heads of States and Governments of the LCBC which was held in Chad in April 2012, it was agreed that the multilateral security outfit be strengthened and its mandate extended to include rooting out Boko Haram. By 2014, the military coalition had been reinvigorated and expanded to address the cross-border terrorism of Boko Haram. Several meetings were conducted between LCBC member states and Benin along with the international community in Paris (May 2014), London (June, 2014) and Washington (August, 2014). Other meetings were conducted in Abuja, Niamey, Yaoundé, among others to reposition the MNJTF and to put it in proper shape to be responsive to Boko Haram and other terrorist activities in the Lake Chad. The taskforce currently has its headquarters in N'djamena, Chad, with a Nigerian Major General as commander. It has a total of troops contributed by Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Cameroon and Benin that evolved from 8,700 at the initial moment of commitment to 8,850 in late 2017. Table 1 below shows the evolution.

Table 1: Troop Contribution to MNJTF by Countries			
S/N	State	Number of Troops Initially Considered	Number of Troops Contributed
1	Nigeria	3,250	3250
2	Chad	3000	3000
3	Cameroon	950	2250
4	Niger	750	200
5	Benin	750	150
Total	8,700	8,850	

The African Union-approved MNJTF (AU, 2015:6-7) has the core mandate to:

Create a safe and secure environment in the areas affected by the activities of Boko Haram and other terrorist groups, in order to significantly reduce violence against civilians and other abuses, including sexual and gender-based violence, in full compliance with international law, including international humanitarian law and the UN HRDDP;

Facilitate the implementation of overall stabilization program by LCBC member states and Benin in the affected areas, including the full restoration of state authority and the return of IDPs and refugees; and

Facilitate within the limit of its capabilities, humanitarian operations and the delivery of assistance to the affected populations.

Within the framework of this mandate and in its AoR, the MNJTF contingents deployed within their national territories are expected to carry out a number of tasks that includes the following:

Conducting military operations to prevent the expansion of Boko Haram and other terrorist activities and eliminate their presence;

Facilitating operational coordination amongst the

affected countries in the fight against Boko Haram and other terrorist groups, including on the basis of the intelligence collected by the LCBC member states and Benin and/or availed by external partners;

Encouraging and facilitating the conduct of joint/simultaneous/coordinated patrols and other types of operations at the borders of the affected countries;

Preventing all forms of transfer of arms and ammunition and other type of support to Boko Haram and other terrorist groups;

Ensuring, within its capabilities, the protection of civilians under immediate threat, IDP and refugee camps, humanitarian workers and other civilian personnel,

Actively searching for, and freeing all abductees, including the young girls abducted in Chibok in April 2014;

Undertaking effective psychological operations to encourage defections from Boko Haram and other terrorist groups;

Supporting, as may be appropriate, the initial implementation phase of strategies for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of disengaged fighters into their communities;

Contributing to the improvement and institutionalization of civil-military coordination, including the provision, upon request, of escorts to humanitarian convoys;

Supporting regional efforts to arrest and bring to justice all those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity; and

Ensuring the protection of the MNJTF personnel, facilities and equipment.

Prospects

Since the reinvigoration and the expansion of the MNJTF, scholars have raised critical issues on the prospects of the force in tackling the Boko Haram violent extremism. The issue has often been the inadequacy of the regional force to confront Boko Haram headlong. For Instance, Lori-Anne Theroux-Benoni suggested that the MNJTF is not adequate to confront Boko Haram's threats in the Lake Chad region:

For those who continue to worry about the kidnapped Chibok school girls and other victims of terrorist acts perpetrated by Boko Haram, the details of the MNJTF deployment come as a major disappointment. The MNJTF appears largely

out of sync with what would have been needed on the ground, in Nigeria, to eliminate the threat posed by Boko Haram (Theroux-Benoni, 2015).

In her view,

What would have been required, it seems, is a rather robust force such as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which has been combating al-Shabaab Islamist since 2007. The format of the AU Regional Cooperation Initiative for the elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA), which was established in 2011, could also have been envisaged. Another model could have been the initial configuration of the African-led international support mission in Mali (AFISMA), in which the national army was intended to spearhead operations with support from the Africa force, to recapture territory in northern Mali that was being controlled by a mixture of secessionist and jihadist armed groups (Theroux-Benoni, 2015).

Theroux-Benoni raises serious doubts about the prospects of the MNJTF and insists that curtailing Boko Haram's regional expansion in the Lake Chad and Nigeria, specifically, should require a more concerted effort rather than an *ad hoc* regional response. She is not alone as a proponent of this perspective. Waddington (2015) also pointed at the inadequacy of the force when he said:

The MNJTF comprising troops from the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) members, increasingly appears unlikely to be able to bring much change to the Boko Haram insurgency that has swept through north-east Nigeria and to its neighbours to the east. The finalized force size, structure and scope of operations give little reason to expect the force to be able to, by itself significantly degraded or contain the Islamist militant insurgency (Waddington, 2015).

However, the perceived inefficiency of MNJTF in its first years of combating the Boko Haram fierce attacks in the Chad Basin Region notwithstanding, capacitating the force strength of MNJF troops as well as effective



Figure 2: Islamist Militant Groups and their Areas of Influence in Africa



coordination of their activities can ensure a military victory against Boko Haram. Our submission is based on the key facts developed in the following paragraphs.

Boko Haram's Area of Operation is confined to Lake Chad Region

Boko Haram's areas of operation is also the area of operational responsibility of the MNTJF (figure 2). A coordinated offensive of military operations from within the territories of these countries can push Boko Haram to the brink and effectively bring its reign to a halt. Although Boko Haram's main stronghold remains in Nigeria, especially Borno State, an offensive from within Nigeria can drive Boko Haram to the dragnet of the multinational force.

Willingness and Readiness of LCBC Member States

Member states of LCBC and Benin have shown readiness to root out the threat of Boko Haram headlong. The March 2014 Yaoundé meeting of the LCBC and Benin Republic showed their resolute doggedness to tackle Boko Haram. This has also invited the seriousness of the international community. Subsequent meetings were held including the Yaoundé between 5th and 7th February 2014 where the concept of operations, command and control, support concept, rules of engagement (RoE) and guidelines on the

protection of civilians were developed and agreed upon. Other meetings held in Niamey in October 2014; Abuja, September 3 and October 13, 2014; and Niamey January 20, 2015 finalized agreements on headquarters of the force and communication networks for the security forces operating in and around the Lake Chad Basin. These agreements were not only crucial steps but also showed the willingness and readiness of the LCBC member states to rid the region of Boko Haram. They also demystified the assertion at some quarters that Nigeria was not ready to accept any "foreign boots" on its territory. However, the leaders of the member states should sustain unwavering commitment in ensuring success of the war on terrorism in their collective interest.

Support of the International Community

International community's financial, logistic and moral support also backs the force's prospect to root out the Islamist sect. The various agreements in the build up to institutionalizing the MNJTF were significant to draw international support. For instance, the adoption of the guidelines on the protection of civilians mainstreamed the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Due Diligence Policy into the formation of the force. This invited the interest of the UN in the formation of the force. UN has since called for increased international support for the force and also worked to ensure that the force gets

necessary financial and logistic support through a Security Council Resolution. The African Union (AU) has given its support to the force by approving the take-off of the force and has also directed that all AU member states and other members of the international community should extend the necessary support to the force. This, the Union reiterated, should include “financial and logistical assistance, equipment, as well as enhanced and timely intelligence sharing support, to facilitate the early and full operationalization of the MNJTF” (AU, 2015:4). Countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as the European Union, also support the regional force with funds, logistics and training (Njamba, 2015).

The AU-approved force commenced action around the Lake Chad region with “Operation Gama Aiki”. Since the commencement of its operation, the force has recorded some significant military successes. It has been able to block the routes through which Boko Haram gets arms and ammunition and also seized and destroyed large quantities of equipment, arms and ammunitions.

Some of the equipment seized from around the commencement of the operation included Hilux van mounted with Shilka gun with 97 rounds of 21mm, AK rifles, rocket propelled grenades, mortar bombs, GPMG rifles, HK 24 machine guns, AKM machine guns and bandoliers (Sahara Reporter, 2016). Furthermore, most territories controlled by the terrorists in Nigeria and Chad have been cleared of insurgents. Similarly, as a result of increase in the firepower of “Operation Lafiya Dole” operating basically in Borno State, a huge number of terrorists have fled their hideouts in Sambisa Forest and moved towards the shores of the Lake Chad on the border between Nigeria and Niger. Several of these have been arrested while some have willingly surrendered to forces around the Lake Chad. According to Colonel Dole:

Sustained offensive operations and blockage of logistics supply routes made the terrorist location untenable; as a result, Boko Haram terrorists and their families abandoned their locations and surrendered



Brief sur les droits de l'homme de l'OCHA

with their arms to the nearest location of the ground force in the operation areas (Informationnng.com/tag/mnjtf)

Although some analysts have suggested that those that surrender might be new recruits that the group has found difficult to retain since losing territories formerly controlled, surrender however, is a sign that the force has been making significant headway

Challenges of the MNJTF in the Fight against Boko Haram

Several challenges appear to limit the effectiveness of the MNJTF. We review some of them below.

Blame Game among LCBC Member States

One major challenge to the MNJTF was the blame game among member state of LCBC since the deployment of the force. Nigeria has been criticized by allied states for parading coward troops and being allegedly reluctant to allow foreign soldiers into the country to fight Boko Haram. Nigeria has also pointed at complicity of LCBC member states in aiding Boko Haram attacks against Nigeria. one of the most counterproductive examples of blame game among the LCBC member states was the trade of words between Nigerien Minister for Defence, Mahamadou Karidjo and the spokesperson of the Nigerian Army, General Chris Olukolade. In a statement signed on behalf of the Nigerien Ministry of Defence, Mr. Karidjo said "Our soldiers are not like Nigerians, they don't run". General Chris Olukolade furiously responded in a series of tweets, saying:

Welcome our friends from Niger. No way for your infamous looting here. How the poor country compensates its soldiers and claim they don't run. Our soldiers have been defending our people and nation's wealth from mercenaries supplied to Boko Haram by those who boast that they don't run (cited by Ekhatior, 2015).

This blame game may not be unrelated to regional rivalries and colonial history of acrimonious rivalries which fifty years has not resolved. For instance, Nigeria and Cameroon have had an historical dispute over the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula that pushed the two countries to the brink of war. The conflict over the peninsula and the International Court of Justice's verdict further polarize the two countries. Implementing the Greentree agreement on the Bakassi Peninsula has become a

problem for the two countries. Similarly, Nigeria also has disputes with Chad and Niger over Islands on the Lake Chad. The effect and potential of the blame game, at least initially, was causing distrust and obviously affecting the coordination and performance of the MNJTF.

Porous Borders

One major structural challenges is the "long and shifting" borders which continue to allow Boko Haram evade the offensive operation of the Nigerian army in the North East (Menner, 2015). The border between Nigeria and other LCB state transcend 2,000 miles with numerous illegal and unmanned routes. Boko Haram's strong ethno-linguistic ties around the Lake Chad and the shrinking of the Lake Chad are also strong factors. While the ethno-religious/linguistic cross-border tie facilitate cross-border movement that makes policing difficult, the shrinking of the Lake has also made the previously difficult borders to cross now easier even for Boko Haram members and other non-state armed groups (Menner, 2015).

This challenge has been made more difficult by the limited size and constrained geographical scope of the MNJTF. MNJTF soldiers of the Nigerian Sector were mandated to only operate at the outskirts between Diffa, Baga and Ngala. Therefore, the main task of the force is to secure Nigeria's side of the Lake Chad to prevent infiltration and cross-border movement of Boko Haram members. This only constitutes between 10 to 15 percent of the entire area where Boko Haram operatives. Therefore, it still remains entirely up to Nigeria to do most of the fighting on its soil than depending on MNJTF that have a very limited area of operational responsibility (AoR). The geographical constraint of the MNJTF has also been hinged on the inability of Nigeria to allow foreign troops on its soil. Where Nigerien and Chadian troops have been allowed to come into Nigeria to assist Nigerian troops fight Boko Haram on Nigeria's soil, it was a different bilateral agreement between Nigeria and these countries and not within the multilateral security arrangement that established the MNJTF.

There are at least four reasons why Nigeria might not want foreign boots on its soil in the fight against terrorism. First and foremost Nigeria prides itself as a regional and continental military powerhouse that has been part or led regional operations in Chad, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Darfur, etc. Therefore, hosting foreign troops on its territory to fight Boko Haram terrorism will demystify and dent Nigeria's regional and continental recognition and image as a military powerhouse.

Secondly, Nigeria has a history of border disputes with all the LCB states which is still affecting the

relationship and cooperation especially between these states and Nigeria. For Instance, Cameroon has a mutual agreement with Chad and Niger to allow troops from these states enter into its territory to flush out Boko Haram elements in its northern region. However, Nigeria did not allow any of these countries' troops enter into its territory till January 2015 when Nigeria allowed Chadian and Nigerien military personnel enter into Nigeria under a separate agreement to assist her military personnel flush out Boko Haram in her territory.

The third reason is derived from an interview with one of Nigeria's contingent in MNJTF who cited possibility of grave abuse of the fundamental human rights of Nigerians by the foreign troops as one of the reasons why Nigeria would not allow any foreign troops especially from neighbouring LCB states. Fourth is the overwhelming influence of France on its former colonies and its distrust of Nigeria's rising influence in West and central Africa.

Resilience of Boko Haram

Boko Haram has been sufficiently weakened and its capacity to fight and hold large swathes of territory. However, even when completely removed, they still have the capacity to periodically launch guerilla attacks in Nigeria and across to neighboring states. This has generated the current humanitarian disaster ravaging the region. This has only shown the group's resilience and ability to retaliate against any major military policy against it. The continuing attacks against Niger and Chad as a revenge of joining the multilateral military response is an indication of the terrorists fighting spirit. However the terrorists are on the back foot and the MNJTF seems to be winning the war even if the momentum is slowed down.

Deficiencies of LCBC Member states' militaries

The fact that military organizations of LCBC member states are deficient in the fight against Boko Haram cannot be ignored. The deficiencies of these military organizations stem from the fact that most of them are not used to fighting against terrorists and are poorly equipped. This accounts for why they are usually overpowered by insurgents. Nigerian soldiers have refused to fight and have even mutinied. Although these

soldiers have been label as cowards, they have also complained of lack of equipment. This seriously impinges on the effectiveness of the MNJTF that are formed by these state. Originally, only Chad has been seen as demonstrating fairly effective military performance in the multilateral military cooperation. Chad's commitment to the MNJTF has been reinforced by the political will drive by the interest of Chad to block the possibility of Boko Haram dangerous expansion to further conflagrate Southern Chad tension. Recently however, Chad's commitment to the cooperation has reduced as a result of internal security caused Boko Haram attacks within the country.

Conclusion: Rethinking Multi-lateral Cooperation for Military Alliance in LCB

It is good to see the LCB region arriving at a common understanding on multilateral security cooperation in spite of the long history of failure to have a clear framework or measure towards addressing vulnerabilities of the region. The question however is whether multilateral security arrangement/cooperation alone is enough to address the vulnerabilities and the insecurity occasioned by cross-border terrorism in the region. Here, it is important to be mindful of the problem tree analysis of conflict perspective. Like trees, violent conflicts have three parts which are: the root causes, the core problem and the effects. Conflicts, especially those relating to violent extremism and terrorism cannot be sustainably ridden-off when the effects or the core problem are only addressed but not the root causes. Using exclusively military approach to tackle the problem of Boko Haram terrorism amounts only to dealing with effect rather than the root causes of terrorism in the LCB region.

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THE MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE: AT THE INTERSECTION OF NATIONAL AND CROSS-BORDER, THE DIVERSIFICATION OF FORCES AGAINST BOKO HARAM IN THE FAR NORTH OF CAMEROON

By Henri Mbarkoutou Mahama

The fight against Boko Haram in the Far North of Cameroon necessitated a strategic adjustment this in favour of the Multinational Joint Task Force which constitutes an essential tie. As a result of the progressive widening of the LCBC's fields of intervention in the question linked to the sustainable management of the waters of Lake Chad and the preservation of the ecosystems towards the promotion of peace and security, the MJTF in its N° 1 sector stand to intervene national and cross-border crisis. This posture conferred on him a dual perspective of synergies, first with the internal forces and then with the other sectors of the MNJTF. The many successes achieved against Boko Haram, by both internal forces and by the MNJTF, are linked to the combination of the various chains of military operations. It is important to show here that the coexistence and interaction of the MNJTF at the national and sub-regional levels, constitutes the main factor in understanding a new strategic dynamic in cooperation between different neighbouring states and different armed forces. The study analyzes the mechanics of internal distribution of roles and the ability to articulate and adapt externally which has endorsed the MNJTF to position itself as a strategic asset for Cameroon and an opportunity for neighbouring countries in the perspective of sustainable stability of the Lake Chad Basin area.



Soldiers of the 764th ordnance company, of the 71st ordnance group (EOD) of the Fort Carson US Army, exploding three different charges to demonstrate the effects to participants of the 2018 UNIFACT Focus in Douala, Cameroon

I. The advent of the MNJTF in the fight against Boko Haram

Created on 20th January, 2015 in Niamey in Niger and endorsed at the summit of the African Union Heads of States on 31st January of the same year in Addis Ababa. The principal aim of the MNJTF was to create a safe and secure environment in the regions affected by the activities of Boko Haram and other terrorist groups, in order to significantly reduce violence against civilians and other abuses, including sexual and gender-based violence, in accordance with international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights due diligence of the United Nations on human rights.¹ On the other hand, this organisation was to face complex and pernicious challenges that constitute the base for organised crime such as, trafficking of all kinds, terrorism and violent extremism. On the other hand, it set in motion to sub-region states to promote security approach to the detriment of an approach that integrates the need for security and the priority of development.² The MNJTF is a top military force which the LCBC member states put in place to work against the Boko Haram threat. Headed from its staff based in Ndjamena, the MNJTF is governed by an operational concept (CONOPS)³ developed by experts at the Yaoundé meeting that defines the details in the strategic coordination, administrative and logistical support to the unit Force, as well as the rules of engagement that underlie the conduct of military operations. According to this concept, the MNJTF operates in four sectors these on the basis of a territorial distribution of the zones of operations. The sector No.1 corresponds to the Cameroonian territorial portion located in the south of the affected areas. This sector is commanded by a Cameroon army general stationed in Mora in the far north of Cameroon.

The MNJTF was not the only military force on the

ground when it becomes operational in November 2015. Cameroon had already defined a strategy of territorial defence forces as part of the national response to the aggression of Boko Haram. At the strategic level, there is a reconfiguration of the territorial division of command areas put in place. It seems to have become clear that the initial response measures that had been deployed since December 2013 lacked vigour and clearly reflected the uncertainties that characterize the misunderstood nature of the threat. The main aim was to revitalize the 3rd Military Region, which covered the northern regions, in order to make it more reactive to the first forms of incursions by the terrorist movement. In addition to the internal organization of the 31st and 32nd motorized⁴ infantry brigades based respectively in Ngaoundéré and Maroua, the Territorial Gendarmerie Group of Garoua⁵ and several gendarmerie brigades were created in the national territory.⁶

The creation of the 4th Military Zone in August 2014 which covers the entire Far North Region and the Mayo-Louti Department in the Northern Region⁷ marks a turning point in the new strategy in the redistribution of the operational units. The will of the Cameroonian Head of State to bring the command of the troops in Maroua from the fields of operations on the border with Nigeria is clearly visible. It remains are to give a real content in its engagements as such, two operations are then put in place. Operation Emergence 4 was created with the hope to materialise the 4th Military Region. It is part of the continuity of Operation Emergence 3 which consists of combat units of the regular army with increased mobilisation in the second-line areas considered refuges and bridges of circulation of the terrorist nebula. Meanwhile Operation Alpha of the Rapid Intervention Battalion (RIB), an elite unit of the Cameroonian army was deployed in the border areas to counter the incursions of Boko Haram on Cameroonian territory. It represents the first front line

¹ Communiqué final de la réunion d'experts, Yaoundé, 5-7 février 2015. Final communiqué of the experts' meeting yaounde 5th-7th february 2015

² Sanusi Imran Abdullahi, Secrétaire exécutif de la CBLT, in *Urgences et contingences*, CBLT News Magazine, n°010, août 2016.

³ Le concept d'opération (CONOPS) précise clairement la méthodologie de positionnement de la FMM à l'intersection des armées nationales et d'une armée sous régionale. Il énonce les besoins à satisfaire en troupes et matériels, fixe les objectifs de la mission et décline le protocole d'emploi des forces dans le concept global interarmées.

⁴Décret n° 2013/476 du 27 décembre 2013 portant organisation interne de la 31e Brigade d'infanterie motorisée et Décret n° 2013/477 du 27 décembre 2013 portant organisation interne de la 32e Brigade d'infanterie motorisée

⁵Décret n° 2013/479 du 27 décembre 2013 portant création du groupement de gendarmerie territoriale de Garoua.

⁶Décret n° 2013/478 du 27 décembre 2013 portant création de certaines Brigades de gendarmerie.

⁷Décret N°2014/308 du 14 août 2014 portant modification du décret n°2001/180 du 25 juillet 2001 portant réorganisation du commandement militaire territorial.

and it's divided into three zones of operations: the southern zone covering the departments of Mayo-Sava and Mayo-Tsanaga, the centre localities of Waza up to Zigué, and the northern zone in the vicinities of Logone and Chari. The Alpha operation is mainly inspired by the mode of operation of the Special Forces based on the principle of the economy force.⁸ In general, they are small autonomous teams, equipped with very elaborate equipment and great firepower.

The redeployment of combat units has a front line equidistant from Nigeria's border. This scheme corresponds to a longitudinal barrier of operation from the south of Mayo-Tsanaga department to the Lake Chad borders. This is in order to create a safe area for the localities of Mokolo, Maroua, Mora and Kousseri. With this in mind, the BIR and GPIGN units, as part of Operation Alpha, occupy the front lines where the attackers are. In support, the BTAP and BRIM regular units based in Mora, Achigassia, Kousseri are Maroua operate under the banner of Operation Emergence 4. The elite units on the front line are modular, flexible and adapted to the fugacity of the enemy.

It is within this already functional device that the

MNJTF is called upon to play a leading role in a context of modernization in the Cameroonian defence forces where the concept of interacting occupies now a prominent place though in terms of Security policy, the concepts and doctrines of the Cameroonian defence forces remain little theorized.⁹ In this regard, it is necessary to recall that the joint approach is based on a double dimension of cohabitation and interpenetration of the defence forces and the areas of interaction. This follows from a concept of interoperability between the infantry, the air force and the navy making up a dynamic combination of efforts involved in the porosity between strategic functions, greater cross-mission and theatre action.¹⁰ The following template illustrates the strategic insertion of Sector No.1 of the MNJTF in the military-civilian environment in the fight against Boko Haram in Cameroon and in the sub-region.

⁹ Pour un aperçu approfondi de la politique de Défense et de Sécurité du Cameroun, lire Pélagie Chantal Belomo Essono, 2017, *Définition d'une pensée stratégique et militaire du Cameroun : entre prospective et fabrique de l'historicité*, Editions Publibook.

¹⁰ CICDE, Concept d'emploi des forces, n°130/DEF/CICDE/NP du 12 septembre 2013.

⁸ P. Le Pautremat, 2003, *Forces spéciales, nouveaux conflits, nouveaux guerriers*, paris, éditions autrement frontières.



Template: the MNJTF in the strategic and operational landscape in the fight against Boko Haram in Cameroon

The joint model adopted by Cameroon to contain the territorial expansion of Boko Haram revolves around the concept of regional security. Although the Lake Chad Basin States have not always favoured a collective security approach, the emergence of a common threat confirms the need for the forces to be pooled. Such a shift in strategy seems to be a priority, all the more difficult that it could be upset by the hegemony of Nigeria, Chad's strategic ambition in Africa and the measured suggestions of Cameroon's international commitment on the external fronts. The strategic reality of a joint force against terrorism should redraw the new security borders around the Lake Chad and in accordance with the systemic nature of the threats and the nascent ambitions of a sub-regional security entity.¹¹

The MNJTF sub-regional vocation gives it functionality that go beyond the state borders as opposed to national mechanisms, based on the

¹¹ Usman A Tar & Mala Mustapha, «Emerging Architecture of Regional Security Complex in the Lake Chad Basin», communication à la Conférence Internationale du CODESRIA sur les Régimes de sécurité en Afrique, Bamako-Mali, 27-29 octobre 2017.

inviolability of the borders inherited from colonisation and the tensions of public security policies, which has been considered and erected as protective barriers. For Cameroon, the establishment of sector No.1 MNJTF actually offset the prohibition of prosecution of the Cameroonian army on Nigerian territory, thus forecasting deep operations in Nigerian territory. Thus, it must not only act in support of the Alpha and Emergence 4 operations that have been operating since 2014 to contain and prevent the Boko Haram attacks, but it must act with settled groups in Nigeria through a collaboration with the military authorities Nigerian.

The concept of inter-armament adopted by Cameroon also makes it possible to compensate certain weaknesses noted in the MNJTF capacity:

This sleight of hand between Operation Alpha and the Multinational Joint Task Force can be explained by the current limitations noted in the MNJTF which has no direct intervention, nor armoured units and less air force. However, the ongoing operation which is taking place in a mountain sanctuary in Boko Haram, requires specific means that only the BIR currently has.¹²

From this observation of complementarities, it is evident that the operational declination of the joint concept whose capacity for appropriation by the MNJTF is reflected in a change in its influence from the internal

¹² *L'Œil du Sahel*, 22 décembre 2016.



Nigerian soldiers patrolling around the boundaries with Nigeria

radiation to a sub-regional impact.

II. The MNJTF sector N° 1: from internal radiation to regional impact

The MNJTF extension in the field of cross-border operations was principally based on the beneficial effects in its capacity to fight against Boko Haram insurgent. While most of the actions carried out internally with the contribution of sector 1 of the MNJTF in the operational framework of the Alpha and Emergence 4 operations, the deep operations on Nigerian territory carries inverse attributes. A good number of the cross-border operations in Sector No.1 of the MNJTF are been carried as team forces.

The battles won by the MNJTF in the fight against Boko Haram are numerous. The events recorded shows that at the climax of the war in 2015, the first MNJTF patrols were visible in November. Although hesitant and uncertain came out because of the changes in the threat by bombings and improvised explosive devices and the operational capabilities witnessed in its initial stage, several camps of the sect were dismantled in Nigeria and in Cameroon. Major operations conducted in coordination with the other three sectors of the MNJTF entered in the deployment phase with major targets. The goal was to secure critical areas and to neutralise the logistic access and the supply chain of terrorist groups.

This phase resulted in cross-border operations in areas with acuity on sensitive points to reduce the operational capabilities of the sect. Later then, follows the offensive operations phase including the strongholds of the terrorist group in Nigeria. Whether focused on internal co-operation targets with the Alpha and Emergence 4 special units or deep offensives with sectors 2, 3 and 4, Sector 1 operations followed one another in the main territories controlled by the terrorist movement. Several analysts have echoed this:

There were at least four military operations: the one from 11th to 14th February 2016 in the Nigerian locality of Ngoshe (as part of Operation Arrow Five); on 24th February 2016 in the locality of Kumshe, Nigeria, near the Cameroon border, considered a rear base of Boko Haram; March 16th, 2016 in the Cameroonian and Nigerian communities of Djibrili and Zamga (as part of Operation Tentacle); and that from 10th to 16th May 2016 in the Madawya forest in Nigeria, jointly led by elements of the sector No.1 of the MNJTF, soldiers of the Cameroon operation Emergence 4 backed by the

Nigerian army.¹³

Major offensive operations brought together by the four armies succeeded in overcoming the Boko Haram attackers in the Sambisa forest, equally neutralised the group's strongholds in Lake Chad and secured border areas between different states.¹⁴ The talents acquired by Sector N°1 of the MNJTF is partly due to the adaptation and resilience agenda. Benefiting from the ecosystem where the operations Emergence 4, Alpha and the territorial units of the Gendarmerie and the Police have already accessed and prepared the theatres of operations, the MNJTF adopted an operational intelligence focused on the successes of the forces in presence, the influence of community leaders, humanitarian actors and public administrations. As a result, collaboration with the various actors has emerged as a key asset in the fight against Boko Haram. It should ultimately serve as a springboard for the formation of a sub-regional army capable of addressing common security challenges to the Lake Chad member states.¹⁵ Flexibility was also an important step especially since the various operations were within the limit of the State of Cameroon military capabilities. By getting aware of its potential capabilities, Sector N°1 of the MNJTF got the right balance between the contribution of others and the definition of its own strategic and operational identity.

¹³ Institut d'études de sécurité, « la force multinationale de lutte contre Boko Haram : quel bilan ? », *Rapport sur l'Afrique de l'Ouest*, n°19, août 2016, p.12.

¹⁴ A ce titre, l'on se souvient qu'à la suite des attaques successives de la ville de Bosso au Niger du 3 juin 2016 faisant plus de 20 morts dont plusieurs soldats nigériens et nigérians¹⁴, de attentats suicides multiples dont ceux de Mémé faisant 19 morts et de Djakana à la frontière avec le Nigeria faisant 11 morts¹⁴, les différentes unités des quatre secteurs militaires de la FMM lancèrent une vaste offensive. Sur le front du nord-est, les armées nigérienne et tchadienne mènent des opérations de sécurisation de de la frontière entre le Nigeria et le Niger que matérialise le fleuve Komadougou. Dans le sillage de l'opération Gama Aiki de la FMM, l'armée nigériane organise une offensive sous la bannière de l'opération Lafiya Dole en faisant une progression de l'état du Borno vers les bases de Boko Haram dans le lac Tchad (voir <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/337993/politique/lac-tchad-lof-fensive-de-force-multinationale-mixte-contre-boko-haram>; L'œil du Sahel, 22 décembre 2016).

¹⁵ Nana Ngassam R., « La force multinationale mixte de la CBLT et l'imbroglie Boko Haram : entre ambiguïtés, réticences et opportunités » in *Vigie*, La lettre bi-mestrielle, géostratégique, mai 2016.

III. The challenge of stabilisation

Since the beginning of 2017 and with the drop of Boko Haram's conventional attack capacity, the war has entered the phase of stabilisation primarily due to the joint response within the army and the coalition of armies from the sub-region under the banner of Sector No.1 of the MNJTF. The stabilisation sphere marks a decisive evolution of way out from the crisis. This is understood as one of the crisis management processes aimed at restoring the minimum viability of a state or region by ending violence as a form of protest and laying the groundwork for a return to normal life by the initiation of a civil process of reconstruction.¹⁶ The sub-regional vocation of the MNJTF seems to have predisposed its sector N°1 to this ambition which in connection with the other national armies perceives more logically alternative options to the war. The stabilization-based prospects for the end of the war are in line with the overall approach to crisis management. It dependent on the willingness to emerge from face-to-face confrontation between the army and terrorist groups in order to establish a dynamic capable of taking into accounts all institutional and non institutional actors. Equally, to open up civil and military actions into a common vision base on collaboration and a common possible coordination within the actors. The challenge faced by Sector N°1 was to lead an internal stability in a system from which it emanates even if it now responds to a sub-regional hierarchy based in Ndjamena.

As a result, the detached sector is now a new vision and new practices that Operation Emergence 4 and Operation Alpha had relatively marked and applied. At the interface of security that it continues to ensure and the homogeny that it envisages, sector N°1 is thus part of its site in the intersection between the national and regional spheres this to engage Cameroon on innovative ways to Boko Haram crisis resolution.

The first field of intervention consists of civil-military actions. The aim is to create an upright relation between the population and the army in a context of asymmetrical conflict that has not only placed a distance between the population and the defence forces, but required the MNJTF to adopt a different approach. As such, the MNJTF has multiplied actions in favour of the populations so as to ensure its collaboration and support. The rehabilitation of drinking water points, the

donation of basic necessities and school supplies materials to the schooling children, the organisation of free consultation and medical care campaigns to the patients, reinstatement of abandoned schools with military teachers, sharing of electrical energy with the populations near the bases of sector No.1 of the MNJTF are some of the actions put in place. Other civil-military actions are envisaged in the domain of the distribution of agricultural inputs, motorcycle-tricycles for the transport of agricultural products as well as the distribution of table benches in some schools. These measures undertaken by the MNJTF are principally carried out in the localities of Hilé-Alifa, Bonderi, Houmaka, Soueram, Zigue, Mada, Doublé where free care campaigns are regularly organized.

More than as usual and beyond its usual framework of collaboration between the national army and the various forces of the nation, the populations benefiting from the MNJTF services exposed more better the Cameroonian doctrine of popular defence so that the desired military victory were won by peaceful and psychological methods along side with the populations. By inserting its intervention in a dual hard and soft dimension, the MNJTF thus marks its identity articulated on a double consensus. The initially geographical phase was between the national and the sub-region and then the theoretical phase was between the military action and humanitarian/ development actions.

The second capital of the MNJTF is the out display of the Cameroonian army on to a regional vocation. The proximity via the MNJTF of the armies of Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad and Niger seems to have created a desire to break away from the need of an international commitment to conspire collective threats. Beyond full cooperation in which Cameroon remain a partisan, the MNJTF operates a strategic rapprochement with Nigeria which remains despite everything, a real structural challenge for the defence and security of Cameroon. There is increasingly an affirmation of a military alliance between Nigeria and Cameroon that the fight against Boko Haram is being ratified thanks to the multifaceted exchanges between sectors N° 1 (Cameroon) and N° 3 (Nigeria) of the MNJTF. This reinforcement prospect finds a particularly positive quality especially as it is taking place in the stabilization phase of Boko Haram affected areas. It also offers the two states to mitigate their respective complexes by a mutual understanding. Especially, the reaffirmation of a strategic independence vis-à-vis the foreign powers in the struggle by the two States against Boko Haram insurgent.

¹⁶ CICDE, *Contribution des forces armées à la stabilisation*, Paris, Février 2010.

Conclusion

Analysis on the integration of the MNJTF in general and Sector N°1 in particular in the strategic and operational landscape on the fight against Boko Haram in Cameroon is that of a dual educational and strategic approach. Beyond the issue on peace return of which necessitated a revision of the strategic plan of Cameroon in its northern part to the southern outskirts of Lake Chad, the integration capacity of sector No.1 of the MNJTF firstly in the national military apparatus of response and then in its projection on the sub-regional scene on the fight against Boko Haram, leads to two observations: The first is that, the MNJTF reveals the strategic capacity of Cameroon to update its operational concepts of military commitment by adapting its employment device might to the threat. The Boko Haram insurgency has the value of having provoked commotion on the models of territorial distribution of

the defence and security forces. The second sphere is the gradual emergence of a Cameroonian awareness on the strategic identity rooted on internal strategic needs and opens to risks threats and the needs for a regional and international cooperation. This strategic differentiation effort is carried by the dual capacity of adaptation and resilience of the sector No.1 of the MNJTF in an environment at the same time national and sub-regional particularly unstable and where new threats are permanent resituated.

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Visit of the MNJTF at the G5 SAHEL

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Visit of the Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit (RIFU) at the headquarters of the MNJTF on the 9th march 2018

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S SUPPORT TO THE MJTF: CAPABILITY LOGIC AND INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE FOR SUSTAINABLE STABILITY IN THE LAKE CHAD BASIN

By FOUMANE André Désiré V

In the face of the regionalisation of the Boko Haram (BH) attacks around Lake Chad since 2013, the LCBC Member States and Benin have set up a multinational joint task force (MNJTF) to fight against terrorism. Since its creation, this force has gradually benefited from US support. The first explanation is that America's efforts have been mobilised since September 11, 2001 to defeat terrorist organisations around the world (Global War on Terror). Secondly, the Lake Chad Basin is fast becoming a convergent area for Islamic State (IS) militants who have been in retreat from Iraq and Syria since 2015. Since then, the US considered the risks of a more hostile reorientation in what was the Islamic State Province in West Africa, which could threaten their national and territorial security in Africa.

In line with these developments, it becomes important to analyse the American action in an evaluative perspective: what is the contribution of the United States of America to the MNJTF and troop-contributing countries (TCC) in the fight against BH? In response, it can be seen from the outset that, under the coordination of the United States Command for Africa (AFRICOM), US support for the MNJTF focuses on reinforcing local military-security capabilities. Two domains can be listed for this purpose: the training and equipment on the one hand (I), and inquiries on the other hand (II).



I- AFRICOM's commitment in training and equipment

As a result of a high capacity deficit of the armies around the Lake Chad basin, the United States puts emphasis on assisting the latter in order to effectively fight against violent extremism. Thus, the irregularity and lacunae¹ of the confrontational configuration compels Washington to seriously limit the possibility of direct military intervention. In fact, the irregulars avoid the "great war" and prefer guerrilla warfare and terrorism for the purpose of optimizing their actions. In this context, the direct involvement of GIs² could lead to another "Restore Hope"³ or another "Vietnam". Hence, the preference for an indirect strategy resulting from the

¹ A front is said to be incomplete when there is no continuity of maneuvering spaces on which the forces can deploy in a conventional way in order to fully express their military supremacy. See Michel YAKOVLEFF, *Tactique théorique*, Paris, Economica, 2006, p. 107.

² Is the form of abbreviating *General Infantry*, the name give to American soldiers.

³ It was the baptismal name of the US-led Somalia operation in 1993, which resulted in the death of 18 GIs. Since this setback, the authorities are quite reluctant to direct interventions in Africa.

multilateral reinforcement of the operational capabilities of the MNJTF (A) and a bilateral support to the national forces concerned (B).

A- The search for greater efficiency through multilateral reinforcement of operational capacities

Just like in the rest of Africa, US security efforts in the Lake Chad Basin are under the responsibility of AFRICOM. When it was created in February 2007, this institution was assigned a specific mission. First and foremost, it has to defend and protect the interests of the US, by strengthening the defence capabilities of African States and regional organizations. This was pointed out by General Carter Ham, the second commander of this structure on 1st March, 2012, before the Senate Committee in charge of the armed forces. According to him, an Africa with well-trained and equipped forces would be less conducive to spreading insecurity and which would also be safer and stable.

As a result of this principle, the Americans reinforce their presence in the Lake Chad Basin for the purposes of security cooperation. In the field of operation, the multilateral assistance from Washington is still embryonic. Apart from 5 million USD pledged in support of the MNJTF in June 2015, most of the assistance is focused on the training of indigenous



Unified Focus 2018 currently going on in Douala - Cameroon

forces. It is from this perspective that the *Flintlock Exercise 2017* came to be known. From 27th February to 15th March, 2017, the armies of 24 countries manoeuvred from N'djamena the command post of the exercise. These joint manoeuvres ended in Diffa, Niger under the leadership of General Donald Bolduc, commander of Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA), GIS trained among others, the forces of the four countries based around the Lake Chad and members of the MNJTF. This training included the conduct of cross-border anti-terrorist investigations and crisis response. Participants worked on information sharing, legal cooperation and other forms of secure collaboration.⁴ The aim was to address the problem of porous borders which facilitates the transnational mobility of Jihadists.

In the same vein, meetings held in February 2017 in Douala brought together US officers and those of the MNJTF. As a prelude to the exercise "Unified Focus 2017" (UF17), this was to lead the development of a coherent strategy against Boko Haram. As part of the

plan for the exercise in question, participants built on the different scenarios and other operational details. The UF 17 multinational exercise itself began on 24th April, 2017 at the Douala naval base. Designed to strengthen the joint planning and coordination capabilities of the armed forces, it brought together more than 100 participants from 10 countries.⁵

The first of its kind for the MNJTF, the exercise was under the command of Brigadier General Kenneth Moore (US Africa Army's second in command, USARAF), also aimed at improving the fluidity and coordination between the forces of the States concerned, the United States, and civil actors. This is because in a war within the population like that led by the armies of the region, coordination and civil-military relations are essential.

Contrary to the classical apprehension restricted to the control of politics over the military, modern civil-military relations take more consideration of the complexity of current threats and conflicts. They aim more at operational efficiency in a safe environment where civilian casualties must be avoided and popular

⁴ "U.S. Military Works with African Security Forces to Fight Boko Haram".

(<https://www.npr.org/2017/03/16/520440725/u-s-military-works-with-african-special-forces-to-fight-boko-haram>), consulted, 13th December 2017.

⁵ Cameroon, Chad, Benin, Niger, Nigeria, Holland, Italy, France, the UK and the USA.



support extended.⁶ Beyond the support for conducting kinetic operations against subversives, AFRICOM held through UF17, to make the MNJTF more capable of inducing an irregular war. Alongside, this multilateral dimension we observe a bilateral assistance for the benefit of the various national forces.

B- US bilateral support to the member states of the MNJTF

In the field of security, the US has traditionally preferred bilateral cooperation. The member States of the MNJTF have benefited more from individual support, both in terms of training and weapons. Some cases can be cited to this purpose. In a letter addressed to the Congress in June 2017, President Trump noted that 645 US troops were present in Niger to advise and train the soldiers of that country. As of 5th October, 2017, this number according to the Pentagon was 800.⁷ In addition, it is in Niger that four GIs 2nd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group of Fort Bragg lost their lives on 4th October, 2017 in an ambush stretched by Daesh members. It was in the village of Tongo Tongo about 200 km north of Niamey and 20 km from the Malian border.

Nigeria is well placed to be among the recipients of US military aid in the fight against Boko Haram. The Obama Administration sold 12 A-29 Tucano model aircrafts to this country, with the intention to supervise information and conduct subversive raids, capable of carrying up to 1.550 kg of ammunition.⁸ Moreover, in the first phase of the training called Counter Improvised Explosive Device-Defeat, which took place in Douala from 123th October to 17th November, 2017, the men of the 764th Ordnance Company (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) were involved. Coming from Fort Carson

(Colorado) and at the request of USARAF, this contributed to strengthen the knowledge of the Cameroonian forces about improvised explosive devices.⁹

Even if it does not fit directly into a multilateral framework, one cannot deny the relevance of the bilateral approach adopted by the Pentagon. This is because in the functioning of the MNJTF, each national army brings its men and its equipments. We can therefore understand that the troops trained and equipped by the US are used for the effectiveness of the regional force. In this regard, AFRICOM's assistance has improved its operational performance, including intelligence.

II- AFRICOM support for intelligence, surveillance and acknowledgement (ISA)¹⁰

In general terms, ISA refers to all military activities intended for the collection, processing and transmission of data in support of military operations. Based on high-tech computing, it gives sophisticated sensors a central role. In the fight against Boko Haram, this system is prioritised. Based on a rather important pre-positioning device (**B**), the ISA is put to the benefit of the member States of the LCBC (**A**).

A- The American ISA security system for the LCBC: tools, mechanisms and assets

Long before the deployment of the MNJTF, the US had deployed its services in the Lake Chad Basin to contribute to the fight against terrorism. In the field of intelligence, they have setup drones and other observation aircraft into operation across the region. For example, in the search for the 276 high school girls abducted by Boko Haram in Chibok in April 2014, Global Hawk drones and MC-12 surveillance aircrafts were deployed in north-eastern Nigeria.¹¹ Since 2013,

⁶ Florina Cristiana MATEI, "A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations," in Thomas C. BRUNEAU and Florina Cristiana MATEI (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, New York, Routledge, 2013, pp. 26-32.

⁷ Krishnadev CALAMUR, "The Region Where ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and Boko Haram Converge," October 5, 2017, available in (<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/us-niger-green-berets/542190/>), consulted 13 February 2017.

⁸ "US steps up fight against Islamists in the Lake Chad basin," available in (<http://www.dw.com/en/us-steps-up-fight-against-islamists-in-the-lake-chad-basin/a-19256945>), consulted 13 December 2017.

⁹ Alexandra HAYS, "U.S. troops train Cameroonian Armed Forces in Counter-IED," November 24, 2017, available in (<http://www.usaraf.army.mil/media-room/article/28463/u-s-troops-train-cameroonian-armed-forces-in-counter-ied>), consulted 14, December 2017.

¹⁰ Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.

¹¹ Jeune Afrique, « Nigéria: des drones américains pour retrouver les lycéennes détenues par Boko Haram », 15 Mai 2014, available in (<http://www.jeuneafrique.com/163793/po>

American soldiers have been operating with drones from Niamey for the purpose of fighting terrorism and all other forms of illegal activities. Drones also monitored the Lake Chad surroundings from the US facility at Air Base 301 in Garoua in mid-October 2015.

From an operational point of view, the drones currently deployed in the Lake Chad Basin are more dedicated to surveillance and intelligence missions. As far as air strikes have not been recorded so far, it would be difficult to talk about an acknowledgment battle. Certainly, there are investigation missions conducted in the form of visual observation and detection, for intelligence acquisition purposes. However, the unarmed nature and lack of potential commitment of information gathering devices reduce the scope of this type of mission.¹² This investigation carried out in a

litique/nigeria-des-drones-am-ricains-pour-retrouver-les-lycennes-d-tenues-par-boko-haram/), consulted 16 December 2017.

¹² There is indeed an ongoing debate between Intelligence and Reconnaissance that focuses on the degree of commit-

ment and arming of the forces responsible for collecting information. As part of a combat reconnaissance, confrontation is considered as an intelligence activity. In this case, the creation of the “contact” is intended for operational anticipation and optimization. See Michel YAKOVLEFF, op. cit., pp. 271-272.

¹³ Nick TURSE, “U.S. Military is building a \$100 million drone in Africa,” september 29, 2016, available in (<https://theintercept.com/2016/09/29/u-s-military-is-building-a-100-million-drone-base-in-africa/>), consulted 16 December 2017.

¹⁴ Despite the 2013 restrictions that limited the use of targeted drone disposal to cases of proven imminent threat to the US, the Obama administration following Bush has made the policy of elimination selected strategic targets, a key operational focus on counter-terrorism strategy. There is even a Kill List that lists the potential targets against which key-



meantime, the drones mobilized so far against Boko Haram are aerial platforms on which are mounted sophisticated observation devices. These devices are able to detect enemy movements in areas as remote as the forest of Sambisa in Nigeria, Kolofata in Cameroon or Diffa in Niger, as many potential refuge areas for jihadists.

In their strategic applications, these air platforms provide supervision in two phases: firstly, there was a prior supervision linked to the regular and almost permanent observation of the crisis zones, hence a better continuous assessment of the situation; then there was a monitoring of activities related to the denunciation of the adverse activities or to the appraisal of the field of action for the recognition of a captured area.¹⁵ This duality in the drone intelligence system was a good illustration of the operational added value of such a mechanism.

The information collected by the American means once acquired must be transmitted to the Member States of the LCBC. In the battlefield, it enhances the freedom of action and gives the initiative to the MNJTF when such information is treated with care. In this sense, this force could better put together its plans and frequently anticipate enemy manoeuvres. This search for the transparency of the battlefield placed at the heart of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) which began in the US in the 90s¹⁶ remains active nowadays. However,

strokes should be made. They are jointly executed by the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). See Jeremy SC-AHILL, "The Drone Legacy", in Jeremy SCAHILL and The Staff of The Intercept, *The Assassination Complex: Inside the Government's Secret War Drone Program*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 2016, pp.1-13. When the directive published on March 29, 2017, on military operations in Somalia is taken into account, there is every reason to fear Donald Trump's prosecution of the policies of his predecessors in the matter. In this Directive, AFRICOM now has more flexibility in the conduct of operations in "areas of active hostilities". In this context, the GIs do not have to wait for the authorization of the higher authorities. It is not excluded that this approach extends into the Chadian basin.

¹⁵ Philippe ROGER, « Les nouvelles applications militaires des drones : applications stratégiques », in Pierre PASCAL-LON (dir.), *Quel avenir pour les drones ? Avions sans pilotes*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1998, p.160.

¹⁶ As a major change in the functioning of the defense system, based on the evolutions of technology, this concept corresponds well to the wars of software and computer systems (third wave) which were to succeed those based on the saber

despite an operational advantage over irregulars, the limitation of technology could not effectively wipe up the threat posed by terrorism. The action phase then follows the observation moment so as to contribute to the achievement of the strategic goals. Despite this limitation, AFRICOM is trying to optimize its ISA by setting up a whole pre-positioning device.

B- Pre-positioning at the centre of the US ISA system: military equipment in support of the MNJTF

At first, one could question the relevance of the relationship between the pre-positioning in the Lake Chad Basin and the ISA system which is currently operational, or even wonder about the added value of such a device in the effectiveness of the MNJTF. It therefore seems appropriate to note that the reinforcement of the US presence since 2013 was and is intended to respond to the increasingly important need for intelligence. The problem is that the region is showered with gray areas that are beyond the control of states. US drones are serious alternatives in places where forces cannot be deployed on permanent basis and also because of the remote nature of the area. Hence, there was the need of proximate military installations within the zones of operations where US military equipment could not be installed.

As an illustration, if a RQ-4 Global Hawk surveillance drone from a US base in Germany to reach Chad, a 4039 km distance, it would take about 12 hours for a to and fro flight with a velocity of about 600 km/h. However, this would significantly reduce its profitability or efficiency despite its 40 hours of autonomy. However, in this scenario, it is not a kinetic operation of the "gas and go"¹⁷ type, but a monitoring operation which requires time above the target zone.

The US in these operations opted for a more discreet presence in order to ensure her proximity while avoiding a military presence too visible and politically expensive. It is materialised by the proliferation of a rather particular type of facilities, namely the Cooperative Security Locations (CSL) and the Advanced Operations Sites (Forward Operating Sites, FOS)

(first wave) and massive destruction (second wave). See Alvin and Heidi TOFFLER, *Guerre et contre-guerre: survivre à l'aube du XXI^e siècle*, Paris, Fayard (trans.), 1994.

¹⁷ An expression used in the US military to designate point and short kinetic operations.

alongside MOB.¹⁸ Today, the FOS and especially the CSL are spread across Africa. They are less pre-positioning bases than advanced intelligence posts.

In the specific context of the Lake Chad Basin, the US has this type of facility. In the North Region of Cameroon, about 300 US soldiers supervise observation drones from the 301 Garoua Air Base. This facility has been in existence since 2015, when President Obama notified the Congress of the sending 90 GIs to the region. Not far from there, 100 American soldiers are operating at the BA 101 base in Niamey. They were deployed there after the signing in January 2013 of the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) between the US and Nigerian governments. Taking into consideration the ongoing construction of the military base in Agadez (Niger) to the tune of nearly 100 million USD, we can understand the contribution that the Pentagon gives to intelligence in its strategy of pre-positioning in Africa and her support to the MNJTF.

Conclusion

¹⁸ These are the main operating bases (MOB). They are larger, with a large staff and a robust infrastructure. The only example in Africa although its status is still argued in scientific circles is Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti.

The Lake Chad Basin is becoming an important theatre in the fight against violent extremism in Africa. Due to the threat of Boko Haram's allegiance to IS, the US is mobilising to support the MNJTF and member States. This mobilisation is all the more important as for the year 2018. About 80% of security cooperation activities with the US partner should be focused on the countries of the region.¹⁹ For the moment, bilateral and multilateral operational capacity building is taking place.

At the same time, the Pentagon and the CIA are working to collect and transmit intelligence reports to the National Forces engaged in the regional force. Certainly, this multidimensional assistance has contributed to the relative achievements of the MNJTF in recent years, even if other explanatory variables could come into play. From a doctrinal and strategic point of view, the approach adopted by AFRICOM in the Lake

¹⁹ General Le Boeuf (commander of the *US Army Africa* since August 2017), cited by Meghann MYERS, "*US Army Africa turns focus to Lake Chad Basin, increases exercises to deter emerging extremist groups*," October 9, 2017, available in (<https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2017/10/09/us-army-africa-turns-its-focus-to-lake-chad-basin-increases-exercises-to-deter-emerging-extremist-groups/>), consulted 13 December 2017.



Chad basin as in the rest of Africa corresponds to “light footprint”. It refers to the deployment of small numbers of military personnel to prevent conflict and defuse crises.²⁰ Initiated under Barack Obama, this policy was considered less expensive from a material and political point of view. To the authorities, it is not likely to hinder the achievement of the US political objectives.

Some observers such as Nick Turse whose multiple small format deployments in progress on the continent devote a “pivot to Africa”²¹ do not agree. In

this effort articulated around anti and counter-terrorism, the Lake Chad Basin can be presented alongside the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, as one of the focal points of this “pivot”. Consequently and in terms of foresight, the MNJTF and its Member States could benefit more from AFRICOM support whose aim is to defeat what could be seen as another jihadist rush to Africa. Though, the question of the size or shape of the impression is secondary from the point of view of African perceptions, but generally favourable to American aid.

²⁰ In this sense, Special Forces are deployed for surgical kinetic operations, intelligence operations or for the training of foreign forces.

²¹ Far from the idea of a “Small footprint”, defended by the Americans, Nick Turse puts forward, the theory of a (Gigantic “Small Footprint”). Because he thinks the deployment of AFRICOM is gigantic. It consists of a deluge of small deployments that by their number become quite dizzying. See Nick TURSE, *Tomorrow's Battlefield: U.S. Proxy Wars and Secret Ops in Africa*, Chicago, Haymarket Books, 2015.

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SUSTAINING THE CONCERTED RESPONSE AROUND LAKE CHAD

BY SAIBOU ISSA

Organised crime is fast growing in Central and West Africa. Most African States have greatly mitigated its rural and urban dimensions through special repression-centered units and operations. The effectiveness of these national responses, coupled with a reorganisation of the commercial and financial habits of target groups have considerably reduced the productivity of crime in organised gangs within countries. Thus, these gangs periodically change their operating methods by investing more in cross-border crime.

Again, bilateral and sub-regional initiatives and mechanisms are being implemented through joint commissions, sector committees, prosecution instruments, and so on. However, it is an unprecedented deployment of national forces in a bilateral or multilateral framework to fight against Boko Haram, which reflects a change in diplomatic and strategic attitudes and triggers concerted responses to a new threat by its magnitude, but which is nonetheless common in its cross-border and human aspects. Crisis factors persist, giving room for resurgences.

This contribution postulates that the sustainable stabilisation of the areas currently affected by Boko Haram requires a perennial integrated military system. It revolves around two axes: a summary analysis of risk factors to reproducing insecurities; an observation of the achievements of the concerted fight against Boko Haram and clues for a perennial integrated defence and security system around Lake Chad and areas at risk.



Lands of cross-border crime

Criminal organizations that spread over three decades in border areas benefit from four closely interrelated strategic factors: the porosity of borders; the profitability of illegality; the convertibility of actors; and the repeatability of crises.

- *The opportunism of porous borders*

The Lake Chad Basin is a space with contrasting reliefs. From the Mandara Mountains to Lake Chad swamps, there are varied spaces alternating orographic refuges, rocky outcrops, shrubby vegetations supportive of dissimulation, flat spaces suitable for the multiplication tracks and overlaps. Between the Logone Valley and the Chari embouchure, water has remained a driver of economic and social exchanges. The canoe is used for men and goods transport away from the few secured crossing points of Zébé and Nguéli. Around the lake, and depending on the season and the water level, the spaces alternate constraints and opportunities to

many border users and agricultural, pastoral, commercial and fish-farming operators.

Itinerant trade, seasonal cattle migration, cross-border smuggling, transmigration of armed groups, electoral movements based on the flexible nationality of cross-border workers, are all legal and illegal uses of cross-border migration. The dyads, which reflect the human configuration and geo-culture of border areas, carry economic and social routines accustomed by users ignoring the legality, by passing or domesticating it, based on State agents' willingness to let it go by interest or habit.

As shown in Janet Roitman's¹ analyses of the normalization of illegality in border areas subject to

¹ Janet Roitman, *Fiscal Disobedience: Anthropology of Economic Regulation in Central Africa*, Princeton (NJ), Princeton University Press, 2005.



precariousness and the circumvention of State rules, a denationalisation/reconfiguration phenomenon of border territories tacitly occurred where cross-border economic areas intertwine with cultural areas and enjoy a small regal presence. It is worth recalling that some Lake Chad Basin riparian countries have gone through decades of instability, which diminished the interest of the State in securing the borders without immediate strategic potential. Moreover, the rivalries between LCBC member countries pertaining to Water control rather favoured the emergence of a lawless zone, where smuggling, armed attacks, extortion, various traffics prospered under the rule of infra-state actors whose influence has turned into a plural regulatory capacity for cross-border interactions. Should this opportunist regionalisation built around the Naira (Nigerian currency), current idioms (Arabic, Hausa, Kanuri), identity links, corporatist socio-economic networks and the plurality of access routes, predate independence, it is much later that it took shape, particularly in the wake of great droughts (1972-3, 1983-5) and interstate conflicts in the Lake from 1983.

Environmental migration has drained entire communities to the cities and shores of the Lake. The economic crisis beginning in the late 1980s impoverished wholesalers, affecting retailers' employment. Following the religious unrest in the northern part of Nigeria as a result of the *Maitatsine* insurgency, the army's vigorous response led to the exodus to rural areas, as well as the expulsion of illegal aliens, including thousands of nationals from riparian countries of the Lake.² At the same time, Libyan commitments in Chad have revived border controls.

Accustomed to living from the porous borders, young people are now reduced to informal activities, while cross-border banditry thrives. Some have joined armed groups or form sporadic and opportunistic gangs centered on subsistence. Others have developed circumvention strategies through smuggling and integrating parallel cross-border networks. These fraternisations across borders are indicators of integration, but in the long run, have trivialized the sovereignty of States over transnational territories coinciding with socio-cultural areas. The States' willingness to (re)gain a foothold have often stumbled

on the disproportion between the social capital of parallel figures of authority and the regulatory capacity of published agents deployed at the borders. Sometimes, these national constraints reduced the State's presence in the periphery.

The profitability of illegality

The cross-border economies of the Lake Chad Basin are modes of production in identity, religion or comrades' networks. As rightly shown by Karine Benafla³, access and mobility within the commercial sector is inseparable from sponsorship based primarily on perceptions and trust before consolidating at the whim of the benefits. Traders, breeders and fishermen move within production lines that certainly hire, but do not facilitate incursions for guaranteed economic social movements of unadorned people. Many young people willing to engage in these activities develop their own tracks outside the formal circuits and existing facilitation networks, being more or less legal in their modus operandi.

The habituation, the diversity and the everydayness of cross-border movements have multiplied actors and exchanges circuits. There, young people excluded from formal and relatively regulated or sponsored circuits find windows of opportunities. Most of them engage in retail distribution, travelling within cities, or from one periodic market to another. However, from Mubi (Nigeria) to the Lake, motorcycles, minibuses, tricycles connect Chadian Basin towns and villages without paying taxes and other duties, at least in the prescribed proportions. A particularly dynamic economy of opportunity has set here, as actors frequently change their area of operation or field of activity per circumstance. Maximisation and adaptation structure the behaviour of these flexible economic operators.

Alongside big traders, cattle breeders/traders, carriers who built long-term assets, a few other young actors quickly prospered in organized crimes: vehicle theft and traffic, handling stolen goods, looting and cattle traffic, armed attacks... The many special operations to fight against rural and cross-border great banditry, carried out in the LCBC zone, revealed the origin of some sudden social facilities found in some young people active on sub-regional transactions. During the 1990s, these operations revealed some personal tracks in the northern part of Cameroon, the

² Guy Nicolas, « 'Guerre sainte' à Kano », *Politique africaine*, n° 4, novembre 1981 ; Daouda Gary-Tounkara, « A Reappraisal of the Expulsion of Illegal Immigrants from Nigeria in 1983 », *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, vol 9 (1), 2015.

³ Karine Benafla, *Le commerce frontalier en Afrique centrale : acteurs, espaces, pratiques*, Paris, Karthala, 2002.

north-eastern Nigeria or the north-west of the Central African Republic. All things that in 2005, motivated the reactivation of joint security commissions between Cameroon and Chad on the one hand, and between Cameroon and CAR on the other hand.

Meanwhile, the impression of impunity prior to structuring vigorous States' responses fostered organised crimes, tax evasion, robberies in towns and countryside. Despite the repression and the almost permanent presence of defence and security forces committed to the fight against serious crime, insecurity entrepreneurship has been renewed as it is a source of capitalization. In the absence of a socio-economic viabilisation and/or a permanent surveillance of the cross-border spaces, the economy of illegality is likely to find a fertile and already known ground.

The convertibility of criminal actors and the repeatability of crises

Although it is difficult to attest a connection between the forms of criminality that follow by establishing a link between actors, it is nevertheless clear that these actors have a range of insecurities that allow their operating methods to change per the change of repression mechanisms. These are: home robberies, cattle raids, ambushes on roads, cross-border attacks, militarized poaching, vehicle traffic, traffic of human remains, hostage taking... The solicitation of criminal labour is diversified, giving rise to a relative specialization, but specifically to the circulation of the criminal actors.

As highway rubbers could no longer use ambushes and cattle raids because of GPIG and BIR units' deployment, the criminal production then moved to hostage-taking. These persist especially in the Adamawa region, where distances between villages, the low level of settlement, the persistence of traditional modes of commercial and pastoral transactions, the wandering of youths unprepared to withstand the effects of the economic situation on lifestyles and the instability of the Central African border in particular, make room for kidnappers. This is a security issue that has been dragging on for two decades. This is a source of financing risk of a more pernicious instability in the Cameroon-CAR-Chad triangle, where plural criminalities, identity conflicts, armed rebellions, mercenaries and trans-regional threats (ecocides, arms trafficking, East African scents...) maintain bloody and disintegrating uncertainties.

The supply of belligerent inputs is particularly strong in the CAR-Sudan-Lake Chad area: adapting criminals, idle fighters, poorly paid and supervised soldiers, deserters and expelled soldiers, demobilised and poorly reintegrated elements, self-defence groups and quasi-

autonomous identity militias, scattered weapons and ammunition, warlords and politico-military armed groups, patrons of organised crimes, harassers and traffickers thriving in the context of disorder... These vectors of violence participate, as the case may be, in all forms of instability that have bloodied West-Central Africa since the end of the 1980s.

The recruits of Boko Haram, new figures of mass violence with religious intolerance, of killing rituals and social contract repudiation, are very young combatants likely to occupy the strategic watch of the Lake Chad basin for years. The military-type skills acquired by many of them⁴, meeting with thousands of these young people from LCBC zone countries, interactions between cross-border members of Boko Haram's ruling strata, the still mixed record of surrenders and the management of the disengaged are all sources of questioning calling to scrutinise the strategic future in a state of awakening.

Achievements of the defence partnership in the Lake Chad Basin

The strategic cooperation between the Lake Chad riparian States is not a new phenomenon. As from 1983, LCBC countries had set up joint patrols to counter the misdeeds of armed gangs, whose activities on and around the Lake were prejudicial to economic exchanges and whose imposture created tensions across demarcated Lake boundaries. From four operational bases, these patrols have mitigated armed assaults in their areas of operation, but have not prevented militarised crime emergence in larger and better seasoned bands using military war weapons.

Thus, high level States commands held several meetings during which was proposed the setting up of partnerships to respond to the regionalisation of a threat that opportunely exploited the dissensions between States (border disputes between Cameroon and Nigeria, lack of right of hot pursuit), the porosity of borders and the focused attention on the stability issues due to a bellicose democratic opening. The Joint Security Force created at the end of the LCBC summit in Ndjamena, 1997, has not been implemented as required. Each State therefore deployed its own special operations and internally confronted the threat whose actors gradually became cross-borders. These same schemes are being implemented against Boko Haram, Nigeria adding to *Operation Flush* a military deployment similar to the one

that, in the early 1980s, had been mobilised against the *Maitatsine* movement.

It was much later that, after hard negotiations, a consensual diplomatic and military formula led to the creation the Multinational Joint Force and supervised its *modus operandi*. To date, the Force is stabilising its front against Boko Haram, thus appearing as a repressive and proactive solution against cross-border threats associated with infra-state armed groups. Some achievements are therefore identifiable:

The continuous adaptability of national systems to new threats: Each State fighting Boko Haram first activated its usual tactical resources against a threat whose resilience and thickening were not then conceivable in the proportions it took. This seems to have reinforced the strategic predictions of the Nigerian sect leaders, presumably expecting everlasting dissensions between States, with regards to establishing an active defence partnership. The growing threat led to significant adjustments in soldiers, materials and equipment in Nigeria and Cameroon as well. Nevertheless, in August 2014, hundreds of Nigerian soldiers and their tanks retreated to Cameroon to escape

Boko Haram attackers, probably superior in number and equipment. It is then understandable that Nigeria has set up the *Lafia Dole* Operation following Cameroon's already implemented *Alpha* and *Emergence 4* Operations which, despite their effectiveness in defending the territorial integrity of Cameroon, were still handicapped by the legal impossibility of pursuing attackers or attacking them in their camps on the Nigerian territory.

Cross-border operations and the dismantling of Boko Haram operational bases: Various categories of operations under the auspices of the MNJTF allowed Cameroonian forces to make incursions into the Nigerian territory, both sporadically over limited distances and deeper in the context of heavy operations, including in the General Headquarters of Boko Haram in Sambisa. These operations resulted in the stabilization of the central and southern front (Mayo Sava face, Mayo Tsanaga), as many bases where Boko Haram attempted incursions from were located along the border. The challenge remains to prevent the reconstruction of these bases.



Permanent consultation between Cameroon and Nigeria operational commands: exchanges with military leaders of the operation area reveal a flexible communication established in the implementation of the partnership between the heads of the units deployed at the front. This facilitates not only the fluidity of intelligence and its exploitation, but also in situ planning, the reactivation of the forces and the adaptation of the mandate to the realities on the ground. In the stabilisation phase, MNJTF contributes to revamping cross-border economic activities, notably by securing movements of people and goods, as well as the main border markets. The role of the army in restoring people's confidence in the habitability of their villages and the resumption of their production activities is growing as coordinated efforts between soldiers of both countries offer prospects for joint securing of Boko Haram affected areas.

However, there lie questions raised by internally displaced people, who subordinate their return less to the socio-economic viability of their home villages than to a sustained security on both sides of the border. Indeed, the sources of fear come not only from Nigeria based incursions, but also, eventually, from hidden followers in communities. A perennial and sufficiently dissuasive military presence is thus a strong expectation of the populations, just as it would translate the capitalisation of the lessons learned from the previous systems to combat cross-border crime. It would also mean to redefine the strategies for implementing the military doctrine of each State, changing its perception of the threat, acting its transnationalisation and expanding the joint defence windows.

In this respect, the socio-strategic missions of the armies, in the stabilisation and reconstruction process of

the areas devastated by Boko Haram, should align with the guidelines of States' post-conflict policies, not without integrating the cross-border and prospective dimension of the proposed responses. Restoring scattered villages, whose basic housing and lack of basic social services would not offer new alternatives to precariousness and would remain vulnerable to insecurity? Rebuild better-structured, more populated pre-urban living environments having schools, health centres, etc., distinct from the agricultural and pastoral areas to be developed, which are easier to protect? Whatever be the short- and medium-term option, the similarity of the options on both sides of the borders should be part of the sustainable security mechanism of these integrated socio-economic and sociocultural zones.

Still, remains the need to go beyond the fight against Boko Haram to include the MNJTF model in a strategic outlook extended to the entire LCBC zone and more institutionally anchored. This requires an in-depth reform of the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the guarantee of the financial sustainability of a lightened but permanent system.

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THE MNJTF AND THE PHASING OF ITS STRATEGIC CONOPS: FROM THE PSO/MOA MODEL TO INNOVATION IN AFRICAN FORCE PROJECTION?¹

By Jean Eudes Biem

It was failing to understand that the expeditionary character of Forces made them paradoxically capable of little success in the new expeditions.

*Vincent Desportes,
La Guerre probable : penser autrement. 2008.*



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¹ The author thanks Major General Leo Irabor, Commandant of the MNJTF; Brigadier General Bouba Dobekreo, Commandant of MNJTF Sector 1; Brigadier General Valere Nka, former Commandant of the 4th Military Joint Forces Region of Cameroon; Colonel Hypolithe Jean Ndougou, Military Advisor to the Executive Secretary of the LCBC; and Professor Issa Saibou, Director of the Higher Teacher Training College Maroua for clarifications and advice given during field research and on other occasions. However, the

The MNJTF in its strategic chronotope: conceptual and praxeological challenges

"Today, African contingents are present in some brother countries in difficulty or participate with the agreement of the AU in stabilization or peacekeeping operations. But now the threat is global and requires an urgent response to the extent of the danger. I believe the time has come to draw practical conclusions from the intervention doctrine we have defined at the scale of the continent. The African Standby Force (ASF) can no longer standby, and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC) should be operational without delay."² This statement made by the President of the Republic of Cameroon during his speech at the African Union (AU) Summit in Malabo on June 27 2014, six weeks after he declared war on Boko haram on

behalf of his peers in Paris, expresses a compelling need. This need is to speed up the implementation, activation and optimal deployment of the different components of the African Architecture of Peace and Security (APSA).

To consider this imperative requires to recontextualize Boko Haram (BH) against the broad background of the Sahel-Saharan crisis which has now become axial for peace and security in Africa and even in Europe, in view of the migration problematics of the so-called "Africanistan"³. In this regard, there is interest in starting by clarifying the recent evolution of the security environment by borrowing from the reverse forecasting methodology that helps examine the evolution of phenomena by confronting those scenarios that actually occurred with others that could have taken place if factors had been configured otherwise and actors had taken alternative course.⁴ One of the uchronia is that the

opinions expressed are exclusively the author's and do not represent, unless otherwise stated, the official position of the LCBC, the MNJTF or EIFORCES.

² Paul Biya, speech delivered during the session devoted to of peace and security problems in Africa at the African Union Heads of State and Government Summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, June 27, 2014.

³ This interweaving of issues beyond the Saharan and Mediterranean barriers is highlighted particularly by Serge Michailof. Read *Africanistan : l'Afrique en crise va-t-elle se retrouver dans nos banlieues ?* Paris: Fayard, 2015.

⁴ For the method and its application, read in particular Jacques Lesourne, *Ces Avenirs qui n'ont pas eu lieu : Une relecture*



MNJTF originally created in 1994 by the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and the Regional Mechanisms (RMs) of the APSA), and in this case the ASF Brigades for Central West and North Africa are fully in place and mobilizeable shortly before, or at the moment of the outbreak of the Malian and Boko haram crises that will be fueled by the proliferation of weapons of war looted from Libyan arsenals after the toppling and assassination of the Guide of the Great Jamahiriya.

The probability is then much higher that the AU Peace and Security Council Resolution of March 10, 2011 which rejects “foreign military intervention of any form to solve the Libyan crisis”. This Resolution thus pre-empted the fateful Resolution 1973 of the UN Security Council voted a week later, allowing member states that have so requested “to take all necessary measures [...] to protect populations and civilians in areas threatened by attack, especially the establishment of a no-fly zone, “including in Benghazi”, while excluding the deployment of a foreign occupation force of any kind and in any part of the Libyan territory”.

Whether this preemption works or not, after the disintegration of the Libyan state, in the hypothesis of the aforementioned availability of Forces, one scenario imposes itself. It is the ASF of the three trans-Saharan regions that would have been spurred to action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity central to AU and the EU decision making processes. They are the ones that would have been tasked with militarily resolving the issues that will otherwise be dealt with by Operations Serval and Barkhane, and subsequently two inter-regional military alliances: G5 Sahel and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of the LCBC, joined on this occasion by Benin.

However, in the current phase of the construction of Africa’s Defense and Security apparatuses, and pending the implementation of the aforementioned position of the President of the Republic of Cameroon which reflects the official option of the AU, the MNJTF of the LCBC appears as a response both imperative and contingent. Examining this force with a view to maximizing its relevance and effectiveness therefore amounts to confronting it with the test of strategic consistency.

The starting point is thus to raise the most fundamental question of any strategic undertaking known since Sunzi’s *The Art of War*. It is the question of the self, of *ipseity*, also the zero question of any reflection-action in foresight strategy, the mandatory Q0

emphasized by Lucien Poirier⁵. What then is this MNJTF? Is it a single or multiple expeditionary force? Is it a composite response force with integrated or even unified command, as suggested by the international mandate and the command structure which are echoed by the *Unified Focus* recurrent exercise? Is it a coordination of national forces whose territorial jurisdictions reflect diehard sovereign tropisms, hitherto complicating coordination and compromising the effectiveness or even acceptance of the Force as some observers like Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos⁶ assert?

Even if this issue of the Force’s nature was resolved, another minimum requirement would be to pass the test of the Force’s suitability to its strategic chronotope (space-time). This pertains to the type of conflict it aims to resolve, with regard to the other incompressible first principle formulated by Clausewitz: “the first, most important, most decisive act of judgment of a statesman or commander is the appreciation of the kind of war they undertake, so as not to take it for what it is not and not want to do what the nature of the circumstances forbids them to do”⁷

Taken as a whole, the principles of this test interrogate the extent to which the structure and doctrine of force employment pertaining to the MNJTF are in line with the needs and trends on the ground. Given the conceptual expansion required for the mobilization and integration of all public policies at different national, transnational and international levels, one must assess

⁵ In his *Essais de stratégie théorique* (Paris: FEDN, 1983), Poirier confirms the incompressible character of the imperative laid in Sunzi’s aphorism: “Know thyself and know thy enemy; in a hundred battles thou shalt not be in peril”. Thus, the method of prospective strategy Poirier proposes articulates four questions that any agonistic entity must work with. Q1: what could happen?; Q2: What could I do?; Q3: What shall I do?; and Q4: How shall I do it?; preceded by an essential preliminary question, Q0: *Who am I?*

⁶ Perouse de Montclos notes, not without excess, that “the anti-terrorist coalition that was set up in 2015 with the armies of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon is far from having resolved its lack of coordination and professionalism: its exactions and damages supposedly “collateral”, its scorched-earth strategy and economic sanctions have fueled the resentment of the population and sometimes legitimized jihadist resistance to forces considered to be occupying forces”. (“Boko Haram: a Conflict Set to Last” *Diplomatique: Les Grands Dossiers* No. 42, December 2017-January 2018: pp. 70).

⁷ Quoted by Paul-Marie De la Gorce, *Carl von Clausewitz et la stratégie moderne*, Paris, Seghers, 1964, p. 152.

without complacency the disparities between what is desired and what can be achieved with the Multinational Joint Task Force and the implementation of its Concept of Operation (ConOps). Evidently, an attempt to provide thorough answers to these issues is well beyond the scope of a brief strategic forecasting note. Rather, the evaluation attempts structure analysis of the objective and strategic conditions of strategy implementation in relation to the objectives. I focus on the ConOps and challenges in order to support forward thinking on sustainable stability in the Sahel-Saharan area and, more urgently, at the service of the impetus initiated by the First Conference on developing a regional stabilization strategy for areas affected by Boko haram in the Lake Chad Basin, held in N'Djamena November 2-4, 2017.

The offset timing of this conference is symptomatic of the challenges: it happens more than two years after the deployment of the MNJTF, whereas the Force itself is in principle just one of the tools of the strategy envisaged *ex ante*. One can therefore infer that, both necessary, relatively relevant and incomplete, the MNJTF draws both its strength and limitations from its constrained conditions of possibility as well as the models it draws from as an *ad hoc* response. The next section of this work will examine the adequacy of the strategic concept of operation in relation to the models it is implicitly or explicitly based on, namely, Military Operations Abroad (MOA) and, *lato sensu* Peace Support Operations (PSO),

within the stabilization frame of reference⁸. Yet, these two operational models are essentially designed for crisis situational response and thus target the Braudelian short duration⁹. Conversely, the last section assesses the MNJTF's prospects from the vantage point of genuine stabilization which, in order to generate sustainable virtuous circles, must meet structural challenges related to mid and long duration.

⁸ This framework is based on Security Council Resolution S / RES / 2211 (2015), which states that the ISSSS (*International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy*), originally developed for the Congo (DRC), reviewed and enriched with stabilization action plans, has become the global reference for PSO stabilization initiatives.

⁹ In Fernand Braudel's classification of the structuring dynamics of societies and their effects over time, the short duration is the time of immediate conjunctural events, the average duration of structures not exceeding two generations, and the long duration, that of the quasi-sociohistoric immobility of cultures in their environment that can generate perceptions of naturalness. "History and Social Sciences: the long term" *Annales: Economies, societies, civilizations*, 13th Year, N°4, 1958, pp. 725-753.



The phasing of MNJTF's ConOps: modeling, relevance and sustainability of a chronostrategy

How to effectively address security challenges in a transnational basin such as Lake Chad and regulate the strategic and operational interaction in this liminal space with and by essentially national Forces? LCB countries have decided to appeal to supranational bodies and global standards to address these issue and challenges. The hybrid modeling of the ConOps and its relative relevance as regards temporality derive from references to these binding regulatory frameworks of Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), Peace Support Operations (PSO) or other forms of Operations Abroad (OA) which are marked by tensions between autonomy and heteronomy, even interference between internal and external aspects of territoriality.

Mandate-mission-planning of the ConOps: a constrained triptych

The document recording the MNJTF's strategic plan for the fight against the terrorist group Boko Haram, endorsed by the AU at its 489th meeting on March 3, 2015 (Communiqué PSC / PR / COMM.CDLXXXIX) , authorizes the MNJTF to implement, in its Area of Operation (AO), the following mandate (Chapter III)

create a safe and secure environment in areas affected by the activities of Boko Haram and other terrorist groups, with a view to significantly reducing violence against civilians and other abuses, including sexual and gender-based violence, in accordance with international law including international humanitarian law and the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy;

facilitate the implementation of comprehensive stabilization programs in the affected areas by the Member States of LCBC and Benin, including the full restoration of State authority and the return of internally displaced persons and displaced persons and refugees;

facilitate, within its capabilities, humanitarian operations and the delivery of aid to the affected population.

With a view to the execution (XIII) of the Mission (XII) resulting from this mandate, the Concept of Operations is as follows : The MNJTF will coordinate with the Defense and Security Forces of the Member States LCBC and Benin, to neutralize and prevent Boko Haram and all other armed groups, freedom of movement in its AO. To do this, the action of the MNJTF will follow specific steps, whose temporality is well

defined *ab initio* :

- a) Phase 0. Planning and Pre-deployment: January 29 - March 30, 2015.
- b) Phase 1. Deployment: March 30, 2015 - June 2015.
- c) Phase 2. Conduct of Offensive Operations: April 15, 2015 - October 15, 2015.
- d) Phase 3. Stabilization: May 1, 2015 - December 31, 2015.
- e) Phase 4. Disengagement: October 1, 2015 - January 29, 2016.
- f) The MNJTF will disengage from the theater of operations only after receiving an instruction from the current President of the LCBC and Benin, on the basis of a resolution.

This planning is questionable in many aspects. Firstly the nonrealistic nature of the duration of various phases is evident. Furthermore, reflecting a good strategic understanding of the situation, the condition set out in paragraph f), that of disengagement not to an imperative time horizon, but subject to a discretionary policy decision at the highest level of the LCBC, lift the mortgages. Here, the chronostrategic flexibility¹⁰ is and will be of paramount importance. It is also an attempt to solve the problems linked to the gap between the voluntarism of the main strategic actors, the countries of

¹⁰ The concept of chronostrategy comes from the debate on the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the ability of the Forces to predict the time needed for a certain victory. Technology-based density, speed and accuracy were supposed to guarantee this certainty by the constant acceleration of the operational tempo, within and in the succession of recursive loops OGD (Observation Guidance Decision-Action). See James Der Derian, "The Space of International Relations: Simulations, Surveillance, and Speed," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.34, No. 3, September 1990. From the point of view of the field , just as geostrategy considers spatial dimensions, chronostrategy highlights the centrality of time. Joseph Henrotin quite rightly suggests to consider in particular the long time of politics, which presupposes the prospective reflection (" We are on in how long? Some reflections on chronostrategy ", *Defense nationale* , No. 5, May 2006). From its consistency , the chronostrategy thinking can lead, as to the terms of the final outcome, to renunciation to victory in a conflict as a condition of its settlement, which for example Cameroon and Nigeria seem to have achieved in the Bakassi case.

the LCBC and, by extension, the regional mechanisms of the AAPS on the one hand and on the other hand the constraints that must be taken into account in order to deal with various imperatives, including relevance and immediate effectiveness, but with a view to a promising effectiveness over time. For lack of own resources and to absorb some interpersonal friction between Member States of the LCBC, the trust deficit impeding Coordination were solved by judiciary agreement of variable geometry, but definitely above the national references.

At the same time, the realistic posture, often in conflict with the cross-border nature of the action commensurable to the spatial disposition of the threat, has remained largely shared in the midst of the imperatives of mutualisation and the right to pursue transterritorial actions. The International framework for action, legitimation, coordination and interoperability was imposed could be but that of UN PSO / PKO. The modeling and scheduling of the ConOps appear as the result of a doctrinal and pragmatic compromise borrowing both from PSO and Outdoors Operations.

Adaptation of the MNJTF ConOps to the PSO / MOA model

The United Nations PSO/PKO are essentially OA. As a matter of fact, they involve the deployment of troops outside the territory of the country providing the " UN peace keeping forces". The other two major types of MOA are on the one hand operations resulting from bilateral Defense commitments such as " Leopard / Bonite" of the Foreign Legion on Kolwezi in May 1978 or more recently Serval in Northern Mali. On the other hand, they are generally coercive operations carried out by long established military coalitions or *ad hoc*, on the mandate of the United Nations Security Council and Chapter VII of the Charter . In this light, MNJTF MOA / PSO dimensions are very special because it is firstly about a coalition of neighboring states, the reactivation of a dormant institution and mission authorized by the AU and deployed even before receiving the full formal support of the Security Council .

On a more immediate use, the mission of the MNJTF is essentially a *stabilization* PSO, that is to say, the fourth (4G) or fifth (5G) type in recent generational classification¹¹. Its mode of operation actually borrows

from developments in the use of force doctrine that tends to standardize contemporary multifunctional PKOs as a three-phase operational continuum - intervention-stabilization-normalization/disengagement - centered on the second¹². Indispensable, the first is a phase of commitment to military dominance. It is the one in which violence and fighting are the strongest, with the challenge of neutralizing factions and factors of insecurity and instability: anti-terrorist and counter-insurgency coercion actions, violence control actions, actions to restore an order essential to urban life.

These were the attribution of the MNJTF at its inception : the initial operations "Lafiya Dole" And "Gama Aiki 1" Are offensives that destroyed the capacity of Boko Haram to wage war a front. In the scheme as in the action of the MNJTF, this deployment- intervention will be followed by the decisive phase of stabilization. The intervention aims to win the battle. It is in connection with the conclusive result of this phase 1 that the positions of the MNJTF and even of the National Armed Forces like those of Nigeria which declared that the war (quasi-symmetrically and abreast) was over, and that they had won it . However, these statements made at the opponent was being offensive again using its asymmetric strategy, led opinion and even some members within to question the effectiveness of the MNJTF. Therefore the insurrectionary opponent could harvest at the same time some perceptual dividends.

Therefore, if the objective of the intervention (managed by the MNJTF at the beginning) is to win the battle, that of the stabilization is to lead to peace by a set of actions of security and control of the operational environment. The most important include the territorial or spatial mesh to restore a secure and widespread

point between the 4th G (peacebuilding with use reinforced strength) and the 5th nascent (hybrid missions multiple chain of command deploying often contingents of " UN peace keeping forces " alongside those of regional organizations, see Jean Eudes Biem, Retroprojection on the effectiveness of the PKOs in Central Africa : from typologies to explanation ", in *Proceedings of the 1st International Colloquium of EIFORCES* , to be published (Paris, L'Harmattan, 2018 , pp. 15-47), and Kai Michael Kenkel " Five Generations of Peace Operations: from the " Thin Blue Line " to " Painting a blue Country " " *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* , 56 (1) 2013, pp. 122-143.

¹² Read in particular the reflection devoted to this concept and its strategic function as a decisive phase of contemporary PKOs by the General Military Review *Doctrine* No. 12, May 2007.

¹¹ In the final classification that I suggested in 2013, it is a stabilization- development operation (4G). In the most " modalitaire " of Kai Michael Kenkel, it is located at the crossing

freedom of movement of people and goods , including humanitarian convoys ; actions related to the restoration of the rule of law and order, including the protection of persons and property ; intelligence actions ; actions for the re-establishment of state social structures and institutions and assistance to the population that pave the way for the indispensable civil-military cooperation for capacity building¹³.

This corresponds moreover to various actions more or less characteristic of the classic counter insurgency. As demonstrated by researchers like Bricet des Vallons , among these actions, some are revealed reusable against jihadist terrorist groups like the Taliban in Afghanistan : looping, raking, separations, profiling, zoning, operational search, etc.¹⁴ The MNJTF actually did them in the direction of Boko Haram's spots of resistance and rear bases , including the Sambisa Forest and various parts of Lake Chad . The relevance of such actions is confirmed by the recent strategic literature, which shows that they are most often adapted in the

context of contemporary models of military responses to mass atrocities¹⁵ .

Since its victory in the frontline war, the MNJTF as part of its transition operations between intervention and stabilization as "Gama Aiki 2", and "RawanKada", or the acceleration of stabilization as "Amni Fakat", currently in progress, has proceeded and is proceeding in search of a cost / efficiency ratio as advantageous as possible. The first turning point was made where, after several ambushes and expensive accidents, logistics used for the battlefield has proved less useful in the fight against an opponent whose main weapons are improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including artisanal mines.

According to Clausewitz's law of reciprocal actions, MNJTF and national forces operating in support or concurrently under the mandate have adapted to an

¹³ In addition to IMO's (military influence operations), this latter group includes disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), as well as SSR (security sector reform).

¹⁴ Georges-Henri Bricet des Vallons (Editor), *Faut-il brûler la contre-insurrection ?*, Paris, Choisei, 2010

¹⁵ See the summary by Sarah Sewall and contributors to *Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook* (Harvard Kennedy School and Harvard Kennedy School, PKSOI, 2010) who identify six operational types: saturation, emulation, the creation of secure areas, containment, and defeat-destruction of perpetrators (pp. 63-78).



organization of the field, a mobile and penetrating zonal mesh and counter zonal-mesh to face tactics based on improvised mine fields imposed on them by the insurgents. With the support of partners and new acquisitions, various basic and sophisticated technologies were activated.

Operational search Methods which are constantly updated have been reinforced by experts in entrapped route opening detachment and counter-IED (CIED), as well as *Weapon Intelligence Teams* (WIT). With the view to facilitating the transition from the intervention phase to the stabilization one, the MNJTF has made significant progress by experiencing new maneuvers made easier by meticulous and patient action technologies - which can also be frustrating and yet unavoidable in wars with permanent trend - as great depth detectors that enable to find weapons caches during operational searches, vehicles equipped with operated TV protective turrets ensuring an optimum protection of the shooter, and non-magnetic shovels to probe the ground and find clues revealing the presence of artisanal mines

It is thanks to this adaptation effort, key modality of the mutation from arsenalised Forces into useful forces in asymmetry,¹⁶ that the MNJTF is currently working on the intensification of stabilization with a view to preparing, in accordance with the triple phase, the subsequent exit from crisis by facilitating the search for non-military solutions. It is worth noting that some are already emerging, certainly more or less erratic but quite suggestive, in the new trend, at the political level, to encourage the leadership of Boko Haram to negotiate, and its individual terrorists to return to civil social life .

It is indeed the success of the central stabilization phase that ensures the achievement of the strategic objective, the final phase of normalization that concludes a successful PSO. This brings to the restored social contract the possibility of consolidating with new institutions and authorities with legitimacy as widely recognized as possible, including by the former insurgents¹⁷. To seriously consider such perspectives in

LCBC, in the trans-Saharan area and in Africa on the wholes, it is important to consider new directions for the projection of African forces from the shortcomings of the MOA / PSO model that structures the MNJTF.

Anticipated results of the MNJTF: from limitations and deviations of the PSO / MOA model to innovation in the projection of African Forces ?

The most conclusive evaluations, the analytical literature and the authoritative doctrinal guidance, whether from the 2000 Brahimi Report, the 2008 Capstone Report or the 2015 Independent High Level Panel Report, leads to the conclusion that the PSOs, and even the PSOs that would be the fourth generation integrating a strong dimension of use of force and *peacebuilding*¹⁸, are not suitable for the fight against terrorism. The experience of the MNJTF, as well as the adaptive deviations that it mobilizes to fill the gaps, put managers, analysts and observers in front of immediate and prospective challenges from which emerges the imperative of new conceptions and models in the projection of the Forces against the dominant forms of contemporary and future conflictuality

i- Compensatory deviations in the face of the strategic deficits of the model

From a MOA point of view, the MNJTF is singular, perhaps unprecedented by some aspects. For example, Perouse de Montclos' reference to (Foreign?) Forces of Occupation concerns an unusual strategic-legal complex. The four sectors are essentially Forces operating on their own territory, but under international mandate. However, what the ConOps specifies is that the MNJTF acts in coordination with the Defense and Security Forces of the Member States of the LCBC and Benin in order to prohibit the terrorist groups in its Operation Area. This effectively allows Forces under national jurisdiction and command to project themselves into the territory of the neighboring country for more or less punctual operations.

Cameroon epitomizes this disposition with its Rapid Intervention Battalion' operation "Alpha" based in Maroua and placed under the direct authority of the Presidency of the Republic, and operation "Emergence

Haram, the recognition of legitimacy is simply allegiance to member states of the LCBC and the renunciation of substituting them for theocracy or other kratoterritorial

¹⁸ Kai Michael Kenkel, " Five generations of peace operations ... " *op. cit.* , pp. 132-35.

¹⁶ Sir Rupert Smith, *L'Utilité de la Force* , Paris, Economica, 2007, Vincent Desportes, *La guerre Probable : Penser autrement*, Paris, Economica, 2008, etc

¹⁷ African policymakers, particularly through the AU CPS, lay special emphasis on the idea that « the success of the PkOs depends largely on the maintenance of legitimacy » .Read in particular Paul D. Williams, " Enseignements tirés des Opérations de Maintien de la paix en Afrique" Bulletin de la sécurité africaine N° 3/2010,p.1. Hence their recurrent insistence on the return to constitutional order. In the case of Boko

4" of the Fourth Joint Military Region which receives its orders from the Joint Army Chief of Staff. Alpha and Emergence simply inform the MNJTF if their penetration distance remains within the limit of 25 km. It is when they intend to go beyond that they must obtain authorization from the MNJTF. From the point of view of full interoperability throughout the theater, everything happens as if the MNJTF and its AO extended in the vectorization of projections, somehow beyond their spaces and troops, sometimes encompassing, sometimes encompassed by the National Forces. This is also suggested by the current Nigerian Forces "Final Push" operation, which summarizes the spirit of all sectors, while the Force's central command is seeking and preparing the means, including amphibians, in order to dislodge Boko haram from the islands of Lake Chad which, with the forest of Sambisa, are part of its last major rear bases

From the strict point of view of the action-results report, the MNJTF has been successful in applying the four Ds of the OSP / OPEX intervention phase : *Disrupt, Degrade, Destroy, Deter*.¹⁹ Offensive operations "Lafiya dole" And " Gama Aiki" effectively managed to degrade the adversary's combat capability, *disrupt* his coordination, control and communications mechanisms as well as his logistical circuits, *destroy* his means of conducting the war head-on, and *dissuade* the adversary from attempting to febuild such capabilities, at least in the short or medium term. However, this success did not deter the will to fight otherwise, to fight at all. He could not and could not, because of the very nature of the adversary and the war ", Lead to peace in the next phase of stabilization that is already stretching in time.

In fact, the failure was programmed, inscribed within the very temporal limits of the ConOps phases, had it not been for chronostrategic flexibility. The first adaptation, quite relevant, as we said, is at this level. It sets the stage for any prospect of future success of the MNJTF, which is subject to a sine qua non condition: *the disqualification of the discontinuity*. In the basin of Lake Chad as on all the grounds of the almost permanent wars of our time indeed, "if this disqualification of discontinuity is confirmed at the strategic level, it is also affirmed at the tactical level. It is irrelevant today to act in up-and-down and to abandon without conquering the conquered territory : barely folded, the opponent comes back to take possession and punish " the returned ". The only maneuver that is worth mentioning

is that of continuity, of the State which advances and establishes itself behind the sword. " ²⁰

ii- Challenges and innovation requirements

PSO/MOA stabilization will not be sufficient under any circumstances. As all generals and analysts note about the likely war (Desportes), in the armed struggle against adversaries with strong social and human penetration (Smith), achieving the desired political ends requires more, much more than military victory. and punctual effects. Any success of the MNJTF in the discontinuity, whether in the initial deadlines or even at a horizon of five, ten, twenty years or more, would be Pyrrhic. It is a question of thinking and acting a great long-term strategy. Absolute and incompressible, this is the requirement. Because without disqualification of both temporal (chronostrategic) and spatial (geostrategic) discontinuity, areas liberated from the BH and insufficiently secure would become more seriously and more permanently dangerous.

Because of the fragmentation of groups and multiple emulations among entrepreneurs of violent extremism, these areas that have become grayer after the departure of the state than at its approach would be quickly controlled by organized crime. Transnationalization of this crime would be inevitable with regard to the socio-historical trajectories of trans-Saharan exchanges. The former Defense and Security Forces (DSF) OAs, which have become those of terrorist armed groups (TAG), criminals armed (CAG) and political armed groups (PAG), would be part of dynamics close to those of the territories located along the old Almoravid roads. and exploited by " caliphs" like Mokhtar Belmokhtar between West and North Africa. This exploitation, as we know, provides resources that allow TAGs such as MUJAO, Al Murabitoune and the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (merger of Al Mourabitoune Belmokhtar and Ansar dine the great Tuareg jihadist strategist lyad ag Ghali affiliated with AQIM) to proliferate and prosper, to unite or to deploy each on his own with considerable freedom of action that states struggle to stem.

The risk is even greater in light of some of the major

²⁰ Vincent Desportes, *op cit.* , p.15 « si cette disqualification de la discontinuité se confirme au niveau stratégique, elle s'affirme aussi au niveau tactique. Rien ne sert aujourd'hui d'agir en « va-et-vient » et d'abandonner sans le contrôler le territoire conquis : à peine replié, l'adversaire vient reprendre possession et punir « les retournés ». La seule manœuvre qui vaille est celle de la continuité, de l'Etat qui avance et s'établit derrière le glaive »

¹⁹ NATO has particularly and effectively systematized them during the Libya Campaign in 2011

trends in the global security environment. Among those with greater impact here are the assaults launched simultaneously at the turn of the century against the Westphalian state by three global insurrections. : the criminal insurgency of the downsized of globalization, the plutocratic insurgency of elites composed on the one hand of international predators of extraction and other transactions fleeing taxation in rich countries, and on the other hand their correspondents of corruption networks in the state apparatus of the rentier states, and the Islamist insurgency, the best known but the least comprehensive and least rich of the three, except when it is supported by states or the increasing porosities and mutabilities between ATG, ACG and APG.²¹

²¹ On the global Islamist insurgency, see David Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency” In Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo (Eds), *Strategic Studies: a Reader*, New York, Routledge, 2008, pp. 326-41. On plutocratic and criminal insurrections, read contributions to *Beyond Convergence : World without Order* led by Hilary Matfess and Michael Micklaucic (Washington DC, Center for Complex Operations, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2016), and in particular “The Twin Insurgencies: Plutocrats and Criminals Challenge the Westphalian State”, pp. 47-60.

The greatest imperative is thus to prevent the former OAs, which have become stateless, from being transformed into ecosystems of repercussions, replicas and proliferation of the dynamics of convergence and hybridization of these global insurrections. The reason is that two of these insurrections target or tend toward outright capture of the state ²² and therefore its most extreme weakening. From this perspective, the jihadist form paradoxically appears to be the most pro-state of the great contemporary insurrections, even if it aims first of all at destroying the democratic state of Western and Judeo-Christian inspiration (even when it respects Islam or applies the *sharia*), before replacing it with an absolutist theocratic state of medieval Islamic inspiration. Likely to precipitate the collapse of the States often fragile or failing as most are in the LCBC and the G5 Sahel,²³ the dynamics of the gray areas under the grip of insurrectional extremism does not seem to promise to Africa future state models something different from the Philippines of the Marcos era, Colombia’s time of glory Pablo Escobar, or Somalia’s Islamic courts.

These are the ultimate challenges to be met, including preventively, by the success of the MNJTF. This

²² Hilary Matfess et Michael Micklaucic, *op. cit*

²³ Read Fund for Peace, *State Failure Index 2018*, Washington, DC, 2018



success, impossible in the timeframe, even on the horizon of year five of the MNJTF (2020), remains difficult to predict in its temporality. In the vast field of possibilities, what seems to be able to compress time is the incipient dynamics of counter-radicalization and radicalization which will be able to orient, particularly politicizing, the evolution of BH's polemological status.²⁴

The new strategic orientations, but first of all political, must be based on a consequent foresight work to decide on continuity as ATG linking and relaying the poles of the Sahelo-Saharan Jihad to destroy, or its mutation. Taking into account the reciprocal actions of the States and Boko Haram as ATG since the error of the extrajudicial execution of Mohammed Yusuf, one could orient it towards forms that make the relation less commensurable. One of the schemas is one or more social-agonistic entities more or less appeased, which can claim the radicalized current, many of which are already taking the opposite or alternative paths of violent extremism²⁵

The next steps envisaged by the MNJTF, to continue and systematize as part of the forthcoming stabilization strategy, are to revive military operations to maintain or improve the current security situation. ; encourage the surrender and return of repentant insurgents ; step up stabilization actions ; massively engage in reconstruction, especially infrastructure ; Initiate or implement multi-agency *empowerment programs* in neighboring communities ; set up development partnerships ; strengthen local government structures; strengthen the management and administration of refugees and IDPs ; continue to raise awareness.

As essential and urgent as they are, these proposals remain within the limits of stabilization. The disqualification of the discontinuity by the permanent institutionalization of the MNJTF as originally conceived

is indispensable. Thus, various innovations are needed to meet the challenges of the strategic chronotope.

Conclusion and perspectives of innovation in the projection of the African Forces

In order to remedy both the geostrategic deficit of the response without the right of pursuit, and the chrono-strategic one of its model, the MNJTF deploys itself as a very specific PSO / MOA whose intelligibility and relevance are inscribed in ConOps' spatial and temporal modal openings. To resolve the spatial discontinuities, the MNJTF acts in coordination and continuity with the DSFs of the LCB Member States and Benin established in the areas contiguous to its AO. To mitigate the temporal discontinuity, its ConOps installs its disengagement in a logic of permanent postponement, perhaps in perpetuity, at least until the deployment of more perennial devices. In this sense, the ongoing MNJTF experiment allows a large accumulation of coordination, complementarity and coherence at the transnational, intra and interregional levels, which cannot be avoided by emulating similar initiatives such as the G5 Sahel, whose AO come across that of the MNJTF in the center of the Sahelian band, imperative geographical pivot of the counter-jihadism in Africa.

Beyond the punctual results and even in perspective, the MNJTF has a great merit. Due to the compensatory adaptability and the strong emulability of its ConOps in terms of sequenced response in a flexible timelimits, it raises the most current issues of strategic thinking in Africa and in the world. In particular, there is that of innovation about the basics of action in the most recurrent and most likely conflicts within our transnational societies and populations : the issues of doctrine ; of Models, Forms and Formats of Forces ; issues of training, military practice, refresher courses ; and in deployment, numerical and logistical adequacy, coordination, complementarity, coherence and cohesion.

In the construction of Defense and Security Africa, the biggest challenge is the lifting of structural mortgages at the level of a major strategy that must necessarily be structurally transformative²⁶, Innovation in

²⁴ Jean Eudes Biem, "Evolutions of the Boko Haram Polemological Status in the Face of the United Nations Global Strategy in Central Africa: Integrated Foresight Outline", *Vigie*, Nos. 003 and 004 December 2014, pp. 73-80.

²⁵ Another factor to be taken into account for this purpose is the result of the UNDP Bureau's large quantitative study for Africa. The investigation of the tipping point of individuals into a violent extremist group membership (of which GATs are only one of the forms), establishes that the death of a parent or friend caused by SDS is a of these most decisive factors, the tipping point par excellence. See *Paths of Extremism in Africa*, UNDP, New York, 2017.

²⁶ Jean Eudes Biem, "Local Cultures in the Instability and Re-stabilization of the Sahel for Africa's Emergence: The Need for Structural Transformative Grand Strategy" In Charles Binam Bikoi and Jean Eudes Biem (Eds), *African Emergence and Industrialization: The New Deal of African Heritage*, Yaounde, CERDOTOLA, 2018, pp. 311-39.

the projection of the Forces must be articulated in two directions. The first is the spatio-dynamic direction mobilized by the Bush-Obama doctrine, which prescribes reducing the primacy of the arsenalized force and large campaigns to deploy, pre-emptively if necessary, the Forces in highly mobile special units often applying the principles of non-identification and endowed with all the firepower and all the logistic support available in mobility on the theaters where the adversities are prepared and neutralized before they get started. The second direction could be qualified as perspective-systemic, referring to the anticipatory programming of the Forces. This implies the lifting of the Forces as well as the maintenance of manpower and equipment necessary for the commands in strict relation with the most probable conflicts, and first of all for the most sensitive areas and points.

This transformative approach could be sustained and systematized with measures like the following, among others:

- 1- Without giving up international support, decide on the necessity to adapt and transform the mandate and the ConOps in order to turn the MNJTF into an advanced integration force with exemplary role in the integration of African Forces within the frameworks of the ASF and the future Africa Federal Armed Forces.
- 2- Start planning those Federal Forces 20 years ahead, beyond the horizon of the ASF full implementation.
- 3- Link the establishment of the Forces at different scales with the management of structural deadlocks as a basis for a new strategic culture. Given the axial issues such as those of the trans-Saharan space, this would make it possible to meet the requirement to move from the current intervention model to a transformation model. In practice, this would involve initiating or increasing the presence of the State with the installation, in risk areas, of productive activities and research and development units based on local assets. These activities could be managed by Security and Defense Forces and intelligence (including Special Forces as needed), with parliamentary control.
- 4- Add a Countering transnational organized crime (CTOC) component to the current MNJTF and in these hybrid units, and develop an African CTOC strategy, or at least national pilot strategies.
- 5- In order to guarantee a permanent interoperability capacity of all the African Forces at the national, subregional and continental levels, and whatever

the combinations, harmonize at all these levels the aforementioned bases of action: Models, Forms and Formats of Forces ; training, training, refreshing ; numerical and logistical adequacy, coordination, complementary, coherence and cohesion, continuous simulations. To do this, transform into an AU agency, like the NEPAD Agency, or into an International Pan African Organization, the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA) and systematize its role as a strategic advisor to the African Union Commission and AAPS regional mechanisms for coordinating, harmonizing and standardizing ASF preparedness.

- 6 - In line with the ASF Roadmap that prescribes the establishment of Equipment Storage and Reserves for the Rapid Deployment Posture in Fourteen Days, Temporarily Build on "tense flow logistics" solutions to set up a culture of maintaining reserves for initial operational capabilities in the event of deployment.²⁷ On this basis, overcome and resolve one of the major weaknesses of African Forces (logistics) by establishing the Douala Continental Logistic Base as a logistical reference center for the elaboration of concepts for support at all levels, as well as the maintenance of equipment deposits.
- 7- Ensure the harmonization of all pan-African defense and collective security instruments and make the provisions of the Non-Aggression and Common Defense Pact of the African Union binding through the signing of bilateral defense agreements between each African country and each of its neighbors. In order to effectively and definitively prohibit the acts reprobated by the said Pact, work to reach a comprehensive agreement whereby any attack on any African country, whether from within or from without, is an attack on all African countries.

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²⁷ On this point, read the note by Colonel Uduak Udoaka of the United States Air Force "The Capacity to Respond", *Africa Defense Forum*, Volume 10, 3rd Quarter 2017, p. 24.

THE LAKE CHAD BASIN, AN “INTOXICATED ZONE” TO BE RE-NATIONALISED

By Wullson Mvomo Ela

In recent years, information about the Lake Chad Basin highlights an important deterioration in security measures. Since the year 2013 marked by the kidnapping of the Moulin-Fournier family, the entire region has witnessed violent Islamic fundamentalists who have implanted organised crimes. The main vector of violence in this context is Boko Haram, an extremist organisation since the 2000s, which has focused on an internal struggle in Nigeria. If Islamic violence has sometimes taken the States of the region by surprise, they are however used to the violence and insecurity that reigns there. Due to its geostrategic position, the Lake Chad Basin has been at stake and an object of rivalry between the different kingdoms that succeeded each other. This is a multi-century problem that the various political identities of the region have not been able to control until now.



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Regarding the weaknesses of the general security situation coupled with the difficulties encountered by the States in dealing with it, there is a real problem in regaining control of the region. The difficulty to regain control in the region, will in our opinion, decline in the double challenges of the sanctuarisation and the assumption of the fluvial States. In fact, such a reading grid imposes on us a resolute approach that is both methodical and graduated, which mobilises as much phenomenology as geopolitical and prospective analysis.

To this effect, it is important to explain the deteriorating security conditions that destabilises the Lake Chad Basin, to a level of making it a theatre and an important breeding ground for violent extremist in Africa, before considering the conditions of an effective security measures in handling the threats in the region. From the outset, one could argue that the geopolitics of instability that characterises the Lake Chad Basin itself is, at least in part, the result of a geopolitical deficit of consciousness on the part of the States found in the region. This deficit is characterised by a parcel of State presence which opens the way for the proliferation of criminal and / or insurrectional organisations of all

kinds, responsible for the transformation of this area into zones of lawlessness, a “no right land”. In order to support this claim, this assertion will deal with the State deficit in this area (I), before examining the imperative of its re-nationalisation (II).

I- The State Deficit in the Lake Chad Basin: Diachronic Anatomy of an “intoxicated zone”

The Lake Chad Basin is regarded as an area characterised by a State vacuum, an “intoxicated zone” whose insecurity dynamics developed long ago. Despite its historical centrality and its several States fragmentation during their independence, the importance of the Lake Chad Basin has decreased over time, giving it this minor dimension which cannot be over emphasised. True anti-people, this locality has become one of the sanctuaries of violent extremism in Sub-Saharan Africa. It has hardly been a subject of interest justifying an affirmation of its neighbouring States constantly known for the free movement of people and goods, because of the permeability or even the absence



of borders between these entities. It is quite reasonable enough for us to say the area would be devoid of any interest. In our opinion, the immobility of the Lake Chad Basin States was more the manifestation of a deficit of geopolitical awareness, giving rise to a relative apprehension of lifestyle and socio-historical dynamics that are at work there; often to the detriment of republican systems of allegiance. Although specific as it may seem, it is not a zonal exclusivity. Indeed, most African States are struggling to control and protect their territories. They do not manage to constitute themselves as present and relevant political structures on all their territories with well-limited borders.¹ This emptiness results in the development and persistence of the interloping character of an area (1) where the environmental crisis and instability have favoured the spread of violent extremism (2).

1- A Traficant Region

Long before colonisation, the Lake Chad Basin area was made up of peoples and socio-political communities for whom raiding was an integral part of the way of life. It was an anthropological practice rooted in societies whose aim was to replenish the reserves of the geopolitical actors who committed themselves to it. Pillage was a form of parallel economy and a means of accumulation by which the political constructions at the time could strengthen their economic base.

According to Issa Saïbou, in ancient empires such as Borno, Baguirmi, Wandala or Ouaddaï, "[...] the raids organized during the dry season by the armies made it possible to bail out the State coffers during the moments of cash crisis. For the peoples, then, the looting helped to compensate for the deficits of the households, to manage the periods of lean, to compensate the bad harvests and to reconstitute the herds decimated by the epizooties or the scarcity of the pastures [...]".² In other words, unlawfulness and violence were ontologically accepted and shared by the people. The multiform trades occupied a major place.

In the 1960s, the civil war in Chad favoured the fortification and sophistication of violent criminal structures in the area. The destabilisation of armed groups from this State has promoted the circulation of arms and rebels across borders. Many of them have re-converted to organised crimes. With the economic crisis in the 80s, the crime rate and violence have increased. Due to the absence of the State, many individuals and organisations have embarked on cross-border banditry practices. If they did not join armed bands of highway robbers (*zaraguinas*), they engaged in acts of kidnappings with ransom demand. Pastoralists and farmers were particularly targeted in this system of militarisation of crime and the criminalisation of the local economy. This set of events have led to a paradigm shift in the region coupled with the disappearance of its central authority.

It is this sphere of constructive marginalisation that justifies Janet Roitman's schema of the Lake Chad Basin, which she describes as a periphery. The people who live there are constantly working to appropriate and transform, through processes of reinterpretation, manipulation, subjectivities, the forms and values driven by the centre.³ If this mechanism is significant in the case of a remarkable presence of the State within the periphery, it is even more exacerbated in the case which interests us. In addition, the acknowledgment of the state has further strengthened the rationalities, the reference systems and the room for the manoeuvre of local geopolitical actors. More fundamentally, the commission for the acts of violence and criminal purposes is politically based on the challenge of the existing political order.⁴ It is also perceived as an act of bravery by the local people. This is to say how behaviours are structured on archaeology of violence very consistent and whose rationalities oscillate, from the perceptual point of view, between defiance and heroism.

This historical situation with anthropological foundations has developed and is perpetuated because of the absence of the State. While actions and initiatives are envisaged that-and-there, but the region still lag the

¹ See Philippe MOREAU-DEFARGE, on the question of geo-historical and geopolitical awareness, *Introduction to geopolitics*, 2nd d. Seuil, coll. « Points essais », 2005.

² Issa SAÏBOU, « Ambush on the roads of the Southern edge of Lake Chad, », *African Politics*, N° 94, February 2004, p. 87.

³ Janet ROITMAN, « Les recompositions du bassin du lac Tchad », *Politique Africaine*, n° 94, juin 2004, pp. 8-10.

⁴ Issa SAÏBOU, *Les coupeurs de route. Histoire du banditisme rural et transfrontalier dans le bassin du lac Tchad*, Paris, Karthala, 2010, pp. 9-62.

control of the authorities. In reality, their efforts were not always part of a true geopolitical consciousness. However, by abandoning its prerogatives, the state has allowed various groups to launch an assault on this area, the character of which is unseemly and riches sharpen desires. It is in this perspective that the diffusion of jihadist in the region can be apprehended in relation to the precarious environment.

2- Ecological crisis, human instability and jihadist

From an environmental point of view, the situation in the Lake Chad Basin is highly worrying. Historically, the livelihoods of the people living around the Lake Chad have largely been depending on the exploitation of this water body. They use it to irrigate the soil, feed livestock or fish. However, due to the drought, the lake has experienced a drastic loss of its water body. The periods (1905-1908, 1912-1914, 1940-1944, and 1972-1984) greatly affected the hydro-graphic network of the region as a result of drought. Indeed, about 24 000 km² in the 1960s, the water body of the area since the 1990s, varies between 1500 and 2000 km². Its main tributaries, the Logone and Chari Rivers, have been severely affected. Despite this gradual depletion, this Lake continues to be under increasing pressure from nearly 30 million people who survive out of it.⁵

In terms of consequences, economic and livelihood activities are undermined. Land is becoming less irrigated for agricultural production while cattle lack pasture. This is all the more dramatic as agriculture, livestock and fisheries are some of the main economic activities in the region. Cumulatively, it poses to the populations, a problem of food security and socio-economic vulnerability. Faced with this complex situation, States show either certain immobility or generally inconsistent public policies.

In the light of this explanation, two axes of analysis can be explored in connection with the implantation and spread of violent Islamism.

First, the Lake Chad Basin is an area in competition with increasingly scarce resources. Secondly, there is great instability that is conducive to any form of

manipulation and popular mobilization for disastrous purposes. For all these reasons, this region has become a fertile ground for the proliferation of proselytism which, in this case, is based on propaganda-type rhetoric based on the fight against inequalities and the rejection of a system of governance generator of social fractures and moral deviance. In line with the so-called root cause theory, the analysis of Boko Haram's socio-economic factors emphasises variables such as government negligence and corruption to explain the emergence of this group.⁶ Far from being a conjuncture datum, the emergence of Boko Haram tends today to be prolonged in the progressive rooting of this actor within the local sociological fabric, either by mechanisms of adhesion of the populations left behind, either because of complicit mutism, or because of the psychotic effect conveyed by the quasi-systematisation of retaliation or threat.

Thus in Northern Nigeria, distraught young people called *Almajiri*⁷ were massively recruited by these subversives. Due to a lack of State educational structures and youth supervision, these young people most often between 6 and 25 years and were taken by *Mallams* who became responsible for their teaching. This recruitment system has been particularly prevalent in Maiduguri, Zaria, Kaduna and Kano among others. In the rest of the Lake Chad Basin, recruitments are conducted under an almost similar model from *madrasas*. They also rely on financial mobilisation, although sometimes terror is used to encourage popular support.

The expansion of jihadist in the Lake Chad Basin has also been facilitated by the cross-border continuity of ethno-religious communities in this large crossroads where many people meet such as Kotoko, Kanuri, Shoa Arab and Mandara, etc. It is not uncommon for "allies" on the other side of the border to take local action initially driven on the Nigerian territory. This is equally encouraged by regular movements across territorial boundaries. This transnational mobility is favoured by the porous borders resulting from the non-control by adjacent States of their spatiality and more specifically from the lack of national public policies in the area of cooperative management on borders. The urgency of State assumption in this area becomes undeniable in view of the above episodes.

⁶ Lucky E. ASUELIME, David J.OJOCHENEMI, *Boko Haram: The Socio-Economic Drivers*, New York, Springer, 2015, p. vii.

⁷ This term refers to a person who leaves their home to seek knowledge about Islam.

⁵ Armel SAMBO, « Perceptions locales et pratiques d'adaptation au changement climatique dans la gestion rationnelle des ressources en eau du Lac Tchad », *Geo-Eco-Trop.*, Vol 37, n° 2, 2013, pp. 293-296.

II- The urgency of an assertion of the State in the Lake Chad Basin: challenges of global governance for a sustainable stabilisation

Considering the porous nature of the Lake Chad Basin, it is urgent for the States of the region to become aware of the geopolitical challenges and stakes and to act accordingly on the ground. If they have so far shown a screaming deficit of geopolitical awareness with regard to the strategic nature of the Lake Chad Basin, it is time for the insecure, multivariate situation to persist in the long term creates a concerted action on their part.

In a fundamental way, geopolitical consciousness structures the vision, which in turn underpins the policy, at the origin of the strategy and the action. It would therefore be unrealistic to envisage a strategy of credible stabilisation of the zone without thinking of a recovery by the States concerned, individuals and collectively on a historically area. The re-stated we are discussing here calls for deployment to different degrees. It should operate as much from the global point of view (1) as that of proximity (2).

1- Globalism as a praxeological method in recuperating the Lake Chad Basin

The member States of the Lake Chad Basin are confronted with the imperative of adopting global governance as a relevant measure for a lasting

stabilisation in order to get this area out of the margin and restore its geostrategic importance. It is a question of starting a re-mobilisation of public policies in two directions.

Firstly, from a cyclical perspective, it would be a matter of strengthening and improving conventional defences and security policies at national and regional level in a coordinated and common approach. Within this framework and beyond the traditional policies that one can imagine, it would be appropriate that, on a cooperative basis, the States resize themselves and affirm their spatial sovereignty, in particular by ensuring an effective presence on the whole national territory, with particular attention to the borders. With specifically regard to these borders, only a relevant cooperative approach, suggesting agreements negotiated between neighbouring States, could lead to a satisfactory control of cross-border flows of people and goods. Obviously, it would be first of all a significant military and security presence; which would have a dual ambition both coercive and dissuasive, and would have the advantage of immediacy.

On the other hand, the military-security deployment by the States being itself incompleteness touches on the structural dynamics responsible for the emergence of cryogenic factors in the zone, another alliance of effort should be envisaged in a long-term perspective.

According to this partnership, civilian and multidimensional this time, the State is called to reinforce its public policies for development and human security



at both national and regional levels. This implies not only urgent measures of stabilisation and humanitarian assistance, but especially lasting ones relating to reconstruction. Here, the redistributive equation of national wealth and the issue of spatial planning should lead the action, given that the feeling of marginalisation has a lot to do with the recruitment of young people into insurgents and radical groups. The challenge of this approach is the conquest of minds which, as we know, is at the centre of any counter-insurgency strategy.

Mao Zedong already pointed out that the insurgent "is in the minds of people like fish in the water". Against this type of enemy, conventional military operations should constitute only 20% of the efforts made; the remaining 80% are non-military operations, the purpose of which is to gain the support of the population, presented as the main objective of counter-insurgency.⁸ It would be a challenge to undertake the fight against an insurgency without the effort to conquer popular support through a humanitarian and participative approach.

In this logic, the most credible approach combines conventional security and defence policies with sustainable reconstruction policies. It is appropriate at this level to focus on the regional scale which is added to the national one. The Lake Chad Basin Commission,

which is a sub-regional body, must enrich its missions and assume its authoritarian role. The collective security approach envisaged in this case is quite innovative and even more relevant than the classic one.

Concept based on the perception of indivisibility and solidarity of peace between different States, and as a system of norms, institutions and / or mechanisms, traditional collective security is often confined to the challenges of external security aggression and interstate security, to the detriment of the population. It is not so concerned with the fundamental and structural causes of conflicts.⁹

Yet States need to cooperate and assist each other not only in urgent situations of violence, but also in a normal context of societal issues such as development and the improvement of the living conditions of the populations. It then becomes relevant to speak of the co-production of security and especially co-prosperity. These two concepts, aimed at reinforcing the State as a whole and aiming at empower the point of view of proximity, which should serve as a praxeological foundation for the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and other regional initiatives.

⁸ David GALULA, *Contre-insurrection. Théorie et pratique*, Paris, Economica (trad.), 2008, pp. viii-xix.

⁹ Serges SUR, «Sécurité collective», in Thierry MONTBRIAL et Jean KLEIN (dir.), *Dictionnaire de stratégie*, Paris, PUF, 2000, p. 503.



2- The implementation of proximity measures: an action at the heart of societies

As discussed above, violence, crime and predation are embedded in the social field of the Lake Chad Basin. They structure ontologically the *habitus*¹⁰ and the perceptions of the populations. We then speak of proximity threats because they are at the heart of societies. It is therefore necessary to initiate actions aimed at eradicating this proximity, particularly by putting distance, if not mistrust, between the perpetrators of violence and the civilian population. This would involve the combined processes of credibility of State institutions on the one hand and de-credibility of insecure entrepreneurs and their alternative project of society if any on the other hand. Here, the communication challenge proves to be major in both quantitative and qualitative terms. It is indeed for States to communicate more, but even more to communicate better by making sure to make adjustments in line with the real needs expressed on the ground by local populations. In our opinion, a transparent State is a better understood State and therefore more able to win the support of its people. Moreover, an effective State is a State that is more convincing and that, as a result, is able to better control the self-referential subsystems within it that would likely compete with it from the allegiances point of view.

From a participatory point of view, the authorities should endeavour to make the populations to be actors of their own development, to evade them from proselytism and to bring them back to State and regional citizenship. In other words, it is question of refunding in their minds, the feeling of belonging to their States, remobilising in particular what participates in the structuring of the modes of representation and the perceptions with regard to the State: republican principles and Shared values, a memory restoration effort, a clear project of society built on a pragmatic vision of the future and concrete actions well defined in time among others. The development of this region must integrate the human rights approach because the non-respect of the economic, social and cultural rights of the

populations by States makes them vulnerable. It is one of the causes of their adherence to extremist movements.

Far from the statist and Jacobin strategies related to the development of public policies "ready-to-wear" according to a "top-down" approach, the privileged reference frame here subscribes to a "bottom-up" approach which is very popular with many theorists of the public action. In an inclusive setting, people should be involved in decision-making at the local level and in shaping the policies that shape their lives. This association could create in them, this feeling of belonging and national identification that they miss so much. Moreover, the actions on the ground could better address their concerns, in the sense of human security defined by Fen Hampson as "*a shared aspiration, to promote and advance human rights, including so that individuals whose physical safety and well-being are threatened may be out of danger*".¹¹ From this perspective, it is clear that the individual is at the centre of security concerns.

This evolution observed in theories of security appeared in the late 1980s, when the Soviet Union began to show signs of weakening. Since then, the concept of security has become the object of a wide apprehension. Moreover, it is written in a constructivist perspective thanks to the Copenhagen School whose main pillars are Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap De Wilde. In his work for example, Buzan starts from an extended approach to security to apprehend it as the fruit of a complex social construct, both multidimensional and multi-scale. It emphasizes the need for survival of communities whose members work together to define in a collegiate way, which in their eyes represents a threat. He speaks about security to account for this mechanism of construction from below, security on a societal scale.¹²

With regard to the Lake Chad Basin, it would be appropriate for local perceptions of insecurity to be taken into account. Beyond organised crime and terrorism, food insecurity and the socio-economic unevenness inherent among others to the deterioration of the environmental and climatic conditions are also equally recorded. The multivariate nature of this insecurity calls for an equally differentiated action that mobilises cross-cutting skills in areas as diverse as

¹⁰ In the bourdieusian sense of the term, *habitus* is a set of dispositions structured by specific conditions of existence and generators of individual and collective practices and representations. The *habitus* reproduces postures engendered by the structure in a historical perspective. It ensures the presence of past experiences. See Philippe DUFOUR DE CONTI, « Pierre Bourdieu », in Yannick YOTTE (dir.), *Sociologie-psychologie sociale: Auteurs et textes contemporains*, Paris, Publication de la Sorbonne, 2000, pp.89-91.

¹¹ Fen Olser Hampson, 2002, p. 4, cited by Charles Philippe DAVID, Jean-Jacques ROCHE, *Théories de la sécurité. Définitions, approches et concepts de la sécurité internationale*, Paris, Montchrestien, 2002, p.112.

¹² Barry BUZAN, "Rethinking Security after the Cold War," *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 32, n° 1, 1997, pp.12-15.

environmental engineering, health and humanitarian issues, development infrastructure, education and employment, border management and traditional security issues, just to name but these.

In conclusion, the Lake Chad Basin, with its history, anthropology, geographical configuration and security context, is an intoxicated area in the heart of Africa. It is characterised by the ineffectiveness of riparian States whose behaviour reflects considerable gaps in terms of geopolitical awareness and territorial assumption. As a result, the area remains uninformed in a context of environmental and humanitarian crisis. Also there, emerged jihadist that has gradually taken root, sometimes with the complicity of the local population. In order to reverse the trend, it is essential to operate within this area a process of re-stated in the sense of an assumption of the States in all the dimensions of their competences and sovereign responsibilities. First of all from the global point of view, it requires a remobilisation of national and regional public policies in the sense of global governance. Then in the context of proximity, it is a question of intervening in the centre of societies to win the minds, to impulse a new citizen conscience and to eradicate the tendencies of violence ontologically rooted in the cognitive and praxeological schemes. Through

this, we could recreate life, peace and security for and with the local population, from an inclusive and sustainable perspective. This principle of proximity is presented as the doctrinal strategic base on the regionalisation of security and stability more relevant. It subsidiary complements, which is at the centre of traditional modes of cooperation, and which finds its limits in situations of stabilisation as complex as that of the Lake Chad Basin.

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