


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STRATEGIC AND
PROSPECTIVE
ANALYSIS
BULLETIN



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Improvised Explosive Devices : A threat to Security in Central Africa



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

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EDITORIAL

UNDERSTANDING THE PHENOMENON OF IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES TO BETTER COMBAT IT

After having devoted its previous edition to the issue of Disarmament-Demobilisation-Reintegration (DDR), this double edition of VIGIE, Strategic and Prospective Analyses Bulletin of the Research and Documentation Centre (CRD) of EIFORCES, this time around, it attacks the «Improvised Explosive Devices» (IEDs), a threat to security in Central Africa», a related issue whose relevance is undeniable in the world in general and in Central Africa in particular.

**André Patrice BITOTE, BG
Director General of EIFORCES**



Indeed, the geopolitics of several countries in Central Africa, in particular the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad and Cameroon, has been dominated for several years, by internal crises with terrorist and insurrectionary references. Most of these States are confronted with the threat of terrorism and secessionist movements, featuring fighters "without uniform" against the Republican Defence and Security Forces.

In Cameroon, initially located in the North and the two English-speaking administrative regions, this asymmetric war entered a new phase through a succession of IED explosions, in 2020, in different parts of the city of Yaoundé, the political capital.

By virtue of their highly symbolic psychological load, these fact-events, which undermine the serenity of the population and public order, objectify and reaffirm the permanence and the persistence of the hybrid, asymmetric and terrorist threat which weighs on Central Africa in general and Cameroon in particular, thus relativizing the distant social perceptions and representations of a phenomenon that is nevertheless significant and complex.

The ambition of this edition of the Strategic and Prospective Analysis Bulletin "Vigie" is to provide elements of understanding and analysis of the phenomenon of Improvised Explosive Devices, assess the ability and effectiveness of current strategic and operational systems to deal with them effectively and, if necessary, indicate the means of strengthening or adapting them. / -

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT TO THE FILE

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES: THE WEAPON OF HORROR

For almost a decade, the countries of the Lake Chad Basin have experienced an unprecedented security and humanitarian crisis. Thus, like countries like Nigeria, Chad and Niger, Cameroon has become the scene of terrible scenes of deadly violence orchestrated by the terrorist movement Boko Haram in the Far North region and irredentists in the North-West and South-West regions.

One of the main “modus operandi” of these unconventional armies is the installation of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), resulting in the forced displacement of the population, both internally and on both sides of the borders of the States of the Lake Chad Basin, and significant loss of human life, both within the Defence and Security Forces, and among the civilian population.

Discovered by the general public during armed interventions in Afghanistan in the years 1990-2000, then especially in Iraq in 2003, Improvised Explosive Devices, regularly qualified as «*poor man’s weapons*», have become the weapons of choice for groups of non-State armies, which use them as instruments of terror, to undermine the actions of the Defence and Security Forces of States. As stated by Mr. Bryan SAND¹, IED Advisor to the United Nations Mine Action Service, “The



Dr PASSO SONBANG Elie

Commissioner of Police

Head of the Research and Documentation Centre of the EIFORCES

cost of an AK-47 in relation to its effects is high compared to the cost of an IED which can ruin many more lives and property worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. IEDs are the preferred weapons of terrorist groups across Africa and the world”. Indeed, IEDs are inexpensive, easy to develop, transport and use, but produce devastating effects. The terrorists who use it-most often use handcrafted materials that are easy to access, and their handcrafted production ranges from the simplest to the most sophisticated, up to remote controlled triggering, often by means of a simple telephone.

The proliferation of Improvised Explosive Devices in Africa and particularly in Central Africa, for instance, is the consequence of the continuing threats, risks

and vulnerabilities (civil wars, insurrectionary movements, poverty, etc.) on-going in this part of the world.

Moreover, endowed with a certain prolific of social engineering skills, and sometimes in search of alternative modes of survival and legitimization of their ideologies and actions, certain criminal, terrorist, or insurrectionary groups use these modes of action to create horror and terror by detonating them in predefined places and with high human concentrations.

A recent report by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) on mines, however, points out that the number of victims of the acts of these movements rose from nearly 6,900 in 2018 to around

¹ E-magazine *Afrique Renouveau*, August -November 2019, Pavithra Rao, consulted on July 29, 2021.

5,500 in 2019, including 2,900 due to improvised devices. Despite this decline, the level of these atrocities remains «very high», notes the Landmine Monitor. Civilians constitute 80% of casualties and children represent almost half of all civilian casualties (43%).

This form of crime, the operational objectives of which tend to undermine the strategy and the efforts to protect the territory carried out by the regular and sovereign security apparatus and devices, in an approach of destabilisation, directly or indirectly, physically and psychologically affects the civilian population. We remember the explosions of IEDs and explosions of improvised devices, in Yaoundé, especially in the neighborhoods of Emana «Borne Fontaine», Melen and Damase, which aroused a lot of commotion in the political capital of the country. One can equally remember the numerous attacks of these unconventional armies, which cost the lives of many members of the Defence and Security Forces and caused significant material loss both in the Far North and the North West and South West regions of Cameroun.

The result of this gloomy picture is the need for States that are victims of these despicable acts directly or indirectly, or in the grip of these atrocities, to strengthen their strategic and operational capacities to fight IEDs, in the sustainable perspective of their eradication. This is why the International School of Security Forces (EIFORCES), an instrument of public policy at the service of the State and the International Community in the fields of security and peacekeeping, has , as part of its statutory research mission, and through its Research and Documentation Centre (CRD), deemed useful, or even necessary,

To do this, experts from various scientific and professional fields (senior officials from the Gendarmerie, the Army and the Police, university professors) were invited to reflect on the issue, in particular on the effectiveness of prevention and management strategies. The objective being that, failing to contribute to the total eradication of this phenomenon, which can be mitigated for the geopolitical tranquillity of the States of the Lake Chad Basin in general and that of Cameroon, in particular because it is incompatible with the requirements, of peace, security, development and stability of these States.

On the basis of an analytical, empirical, and

prospective approach, these experts propose an analysis of the threat of IEDs, assess the current strategic and operational systems put in place to fight against their use, and offer the competent State and regional authorities solutions, including their implementation, that would ultimately give new impetus to the drive to eradicate this phenomenon in the Lake Chad Basin and specifically in Cameroon.

A total of 16 experts² have tackled this exercise. It is a sum that makes us read, to see, to think and to act, so that the tears and other atrocities experienced by the States of the Lake Chad Basin and their populations in general, and particularly the State of Cameroon and its population, whether in conflict zones or those which are not.

²They relate respectively to: «The fight against improvised explosive devices within the framework of sub-regional police cooperation»; «Improvised explosive devices: the urgency of training and awareness»; «Understanding improvised explosive devices in conflict zones and the means of fighting for their eradication: a cross-section of the regions of the Far-North, South-West and North-West of Cameroon»; «Risk and disaster management within the context of improvised explosive devices»; «The tactical use of drones in the fight against IEDs in Cameroon»; «Strategic and operational challenges and constraints of the criminal investigation linked to improvised explosive devices»; «IEDs in the geopolitics of perils, threats and terror in Cameroon »; «Forward-looking intelligence in the management of improvised explosive devices (IEDs)»; «IEDs in the strategic and operational doctrine of the fight against terrorism of the multinational joint force»; «The Special Group of Operations, secular arm of the Cameroonian police against the threat of improvised explosive devices»; «Military engineering: a bulwark against improvised explosive devices»; «Cameroonian customs in securing the territory against the threat of improvised explosive devices (IED)»; «The Gpign in the fight against terrorism and urban and rural crime in the far north of Cameroon»; «Cameroon's action in international cooperation in the fight against IEDs: what progress for better prevention, management and resolution of crises in Central Africa? »; «Understand to better anticipate: critical factors for the future of improvised explosive devices in Africa »; «The fight against IEDs in the Far North of Cameroon».



Cameroon

EIFORCES IN BRIEF



EIFORCES

The EIFORCES is a Published administrative institution under Cameroonian law, with legal personality and financial autonomy.

Location

Headquarter: Awae

Institutional texts

Decree No 2008/179 of May 22, 2008 establishing the EIFORCES;

Decreet No 2012/307 of 25 June 2012 on the organisation and functioning of the EIFORCES.

Missions

Providing **training and facilitating research** in the areas of Security and Peace Support

Structure

A Board of Directors chaired by the Minister Delegate at the Presidency in charge of Defence.

Members : the Minister of External Relations, the Secretary of State for Defense in charge of the National Gendarmerie, the Delegate General for National Security, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of the Economy, the Divisional Officer of Mefou and Afamba, the Representatives of partner countries (China, the United States, France and Japan) and organisations (UN, European Union, African Union, ECCAS, etc.).

General Management: Headed by a Director General working with an Assistant Director, Technical Advisors, Directors, Heads of Divisions ...

And Advisory bodies.

STRATEGIC PARTNERS

Countries



China



United States



France



Japan

Organisations



United Nations



African Union



European Union



ECCAS

Others



TYPES OF TRAINING

Specific Peacekeeping	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The individual UN police officers; • Protection of civilians; • Protection of vulnerable groups; • Negotiation and mediation; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gender training; • The fight against sexual abuse; • The fight against terrorism.
Fundamental Security Training	
Commanding Security Units Course (SCUS)	
<p>Public Order Pole</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training of Formes Police Units; • Training of Trainers of United Nations Formed Police Units; • Recycling Trainers of Formed Police Units; • Protection of Important Personalities; • Neutralisation/Destruction of Explosive Devices. 	<p>Judicial Police Pole</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Projectable Teams of Experts in Investigation; • Accompanying Policy; • Training of Technicians in Criminal Identification; • Training of Investigation Leaders
Higher Security Training	
<p>Operational level :</p> <p>Security Forces Staff Diploma (DEMFS)</p>	<p>Strategic level :</p> <p>Higher Security Studies Degree (BESS) + Master in International Security</p>

EIFORCES: «*A tool at the service of Peace and Security on the African Continent*»

EIFORCES HAS ITS 2021 ADMINISTRATIVE PERFORMANCE PROJECT

The Board of Directors of EIFORCES met in its 17th Ordinary Session on Tuesday 29 December 2020, under the effective leadership of its Chairman, Joseph BETI ASSOMO, Minister Delegate at the Presidency in charge of Defence, at the effect of examining and adopting the Administrative Performance Project for the 2021 fiscal year.

At the end of the session reported by the Brigadier General, Director General of EIFORCES, André Patrice BITOTE, the Board approved the said document which constitutes a real compass for EIFORCES in 2021. This balanced project in terms of income and expenditure amounted to four billion six hundred and fifty one million eight hundred and sixty-eight thousand and forty-six CFA francs.

During the said meeting, the administrators also took note of the provisional performance report on 31 December 2020, of the report of the Specialised Financial Controller on the execution of the 2020

budget, as well as of the special reports of the Director General on various questions concerning the functioning of the establishment.

With this budget, EIFORCES is resolutely turned towards optimising its performance in the fields of training and research in security, peacekeeping and support. There is the need to complete the process of certification of training by the UN, in view of erection EIFORCES as the centre of excellence of this institution and thus, to increase the radiance and credibility of this school. It will then be a real qualitative leap towards its international radiance./-



Family photograph

RECENTLY APPOINTED OFFICIALS AT EIFORCES TAKE OFF

On 9 July 2021, on the provisional site of EIFORCES, Yaounde-Ngousso, Brigadier General André Patrice BITOTE, Director General of EIFORCES, representing the Minister Delegate at the Presidency in charge of Defence, Chairman of the Board of Directors EIFORCES, installed the officials appointed by decree n ° 2021/359 and arrêté n ° 0541 / CAB / PR of 23 June 2021 in their functions:

The Commissioner of Police PASSO SONBANG Elie, Head of the Research and Documentation Centre



Superintendent of Police BETSEM BETSEM II Bertrand Blaise, Administrative and Financial Chief of Service at the Administrative and Financial Department



The Commissioner of Police MINKOUE EYENGA, Administrative and Financial Director



Superintendent of Police NDECK Roger, Head of the Assessments Office at the Division of Fundamental Education in Security and Preparation for Peace Support Operations, at the Department of Studies.

The Commissioner of Police Doctor LYEB Yolande epse NGAN YAMB, Technical Assistant seconded to the Technical and Logistics Department



By calling on them to show inventiveness and daring, the Director General instructed the newly promoted to get to work resolutely. In addition, these new collaborators have been committed, in a spirit of vertical and horizontal collaboration, to work towards the achievement of the performance objective of the School, Centre of Excellence of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the African Union (AU).



The Senior Superintendent of Police TCHUENDEM SIMO Rosyne Arlette epse NOUNKOUA, Head of Research Laboratories at the Research and Documentation Centre

The ceremony, rich in sounds and colours, took place in great solemnity, in the presence of representatives of the Minister of External Relations, the Secretary of State for Defence in charge of the National Gendarmerie, the General Delegate for National Security, the Minister of the Economy, Planning and Regional Development, and large families to celebrate with the newly appointed.

The Commissioner of Police FOU MENA Frédéric, Head of the Judicial Police Pole, cumulatively with his functions of Head of the Assessments Office at the Division of High Education in Security and Preparation for Peace Support Operations, at the Department of Studies



Captain EBALE ZOUA Fernande, Chief of Service for Cooperation at the Cooperation and Public Relations Division of the Director General of EIFORCES' cabinet



Family photo after the installation of the newly appointed

EIGHTEENTH ORDINARY SESSION OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF EIFORCES

The eighteenth ordinary session of the Board of Directors of the International School for Security Forces (EIFORCES), devoted to the closing of the accounts for the 2020 fiscal year, was held on 30 July 2021 at the Yaoundé Conference Centre. BETI ASSOMO Joseph, Minister Delegate to the Presidency in charge of Defence, Chairman of the said Board, chaired the session.

Brigadier General André Patrice BITOTE, Director General of EIFORCES, assisted by the Commissioner of Police Cécile OYONO THOM, Assistant Director General, reported on the issues on the agenda.

After approval of the draft Agenda and the Minutes of the proceedings of the 17th Session of the Board of Directors, the Administrators, on the one hand, followed, examined and took note of the final Administrative Performance Report 2020, the Provisional Administrative Performance Report for the first half of 2021 and the Reports of the Specialised Financial Controller for the

2020 financial year and for the first half of 2021. The Administrators, on the other hand, adopted the 2020 Administrative Account and the Management Account of the same exercise.

After congratulating the Brigadier General, Director General for the quality and clarity of the documents presented, the Council urged him to accelerate the process of final relocation of EIFORCES to its headquarters in Awaé, in the Mefou and Afamba Division, while ensuring efficiency in the execution of training and research missions, as well as the international radiance and credibility of the School ./-



An attitude of the participants

I. TRAINING ACTIVITIES



TRAINING SEMINAR ON THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS.

This seminar, which was held from 11 to 22 January 2021 in Awaé, brought together thirty-five (35) senior executives including twenty-five (25) from the Gendarmerie, the National Guard and the Police of Cameroon, Congo, Ivory Coast and Mali, on the one hand, and ten (10) Cameroonian public administration officials from the ministries in charge of Territorial Administration, Social Affairs, Communication, Justice and External Relations, on the other hand.

The EIFORCES campus served as a framework for revisiting the "Protection of Civilians" through the prism of resolution 1894/2009, which enshrines the necessity and importance of the protection of civilians in armed conflicts. This reality can only be envisaged within the framework of a global synergy between multi-sectorial actors.

Presiding over the closing ceremony, Brigadier General André Patrice BITOTE, Director General of EIFORCES, representing the Minister Delegate to the Presidency in charge of Defence, Chairman of the Board

of Directors of EIFORCES, insisted on the interest of this seminar, whose objective is to make participants real levers of action in favour of civilians in conflict zones. He also took the opportunity to salute the excellence of the Japan-EIFORCES partnership, which made possible the organisation and the success of the said seminar ./-

ORGANISATION OF THE 7TH HIGHER DEGREE SECURITY STUDIES (BESS) AND THE 10TH SENIOR STAFF DIPLOMA FOR SECURITY FORCES (DEMFS)

25 Police and Gendarmes auditors from Cameroon, Congo, the Ivory Coast, Mali, and 21 Security Forces trainees from Cameroon, Congo and Senegal, stayed for a period of 40 and 20 weeks respectively, within the framework of the 7th Higher Degree of Security Studies and the 10th Senior Staff Diploma for Security Forces.

During this training, which ended on 21 July 2021, the trainees were imbued with issues of geopolitics, international cooperation, strategic planning among others. Emphasis was placed on lessons in peacekeeping.

At the end of these training, the trainees also benefited from certifications as Individual Police Officers of the United Nations.

DEMFS 10 INTERNAL FIELD TRIP: IMMERSION AT THE HEART OF THE WESTERN REGION'S SECURITY SYSTEM

In times of peace and crisis, the administrative authority is the conductor of security operations. He organises and coordinates the activities to be carried out". It is with these incisive words from the Governor of the Western Region, AWA FONKA Augustine, on 3 May 2021, that the first stage of the internal study mission of the tenth promotion of the Senior Staff Diploma for Security Forces (DEMFS 10). These remarks by the first authority of the Region provide sufficient information on the position of the administrative authority in the security system, both nationally and regionally and even below. Indeed, as a hegemonic figure of the Senior Staff, he is its strategist, planner and facilitator in the field. He ensures, hence, the role of conception and impulse of the operations necessary for the preservation of public order. A preponderant posture within the security staff, a sort of institutional linkage, which it manages on a daily basis as part of the preservation, anticipation and operational response in the event of a threat to the peace. The deployment of this operational device is carried out according to the circumstances and the prevailing security situation.

The visit of the trainees of the 10th DEMFS to the Regional Delegation for National Security of the West, to the Gendarmerie Legion, to the Customs Sector and to the Land Military Sector as well as to the Forestry and Wildlife Delegation, enabled them to review the Regional Security Staff in order to understand the springs of its action and the specific responsibilities of each link in the chain.

These stages punctuated an intense stay rich in lessons for a fruitful professional immersion of the trainees. The mission, which ended on 9 May 2021, was also marked by a tourist component that enabled the trainees to discover the wonders and natural resources of the Western region. / -

ORGANISATION OF THE APPROPRIATION EXERCISE OF THE GLOBAL OPERATIONAL PLANNING METHOD (MGPO): "CARANA"

The CARANA exercise took place from March 1 to 12, 2021 at the EFORCES headquarters in NGOUSSO. The exercise of appropriation of the Global Method of Operational Planning (MGPO) aims to consolidate the achievements of the initiation and learning exercise "Missed landing".

Coming under the domain "Specific knowledge in the field of security", this exercise is a component of the sub-domain "Command techniques" and of the module "Planning exercises". During this event, the International Committee of the Red Cross, on 15 March 2021, educated the auditors on the planning of humanitarian activities within the framework of a peace mission.

DOUALA-MALABO EXERCISE ON SECURING A SUMMIT OF FRANCE-AFRICA HEADS OF STATES

From 24 May to 11 June 11, 2021, the DOUALA-MALABO exercise was held on securing a summit of France-Africa Heads of State. The exercise ended on Friday, 11 June 2021 with a joint ESIG / EFORCES restitution, in front of the Governor of the Centre Region at the Amphitheatre of the Yaounde International War College ./-

INTERNATIONAL STUDY MISSION OF EFORCES: THE BESS 7 AND THE DEMFS 10 IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

It is in a context marked by the Covid-19 pandemic that the EFORCES Study Mission in Africa took place. Indeed, the delegation of EFORCES, made up of 10 supervisors, 23 auditors from BESS 7, and 21 trainees from DEMFS 10, under the leadership of Brigadier General André Patrice BITOTE, Director General of EFORCES, stayed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 13 to 21 June 2021.

The visit to the Embassy of Cameroon in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) opened the international study mission of EFORCES where the delegation was received by His Excellency CHUNGONG AYAFOR, Ambassador of Cameroon in the DRC.

The College of High Studies in Strategy and Defence (CHESD) and the Kinshasa War College (EGK) were the

News on EFORCES

September 2020 - July 2021

two stops on the second day of the EFORCES international study mission in the DRC. At CHESD, Professor Doctor, Major General Augustin MUBIAYI MAMBA, Commander of this sub-regional training institution at the strategic and political level of the senior civil-military administration, focused his presentation on his missions of anticipation and strategic watch. While at EGK, the Brigadier General, Commander of the young training institution for the military elite of the DRC, did not hide the ambitions of his College, which intends to follow in the footsteps of similar renowned institutions, like EFORCES.

On the third day, the EFORCES delegation was received by Lieutenant-General YAV KABEY Jean Claude, Assistant Chief of Staff in charge of the Operations of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC). In her presentation for the occasion, Brigadier General Justine SHESHI in charge of training and practice edified the audience of BESS 7 and DEMFS 10 of EFORCES on the organisation, missions and functioning of the FARDC whose current reform aims to face security challenges.

The EFORCES Study Mission continued with the meeting of the Commissioner of Police MUSHID YAV Philémon Patience, Assistant General Commissioner in charge of the Coordination of the Administrative Police at the General Commission of the Congolese National Police (PNC) to build the EFORCES delegation on the organisation and functioning of this body, as well as the training of its personnel.

Subsequently, it is in strict compliance with the barrier measures against COVID-19 that the MONUSCO Headquarters in Kinshasa hosted, on 18 June 2021, the delegation of EFORCES, as part of immersion in the most important peace mission led by the UN.

The presentations on the analysis of the mission, the role and the deployment of the police and the Force component were beneficial to the auditors of the BESS 7 and to the interns of the DEMFS 10 of EFORCES, to better understand the activities of the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in DR Congo. This important step was marked by the warm and fraternal reunion between Brigadier Generals André Patrice BITOTE, Director General of EFORCES and MODY BERETHE, Chief of the Police Component within MONUSCO, previously Chairperson of the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA).

The audience granted to the EFORCES delegation led by its Director General, Brigadier General André Patrice BITOTE, on the morning of 19 June 2021, by Antoinette N'SAMBA KALAMBAYI, Minister of Mines of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), closed the protocol part of EFORCES' study mission in DRC. The discussions mainly focused on the security and geostrategic impact of the DRC's mineral resources, a source of rivalries and various greed that require appropriate and lasting solutions for the stability and prosperity of this great country. On its part, through training and research, its two statutory missions, EFORCES is ready to support this process.

Through this Study Mission, EFORCES intends to continue its international influence and enable its learners from Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, and Senegal to better understand the security game in its African dimension with the DRC as a sample./-

THE SECOND COURSE SECURITY UNIT COMMANDERS OF EFORCES: FIELD TRIP TO THE AIRBORNE TROOPS BATTALION IN KOUTABA

From 06 to 11 June 2021, fifty-three trainees undergoing training as part of the 2nd Security Unit Commanders Course (SCUS 2) carried a field trip to the Airborne Troops Battalion (BTAP) at KOUTABA in the West Region-Cameroon.

In this rustic environment, the stay enabled the trainees, under the guidance of BTAP instructors, to carry out scenarios for a better appropriation of the Techniques of Operational Defence, Maintenance of Order, Tactics and Topography.

In addition to these educational activities, the Head of the EFORCES delegation, the Commissioner of Police Désiré BESSALA, accompanied by the BTAP Commander, the Director and the Internship Warrant officer, on behalf of the Brigadier General, Director General of EFORCES, paid a courtesy visit to the Divisional Officer of the Division NOUN, on Tuesday 8 June 2021 at 10 a.m.

This mission coincided with the symbolic destruction ceremony of a stockpile of weapons seized by the Cameroonian Defence and Security Forces in various national theatres, particularly in the North-West and South-West Regions; ceremony chaired in Buea, on 19

May 2021, by the Prime Minister, Head of Government, Chief Doctor Joseph DION NGUTE. / -

CLOSING CEREMONY OF EIFORCES SCUS 2: STRENGTHENED EIFORCES-FRANCE COOPERATION

On 25 June 2021, the EIFORCES campus in Awaé hosted the closing ceremony of the second Security Unit Commanders Course (SCUS), launched on 28 March 2021 and organised by EIFORCES with the support of France.

Chaired by Galax ETOGA, Secretary of State to the Minister of Defense in charge of the National Gendarmerie, this graduation of SCUS 2 enabled the representative of the Minister Delegate to the Presidency in charge of Defence, Chairman of the Board of Directors to EIFORCES to exalt the dynamism of cooperation between Cameroon and France.

Brigadier General André Patrice BITOTE, Director General of EIFORCES, meanwhile, recalled the very high solicitude of the President of the Republic, His Excellency Paul BIYA, whose special funding made it possible to

increase the staff of the internship from 30 to 53 including 11 women, coming from several countries, in particular from Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad and Togo. During this training, the interested parties not only integrated the strategies of peacekeeping but also, benefited from a training seminar of the Individual Police officers and an exercise of appropriation of the MEDO and the MRG.

On the side-lines of this ceremony, His Excellency Christophe GUILHOU, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the French Republic in Cameroon, paid a working visit to the EIFORCES campus in Awaé. On this occasion, he gave a donation of teaching material to the Brigadier General, Director General of EIFORCES in order to contribute to the strengthening of the operational capacities of the institution.

It should be mentioned that France, which is one of the statutory partners sitting on the Board of Directors of EIFORCES, plans to increase, in the coming months, the infrastructural capacity of EIFORCES, by expanding its accommodation offer. Through this visit, France intends to confirm its place as a privileged partner of EIFORCES



and by the same token, to mark its presence by substantial and significant investments. / -

TRAINING ON ROAD SAFETY IN RESCUE AND POST-ACCIDENT MEDICAL CARE

As part of the implementation of the 11th European Fund for Development (EDF) of the European Union, and through the Support Unit for the National Authorising Officer (CAON-FED) of the Ministry of Economy, Planning and Regional Development (MINEPAT), EIFORCES organised a training course on "road safety in terms of rescue and post-accident medical care", from March 29 to April 2, 2021, in its Awaé campus.

This internship, which is part of a series spread over four years and falls within the scope of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, Component 3 of the training activities of the Support Program for the Governance of Regional and National Infrastructures in Central Africa (PAGIRN).

During five days, this training of trainers brought together thirty-four staff including thirteen doctors, thirteen nurses and eight community relay agents from the Ministry of Public Health, the National Gendarmerie, the National Security, the National Fire-fighters Brigade and EIFORCES ./-

JOINT EIFORCES BESS 7 AND DEMFS 10 CLOSING CEREMONY: AN ADDITIONAL SOLUTION FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN AFRICA

On 21 July 2021, at the Yaoundé Conference Centre, the 25 auditors of the 7th cycle of the Higher Degree of Security Studies (BESS) and the 21 trainees of the 10th Senior Staff Diploma for Security Forces (DEMFS) of EIFORCES solemnly received their final internship scrolls, during the ceremony chaired by BETI ASSOMO Joseph, Minister Delegate to the Presidency in charge of Defence, Chairman of the Board of Directors of EIFORCES (MINDEF / PCA).

During this ceremony, in which other Members of Government, Heads of Diplomatic Missions, Administrative Authorities and many guests took part, the new batch of patentees and Senior Staff graduates from Cameroon, Congo, Ivory Coast, Mali and Senegal, was invited to make good use of the lessons provided. "I recommend that you rise to the challenges and expectations placed in you by your States which have granted significant resources for your training. The lessons received will enable you to face all the security challenges of your countries and your continent", he told them during his speech./-



II. RESEARCH ACTIVITIES

PUBLICATION OF A DOUBLE EDITION ON THE STRATEGIC AND PROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS BULLETIN "VIGIE" ON ISSUES OF DISARMAMENT-DEMobilISATION-REINTEGRATION IN CAMEROON AND AFRICA

As part of its statutory monitoring and research missions in the field of security and peace, the Research and Documentation Centre of EIFORCES, devoted a file on the significant and complex issue of Disarmament-Demobilisation-Reintegration in Cameroon and in Africa. Beyond the on-going programmes in several African countries, the creation of the National Committee for Disarmament-Demobilisation- Reintegration (NCDDR) by Decree n ° 2018/719 of 30 November 2018, by the Head of State, His Excellency Paul BIYA is a strong response in resolving security crises in the Far North, North West and South West regions.

The double edition of "VIGIE" entitled "DDR at the service of Unity, Peace and Stability" enables EIFORCES, a public security policy tool for Cameroon and the International Community, through its Research and Documentation Centre, to report on the efforts of the Cameroonian Government and its partners for a lasting return of peace, security and stability in regions plagued by armed conflicts. / -

PARTICIPATION OF THE RESEARCH AND DOCUMENTATION CENTER IN THE SEMINARS ON THE FOLLOWING THEMES: "PHYSICAL SECURITY, STOCK MANAGEMENT (PSSM) OF WEAPONS" AND "COMMUNITY POLICING"

From 15-17 and 20 October 2020, the EIFORCES Research and Documentation Centre took part in two seminars, respectively on the themes: "Physical Security, Stock Management (PSSM) of Weapons" and "Community Policing". During these seminars organised by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), the Cameroonian Ministry of External Relations and the General Delegation for National Security, several executives from the Research and Documentation Centre actively took part in the workshop and plenary sessions.

EIFORCES CONTRIBUTION ON THE PREPARATION OF CAMEROON'S PARTICIPATION IN THE HIGH-LEVEL MEETING PLANNED AS PART OF THE WORK ON THE 75th UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN NEW YORK

As part of the preparation for Cameroon's participation in the high-level meeting planned as part of the work of the 75th United Nations General Assembly, in New York, EIFORCES, through its Research and Documentation Centre, was approached by the Ministry of External Relations, in order to prepare the Institution's contribution on the theme: *"EIFORCES in the dynamics of maintaining and consolidating peace, security and stability in Cameroon and Africa"*./-

WORK ON THE HARMONISATION OF ECCAS-CEMAC INSTRUMENTS AND PROGRAMMES IN PEACE AND SECURITY

As a public security policy tool for Cameroon and the International Community and a Centre of Excellence for the Economic Community of the Central African States and the African Union, EIFORCES has been associated with the work of the harmonisation of ECCAS-CEMAC instruments and programmes in the area of peace and security, on 8 October 2020, in the Conference Room of the Ministry of Defence.

PARTICIPATION OF THE HEAD OF THE RESEARCH AND DOCUMENTATION CENTRE IN A WORKSHOP ORGANISED BY THE AFRICAN PEACE SUPPORT TRAINERS ASSOCIATION (APSTA)

Pursuing the plan to diversify its partners in research, and to strengthen its collaboration with actors working in the field of security, Doctor PASSO SONBANG Elie, Commissioner of Police, Head of the Research and Documentation Centre of EIFORCES, took part in an online workshop on the theme: "upsurge on violent extremism across Africa: interrogating capacity deficits", organised by the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA), by videoconference, in Yaoundé on 3 June 2021.

YAOUNDE 2021 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COVID-19: REFINING AFRICAN STATES RESPONSE STRATEGY AGAINST COVID-19 AND EMPOWER AFRICA IN THE MANAGEMENT OF ISSUES RELATED TO HUMAN SECURITY

On 27 and 28 May 2021, the International School for Security Forces organised an International Conference on the theme: *"The African State faced with the COVID-19 pandemic: the imperative of strengthening the strategic and operational capacities of human security for the resilience, autonomy, anticipation and response of dedicated systems"*, at the Yaounde Conference Centre, with the support of Japan, a partner of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP),.

This scientific and professional meeting mobilised, in strict compliance with barrier measures, a wide range of participants, in particular the Heads of Diplomatic Missions accredited to Cameroon, administrative and religious authorities, officials of the Defence and Security Forces of high rank, international partners, academics, researchers, as well as social and health scientists.

Through its holistic, multidisciplinary and transversal approach, this high-level international conference made it possible to address the issue of the fight against Covid-

19 through the prism of human security, to address the stakes, the actions undertaken and the challenges, in view of refining the resilience strategies and capacities of African countries in general and those of the Central African sub-region, in particular.

At the end of this work, several recommendations were made, namely:

- Taking into account the political, economic, health, environmental, personnel, food and community aspects of human security in public policies;
- The adoption of standards aimed at best safeguarding human security;
- Taking into account traditional African medicine (alternative, complementary or heritage medicine) as a relevant tool for the management of Covid-19 and the establishment of a suitable device to promote and supervise it;
- The pooling of traditional and modern medical and medicinal practices in order to fully exploit all the available potential, for the needs of strengthening the fight against this pandemic;
- The promotion of medical and medicinal research in order to promote the emergence of new therapeutic protocols and cooperation between research laboratories in all countries;



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- Adaptation of response strategies to the African context;
- The diversification of actions to gain the confidence of the population;
- Strengthening strategic intelligence activity in the medical field;
- Working in synergy and pooling forces at the local, sub-regional, regional and universal level, in view of setting up a global approach to guarantee human security.

The Yaoundé meeting made it possible to lay the groundwork for the harmonisation of African emergency response strategies in the event of a sudden onset of a disaster or an epidemic, like the Covid-19, and "initiate an overall reflection, the implementation of recommendations which should make it possible to

improve the strategic and operational capacities of States in view of greater autonomy in the response to this pandemic and to anticipate any threat endangering the human security.

This conference ended on a note of optimism with a real happy-end, which opens up new perspectives for Cameroon and Africa. Through the organisation of this important meeting and the publication of the Proceedings of the International Conference, as part of its African Journal for International Security (RASI), EIFORCES, through its Research and Documentation Centre, effectively assumes its strategic and information monitoring role, and thus confirms its status as a Centre of excellence and strategic reflection on security issues.

This bodes well for this school whose ambition is to become a United Nations reference centre. / -



III. THE ACTIVITIES OF THE TECHNICAL AND LOGISTICS DEPARTMENT

STRENGTHENING THE INFRASTRUCTURAL CAPACITY OF EIFORCES

On April 15, 2021, Brigadier General André Patrice BITOTE, Director General of EIFORCES, on behalf of the Minister Delegate to the Presidency in charge of Defence, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the EIFORCES, inaugurated a 32-bed dormitory built with funding from the Japanese Government, under the specific agreement of March 2020-March 2021 at the Awaé campus.

The ceremony took place in the presence of IKEDA Kiyohiko, Counselor at the Embassy of Japan in Cameroon, representative of H.E OSAWA TSUTOMU, Ambassador of Japan in Cameroon, unable to attend.

The construction of this building not only increases EIFORCES' accommodation offer but also reinforces its operational capacities within the framework of a vast infrastructural development program. The official inauguration of this building makes it possible to magnify the contribution of international cooperation in the construction and influence of EIFORCES. In this process, Japan is positioning itself as a secure strategic partner, which enables EIFORCES to consolidate its reputation as a regional and African centre of excellence.

With this new building, EIFORCES makes a qualitative leap towards modernity and begins with serenity and confidence the definitive migration of its administrative and educational apparatus to the AWAE site, an

attractive learning environment that complies with international standards. / -

ACCELERATION OF WORK IN VIEW OF RELOCATING TO THE AWAE CAMPUS

The Technical and Logistics Department is hard at work to finalise the work for the relocation of the administrative staff of EIFORCES to the AWAE Campus, scheduled for the end of September 2021. The construction of the administrative building is practically completed, with an execution rate estimated to date at 80%.

The equipment of this prestigious work is in progress, in order to offer the executives of this Institution a suitable working environment, meeting international standards.



IV. COOPERATION AND INTERNATIONAL RADIANCE

SIGNATURE OF PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT WITH CERTAIN AFRICAN NATIONAL AND REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS

On 10 and 12 September 2020, the International School for Security Forces (EIFORCES) signed a Framework Agreement with the University of Yaoundé II (Soa) on the one hand and a specific agreement relating to training for the Professional Master's degree in International Security with the International Relations Institute of Cameroon (IRIC), on the other hand. The partnership with the University of Yaoundé II (Soa) is part of the logic of development and the exercise of cooperation in academic matters. The areas targeted in this context are the masters training programs in National and International Security in accordance with the LMD system in force in higher education institutions in Cameroon, the academic mobility of student-interns, scientific animation programs, training of trainers, strengthening the capacities of the executive staff of EIFORCES, the mobility of lecturers, the promotion and the development of security research.

As an extension of this university cooperation, the Specific Agreement with IRIC sets out the terms of collaboration in the field of training relating to the Professional Master degree in International Security. This Specific Agreement covers the field of supervision of the academic activities of EIFORCES by IRIC with regard to the aforementioned Professional Masters (programming of lectures, practical lessons, professional internships).

These partnerships aim to modernise the training offer of EIFORCES and its alignment with the requirements of the LMD, which structure contemporary university training. It is also in line with this academic modernisation that the Convention being finalised between EIFORCES, headed by Brigadier General André Patrice BITOTE, and the African Centre for Training and Administrative Research for Development (CAFRAD). This Agreement, whose validation has been recorded by both parties, will be signed very soon.

THE NIGERIA AIR FORCE WAR COLLEGE VISITS EIFORCES

Irregular warfare and national security: what lessons for Nigeria? This theme guided the visit of the

delegation of the Nigerian Air Force War College to EIFORCES, at the School's campus in Awaé, on 21 October 2020.

The fourteen Nigerian officials including 10 auditors and 04 supervisors paid a visit to the International School for Security Forces, as part of the study trip of the sixth promotion of this strategic level school.

This visit was an opportunity for visitors to get to know EIFORCES, the flagship of Training and Research in the field of security and peacekeeping. This position of the School was reminded to the hosts of the day by Brigadier General André Patrice BITOTE, Director General of EIFORCES.

In return, Air force Brigadier General Olufemi Babadjide ODEYINDE, head of the Nigerian delegation elaborated on the meaning of the visit to Cameroon and to EIFORCES. He did not fail to express his appreciation for the results of EIFORCES and the quality of the reception.

The visitors were thus able to discuss with their Cameroonian, Congolese and Malian counterparts from the 7th cycle of the Higher Degree of Security Studies on-going at EIFORCES since October 5, 2020./-

FRANCE AND EIFORCES STRENGTHEN THEIR PARTNERSHIP IN FAVOUR OF THE RENEWAL OF THE CONVENTION

The Ambassador of France in Cameroon, H.E Christophe GUILHOU and Brigadier General André Patrice BITOTE, Director General of EIFORCES, signed the Agreement relating to the Cooperation Programme "French Support to EIFORCES" on 3 December 2020. This instrument defines the terms of French support for the accomplishment of EIFORCES missions. Lasting three years, this renewed Agreement stems from the Agreement between the Governments of the French Republic and the Republic of Cameroon, establishing a defence partnership between the two countries (APD-Cameroon-France). The ODA is in reality a general instrument, which defines the modalities, fixes the framework, the objectives, the limits as well as the mutual commitments between both parties within the framework of the programmes calling for the support of France.

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The Agreement relating to the “French Support to EIFORCES” cooperation programme enables France and EIFORCES to strengthen the partnership ties that have united them since the establishment went operational. France, it should be emphasized, has stood by EIFORCES since its creation. It works to strengthen the operational capacities of EIFORCES and supports it in its rise as a United Nations Reference Centre. Through her contribution, she sits on the Board of Directors as a statutory member.

WORKING VISIT TO THE AWAE CAMPUS OF THE HEAD OF THE PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS DIVISION OF THE AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION

On March 4, 2021 at 1 p.m., Siviliye THANDIKAYA BAM Head of the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) of the African Union Commission paid a working visit to the EIFORCES campus in Awaé. This visit, part of the activities of the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA) for which EIFORCES is the treasurer, aimed on the one hand to strengthen the close cooperation links that exist between EIFORCES and the African Union. , of which EIFORCES, is a Centre of Excellence and, on the other hand, to take stock of the

cooperation between the PSOD and EIFORCES in terms not only of peace support training but also of implementation of the partnership between both institutions.

The Head of the Peace Support Operations Division of the African Union Commission praised the admirable training work that EIFORCES is doing to equip the continent with competent actors, perfectly mastering the issues related to the maintenance and / or support for peace and international security.

In the same vein, he urged EIFORCES to ensure the proper use of the products it places on the African international security market, in order to be sure that the efforts provided are capitalised. This visit thus made it possible to strengthen the existing links between EIFORCES and the African Union through the PSOD./-

EIFORCES-JAPAN / UNDP COOPERATION: EIFORCES AND UNDP TAKE STOCK.

From 22 to 26 March 2021, a workshop was held in Douala to assess the 2020-2021 Convention linking EIFORCES to Japan via the UNDP and to plan for the 2021-2022 Convention. This was an opportunity for both parties to review the state of activities funded by



Japan for the benefit of EIFORCES for the above two periods.

The session, co-chaired by Brigadier General André Patrice BITOTE, Director General of EIFORCES and Dr Zéphirin EMINI, Assistant to the UNDP Resident Representative in Cameroon, resulted in the finalisation of the final report of the 2020-2021 Convention and the framework for the execution of the 2021-2022 Convention, amounting to USD 300,000, dedicated to an international conference scheduled for the month of May and two training sessions.

Both parties expressed their satisfaction for this fruitful partnership, whose good execution of which undoubtedly contributes to the accomplishment of the training and research missions of EIFORCES for peace and stability in Africa and in the world.

TOWARDS THE CONSTRUCTION OF A PARTNERSHIP WITH CAECOPAZ

During the first semester of 2021, EIFORCES conducted discussions with Argentine authorities in view of establishing a mutually beneficial partnership with the Argentine Joint Centre for Training in Peacekeeping Operations (CAECOPAZ). These exchanges resulted in the acceptance by the said authorities of the principle of a working visit by a delegation from EIFORCES to CAECOPAZ. Initially scheduled for 22 April to 3 May 2021, this working visit was postponed to a later date due to the persistence of the pandemic linked to Covid-19, the perverse effects that have led to limit movements at State borders. The principle of this visit remains maintained and once the sanitary conditions permit, both parties will agree on a new date to carry out this activity ./-

EIFORCES-UNREC: A SUMMIT AUDIENCE TO MARK OUT PROBABLE COOPERATION PATHS

The Director of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC), Anselme YABOURI, was received at EIFORCES by the Commissioner of Police, Assistant Director General, Doctor Cécile OYONO-THOM, on behalf of the Brigadier General, Director General of EIFORCES, on Tuesday 18 May 2021.

The guest of Cameroon took the opportunity to lift a veil on the institution for which he is responsible and whose mission is to fight against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), whose circulation constitutes an obstacle to peace and security in the world and particularly in Africa where the phenomenon is particularly growing. During his stay, Anselme YABOURI had to understand the issues and challenges of the phenomenon in the Cameroonian context, as well as the related perceptions and representations. This is in view of considering avenues for cooperation between his Institution and Cameroon.

As recalled by the Director of UNREC, the phenomenon worries the Secretary General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, which justified the development of a global agenda for disarmament and peace. This commitment made it possible to set up a fund intended to support the fight against the proliferation of these instruments, which undermine world peace.

Thanks to the dynamism of his Government through the Ministry of External Relations, Anselme YABOURI announced that Cameroon and Jamaica have been chosen to serve as the launching pad for this Fund. The Centre also aims to develop a training programme for peacekeeping with some handpicked training centres, including EIFORCES. /

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IEDS IN THE GEOPOLITICS OF PERILS, THREATS AND TERROR IN CAMEROON

Pr Joseph Vincent NTUDA EBODE

In recent years, there have been an increasing number of fatal incidents in Cameroon or its immediate vicinity resulting from mines, unexploded ordnance, and Improvised Explosive Devices. Although the targets targeted by the various anti-government and non-State armed groups are primarily the Defense and Security Forces, many civilians are also blindly killed and maimed. Even if it is more in Nigeria and Chad that this reality excels in the Lake Chad Basin, Cameroon is no longer an exception. Indeed, in this country also that one observes for approximately 5 years, a rise in power of such acts. Thus, if we take 2017 as a milestone, we see that Boko Haram on the northern front, carried out 69 suicide bomber attacks and 20 IEDs were carried out; in 2018, 11 suicide bomber attacks were recorded and 8 explosions by IEDs took place; in 2019, a suicide bomber attack was committed and 11 explosions by IEDs were identified; in 2020, 8 suicide bomber attacks were committed and 15 IEDs were carried out; and lastly, in the first quarter of 2021, 2 suicide bombers were noted and 3 IEDs posed. Table number 1 below lists, in exemplary fashion, the activities of the various actors of the northern site during the year 2018.



Camer.be - fight against IEDs; bags banned in Yaoundé supermarkets

Table 1: Attacks of B.H, hostage-taking by armed gangs and actions of the defence and security forces in 2018

MONTH INDICATORS	Suicide Bomber attacks	IED explosions	BH ambushes	BH incursions	Number of BH questioned	Number of BH killed	Number of military deaths	Number of civilian deaths	Number of military casualties	Number of civilian casualties	Number of people abducted by BH	Damaged military vehicles	Damaged civilian vehicles	People kidnapped by armed gangs
JANUARY	5	0	1	33	5	20	3	23	11	20	11	2	0	30
FEBRUARY	1	1	1	11	9	2	0	17	13	9	13	1	0	28
MAR CH	1	0	2	14	0	5	0	3	0	1	1	0	0	30
APRI L	0	0	1	18	1	9	7	7	9	7	0	0	0	0
MAY	0	2	0	21	110	20	0	6	3	8	4	0	1	0
JUNE	0	0	1	0	10	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
JULY	0	2	2	30	3	9	0	24	6	15	4	1	0	26
AUGUST	0	0	1	25	7	11	0	16	0	9	6	0	0	12
SEPTEMBER	0	1	2	17	0	0	1	17	9	6	1	2	0	17
OCTOBER	0	2	0	23	3	16	0	10	0	6	16	0	0	19
NOVEMBER	1	0	0	6	6	4	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	12
DECEMBER	3	0	0	9	1	3	0	4	0	7	12	0	0	71
TOTAL	11	8	11	207	155	99	11	128	51	97	68	6	1	245

Source: compilation of CREPS

These remarkable acts on Cameroonian territory, which, at first, were concentrated in the North and the East, quickly spread to the North-West and the South-West where, since 2016, the security forces, supported by some units of the defence forces, and within the framework of the maintenance of the reinforced order, face the irredentists. Here particularly, if in 2017 (see table number 2) and 2018 (despite the fairly high number of fallen soldiers (138) and wounded (514), against 1139 secessionists killed and 257 arrested, we still observe no recourse to IEDs (see table 3 below); in 2019 there were 23, in 2020, 47 and in the 1st quarter of the current year, there were 16.

Table 2: Activities of secessionist movements in the NOSO in 2017

MONTH INDICATORS	Attacks on DSF posts	Ambushes on the DSF	DSF elements killed	Injured DSF elements	Arson	Civilians killed by secessionists	Civilians injured by secessionists	Secessionists killed	Secessionists wounded	Vehicles damaged	Burgled infrastructure
JANUARY	9	6	4	77	45	140	21	24	45	35	10
FEBRUARY	1	1	3	30	11	19	8	9	14	8	2
MAR CH	2	2	0	14	28	23	2	1	27	5	1
APRI L	4	1	1	20	0	11	8	9	31	40	4
MAY	3	1	0	12	9	4	1	1	7	10	4
JUNE	14	2	1	22	12	186	5	29	6	43	2
JULY	9	0	0	19	24	6	3	20	44	27	12
AUGUST	7	0	2	25	6	9	3	42	0	32	19
SEPTEMBER	6	4	1	24	1	0	3	27	1	10	31
OCTOBER	6	1	3	19	0	4	0	32	0	20	0
NOVEMBER	3	1	0	42	4	2	0	22	5	37	8
DECEMBER	5	1	1	29	1	0	0	9	5	37	5
TOTAL	69	20	16	333	141	404	54	2	185	304	98

Source: compilation of CREPS

Table 3: Activities of secessionist movements in the North-West and South-West regions in 20

INDICATEURS MOIS	Attaques contre les postes des FDS	Emboscades tendues aux FDS	Eléments des FDS tués	Eléments des FDS blessés	Incendies criminels	Civils tués par les sécessionnistes	Civils blessés par les sécessionnistes	Sécessionnistes tués	Sécessionnistes interpellés	Infrastructures cambriolées	Prises d'otages	Véhicules endommagés	Incursions sécessionnistes
JANVIER	11	4	4	6	7	0	4	3	0	2	6	1	0
FEVRIER	20	17	11	45	1	6	1	32	0	6	21	3	0
MARS	18	5	5	33	5	5	10	43	0	21	19	0	0
AVRIL	22	2	13	21	0	2	9	23	0	4	12	16	0
MAI	18	6	19	23	4	8	6	47	0	6	15	4	0
JUIN	24	11	11	57	39	5	4	69	0	6	13	22	0
JUILLET	45	6	8	61	11	6	2	113	80	16	21	36	4
AOÛT	36	12	20	92	17	8	3	190	27	11	36	9	2
SEPTEMBRE	40	7	20	65	19	4	1	325	73	2	31	10	8
OCTOBRE	41	19	12	41	8	13	19	97	18	1	31	3	14
NOVEMBRE	24	13	10	27	19	16	6	125	23	0	136	9	31
DECEMBRE	21	21	5	43	13	4	0	72	36	6	15	30	30
TOTAL	320	123	138	514	143	77	65	1139	257	81	356	143	89

Source: compilation of CREPS

This upward trend continued in the second half of 2021, as shown by the non-exhaustive collection below, covering the month of April alone. On 1 April 2021, an Improvised Explosive Device was activated at Alachu mile 8 when a BIR convoy passed. Others were defused in Mkemkem / Bamboui and Kumbo where there was an explosion. In addition, the Nkor Oku Ibal Babungo axis was barricaded and machinery lay. Finally, a machine was discovered on the Square-Mbveh axis and another at Mbengwi Road 02 Wia.

On April 6, 2021 in Ndop, in addition to home-made cannons, IEDs were defused by GPIGN in Mulang, others in Sop / Jakiri on the Jakiri-Kumbo axis; in Gary Market / Babessi also against a BIR convoy, in Bamali / Ndop and in

Wainama / Kumbo. On April 20, 2021, an Improvised Explosive Device was discovered at Ibal on the Oku-Babungo axis and at Nkar / Kumbo. On the 25th of the same month, devices were found in Melim and Kumbo against a BIR convoy. On 04/27/2021 finally, on the RN 11 Sop and Nkar / Kumbo, 3 devices were activated and others were found in the town of Kumbo, on the bridge connecting Tobin and Mveh

While it is evident that 2019, 2020 and 2021 mark a decisive turning point in the rise of IEDs in the NOSO, a more global analysis not only makes it possible to note that the threat, while remaining residual, is spreading (with incursions into the coast, mainly in the Centre and West), but also that it is increasing in intensity. In fact, the crisis started with the mouth, then the hands, then the stones, after the machetes and the shotguns. It evolved with shotguns, battle rifles, machine guns, grenades, IEDs, and rocket launchers. Beyond the question of what the IED means, which brings us to their typologies and functioning (I),

I - TYPOLOGY AND MODE OF ACTION

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), or Circumstantial Explosive Devices (EEC), appear today as the main weapons of terrorists. They differ in their use, nature and implementation.

The first distinction is in their application; in fact, IEDs can be used tactically (to kill a person or ambush a convoy) or strategically (to cause widespread terror). The best-planned operations combine the two uses: a tactical bomb targeting a convoy, followed by a second bomb, which hits the curious and / or the emergency services a little later.

The second difference concerns their typology. There are, in fact, two main types of IED: lateral Improvised Explosive Devices (which are hidden on the ground or concealed in packaging) and vertical Improvised Explosive Devices (this is the example of home-made cannons). However, the most frequently used IEDs are of the "pipe bomb" type, made from plumbing elements. Mail bombs are also used to strike targeted personalities or institutions. Finally, cars can also be used for terrorist operations.

In relation to the firing, the third major difference, a classification can be made into three broad categories: victim-initiated IEDs, which meet the definition of a landmine; timed devices that are programmed to trigger at a specific time; and remote-controlled devices that are triggered by deliberate or unintentional pressing of the switch. While the use of landmines declines in time and space, there is, however, an increase in the number of

IEDs employed by non-state actors, and this is exactly the case in Cameroon.

II - CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

Present in different forms on the northern front since at least 2017, IEDs made their appearance at NOSO in 2019 and intensified in 2020 and 2021. Thus, since the beginning of 2021 precisely, the installation of Improvised Explosive Devices and the use of home-made cannons (also known as side improvised explosive devices, as opposed to the vertical ones, which are fled on the ground or hidden in packaging), are experiencing a steady rise in power in the NOSO. In reality, two of the three fronts facing Cameroon are today heavily invested in IEDs. Why this rise in power and this spread?

Beyond the limits of the strategic, operational and tactical system put in place to deal with irredentists, terrorists and others, highwaymen, the rush of criminals towards these devices can be explained by many reasons. First, there is the scarcity of financial resources that insurgents are now facing due to the Covid 19 pandemic, legal proceedings in the USA and the increasingly targeted monitoring of financial transactions in Cameroon.

Then there is the avoidance of confronting the Defence and Security Forces militarily and head-on because of the asymmetry of resources. In fact, IEDs allow the insurgents, limited in terms of conventional technical means, to avoid close combat actions where they have a major disadvantage. Indeed, by using IEDs, they deal with their own weaknesses by bypassing the technological superiority of Defence and Security Forces.



Africtelegaph Chad - Suicide bomber kills five people

Third, there is the relatively low cost of the manufacture of these devices, the damage that this procedure is likely to cause, and the availability of inputs such as Trinitrotoluene (TNT), a very powerful malleable explosive from Nigeria recently discovered in the zone.

Finally, on the operational level, the recourse to IEDs aims to restrict the mobility of forces. Because in addition to increasingly heavy equipment, roads must be systematically inspected by AIED services before and during each trip which considerably slows down land operations.

This propagation of improvised explosive devices leads to a plurality of threats. If we put aside the perils on the forces, there is that in addition to the terror on the local population, these mines represent a danger for the refugees and the displaced persons because, they constitute an obstacle to their right to go back home ; a mortal danger for many years after the end of the conflict. Thus, in addition to the high number of deaths, injuries and the after-effects inflicted, including psychological damage, the presence of explosive devices also hinders the access to livelihoods of the local population such as pastures, fields, farms, firewood and community infrastructure. They also affect the delivery of humanitarian aid and development activities.

IED-related incidents, in addition to the atrocious deaths they cause, push people to abandon their means of survival such as fields and markets, while causing significant material losses. In addition, the people who survive become burdens for the community and their families, because of their disability.

In terms of security, the presence of IEDs limits the movement of people and exposes them to constant insecurity, especially for populations looking for means of survival or even displaced people wishing to return to their villages. Survival strategies are reduced because the tracks taken on a daily basis are dangerous.

Psychologically and emotionally. The phenomenon of IEDs creates a psychosis because it is frequent in areas where economic activities (cultivation, fishing, and

weekly markets) are possible. Finally, their presence pushes the population to move as a preventive measure due to the intensification or even incidents of IEDs in their localities, thus increasing their level of vulnerability.

CONCLUSION

If Cameroon was, for a long time, next to Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, an exception of peace and stability in Central Africa, this is no longer the case, since the middle of the 2000s, but a distant memory. Threatened to its northern left by Boko Haram, to its southern left by Anglophone irredentism and to its southern right by Central African insurgents, the country gradually found itself caught in the stronghold of asymmetric threats and terror conveyed by the IEDs whose geographic spread and intensity seem to be increasing day by day.

While it is true that the combined effect of these three fronts has so far not broken any line of defence of the National Defence and Security Forces, there is no doubt that the appearance of IEDs constitutes a major challenge to the regular progression of forces and their morale, as well as a certain threat to the population, displaced persons and refugees. Getting out of this geopolitics peril requires some readjustments of the security-military tool taking into account at least two dimensions: training in demining and the replacement of pick-ups as a means of transporting troops by armoured vehicles.

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CAMEROON'S ACTION IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FIGHT AGAINST IEDS: ANY PROGRESS FOR BETTER PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION OF CRISES IN CENTRAL AFRICA?

By Dr Moussa OUMAR

The proliferation of a variety of threats in Africa during the 20th century and much more at the beginning of the 21st century has contributed to the weakening of the security fabric of this part of the world. Particularly Central and West Africa have been confronted for several years with the scourge of mines, Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). Their use by the various protagonists of violence not only causes victims, but also makes the land unusable for agriculture and livestock. In the Lake Chad Basin, particularly in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger, the extent of the manipulation of Improvised Explosive Devices is increasingly exposing civilians to suicide attacks.¹ This is why it is therefore a question of considering IEDs as a significant security threat in Central Africa and of defining the role that Cameroon plays in the dynamics of containing this scourge. In other words, what is “Cameroon’s action in international cooperation in the fight against IEDs: any progress for better prevention, management and resolution of crises in Central Africa?”. The response to this concern consists first of all in circumscribing the national system for combating IEDs (I), then Cameroon’s role in cooperation in this area (II) and, finally, the challenges and prospects for strengthening the fight against IEDs in Central Africa (III).

¹ Action On Armed Violence (AOAV), Improvised Explosive Devices, Global Threat, Global Response, Impact Analysis of Improvised Explosive Devices, DGRIS, MINDEF.



Journal du Cameroun: Cross-border security: Cameroon and Nigeria in conversation against terrorism

I - NATIONAL MECHANISMS FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST IEDS

The development and implementation of a national mechanism to fight against IEDs is the result of the proliferation of instruments of violence in Cameroon, a consequence of major perceptible security problems. The said mechanism consists of regulatory measures taken to prevent the acquisition of materials that can be used to manufacture IEDs (A) and response mechanisms through the establishment of an appropriate national legal framework (B).

A. The national regulatory framework for combating IEDs

The presence of IEDs is confirmed in Cameroon, particularly in the Far-North region and in the North-West and South-West regions respectively in the conflict with Boko Haram and the English-speaking separatists. Groups who lay artisanal mines on the route of convoys of Cameroonian officials as they move through these areas perpetrate IED attacks there. Another more worrying fact is that the presence of this type of device in the capital, Yaoundé, reinforces the spectre of a rush towards the acquisition and clandestine manufacture of IEDs in defiance of the regulatory provisions set by the State. However, Decree No. 81,279 of July 15, 1981, fixes the terms of application of Law No. 7715 of December 6, 1977, regulating explosive substances and detonators. In Chapter 3 of the said decree, it is clearly stated that, it is first of all necessary to obtain an authorisation to operate a factory or a workshop for encapsulating explosive substances or detonators. That is to say, the authorisation to operate a factory or a cartridge-filling workshop confers on its holder the right to build and operate a manufacturing plant or a cartridge-filling workshop for firing devices and explosives and detonating substances. In Chapter 5, article 24, it is specified that the import, sale, purchase or transport of explosive substances and detonators is subject to prior authorisation issued by the competent authority.

B. The applicable national legal framework for combating IEDs

To cope with the growing use of Improvised Explosive Equipment on Cameroonian territory, the Government immediately adopted a series of measures aimed at combating this new type of threat. In addition, a mechanism strengthening its national legal framework relating to issues of disarmament, transnational crime, terrorism, corruption and human rights is deployed

because of their proven link with the use of IEDs. These include laws relating to the transport of weapons and ammunition on board aircraft, as well as the prohibition, sale of firearms and their ammunition in regions of the country.

This legal framework is based on the international conventions and treaties related to the major issues mentioned above, dealing with specific weapons such as anti-personnel mines, cluster munitions and other explosive remnants of war that could be considered like Improvised Explosive Devices triggered by the victims. It would therefore not be superfluous to infer that these texts cover the effects of all IEDs, because in addition to Resolution A / RES / 70/46 "Combating the threat posed by Improvised Explosive Devices², there is not yet a specific treaty on IEDs. In addition, certain Conventions contain provisions strongly borrowed from a mark of solidarity in the fight against explosives and the like. This is the case with the Ottawa Convention of December 3, 1997, on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction, as well as the Oslo Convention of May 30, 2008, on cluster munitions. Both texts ratified by Cameroon each provide for a reciprocal obligation of the producing countries and holders of mines in terms of pollution control and assistance to victims, in particular in their articles 6 (International cooperation and assistance).³ Many other texts underpin Cameroon's fight against IEDs⁴. Obviously, these measures all remain inevitably dependent on a complex interdependence, given the complexity of the issue of IEDs in itself, and require the strengthening of cooperation with our bilateral and multilateral partners.

II - COOPERATION IN THE FIGHT AGAINST IEDS

Efforts to limit the damage caused by IEDs have led States to act within a diplomatic framework constituting

²Adopted on December 7, 2015, on the occasion of its 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly, this resolution does not yet address the need for reparations for the victims of these attacks.

³Dixit DELACROIX P., "The Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel mines: an exemplary treaty or a case in point?" »In International and Strategic Review, 2014/4 (n° 96), pp133-141.

⁴Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949 and their additional protocols; Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Techniques of Altering the Environment for Military or All Other Hostile Purposes of December 10, 1976; Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Weapons Which May Be Considered to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects of 10 October 1980 and its Protocols IV, II amended and V; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction of September 3, 1992; Pelindaba Treaty on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Africa of April 11, 1996; Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty of September 10, 1996; Lomé Agreement-Constitutive Act of the African Union of July 11, 2008; Arms Trade Treaty of April 2, 2013; Central African Convention for the control of small arms, their ammunition and all parts and components that can be used for their manufacture, Repair and assembly, known as the Kinshasa Convention, of April 30, 2010 Union Convention Africa on the prevention and fight against corruption, 2003. P14. Convention of the Organization of the African Union on the prevention of terrorism and the fight against terrorism, adopted in Algiers on July 14, 1999.

the basis of all cooperation. The Cameroonian Government has activated its levers to intensify its bilateral relations with States having proven expertise in the fight against IEDs (A), and is deployed at the multilateral level for negotiations leading to the acquisition of local expertise in the domain (B).

A. Bilateral cooperation in the fight against IEDs

Recently impacted by the phenomenon of IEDs, Cameroon had to strengthen its bilateral cooperation with certain strategic partners within view of better appropriation of demining techniques and other prevention mechanisms against this new type of threat. It was thus able to negotiate clauses relating to related issues raised by IEDs in certain Defense Agreements with Governments and armed forces offering their expertise, equipment and financial assistance. Cameroon was also able to obtain offers to improve its capacities against local IEDs, in particular through military cooperation with its historical partners⁵. Many military and police detachments have thus benefited from training as part of the emergence of local expertise. In addition, the diversification of the panorama of Cameroon's partners has further strengthened this aspect, in particular with its new partnerships, which offer individual training or to operational units. Their salutary and significant contributions in the fight against the Boko Haram nebula are also part of the dynamic of strengthening the security system in the Central African sub-region, particularly around the Lake Chad Basin and the maritime facades of the Gulf of Guinea. Thus, several activities have been carried out in terms of specialized training of law enforcement bodies in the field of crime prevention and fight⁶.

This bilateral dynamic is also verified at the level of intra-African cooperation. Indeed, more than 80 African schools, like EIFORCES, welcome interns from other countries of the sub-region. In this wake, the specific protocol for the establishment of a coordination of intervention brigades in cross-border security relating to the tripartite cooperation agreement between Cameroon, the Central African Republic and Chad of 15 March 2018 illustrates this momentum. The Cameroon-Nigeria Agreement on the Non-Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) of 3 August 2018, or the Cooperation Agreement between

Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea relating to the modalities of coordination of joint actions in of Defense and Security of 21 July 2020 reinforce this aspect. The sensitisation campaigns like those organised at the benefit of Interior Security Forces of Cameroon, Niger and Chad are equally to be congratulated in the sense that they stamp the mark of a multilateral footprint in this fight against IEDs.

B. Multilateral cooperation in the fight against IEDs

Many multilateral actors are involved in military cooperation programs aimed at strengthening African armies and forging special partnerships.⁷ At the level of International Organisations (IOs) with a continental vocation such as the African Union (AU), the development of a strategy to combat IEDs is proving fruitful. International Organisations and International Agencies finance cooperation projects between countries within the framework of the fight against IEDs. Thus, the Multinational Joint Task Force created by the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) against Boko Haram, through which States demonstrate a collective will to take charge of security issues in the sub-region has benefited from some of this funding⁸. Although regional operations against IEDs are successful, it is increasingly recognized that a preventive strategy requires collaboration at the international level.

Operations against IEDs include a variety of International Organisations cooperating globally. With regard to the United Nations (UN), it is active in adopting a Pan-governmental or comprehensive institutional approach to combating IEDs. It is in this context that the Disarmament Forum in Geneva plays a leading role by animating several events on the theme of IEDs and that States, like Cameroon, carry out and follow their pleas to benefit from training offers on that question. In addition, the countries conduct negotiations there on Conventions aimed at capturing the offers to be made available to their competent technical administrations to reduce the damage caused by Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) are numerous⁹.

⁷LEBOEUF Aline, "Cooperating with African armies", strategic focus, n° 76, IFRI, October 2017. 68pp. IFRI Security Studies Center.

⁸In the same sense, the Joint Multilateral Force (MNJTF) to unify the efforts of each country against the Boko Haram insurgency strengthens the collaboration between the armies and police services of Nigeria, Niger, Benin, Chad and Cameroon. . They are reinforced by the actions of other entities such as the African Center for Study and Research on Terrorism (CAERT), a structure for centralizing information, research and analysis on terrorism and terrorist groups, establishes a platform interaction, discussion and cooperation in the fight against terrorism between the Member States and Regional Economic Communities / Regional Mechanisms for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts (RECs / RMs); AFRIPOL.

⁹Development agencies (AFP, GIZ, USAID) and other specialized institutions (UNDP, UNODC) also play a driving role in this dynamic of supporting C-EEI projects; In the Far North

⁵In the form of bilateral meetings between personalities from the world of defense and signing of agreements; structural assistance that may take place in beneficiary countries or in those providing cooperation; training and training by secondments of cooperants or technical or operational advisers; organization of joint exercises; donation or sale of infrastructure, equipment or weapons; financial assistance.

⁶ <https://www.prc.cm/fr/actualites/audiences/1988-le-nouveau-commandant-d-africom-au-palais-de-l-unite>

Leading organizations in this fight such as the AXON Global Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) Partnership, the Action Group against Money Laundering in Central Africa (GABAC), the Global Shield Program (PGS), the Chemical Anti-Smuggling Enforcement (CHASE) are the result of cooperation between several entities; in particular the World Customs Organization (WCO), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and INTERPOL. These organisations operate jointly and offer C-IED training with a view to expanding information exchange networks. By way of illustration, the Project aimed at strengthening the capacities in terms of customs security in West and Central Africa (WCA), for the attention of 14 Customs Administrations¹⁰, in 2020 led to the seizures of various chemicals and IED components, namely: 39 tons of cyanide, 7.8 tons of explosive components, 5,200 meters of detonating cords, 1,052 litres of nitric acid, 660 components of ignite and 220 litres of hydrogen peroxide (ALAMBA operation). Funded by the Japanese government, this project provided participants with a range of equipment¹¹. Notwithstanding these successes, the persistence of a certain number of vulnerabilities common to most African States constitutes a brake on the system for combating IEDs in the Central African sub-region.

III - CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR STRENGTHENING THE FIGHT AGAINST IEDS

The complexity of the IED threat limits the scope of actions undertaken in the fight against these devices in Central Africa and therefore constitutes challenges (A)

of Cameroon, more than 42 organizations are piloting around 156 projects (OCHA, February 2017). In addition, cooperation with relevant international organizations responsible for combating terrorism, including the CCT, UNODC, the United Nations Interregional Institute for Research on Crime and Justice (UNICRI), the International Conference on national and regional counterterrorism strategies (CTITF), the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and the (CGCC) In this regard, joint efforts between CAERT,

¹⁰ Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Central African Republic, Senegal, Chad and Togo.

¹¹ Twenty high-tech Raman spectrometers were distributed for the detection of explosive chemical precursors and 9,900 disposable test kits fulfilling the same function but intended for use in the field. In addition, 640 hand-held metal detectors have been provided to aid in the detection of weapons and IED components, especially at land borders and in seaports.

whose solution requires forward-looking actions (B).

A. The challenges of the fight against the use of improvised explosive devices

Containing the global spread of IEDs is the United Nations' biggest peacekeeping challenge to date. Indeed, IEDs represent a global threat by which some countries are more affected than others. However, security issues require an integrated approach, which takes both regional and global aspects, technological and military dynamics, but also media and human; or the new dimension acquired by terrorism or post-conflict stabilisation. Many States have thus improved their skills in combating IEDs over the past decade, be it the capacities of the police, military, or other national security forces.

In addition, most states agree on classifying certain information on IEDs for reasons of national security, but this principle sometimes leads to their fragmentation. In the same vein, certain practices in the field sometimes give rise to controversy. Nigeria and Cameroon have suffered criticism from human rights associations in the fight against Boko Haram (Human Rights Watch, 26 May 2015, Amnesty International 2016)¹². Innovative strategies should therefore be considered to address these shortcomings and make measures against IEDs more effective and efficient.

B. Perspective actions for better prevention against IEDs

Investigations show that the international community is not yet using all the available levers in the fight against IEDs. Indeed, the absence of a treaty specific to IEDs poses the need for the development of a new legal instrument in which assistance to victims of IED attacks would specifically address the damage suffered by these attacks in times of peace and necessary assistance to these same victims following such an attack. The signatories of this text would be obliged to implement measures, which would come to the aid of the victims and would reinforce the financing and the sensitisation of this fight. In the same sense, civil society and private companies have information that could be beneficial to this dynamic. In addition, the creation of permanent consultation platforms between State institutions, Civil Society Organisation, academics and development partners could consolidate the coordination of the actions of the various stakeholders in the process. They

¹² Good cause, bad means: human rights and justice violations in the fight against Boko Haram in Cameroon.

could then carry out an assessment of the mine and IED situation and put in place a mine risk education strategy.

In addition, innovative methods should be developed to approach the management of weapons in conflict zones. The use of technologies to personalise and trace weapons, as well as to restrict the diversion and misuse of small arms in conflict, post-conflict and crisis contexts are options. In addition, in view of the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, the West and Central Africa Security Project will help Customs Administrations to secure logistics chains against terrorist activities and violent extremist movements. Cross-border spaces should therefore be developed to increase their potential for human exchanges and mobility while securing civil status,

CONCLUSION

The proliferation of IEDs in Central Africa constitutes a real security challenge. These instruments of violence are strategically used to cause victims, generate a perception of insecurity, and influence the national will. The efforts to combat IEDs are part of the dynamic of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in military fields and information sharing. However, the persistence of certain shortcomings requires appropriate solutions in the regulation of the fight against IEDs, in order to improve international technical assistance and cooperation, as well as assistance to victims. The African Union Peace and Security Council should consider advocacy or the creation of a fund in its efforts to combat Improvised Explosive Devices.

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THE FIGHT AGAINST IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES IN THE SUB-REGIONAL POLICE COOPERATION FRAMEWORK

Senior Police Superintendent William WANDJI KOUAMOU

Improved Explosive Devices (IEDs) pose a serious threat to societies around the world today. They strike indiscriminately and their effects mainly affect the civilian population. This is why, in 2018, the United Nations General Assembly expressed its deep concern about "the devastations resulting from the increasing use of Improvised Explosive Devices by illegal armed groups, terrorists and other unauthorised users, which affect a large number of countries and claim thousands of lives, both civilian and military".



Figure N ° 1: IED based on military explosives - en.wikipedia.org



IEDs have become a weapon of choice for all interconnected networks whose activities constitute a threat, whether criminal, insurgent, or terrorist. Networks that exploit this threat typically use these devices because their components are cheap, easy to access, easy to manufacture, deadly, and very efficient.

They are positioned or manufactured in an improvised manner and incorporate explosive, incendiary, or toxic chemical components. Tactically, they are designed to destroy, cripple, slow down, or distract. They can incorporate elements from military arsenals (grenades, mines, artillery shells, etc.), but most often, they are made up of an assembly of non-military parts that are the chemical precursors of explosives.



Figure N ° 2: EED based on precursor chemicals - wcoomd.org

With regard to Central Africa in particular, to date and from observation, 4 countries are paying the price for these devices of death namely: Cameroon, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo and, for a few months, the Central African Republic.

INTERPOL, as the leading international police

cooperation organisation, has integrated this dimension into its overall counterterrorism strategy, by establishing mechanisms that can help countries detect, track down and thwart arms trafficking and materials necessary for terrorist activities.

The implementation of this strategy was based on a hybrid decentralisation model, based on a regional approach with the establishment of regional counterterrorism poles (RCTN in English: Regional Counter-Terrorism Nodes).

INTERPOL's regional counterterrorism centre in Central and West Africa (RCTN WCAF) is equipped and staffed with professional and experienced personnel. The INTERPOL regional offices in Yaoundé and Abidjan essentially carry out an operational action mission within the framework of INTERPOL's Counterterrorism Program, establishing direct bilateral links with the countries' national counterterrorism services.

Concerning especially the fight against Improvised Explosive Devices, the expertise of the cluster revolves around the following actions:

I - Facilitate the exchange of information between member countries on people and procedures related to IED incidents

It is imperative that countries have information to carry out their NRBC-E (Nuclear, Radiological, Biological, Chemical and Explosive) terrorism prevention programs and to adapt their operations. INTERPOL, on a daily basis, works to collect, transmit and analyse information on trafficking in NRBC-E substances and other related illicit activities, by exploiting specialised analysis capacities such as the Geiger database. The results of the analyses are systematically communicated to the member countries through regular and ad hoc reports.



Figure N ° 3 "Linking fonts for a safe world" - Interpol.int

INTERPOL has developed a database called WATCHMAKER, which covers known and wanted persons involved in the manufacture and / or use of explosives and Improvised Explosive Equipment. The WATCHMAKER project enables our member countries to identify and track individuals known or suspected to be involved in the manufacture or use of IEDs. To do this, working groups have been created to facilitate the exchange of biometric data and documents by identifying and adding profiles of known or suspected individuals to the database provided for this purpose.



Figure N° 4: Watchmaker project - interpol.int

In addition, still within the framework of the WATCHMAKER project, notices and alert messages could be used by member countries to transmit technical information on IEDs and on the related operating procedures and to update and modify this information.

INTERPOL, on a daily basis, works to explore opportunities for collaborating with leading think tanks and academic institutions to create a comprehensive database of IED incidents around the world. This will provide member countries with a comprehensive strategic analysis on emerging IED trends and threats in target regions. INTERPOL will continue to play a central role in the Global Alliance to Combat IEDs and to work in the spirit of United Nations General Assembly resolution A / RES / 70/46, which encourages countries to share more information on the theft, diversion, loss and illegal use of materials that can be used to manufacture IEDs.

II - Strengthen the capacities of member countries to prevent and respond to IED attacks effectively, by putting in place control programs to this end.

Given the seriousness of IED terrorist attacks and their transnational consequences, preparedness and

prevention are essential elements of national and regional strategies. INTERPOL is working on capacity building to raise awareness among member countries of IED attacks and improve their preparedness. To this end, prevention methods and guides are submitted, and specialised training is organised to strengthen the capacity of law enforcement agencies to prevent and respond to IED attacks more effectively.



Figure N°5 @INTERPOL CBRNE

INTERPOL is working to further strengthen the capacities of specialised units in forensic data collection, analysis and post-explosion investigation through tailored training and exercises. A multidisciplinary approach to the threat is essential in this regard. In addition, INTERPOL will continue to advocate a multi-institutional approach (police, customs, army, public health, academia, supervisory authorities and politicians) for the implementation, at national and regional level, of programs aimed at combating this threat.

III - Develop and coordinate cross-border intelligence-driven inter-agency operations to intercept trafficking in CBRN material and IED components

The detection and interception of cross-border trafficking in CBRN material and IED components and the related investigations require effective coordination between services at the national and transnational levels. Through its mandate and its police capacities (databases, intelligence analysis, border security, CBRN-E training and expertise), INTERPOL aims to facilitate and guide the implementation of reinforced border controls in order to support national counterterrorism measures aimed at thwarting the trafficking of CBRN materials and IED components.



Figure N ° 6: SIMBA III operation detection of EEI precursor's interpol.int

INTERPOL strives to improve the coordination of cross-border operations in the regions targeted by its strategy, in order to combat international trafficking in CBRN material and IED components used in terrorist attacks.

The implementation of this operational strategy relies mainly on the police capacities of INTERPOL and on the organisation of inter-service training, translated into operational frameworks. The exact location of operations is determined on the basis of tactical and strategic analyses and in close consultation with the participating member countries.

IV - Establish lasting strategic partnerships in the field of CBRN-E terrorism on a global scale

Since the establishment of its CBRN-E unit, INTERPOL has become an essential cog in the global mechanism for preventing and combating CBRN-E terrorism. In this regard, the Organisation will maintain its commitment at two levels:

Continue the integration of all relevant major international frameworks (e.g. Committee established under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 on the Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (UNSGM), Global Partnership Against the Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials, Global Alliance to Combat the IED Threat, Nuclear Security Summit (SSN), Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), Global Health Security Program (GHSA), Convention on chemical weapons, Biological Weapons Convention).

Establish lasting partnerships with the main international organisations concerned (UNODA, UNICRI, IAEA, OIAC, WHO, OIE, UNMAS, DPKO, etc.).

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IEDS IN THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM DOCTRINE OF THE MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE

Colonel Jean-Claude MPAY

Faced with the prepotency of the sacrificial asymmetry of suicide bombers, making substantial use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)¹ as a terrorist tactic against populations and regular forces in the geosphere of the Lake Chad basin, strategists are concerned with configuring strategic and operational approaches to optimise the response against IEDs. The present article proposes to answer the following problem: What nature and what extent does the² strategic and operational counterterrorism doctrine of the MNJTF have, and how could we strengthen the mechanisms to fight against IEDs that emasculate the engagement of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)³? Triangularly, it is a question of making the fluoroscopy (I) of the MNJTF entangled in the peril of IEDs, its operational mapping (II), then prospectively, the remedial telescopic (III) of IEDs in the space of the Lake Chad Basin.

1 An IED is a device positioned or manufactured in an artisanal way and incorporating explosive, incendiary or toxic chemical components. It is designed to destroy, cripple, slow down or distract. It can incorporate elements from military arsenals (eg a grenade), but more often it is made up of an assembly of non-military parts.

The IED typically consists of an explosive charge, a priming charge, a detonator, and either a mechanical or electronic firing system. There are many types of improvised explosive devices, often assembled from motley parts.

2 The doctrine is a theory, which establishes and describes the principles making it possible to conduct all the operations devolved to the armed forces.

3 The member countries of the FMM are Cameroon, Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Benin.



Photo n° 1: Suicide bombers with their explosive vests with 12.7 mm ammunition holsters loaded with urea Nitrate HME

I - THE RADIOSCOPY OF THE MNJTF IN ITS FIGHT AGAINST IEDs

In its current format, the MNJTF⁴ is configured multilaterally between the riparian countries of the Lake Chad basin, to which Benin was added, between the end of 2014 and the beginning of 2015, with a launching force of more than 8,000 men, in order to fight the jihads raging in this interregional area. The MNJTF has recorded notable successes, insofar as this security multilateralism has allowed tactical coordination and cross-border cooperation between the forces of the different countries that compose it. As proof, the offensives of the MNJTF in 2017 and 2018, accentuated by a more sustained operation in 2019, significantly reduced the number of terrorists.

In execution of its mission, and to face asymmetric threats in general and IED in particular, the MNJTF carries out complementary land, air, amphibious and psychological operations to fight against the terrorist sect

and protect the territorial integrity of the States concerned, their forces and their population. Tactical successes have certainly been achieved, but they do not make it possible to switch to strategic triumphalism because, despite the strong mobilisation of the MNJTF⁵ and the National Armies of the countries bordering Lake Chad, the terrorist threat persists and continues to infuse horror, terror and misery in this interregional area. In its politico-strategic posture, the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) has established three levels of responsibility for the levels of command in the fight against IEDs: the strategic, operational and tactical levels, which give a tone to the strike force of the MNJTF. X-raying the MNJTF strike force is like talking about its echelons of command⁶, through the successive sequences of planning and prevention of IEDs.

⁴ The African Union (AU) approved the creation of the FMM on March 3, 2015, and provided for a sub-regional organization, the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), to be the civilian body responsible for leading it.

⁵ Historically, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) was created to fight against the Boko Haram octopus in the Lake Chad Basin. The MNJTF⁵ appears as the operational commitment of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC).

⁶ Confer. DIA-3.12 Support of military engineers to joint operations - French supplement to AJP-3.12. This DIA constitutes the reference document concerning the operational employment of military engineers. The prerogatives of the engineer command levels, particularly at the operational level, are precisely defined.



Photo n° 2: An IED

A. PLANNING THE RESPONSE AGAINST IEDs

The planning of the fight against IEDs can be approached under the threefold strategic, operational and tactical aspects.

1. The strategic level of the fight against IEDs

The strategic level is a framework for the cohesion of the forces mobilised in the fight against IEDs. This framework brings together rules and norms as a means of standardising a force against the evanescent and chameleon enemy. It is then a question of framing the common language of the allies and the armies engaged. This level is structured around several components, including the sharing of information and the strengthening of cooperation with other international organisations and public forces (Police, Customs, National Armies, etc.), in particular the neighbouring national forces of countries contributing troops. In terms of level training not available in troop contributing countries', requests to partner countries for training of trainers are regularly issued.

2. The operational level of the fight against IEDs

The responsibility for dealing with the IED threat lies with the Force Commander who may, as much as necessary, request the advice of experts in the fight against IEDs grouped together in particular at the level of the State's Counter-IED command and coordination cells of the Senior Staff of the MNJTF. Its head of unit ensures the proper execution of measures to fight against IEDs in the 4 sectors, through the harmonisation of training and requests for the training of Force personnel. The sharing of information between international and national public forces, as well as between customs and border control services, plays a decisive role in the graphic representation of enemy networks. The MNJTF also trains its troops to interact with civilians during deployment. Information provided by civilians, who are familiar with the area, can be essential in preventing IED attacks.

3. The tactical level of the fight against IEDs

The commanders at the tactical level are particularly intended to conduct specific operations aimed at attacking networks and

defeating the IED system by implementing specialised capabilities (Explosive Ordnance Disposal - EOD, Weapons Intelligence Team - WIT, operational search, ...)⁷.

B. PREVENTION AGAINST IEDS IN THE LAKE CHAD BASIN GEOSPHERE

Two instruments are mobilised by the MNJTF in the prevention of IEDs: intelligence and force preparation.

1. Intelligence and exploitation of information

1.1. Intelligence gathering⁸

Intelligence gathering is important in the specific context of the fight against IEDs. All the components and all the sources of information (generic or specialised) contribute to the fight.

Intelligence from Humans (ROHUM), which mainly, has often made it possible, thanks to its supply by favourable population, to neutralise terrorists before the laying or triggering of the explosive charge of suicide bombers.

Intelligence from Images (ROIM) concerns the capture of images by drones or ISR (Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance) aircraft. It has often been used to observe nocturnal placed IEDs and IED factories among others.

The Intelligence of Electro-Magnetic Origin (ROEM) concerns the interceptions of radio or telephone communications, which have made it possible to locate and neutralise manufacturers and installers of IEDs.

1.2. Analysis and use of information

The MNJTF foresees three-level exploitation of the information collected in the context of IED events:

- field operations (level 1) involving the intervention of specialists as close as possible to the event;
- theatre operations (level 2) from analytical laboratory (s) implementing specific scientific procedures, in particular on objects containing active materials, which are difficult to transport

⁷ In addition to AJP-3.15, AJP-3.12 (Allied Joint Doctrine for military engineering - edition B of June 2014) underlines the importance of the role played in terms of coordination of the means of combating IEDs by the Joint Force Engineer.

⁸ Chapter 2 of AJP-3.15 Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering - Improvised Explosive Devices is entirely devoted to the importance of intelligence

outside the theatre;

- operation outside the theatre (level 3) involving national forensic laboratories and friendly countries.

The materials used and the manner of arranging them in the manufacture of IEDs often enable the identification of the author of the assembly.

2. The preparation of the force against IEDs

Before their deployment, the forces of the MNJTF undergo training to prepare them⁹ for the conduct of operations in an environment contaminated by IEDs. This anti-IED training is mainly focused on the ability to defeat networks before the placement of devices, to detect IEDs and to neutralise them in a safe manner before soldiers or civilians are injured or killed,

⁹ There are hardening centers in each country for troops called to be deployed in the MINJTF theater such as that of Mindif in Cameroon.

as well as the maximum reduction of their effects through the protection of soldiers, platforms and installations. There are also training courses for interaction with civilians.

During deployment, the forces also receive additional instructions aimed at updating their knowledge and helping them deal with the challenges specific to each region¹⁰.

II - THE OPERATIONAL MAPPING OF THE MNJTF AGAINST IEDS

Anti IED mapping is based on four functional components as well as on the neutralisation system.

A. THE FOUR ANTI IED FUNCTIONAL

¹⁰ Several centers of excellence also offer internships and training specific to an environment contaminated by IEDs, such as the School of Demining of Benin.



COMPONENTS

1. The land component

In view of the mainly land-based nature of IED events, the land component contributes with all of its capabilities to the fight against IEDs. The detection of IEDs in the field has been observed on several occasions mainly by it, most often in checkpoints where IED components have been discovered in vehicles.

2. The air component

Concerned in the same way as the land component for all activities requiring a land footprint, the air component contributes directly to the fight against IEDs through its ability to make reconnaissance and deliver fires quickly and precisely. These fires can be direct (on the members or spheres of the IED systems) or indirect (in order to reduce the mobility of the members of the IED system). In addition, new means of detection increasingly involve the air component. MNJTF fighter aircraft destroyed several IED factories while ISR and drones observed IEDs being placed day and night.

3. The maritime component

The maritime component requires a very small land footprint to manoeuvre. It is therefore only marginally exposed to the traditional IED threat. However, in the maritime environment, IEDs constitute a proven and particularly sensitive threat in terms of freedom of action. The BH fighters began to use river mines after the numerous losses suffered by them during Operation «Anger of Bohoma» where the terrorists lost a thousand men following the amphibious land and air attacks of the MNJTF.

In terms of response, the maritime component plays a role in disrupting and jamming, even cutting off the supply lines of IED networks. Thus, the amphibious troops intercepted and destroyed many boats and rafts belonging to the terrorists loaded with urea, aluminium cables and batteries, which are basic components of IEDs.

4. The special operations component

The special operations component participates in the fight against IEDs through its observation, identification and targeting capabilities of adverse elements participating in IED systems. At the MNJTF, its elements carried out targeting operations on IED manufacturers after research and positive identification.

B. THE NEUTRALISATION OF IEDS

The neutralisation of IEDs is probably the most visible part of anti-IED activities. For it to be truly effective, it must be preceded by activities aimed at identifying and defeating the networks that place, manufacture and acquire IEDs. The MNJTF is working to reduce the frequency and severity of IED attacks, but it is also targeting logistics channels.

1. Attack on networks

The network attack involves defeating the networks that place, manufacture and acquire IEDs by reducing the frequency and severity of attacks perpetrated by these means, but it also targets logistics channels. It requires a global approach and specific modalities on which we insist in the prospective part of this analysis. However, while focusing on the area of operations, the MNJTF is studying the execution of operations aimed at defeating enemy networks in the Force's area of interest. The Force seized several times stocks of urea and copper cables used in the manufacture of IEDs. Networks are generally attacked by:

- Pressure exerted on opposing groups;
- The isolation of the adversary and his physical neutralisation;
- The critical use of the adverse cause and the grievances presented, in order to cut the groups opposed to the support of the local population;

The management of figureheads. Certain opposing movements use highly media personalities in order to personalise their struggle and to mobilise a section of public opinion. The fight against these personalities contributes de facto to network attrition.

2. Defeating IEDs

The defeat of the IED covers a wide range of tactical activities contributing in particular to the protection of the Force and the population. The objective remains the preservation of the Force's freedom of maneuver and, within the specific framework of stabilisation operations, to enable the Force to interact concretely with indigenous actors and to guarantee the security of the local population. The failure of the apparatus is carried out according to two distinct but complementary approaches.

2.1. Direct action

Direct action makes it possible to confront the

adversary, to put him out of action and to prevent him from developing any possibility of terrorist or guerrilla actions and to deal with IEDs to put them in check. It enables rapid results to be obtained but not always lasting. By its insidious nature, especially if the adversary has recourse to suicide attacks, the IED threat is difficult to counter by direct action alone, unless it takes the form of offensive operations taking place upstream of any attack. The Boko Haram sect using suicide bombers and ram vehicles in their defence system, during certain operations, the MNJTF forces neutralised them several times before they took action.

2.2. Indirect action

Indirect action relates to the adversary's resources (financing, recruitment, constituents, etc.) and aims to limit the indirect effects of attacks by IEDs (media exploitation for propaganda purposes). Often more effective in the long run, indirect action does not allow immediate effects to be obtained. It is therefore implemented over time to give it time to produce its effects. In addition, it requires close coordination of operations at the strategic and operational levels.

III - THE PREFERENTIAL STRATEGIC APPROACH TO OPTIMISING THE FIGHT AGAINST IEDS IN THE LAKE CHAD BASIN

Today, in the broad sense, defence is much more than fatigues and rangers, the military knows that better than anyone. In the practice of armies, there is a fundamental, almost axiomatic asymmetry between contribution and output, generating efficiency and profitability far below the ambitions and legitimate hopes of the population. The fragmented approach is understandable, explainable, legitimate, but it is not satisfactory. We must have the courage to rethink the methods of consultation and intervention of the international community in crisis areas.

A. STRATEGICALLY MAXIMIZED RESPONSE BY THE ECONOMICO-STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE AND GLOBAL APPROACH DUO

This strategic option appears preferable in the complete attrition of IEDs around the Lake Chad Basin and can be articulated around two complementary levers, which are:

Economic and Strategic Intelligence (IES) in the fight against IED;

The comprehensive approach in the fight against IEDs.

1. The conceptual and contextual approach of IES against IEDs

The IES refers to the re-modelled version of what is conveniently referred to as "strategic monitoring". The IES corresponds to an adaptation of the security system in the face of a post-State context with asymmetric dominance which dictates the phenomenon of IEDs. Through the IES, the fight against IEDs now hinges on a robust projection of pre-emptive logic, which is attentive to the capacity devolution of regular forces, to nip any explosive artisanal initiative in the bud. In fact, the word Intelligence¹¹ is derived from the Latin *intelligere*, which means «to discern, to grasp, and to understand». Intelligence is what makes it possible to build a new algorithm¹², rather than reproducing what has already been done, by adapting the problem-solving processes¹³. Regarding defence, in addition to the acquisition of information, its processing and the management - distribution of knowledge, it is also a matter of classifying and securing information and of being able to manage reputation and influence¹⁴. Very specifically, Economic and Strategic Intelligence¹⁵ collects information that enables the analysis of the environment: dynamic forces present, terrain and methods of action of the actors. Economic and Strategic Intelligence is the tool that allows the establishment of prospective hypotheses from which the decision-maker can design his strategy in order to achieve the goal he has set for himself. In terms of security, the applications of Economic and Strategic Intelligence can be varied. She has not only proven techniques for acquiring information and knowledge in general, but also methods of approaching issues such as strategy, without forgetting her analytical and influencing capacities. This means that Economic and Strategic Intelligence is the seedbed of the global

11 In the 6th century BC, one of the precursors of intelligence, the Chinese SUN TSÉ, author of «The Art of War», thought of formalizing the construction of networks of spies and informants. For him: «an army without secret agents is a man without eyes or ears».

Later, MACHIAVEL (1469-1527) concurred in the same direction, maintaining that «nothing makes a captain greater than to penetrate the designs of the enemy».

12 The tools of economic and strategic intelligence make it possible to improve representations of reality, to acquire knowledge and to understand the forces and relationships that control the environment of an organisation in time and in the space considered, in order to conceive and carry out its strategy, that is to say define and acquire its goal with the greatest chances of success.

13 Intelligence makes it possible to move from intuition to concept, but also from the perceptual unconscious to the structured conscious and from the instinctive, or conventional reaction, to the strategy conceived and constructed, in order to cope in an adapted and operational way to a new situation.

14 Christian HARBULOT believes that economic intelligence makes it possible to formulate a reading grid of economic clashes at the different levels of stakeholder involvement.

15 Economic intelligence is in fact at the service of strategy because it intervenes in several inseparable aspects in the development of an organization's strategy:

- Anticipation
- Risk management
- Innovation
- Development.

approach.

2. The global approach as a missing link in prevention and deconstruction strategies of IEDs

Through the global approach¹⁶, which aims for a lasting and rapid resolution of crises, the tactical gains in the theatre of operations must be transformed into complementary political, economic, social, symbolic, technological and legal challenges. It is a question of making human security the breadcrumb trail of institutional security in order to give meaning, consistency, and this, in a lasting manner, to the notion of global security of States. Thus, the MNJTF sees this fight in a global way. IED events are only the most visible part of a complex systemic network against which it is necessary to act in its entirety in a coordinated manner, in order to obtain tangible results. If the defensive aspects are essential, their offensive counterparts are decisive and the fight against IEDs intrinsically requires a proactive approach on the part of the Force. Finally, a capital condition in the implementation of the global approach in the fight against IED is based on the **anthropological factor**¹⁷ in order to better understand the needs and culture of the communities and States of the Lake Chad Basin. Another way of saying that the global approach is ineffective is if prior knowledge of this geopolitical area is not understood, whether at the level of military actors (armed) or civilian actors (ministries, international institutions, and non-governmental organisations). The global approach must therefore take into account «the human being». Failure to take into account the anthropological factor by strategists can compromise the sustainable deconstruction of terrorism¹⁸.

B. AN OPERATIONALLY OPTIMISED RESPONSE THROUGH THE USE OF BIOMETRY

Biometrics (or more precisely biometric recognition) is defined by the use of physiological traits or distinctive

behavioural characteristics (fingerprints, face, iris, voice, etc.) to recognise people automatically. It would be desirable for the introduction of the use of biometrics to be taken into account. Biometrics is an essential tool in the fight against the IED system. The readings carried out on intact IEDs or following an event (ten-digit prints, DNA, etc.) prove to be decisive for knowledge and the fight against networks¹⁹. Currently, the main goals of a system are to do identification (a search for an individual in a biometric database), or authentication (verification of identity against reference data). The use of biometrics can usefully be grafted onto other optimisation approaches in the fight against IEDs:

Harmonisation of the laws of the 4 countries around Lake Chad for the prohibition of urea, an agricultural chemical fertilizer, used in the artisanal manufacture of IEDs. Providing more efficient new generation detection means also appears to be an emergency. Indeed, terrorists are always one step ahead of the forces. Currently, in addition to river mines hidden under water they make it difficult to detect IEDs by wrapping metallic materials so that detectors cannot spot them.

Equipment for additional armored personnel carriers with a «V» frame.

Acquisition of latest generation detection means capable of detecting IEDs in plastic packaging.

Training and equipment of mine clearance divers in view of the recent introduction of river mines.

The Provision or even the increase theater operating laboratories and national forensic laboratories in each country

The intensification of civil-military actions to increase the support of the population in the affected areas.

Increased education of the population on the risk of IEDs and how to respond when they are discovered.

¹⁶ The comprehensive approach is a crisis resolution strategy particularly suited to fragile or failed states.

The comprehensive approach is a strategy, which indicates that the security-development-governance triangle constitutes the irrefutable lever for the synchronised and lasting resolution of a conflict. Here, a development community is only relevant if it is upstream a security community built on democratic governance.

¹⁷ Political anthropology is useful for understanding the functioning of societies, tribes, communities, and governance in the Lake Chad basin; it aims to understand a «primitive» and traditional political system.

¹⁸ Two factors may justify the need to take anthropology into account in the strategy to combat IEDs:

The factor linked to social disorganisation:

Indeed, when social control within the community collapses, due to poor economic status, or increased cultural heterogeneity, the rate of radicalization of terrorist recruits increases;

The factor linked to structural societal tension:

The feeling of having no prospect of social success can push some individuals towards terrorism.

¹⁹ If as it stands, AJP-3.15 remains cautious and evasive with regard to this aspect, the national specificities in terms of biometrics and the collection, storage and use of data are decisive.

CONCLUSION

All in all, this research intends to shed a strategic and operational light on the nature and structure of the response led by the MNJTF on IEDs in the Lake Chad Basin. In a ternary approach, it was a question of doing the fluoroscopy, the cartography and the telescoping of the fight against the homemade weapons, which Boko Haram terrorists use to sow institutional stress and human distress in this geopolitical sphere. The mixed aspect of the results so far obtained by the MNJTF against IEDs inspires a systemic re-parameterisation, which is based on two projection levers: economic-strategic intelligence and the global approach. These

two ideological leavenings meet the anthropological approach and the recourse to biometrics in the pre-emptive, preventive and curative perspective of IEDs.

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Photo n° 3: Vehicle bombed with two bottles of propane gas and timer

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES: THE URGENCY OF TRAINING AND AWARENESS

Colonel Fiacre Kisito ATANGANA

Since the siege of insecurity in the Far North of Cameroon with the rise of the Boko Haram sect and the ensuing declaration of war against the said terrorist group, the Cameroonian population has become accustomed to expressions such as Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) otherwise called «Homemade Bombs», suicide bombers etc. However, an assiduous flirtation with history teaches us that the term Improvised Explosive Device dates from a very distant time. Without rushing into history, particularly in Antiquity, the development of asymmetry in insurgent wars (Afghanistan) and the fight against terrorism and violent extremism in Asia, Africa and the world in general (Al Qaeda, Iraq, Syria etc ...), enabled the observation of a systematic resort and an exacerbated use or “the weapon of the weak”¹ homemade bombs, to face the firepower of modern armies, conventional forces.

¹ Name used in Mali to explain the use of homemade bombs by terrorist groups with rudimentary equipment.



CRTV - Explosion of a homemade bomb in Nsam

What should be remembered is that an Improvised Explosive Device is «an unconventional explosive weapon, whose shape is not defined and which can be activated in several ways»². Its misuse by terrorist groups, rebels and various irredentist movements make it a global security concern.³.

Today, IEDs subject the heads of the Defence and Security Forces to multiple issues, including:

- Detection ;
- Neutralisation;
- Identification;
- The destruction ;
- The dismantling of promotion networks;

- The protection of forces and civilians, real collateral victims.

With regard to the operating methods of their users, one observation is clear: IEDs kill indiscriminately, causing more victims among civilians who do not have protection equal to that reserved for the forces.

In the global strategy adopted by the various States and organisations⁴ to fight against the use of IEDs and reduce their impact in asymmetric conflicts which are constantly increasing, training is a major pillar. EIFORCES, aware of its role in the preparation of security forces and civilians for internal security and peace operations, has not remained inactive in the face of the urgent need to develop engineering in the field of IED training. Although still in its infancy, the training driven by the AU and ECCAS Centre of Excellence is inspired

² Definition given by NATO.

³ Some statistics drawn from a good source (Author) attest to the vertiginous increase in the number of dead and wounded, soldiers and civilians due to the use of said devices.

⁴ Among the organisations that have taken on the fight against IEDs, NATO has adopted a legal framework for training and monitoring which has developed a training approach in this area at a number of training centres hosted by some member countries.



Photo 1: an IED model

by the standards defined by NATO (I), thus allowing itself, at the height of its modest means in the field, to prepare the forces and other actors to face evil (II).

I - DEFINITION OF STANDARDS IN TRAINING

As part of its strategy to combat IEDs, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has defined an action plan focused on three objectives, namely neutralisation, training and practice.

I.1-Neutralisation of Devices

The neutralisation of the devices requires the identification of the networks, which place, manufacture and acquire IEDs. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has developed a comprehensive approach that integrates all the players in the fight against these devices. This approach is based on information sharing, cooperation with international organisations and public forces. Its action plan then honours specific training for troops deployed in areas where IEDs are widely used.

I.2-Training and practice

This involves training the forces before their deployment, in order to prepare them for the conduct of operations in an environment polluted by IEDs. In addition, there is training «in situ» to make people aware of the realities on the ground, to update their knowledge and to face the difficulties specific to each region.

NATO is also working to reduce the gaps between countries in training, standardisation and doctrine development in the fight against IEDs. This framework, which can still be improved, is not yet at the heart of the concerns of African regional and sub-regional organisations. Given the topicality and the urgency to adopt its pro-action as well as its reaction to the security context imposed by the theatre of operations, EIFORCES has taken full measure, by investing in preparation and training security forces and civilians on IEDs.

II - EIFORCES IN THE FOREFRONT

In the movement, which is in line with what is happening in other parts of the world affected by the phenomenon of IEDs, training and awareness are decisive. In addition, the International School for Security Forces has made this concern its own. In order to prepare the troops and social actors, mobilised to resolve the various conflicts, to face this reality,

EIFORCES is working to raise awareness at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. It also gives a point of honour to the training of men in the field.

II.1 - AWARENESS OF IAS: A PREREQUISITE



Photo 2: a soldier inspecting a vehicle - Source: Author

EIFORCES has developed awareness-raising modules for the first and second training of police and gendarmes on demining and destruction of identified devices.

Indeed, since the year 2018, with the extent of the use of IEDs both by Boko Haram terrorists and the more and more systematic use of these devices by so-called "Ambazonian" secessionists, who roam the streets and tracks in the North-West and South-West regions, the need to raise awareness is extremely acute. In this context, a one-week seminar is planned for personnel serving in conflict zones. The objective of the course is to teach them how to react to the dangers associated with explosive devices and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). Also interested in the said seminar are staff serving in NGOs and exposed to the same dangers.

In the same vein, the need to introduce IED awareness courses during internships developing other themes was felt. Thus, in January 2021, as part of the seminar on the protection of civilians (POC) organised for the staff of the Cameroonian senior administration and Cameroonian and foreign auditors of the Higher Degree of Security Studies (BESS 7), a module on raising awareness of the dangers of IEDs and on the attitudes to adopt in the face of these devices was given to participants.

In addition, the organization of an awareness-raising seminar on IEDs under the aegis of the UNDP is planned, during the month of November 2021, with Japanese funding. Lasting one week, this seminar will bring together the personnel of the security forces, members of NGOs deployed in conflict zones, in one week, in order to sensitise them and give them assets

enabling them to better face the insecurity generated by the use of IEDs in asymmetric conflict zones.

II.2 - TRAINING

As for training, it aims at teaching trainees to recognise explosive devices, to locate and destroy them «in situ» or to prepare the ground pending the intervention of a more equipped team. By complying with the above-defined standards, the training provided by EIFORCES is divided into three levels:

The first level consists of training personnel on the identification of explosives, taking into account the environment and preparing the ground while awaiting intervention from the upper echelon;

The second level consists of teaching trainees to recognise the characteristics of various devices and ammunition, their country of manufacture, their mode of operation and their neutralisation.

Finally, **the third level** enables the trainee to develop the skills of identifying the different types of ammunition, the countries of manufacture, their mode of operation and their neutralisation.



Photo 3: improvised explosive devices

For EIFORCES, after sensitising stakeholders on IEDs, it is, therefore, a question of training in sufficient numbers, both experts and trainers likely to play a decisive role in the field by managing the identified cases of the use of IEDs and able to support future training.

This is the objective of the November 2021 one-week seminar on Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) levels 1 and 2. Through this training, EIFORCES will make available to the Gendarmerie and the National Security of Cameroon, whose troops are deployed both in the North-West, South-West and Far-North regions, thirty members of staff able to ensure the identification, transport and destruction of Improvised Explosive Devices or explosive homemade devices⁵. Moreover, they must be able to prepare crime scenes and create an environment favorable to the judicial aspect, through the preservation of clues and the production of material evidence liable to confuse the possible perpetrators of said acts before the judicial authorities.

Moreover, it should be noted that the training of staff in relation to the urgency of the security situation on the ground remains finicky. EIFORCES is still seeking autonomy in this area, particularly by increasing its number of certified experts in order to intensify training. For the time being, it benefits, quite opportunely, from the support and support of the expertise of the Military Engineering Regiment in the use of explosives. The support of other partners should not be neglected. Cameroonian executives and experts have indeed benefited from training with foreign institutions on scholarships offered by partner's⁶.

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⁵It is necessary to note the richness of the expressions relating to the designation of improvised explosive devices; besides the name homemade bomb, other authors speak, without great discrimination or characterisation, of explosive homemade devices.

⁶Cameroonian experts have received training on IEDs. Very often requested by the UN in the context of the Peace Operations it supports, they constitute the backbone of the School's training in this matter.

FORECAST INTELLIGENCE IN THE MANAGEMENT OF IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (IED)

Lieutenant-Colonel Jules MEVONO NGOMBA

Manufactured and packaged for deployment at tactical and sometimes operational levels, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) are generally encapsulated in conflicting approaches based on weak to strong strategies. Despite their strong psychological and politico-media impact on the conduct of operations, the flaws in the methods of their operational deployment enable an adapted and proactive forward-looking intelligence system to limit their effects or thwart their use. To work in a simplified sense of intelligence, we could agree with authors like Jean-Claude COUSSERAN and Philippe HAYEZ¹ that its purpose is to produce the information and data necessary for the decision-making process, whether within the framework of military strategy or more generally for the conduct of foreign, defence or security policy actions of a State. It should therefore be stressed from the outset that intelligence is not possible if it is not at the service of a political will, generally at the State level, which determines its objectives, conditions, and which exploits the results. In a more operational approach, Robert M. CLARK posits that intelligence aims «to reduce uncertainty by obtaining information that the adversary in a conflict wishes to deny you»². This means that intelligence has, in the context of a conventional or asymmetric conflict, a central place, which conditions the success of operations and maneuvers engaged in the field.

1 JC. COUSSERAN and P HAYEZ, "Defining intelligence" (chapter 1) in Informing democracies, providing information in democracies, Odile Jacob, 2015.

2 RM CLARK, Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centered Approach, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2004, p.138.



www.aa.com.tr Cameroon - Two Boko-Haram suicide bombers neutralised by the army in the Far North

I - IEDs: BETWEEN THE RUSTICITY OF THE ENGINEERING OF VIOLENCE AND POLITICAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES

The political objectives at the heart of asymmetric conflicts have engendered ever more ingenious modes of production of violence, linked to the desire to cause the enemy as much damage as possible at minimum cost. This sophistication of the engineering of violence, which is not always accompanied by sufficient material and technical means, has historically, led to their rusticity. In this register, the insurrectional and terrorist movements, which resort to IEDs mainly seek to compensate for their material and logistical weaknesses by means with significant media effects. IEDs thus constitute rustic means deployed on a tactical or operational scale and producing effects, both military and politico-strategic.

IEDs are easy to manufacture, simple to implement and generally require only a low level of technical skill. This ease of production coupled with the inexpensive nature of inputs (which are most often acquired in local markets) has made IEDs acquire the sad status of the privileged weapon of many terrorist and /or insurrectionary movements. The rudimentary design of these devices, which combine components of military origin (mines, military explosives) or civilian chemicals (agricultural inputs, industrial products) increases their operational appeal, as the ratio of means to be implemented and expected effects seem very advantageous in the context of conflicts in gray areas³. For the United Nations, in recent years, armed insurrectional or terrorist groups have increasingly favoured the use of IEDs as a *modus operandi* in their actions on the ground⁴. Thus, whether it is the terrorist group Al Qaeda and its multiple branches in Asia and Africa, the terrorist group Boko Haram or small armed groups around the world, the use of IEDs has increased significantly and now occupies a major place in the arsenal of means implemented to establish and consolidate predation systems or to achieve political objectives.

The use of IEDs, therefore, has multidimensional goals in a conflict of an unconventional type. Their place in asymmetric strategies is based on a double psychological and symbolic dimension, whose scope of which is both military and political. The psychological

effect results from the fear and trauma that IEDs produce both vis-à-vis the regular forces and population that seek to protect States caught in the spiral of insurrectional or terrorist violence. At the military level, the explosion of IEDs during a violence control operation generates, in addition to personnel and material damage, has a significant psychological impact on the troops engaged in the field. These lose in insurance, in spite of their reassuring position of the holder of the legitimate force and the dissymmetric means of military superiority. In these situations, the commitment of the personnel, even if it is maintained through constant remobilisation by the command, loses a not insignificant part of its intensity. That is, the fear that creeps in among troops inevitably weakens their motivation because of the essentially unpredictable nature that is at the heart of IED employment.

For the population, the use of IEDs presents equally important traumas. In fact, caught in a pincer movement between the two conflicting parties, the population suffers, generally very high human and material losses. Suicide attacks, the burying of explosives on highways or attacks on strategic targets or of high military value or State installations and symbols, generate direct losses and sufferings for the local population. Once entered in the conflict *modus operandi* register, IEDs in still fear and psychosis, reducing the activities and mobility of people and goods. The fear and indirect losses linked to this climate of terror are difficult to quantify and contribute to amplifying the socio-political effects of the conflict.

The coalescence of the military and psychological effects of the use of IEDs is at the basis of their use in strategies from the weak to the strong. An aggregate effect of all the effects obtained at the tactical and operational levels then makes it possible to open the horizons of analysis on the highly political dimension of IEDs.

Overall, the contestation of the use of legitimate violence and of the political and social ordering monopolistically held by the State appears to be the major substrates on which the action of asymmetric actors using IEDs as a mode of production of alternative violence. Several studies have also highlighted predation as a regime of explaining the reasons and motives governing the use of explosive devices designed in a rudimentary way and engaged in an unconventional way by sub-State actors. It, therefore, becomes central and imperative to identify the objectives sought by armed groups using IEDs in the repertoire of their actions so that by correlating them with their instructions for use, we are able to build effective strategies for their failure. In doing so, we will better understand the role and place occupied by a carefully calibrated forward-looking

3 G. MINASSIAN, *Gray areas. When the States lose control*, Editions du CNRS, Paris 2018, 271. pages

4 Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations General Assembly of July 17, 2020, on the need to combat the threat posed by IEDs

intelligence system capable of countering this particular threat of IEDs.

II - FORECAST INFORMATION ON IEDS: BETWEEN THREAT MAPPING AND PROACTIVITY

If it is classic to evoke the empirical approach of intelligence by highlighting the multi-time cycle, the functional relevance, which seems to arouse the support of modern State services, the typology based on the time of action makes us take into account better situated operational constraints. Indeed, to build entities of meaning, which encapsulate a stratification of action levels from micro to strategic, taking into account the sequential dimension of so-called new conflicts, the repertoire of acts of violence, which varies from simple to complex, so-called forecast intelligence, offers the best tools for operational assessment and anticipation. Indeed, located upstream, the forward-looking intelligence approach is part of both the tactical and operational scales after the desired objectives have been finalised by the authorised levels. However, this

approach is based on the mastery of the key factors previously identified through monographs solidly documented in the field and on people.

A DUAL GEOGRAPHICAL AND HUMAN MAPPING

The levers of action on which intelligence must rely in the context of the fight against IEDs essentially relate to geographic and human factors. Establishing in-depth monographs of action areas where asymmetric actors act is all the more essential since, for Gaïz MINASSIAN, mastery of the field and knowledge of socio-human specificities in gray areas are determining factors in the conduct of any reconquering operation of a territory plagued by alternative political projects. These monographs must therefore be part of the perspective of perfect knowledge of the field based on geographical elements, communication routes and infrastructure.

For Yves LACOSTE, «*geography is used, first of all, to wage war*»⁵. This means that in order to set up a

⁵ Y. LACOSTE, *geography is used primarily to wage war*, Paris, The Discovery, 2014, 254 pages



BBC Cameroon- 15 dead in Kolofata - BBC News Africa

forward-looking intelligence system, taking into account the territory seen here as space and stake is decisive. The author insists by stressing that, *"if the precision and reliability of intelligence are necessary conditions for the success of a military or public order operation, they are not sufficient to ensure it. Knowledge of the physical environments - whether it be the relief or the built volumes - is undoubtedly essential"*⁶. It is, in fact, imperative not only for the staff to have up-to-date maps of the area but also for each operational sector manager to have up-to-date geophysical and geographic data for his sector. Thus, the planimetry, vegetation, rainfall, land movements, communication routes and all the key points of the land must be systematically identified and listed. All these elements of geography that can be of military value serve as input in the analysis of possibilities and exploitable opportunities in the context of a conflict where the enemy forces seek to hide and camouflage their actions. What's more, the layout of the habitat and the peculiarities of the communication routes, more specifically in areas with very high or very low population density, are also full of places that can be highlighted in military terms and facilitate the installation or remote triggering of IEDs. As the effects sought by dissident forces are both military and psychological, all areas of land of tactical interest for the installation of IEDs become, in the context of an unconventional confrontation, key points to be taken into account in any analysis of anticipation and conduct of the intelligence manoeuvre.

The lines of communication present, in this analysis, a primordial value, both tactically and operationally. Non-state armed groups, in effect, exploit these channels of communication to set up logistical routes that are established in order to build and maintain the constant flow of resources necessary for their extensive use of improvised explosive devices. We have observed, for example, around the Lake Chad Basin that the Boko Haram group and its small affiliated groups kept numerous useful tracks according to the seasons in order to maintain a constant flow in terms of supply between their logistics bases and the places of attacks in the targeted areas. The control of material flows in these crisis zones is only optimal if the intelligence system put in place is based on a mapping and an in-depth monograph of the territory. In doing so, mastery of geography appears to be essential in defining information needs but also in subsequent collection operations.

The forward-looking intelligence approach is also very much in line with human aspects. Completing the

mapping of risks related to geography and terrain, human aspects appear to be the most complex to define and explore. The reason is twofold: the population is the centre of gravity of any asymmetric conflict, and the management of human flows in a gray area is essential for the success of any intelligence manoeuvre.

Forged by Carl Von CLAUSEWITZ, the concept of the centre of gravity is fundamental in understanding modern conflicts. For this author, it is *"the hub of the power of movement, on which everything depends. This is the point against which all our energies must be directed"*⁷. The centre of gravity has become in modern agonistics a notion that is used at the same time on strategic, operational and tactical plans. For the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), it is the set of *"characteristics, capacities or places from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or any other group derives its freedom of action, his physical strength or his will to fight"*⁸. It can thus designate enemy troops or units, its installations or command structures, the population or public opinion, etc. In short, the centre of gravity appears as the *«hub of power and movement»* which is the basis of intentions and the strategies of the enemy or adversary. In the clashes where the parties to the conflict make extensive use of IEDs, the population appears to be the target of all the ambitions and all the objectives of the actors of asymmetric violence and of the alternative order. If the actions of armed groups and terrorist groups seem to target the population in crisis areas only secondarily, it is to better implement their objectives of control and domination of people and their property. Moreover, when IED attacks proceed a target on public institutions in urban or populated areas, it is the civilian population that generally suffers the most important damages.

The aspects to be monitored within the framework of forecasting intelligence within the population relate *prima facie* to the search for individuals with technical capacities that can enable them to manufacture IEDs or to participate in the logistics chain of their installation in a theatre. Admittedly, the manufacture of IEDs requires very little technical knowledge, but the minimum essential for the handling of such dangerous products is not within the reach of the ordinary population. For the United Nations, however, *"It should be noted that in several countries the armed groups have perfected their technical capacity in view to diversifying, designing and deploying increasingly sophisticated devices. The growing complexity of their design, combined with*

⁶Y. LACOSTE, "Intelligence and geographic intelligence," in *Hérodote*, 2011/140, p. 7

⁷ CV CLAUSEWITZ quoted by Olivier KEMPF, «What is a centre of gravity in asymmetric conflict», in *Strategic*, 2005/1 (No 85), p. 52

⁸ Ibid.

*standardisation and large-scale production by some non-State actors, is, therefore, a source of concern*⁹.

The control of human flows within crisis zones makes it possible to place research and collection actions in the social depth. Acting generally within the population, asymmetric or predatory armed groups develop networks of flow and trafficking of the various components which must allow them to mount and discreetly place these devices of death directed against the regular forces or against the population who collaborate with them. The provisional intelligence system must therefore be based on crowdsourcing techniques understood as the establishment of a network of informants and sensors within the population. Its main targets are essentially made up of manufacturers or sellers of materials and inputs, places of flow and traffic of materials not only military but also commercial. The use of commercial products in the manufacturing process indeed increases both the chances of success and the overall effectiveness of the attack, these products being generally in open trade. However, because of the law of silence generally imposed on the population, the forecast intelligence system must also be proactive.

B- "PREPARE FOR THE UNPREDICTABLE"?

The pro-activity required in the search for predictive intelligence in the context of the fight against IEDs, however, does not consist in «foreseeing the unforeseeable». It is based on the coalescence of elements related to the mastery of the geophysical

aspects of the theatre of operations, the technical capacities of the insurgent forces and the network of sensors within the population in order to set up a manoeuvre to anticipate the actions of the armed groups using IEDs.

From the outset, and according to Philippe BOULANGER, it is necessary to make a transition from «*empiricism to the rationalisation of geographic intelligence*»¹⁰. Geographic intelligence in fact requires linking enemy strategies and possible actions in the territory of their implementation. Next, the forecast intelligence analysis must be qualitative and multidisciplinary in order to understand and anticipate the ways of thinking and actions of alternative forces. Knowing the enemy in his environment through human and technological monitoring tools is the basis of all anticipation. In doing so, forward-looking intelligence systems can then effectively obstruct the tactical prospects for the deployment of IEDs, which are strongly subservient to the political and military objectives pursued by asymmetric actors. According to the terms of Vincent DESPORTES, forecast intelligence will thus be able to render what is strategically sort and politically searched for tactically possible¹¹.

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⁹ Report of the Secretary General of the General Assembly of the United Nations of July 17, 2020, op.cit.

¹⁰ P. BOULANGER, "Geographical intelligence and military culture", in *Hérodote*, 2011/1 n° 140, p.48

¹¹ V. DESPORTES, *Strategy in theories*, in *Foreign Policy*, 2014/2, pp. 165-178

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Monde Actuel Cameroon - the discovery of a homemade bomb at the entrance of the Kumba market in the South-West creates panic

RISK AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT RELATED TO IEDS

Colonel Professor Francis LYSONGE EKOSSO, PhD

Risk and Disaster Management are subjects too encompassing to be left in the hands of Risk managers, emergency managers and disaster managers alone. Likewise, these subjects are too important to be left in the hands of government officials, defence and security forces, or well-wishers alone. The successful prevention of and reaction to IED attacks can only be the result of a collective and coordinated effort. Landmines, booby traps and every type of explosive device have existed from the moment when mankind discovered that gunpowder can serve as ammunition in wars and armed conflicts. Taking into consideration that war is a human activity, people were, are, and will remain the primary target of these devices. As such, in the management of risks and disasters, it is understood that the act of safeguarding persons and property from the effects of improvised explosive devices is also geared towards the protection of the environment and the continuity of normal daily activities in a given community. Among many other threats to property and the environment such as floods, volcanic eruptions and structural collapse of the built environment, armed confrontations have been classified as disasters. According to the fact sheet made available by the American National Academies and the Department of Homeland Security to the American people, an IED attack refers to “the use of a ‘homemade’ bomb and/or destructive device to destroy, incapacitate, harass or distract”. They “are used by criminals, vandals, terrorists, suicide bombers and insurgents”. Reasoning from this standpoint, it can be observed that the potential victims include not only the targets of such make-shift weapons but also, their unskilled manufacturers and users. Many of them have been seen to sustain serious injuries or lost their lives while trying to fabricate or handle these homemade explosives.




237 News Cameroon-Anglophone crisis- Several homemade bombs explode in Bamenda.

In their study entitled "Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism: An Analysis of the Current Considerations and Barriers Inhibiting the Adoption of Counterterrorism Protective Measures," Monaghan and McIlhatten (2018), codified the basic concept that every criminal will look for the greatest possible effect by targeting the built environment and crowded places. With the knowledge that the media practitioners would be more interested in the graphic effect caused by an explosion than that caused by marauding gunmen, terrorists would certainly choose the bomb option. They weigh the effect and the costs before they embark on their activities. Hence, persons who find themselves in crowded places may be potential targets of IED attacks. Though it is important to be alert and vigilant when in such environments, potential targets can equally

participate in the general security measures. A researcher such as Ronald Clarke in his book "Outsmarting the Terrorists", (London, 2008), propound five mechanisms to affect the potential offender's decision to strike. Firstly, he talks about increasing the effort which translates into target hardening, screening and access controls. Secondly, there is the aspect of increasing the risk of the offender getting caught through surveillance and anonymous security persons within the area. Thirdly, considering that exposure or publicity is one of the main goals of a terrorist, it is essential to deny him/her the satisfaction that they seek by concealing the targets or keeping media coverage to the strict minimum. Next, it is important to reduce the provocations such as social frustrations and stress as well as discouraging imitation of what happens in other





countries or cities. Finally, Clarke talks about the need to fight against the use of drugs and excessive consumption of alcohol in conflict zones, which may impair rational thinking relative to the damage of operating an IED. Though these mechanisms may seem very appropriate, would-be criminals of such attacks may simply change the location of their assault, when they get discouraged from carrying them out in a given area. In this case, the importance of public awareness and surveillance through the right channels cannot be underscored. In Cameroon for example, in the wake of what has come to be known as “the Anglophone Crisis”, public buildings, especially during working hours, and administrative authorities are often targets for IED attacks. Security and official convoys have suffered the effect of these devices. However, potential terrorists have been observed to move away from such heavily guarded targets to more vulnerable communities where these atrocities are committed often. It is quite rare these days, to hear of a bomb explosion in the urban areas, but these detonations occur regularly in rural areas on market days.

Improvised Explosive devices can be made by a mixture of “regular” products which, when combined in appropriate proportions, would result in the desired blast. The use of the term “regular” in this case, denotes the non-illicit nature in the distribution of the components of IEDs. For instance, it was discovered that the April 19, 1995 truck bomb in Oklahoma City was made of ammonium nitrate fertilizer and nitro-methane. Fertilizer is used in the agricultural sector while nitro-methane is used as a fuel for radio-controlled aircraft. Users of this type of aircraft operate them as a hobby, therefore, justifying the popular use of this source of energy. The constituent elements of the March 11, 2004 train bombs in Spain were simply bags stuffed with Goma-2 ECO explosives and metal fragments, using regular cell phones as timers. The Goma-2 ECO type of explosive is an ammonia gelatine dynamite used by miners all around the world. Its acquisition is subject to authorization but that does not make it a forbidden substance. It could be bought just by anyone who is in possession of a mining or drilling permit. On that day in Spain 169 and 191 persons respectively lost their lives in the two mass catastrophe incidents. Looking at the armed conflicts on the African continent and particularly at the Cameroonian scene, it has been determined that a vast number of IEDs are improvised from simple construction material and domestic gas or any other type of fuel and oxidizers for maximum effect. In relation to the disruption of normal human life in various communities engendered by these devices, the management of such disasters requires the attention of levels of responsibility, from the grand strategic to the

tactical levels. Vast awareness campaigns aimed at the general public, responders and even the eventual perpetrators of IED attacks are necessary for their prevention. It is highly recommended that this IED phenomenon, be managed according to the disaster management cycle. It also requires socio-cultural and ethnological approaches, which enable the detailed study and identification of specific reactions of people to various phenomena. In many African communities, the level of uncontrolled curiosity is such that individuals move towards a dangerous scene such as an IED attack after the initial instinct of self-preservation, instead of moving away from it.

At the grand strategic or political level, leaders need to elaborate policies aimed at effective IED disaster management. It is essential that this be done in conformity with existing international standards, such as recommended by the UN Secretary-General’s Report A/71/187 and UN Resolution 1/RES/71/72. As the old saying goes, “no man is an island”, there is no Nation which auto-sufficient in every aspect. Slavery, geopolitics, colonialism, international trade and migration, for instance, are all constituent elements of natural human greed in the acquisition of wealth and power, ignoring the interests of the other party. Wars are the most brutal expression of this tendency of aggrandizement and expansionism. Other more subtle means include diplomacy and negotiation where less violent techniques of manipulation are employed, all for the same purposes: either to preserve what a given individual or community possesses already or to gain more using deceptive politeness. International laws and conventions have been adopted around the world, not only to wing this tendency but also to enable the game of power to continue with less ruthlessness. Zooming in on the aspect of war, the use of improvised explosive devices is rampant, not only in internal conflicts but also in cross-border situations of insecurity. The Boko Haram terrorist strategies constitute a practical example of this phenomenon. They employ these devices as land mines and suicide bombers. The insurgency has favoured this activity considering that dissident groups in neighbouring countries tend to exchange on the maximum amount of damage that can be caused by any one of these devices according to their operating budgets. State monopoly of violence to ensure the rule of Law renders the procurement of arms and ammunition quite challenging for armed groups within a country. The fabrication of IEDs is the easiest way out for belligerent dissidents. This highlights the notion of governance which is a major issue worldwide spiced with various shades of bias according to international political interests. Conversely, despite the existence of relative global morality as far as the protection of human life and property are concerned,

African political level decision-makers need to prioritize national interests in their management of IED-related disasters. The elaboration of administrative doctrine requires taking into consideration of societal values on a long term basis. According to Catheryn Seckler's first principle of public management, policy should be defined and imparted to those who are responsible for its achievement. This brings to mind the need for proximity to local governments. In the Central African Region, one would notice that national administrative regions are too large for the local authorities to be in contact with the populations. In such a situation, public education becomes a problem including sensitization efforts on the dangers of IEDs.

At the strategic level, interagency cooperation is indispensable. A detailed study of the sociological, ethnological and anthropological factors is equally a requisite because culture may sometimes constitute a powerful obstacle to anti-IED policy implementation. Strategic level decision-makers are encouraged to carry-out multispectral evaluations on a long-term basis, studying the effects of the local mind-set on the protection mechanisms against the said devices. It has been observed within the Central African context that when such disasters occur, follow-up tends to fade away as the events recede into the past. This tendency is also encouraged by the media which quickly turns its attention towards more current events and vain futuristic speculations. It is therefore essential for governments to outsource strategic elaboration, evaluation and follow-up of IED-disaster policies. Furthermore, porous national boundaries comprise a favourable corridor for the movement of IEDs from one country to the other according to how criminal needs may arise. It is at this level that political directives meet with their first practical obstacles. It is crucial to identify the supply chains of regular commercial products or chemicals which may be used to make IEDs and apply stringent control mechanisms within these areas. Emphasis should also be laid on the elaboration of practical strategies as far as border controls and intelligence gathering are concerned. Local authorities, as well as the heads of defence and Security agencies, require strategic awareness and management training in IED-related disasters. It is at this level where the importance of outlining the various types of detection equipment, as well as the strategic insertion of informants becomes vital. Working with the media to obtain enough airtime is one of the key factors of strategic-level IED-attack management. This method maintains the awareness in the active memory of the citizens. However, it is worth noting that the adverse effect of regular broadcasts may either engender a general psychosis or carelessness when the topic is over-laboured. In this case, it is

indispensable to have mental health experts working in close collaboration with policy implementers, in order to identify the best practices in regular public expression which would create neither of these two phenomena.

At the operational and tactical levels, there is a need for mass education on the characteristics of IEDs, how these can be quickly identified and various individual and collective safety procedures, including the enhancement of primary level intelligence gathering. The training and proper equipment of bomb specialists deserve special attention. First responders, as well as disaster relief workers, require daily briefs, particularly when one considers that there could be chain explosions after the initial blast. Their training must include victim care, management of the dead, evacuation routes, awareness on the preservation of their own lives and avoidance of further destruction linked to the incident. All responders may be required to learn procedures and apply them when alerted of a bomb attack. Within the Central African region, unbridled curiosity seems to lure crowds towards the epicentre of a bomb incident. One of the main causes of this attraction is the remarkable increase in the number of smartphone users who are inclined to transform themselves into amateur audio-visual reporters, seeking to immortalize the moment by every means possible. Unfortunately, some members of crisis response units usually find themselves within this category. The exercise of personal discipline and the scrupulous compliance to standard operating procedures are of utmost importance at this point. Responders must learn to direct crowd moved away from the scene while issuing on-the-spot advice and instructions. The coordination of relief efforts such as victims' management and investigation is primordial to every catastrophe incident. There must be complementarity between military and civilian responders under one lead-agency and a single incident commander. The multiplicity of command posts as observed in the past by each to responding agency is an indicator of inevitable failure. In spite of the necessity to have every stakeholder on board, it is imperative to eradicate the "know-all/do-all" tendency which is a popular feature of Central African culture. Finally, it is necessary to organize interagency post-incident evaluation meetings aimed at the improvement of pre-catastrophe validated contingency plans.

All management cycles have three main components: before, during and after. Risk Management, Emergency Management, Crisis Management and Disaster Management are no exceptions to this rule. Considering that armed conflicts have been classified as disasters, the study of the use of IEDs within the framework of the disaster management

cycle becomes imperative. This cycle has two main parts namely, risk management, which is in this case synonymous with protection; and crisis management, which in turn translates into reconstruction or making sure a given community is able to recover from such attacks as well as develop flexible contingency plans adapted to the human environment. It is worth noting that crisis management, though sometimes interchangeable with incident management, are both distinct components of the big picture of disaster management. Hence the first part which entails the management of identified risk as far as IEDs are concerned, includes prevention, preparation for eventual manifestation of risk and early warning on the imminence of an IED attack prior to the real incident. Incident management triggers the components of the second part of the disaster management cycle. The identification of vulnerabilities, particularly in conflict zones such as in North Kivu in the Democratic Republic of Congo, is indispensable to the proper management

of such incidents. When an IED attack occurs, the impact evaluation process begins almost simultaneously with response procedures. These actions will eventually question the position of IED-related threats on the risk matrix. At this point of the study, the levels of alerts relative to probability or frequency and impact will certainly be modified, given the intensity of the said conflict. This is followed immediately by the activation of provisional measures and reconstruction, which seeks to re-establish normalcy or development of the affected community. At this point disaster resilience links the cycle back to the risk management part of the cycle and a revised contingency planning, based on lessons learned and the evolution of the situation on the ground.

In conclusion, while this article has sought to give an insight into the management of risk and disasters induced by IED attacks, it does not constitute an exhaustive treatise on the subject. It should be noted that not only insurgents and criminals are prone to the use of IEDs. Certain makeshift apparatus' such as the boilers



Cameroon24 cameroon - Cameroon - Urgent Security - Explosion of a homemade bomb in Yaoundé -

of counterfeit alcoholic drinks are in fact, improvised explosive devices, when one considers the known hazard to life, property and the environment in case of an explosion. Though the intention of creating destruction is lacking in this case, it is important to know that any form of explosion produced by the improper handling of explosive substances constitutes a criminal offence for which an investigation, as well as prevention mechanisms, remain mandatory. IEDs are and will be for a long time, a serious danger to vulnerable human security in the world at large and to the Central African Region in particular. Their eradication deserves particular attention on the part of governments which

should take necessary measures to repress their manufacture, their use and contain the induced damage. Follow-up and coordination remain the key terms of this piece of writing on risk and disaster management within the framework of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in the Central African Context.

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Panorama papers Explosion of a homemade bomb at the Mokolo market in Yaoundé - Panorama papers

CAMEROON CUSTOMS IN SECURING THE TERRITORY FACED WITH THE THREAT OF IMPROVED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (IED)

Customs Captain Quentin Achille DIMA

The contribution of customs administrations around the world in border security has grown following various events:

- *The adoption of UN Security Council resolutions (Resolution 1540 of 2004) and other high-level political commitments, including G7 and G20 declarations;*
- *The establishment of SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade as a global customs instrument to deter international terrorism, to ensure revenue collection and promote trade facilitation at the global level;*
- *The adoption by the WCO Policy Commission in December 2015 of the Punta Cana Resolution, which reaffirms and highlights the role of customs and its contribution to border security and the fight against terrorism. Shortly after the adoption of the said Resolution, the WCO launched its Security Program to help customs administrations strengthen their capacity to deal with specific security risks.*



Journal du Cameroun - Cameroon - 210 explosive devices seized by customs

Taking note of this security mandate, the WCO Security Project for West and Central Africa (OMD-OAC) has, since 2018, strengthened the capacities of Customs personnel and other law enforcement agencies and prevention of illicit trade in the region as part of the control of the movement of chemical substances and other components of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), through awareness seminars and the provision of detection equipment related to safety, in particular through the WCO's largest security initiative launched since 2010, called the Global Shield Program (PGS).

Similarly, the World Customs Organisation has developed the Security Agenda, with the aim of achieving border security outcomes in the following five strategic areas:

- The definition of policies and anticipation;
- Providing guidance and disseminating good practices regarding customs controls related to security;
- The coordination of security-related customs fraud control programs and operations;
- International cooperation;
- Technical assistance and capacity building;
- Sensitisation of the private sector.

This program is structured around five (5) thematic areas / by-product and is based on a global technical assistance and capacity building initiative, which includes the five components detailed below:

1- Passenger control

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 of 2014 calls on member States to focus their attention on the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters and to prevent the movement of high-risk individuals wishing to leave or return to conflict areas. The WCO Passenger Screening Initiative aims to help Customs use Advance Passenger Information (API) and Passenger Name Record (PNR) as part of their passenger risk assessment procedures.

2- The Global Shield Programme

Longest in place, the Global Shield Programme is a security initiative that represents a multidisciplinary effort to monitor the licit movement of the most common chemicals and other components that are used by terrorists and violent extremist organisations to manufacture Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and to prevent illicit trafficking and diversion. The WCO's

partners for this program are the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Global Shield is a programme that intends to preserve the life and physical integrity of people.

3- Strategic Trade Controls Application Project (ACES)

The ACES Programme focuses on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the prevention of illicit trafficking in components that could be used in WMD or in their delivery vehicles. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) calls for adequate controls on exports and transit operations of these products, as part of efforts to combat the proliferation of WMD. The ACES Programme is the WCO's main tool to help Members set up and conduct these border controls.

4- Project on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

In the wake of the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty, the WCO established a special project on SALW to help its Members implement measures designed to prevent trafficking in firearms. In addition to the Treaty, the two other reference instruments, which set the framework for the activities of the WCO SALW Project are the United Nations Program of Action and the Firearms Protocol of the United Nations Crime Convention against transnational criminality.

5- Financing terrorism

United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 2178 (2014) urge member States to strengthen their controls over financial flows and ensure that these flows do not end up in the hands of extremist groups. The Security Program follows this line: the work carried out within this framework aims to prevent the use of cash and bearer negotiable instruments and to hinder the smuggling of cultural property.

I - IMPLEMENTATION WITHIN CAMEROON CUSTOMS

At the national level, the implementation of the aforementioned resolutions has materialized at two levels:

1-At the strategic level: the adhesion of Cameroonian Customs to the WCO Security Programme

- The integration of security at the heart of the DGD's 2020-2024 strategic plan. Indeed, the DGD has devoted a strategic axis to security and

controls which takes into account the development of intelligence, the strengthening of the fight against fraud, major trafficking and cross-border crime;

- The training of trainers on the Global Shield Programme and on the engineering of the COPES training (Compendium of customs operational practices in the fight against fraud and seizures of the WCO), at the Post-conflict actions development centre of Demining and Pollution Control (CPADD) in Ouidah (Benin). Cameroonian Customs participated in the two training sessions organised in this context by appointing four (04) executives who, upon their return, gave feedback on the knowledge acquired to the attention of the heads of the operational units.

2-At the operational level: strengthening the operational capacities of technical control units

- Participation in the regional operation to control the possession and circulation of chemical precursors, which are components of IEDs. This operation made it possible to carry out more than two hundred (200) seizures of explosives precursors and components of improvised explosive devices throughout the WCO West and Central Africa region;
- The acquisition of modern intelligence and anti-fraud tools. In fact, within the framework of the Security Program for West and Central Africa (PSAOC), Cameroon Customs have benefited from the provision of two (02) RAMAN 100 spectrometers, forty-five (45) metal detectors and support for the establishment of the National Anti-Fraud Network (nCEN)).



Journal du Cameroun Anglophone crisis - suspected separatist 'attack' causes a dozen deaths in North West

II-SEIZURES CARRIED OUT IN RELATION TO SECURITY:

N°	Date	Lieu	Pays de Départ	Pays de destination	Marchandises saisies	Quantités	Unité
1	07/01/2021	TIKO	NIGERIA	CAMEROUN	Munitions de calibre 50	50	Pièces
2	23/12/2020	BANYO	NIGERIA	CAMEROUN	Charges explosives artisanales	150	Pièces
3	23/12/2020	BANYO	NIGERIA	CAMEROUN	Précurseurs d'explosif – Acide nitrique	2 000	Litres
4	20/12/2020	BONABERI	NIGERIA	CAMEROUN	Précurseurs d'explosif – Acide nitrique	2 000	Litres
5	27/11/2020	DOUALA	NIGERIA	CAMEROUN	Précurseurs d'explosif – Peroxyde d'hydrogène	300	Litres
6	27/10/2020	KONTCHA	NIGERIA	CAMEROUN	Charges explosives artisanales	11	Pièces
7	13/10/2020	TIKO	NIGERIA	CAMEROUN	Produits psychotropes - Tramadol	92 000	Comprimés
8	06/10/2020	GAROUA	NIGERIA	CAMEROUN	Précurseurs d'explosif – sulfate d'aluminium	230	Litres
9	26/08/2020	GAROUA	NIGERIA	CAMEROUN	Précurseurs d'explosif – Pâte/poudre/paquettes d'aluminium	207	Pièces
10	08/06/2020	DOUALA	CAMEROUN	CAMEROUN	Cannabis	50	kg
11	02/05/2020	SELOU SEMBA	NIGERIA	CAMEROUN	Produits psychotropes – Tramadol (injectable)	620	Ampoules
12	26/04/2020	GAROUA	NIGERIA	CAMEROUN	Produits psychotropes - Tramadol	2 000	Comprimés
13	11/04/2020	YAOUNDE	CAMEROUN	CAMEROUN	Cannabis	32	kg
14	16/03/2020	MAYO MOSKOTA	CAMEROUN	CAMEROUN	Précurseurs d'explosif – Engrais à 46% d'urée	2 000	kg
15	19/11/2019	BOUKOULA	NIGERIA	CAMEROUN	Composants d'explosifs artisanaux – câbles, cordeaux détonants, précurseurs chimiques, etc.	78	kg
16	17/08/2019	TIKO	NIGERIA	CAMEROUN	Munitions pour armes à feu	1 400	Pièces
17	20/07/2019	YAOUNDE	NIGERIA	CAMEROUN	Produits psychotropes - Tramadol	45 000	Comprimés
18	15/07/2019	KENTZOU	RCA	CAMEROUN	Cannabis	1	kg
19	14/04/2019	DOUALA	NIGERIA	CAMEROUN	Produits psychotropes - Tramadol	151 000	Comprimés
20	16/03/2019	KENTZOU	CAMEROUN	RCA	Munitions pour armes à feu	750	Pièces
21	31/05/2018	KENTZOU	CAMEROUN	RCA	Munitions pour armes à feu	250	Pièces
22	31/05/2018	KENTZOU	RCA	CAMEROUN	Munitions pour armes à feu	250	Pièces
23	18/05/2018	MBOMBETE	CAMEROUN	RCA	Munitions pour armes à feu	100	Pièces
24	11/03/2018	KYE-OSSI	CAMEROUN	GABON	Munitions pour armes à feu	175	Pièces

25	07/03/2018	YAOUNDE	France	CAMEROUN	Munitions pour armes à feu	50	Pièces
26	03/12/2017	YAOUNDE	France	CAMEROUN	Munitions pour armes à feu	85	Pièces
27	03/12/2017	YAOUNDE	France	CAMEROUN	Armes de petit calibre – Fusil de chasse	1	Pièces
28	21/01/2017	GAROUA-BOULAI	CAMEROUN	RCA	Munitions pour armes à feu	194	Pièces
29	14/07/2016	BERTOUA	RDC	CAMEROUN	Munitions pour armes à feu	359	Pièces
30	07/06/2016	MAROUA	NIGERIA	CAMEROUN	Arme de guerre - Kalachnikov	1	Pièces
31	05/02/2016	KENTZOU	RCA	CAMEROUN	Fusil de chasse	1	Pièces
32	28/01/2016	YOKADOUA	RCA	CAMEROUN	Parties de munitions – Balle/projectile	15	Pièces
33	12/01/2016	YAOUNDE	France	CAMEROUN	Arme de chasse	1	Pièces
34	12/01/2016	YAOUNDE	France	CAMEROUN	Arme de chasse	1	Pièces
35	12/01/2016	YAOUNDE	France	CAMEROUN	Munitions pour armes à feu	100	Pièces
36	12/01/2016	YAOUNDE	France	CAMEROUN	Munitions pour armes à feu	60	Pièces
37	12/01/2016	YAOUNDE	France	CAMEROUN	Munitions pour armes à feu	20	Pièces
38	09/09/2015	DOUALA	CAMEROUN	TCHAD	Munitions - Armes à feu	15	Pièces
39	09/09/2015	DOUALA	CAMEROUN	TCHAD	Armes de petit calibre – Pistolet semi-automatique	2	Pièces
40	28/06/2015	YAOUNDE	CAMEROUN	CAMEROUN	Munitions - Armes à feu	86	Pièces
41	26/05/2015	MOLOUNDOU	RCA	CAMEROUN	Munitions pour armes à feu	1 003	Pièces
42	26/05/2015	MOLOUNDOU	RCA	CAMEROUN	Armes de petit calibre – Fusil d'assaut/carabine/usage militaire	1	Pièces
43	08/03/2015	YAOUNDE	CAMEROUN	ÉTATS-UNIS	Fusils de chasse	2	Pièces
44	10/02/2015	YAOUNDE	BELGIQUE	CAMEROUN	Munitions pour armes à feu	200	Pièces
45	30/05/2014	YAOUNDE	CAMEROUN	MAROC	Munitions pour armes à feu	239	Pièces
46	29/04/2014	DOUALA	CAMEROUN	SRI LANKA	Explosives	1	Pièces
47	06/04/2014	YAOUNDE	CAMEROUN	MADAGASCAR	Munitions pour armes à feu	25	Pièces
48	22/01/2013	YAOUNDE	NIGERIA	CAMEROUN	Précurseurs d'explosif – Autre	2 400	Pièces
49	22/01/2013	YAOUNDE	NIGERIA	CAMEROUN	Précurseurs d'explosif – Nitrate d'aluminium	2 400	kg
50	23/05/2012	BAMENDA	CAMEROUN	NIGERIA	Fusils de chasse	5	Pièces

OUTLOOK

In its permanent quest to improve its performance, the General Directorate of Customs is considering, as part of its contribution to securing the territory against the threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), the following measures:

- Strengthening the operational teams in sensitive regions;
- Boosting coordinated border management initiatives and the SPC ++ programme with neighbouring countries (Nigeria and the Central African Republic);

- The implementation of partnerships with a few strategic partners in the security sector in view of the harmonisation of methodologies for communication, programming and organisation of operations, in particular within the framework of the coordinated management of penthières and the mastery of techniques of peacekeeping, demining and depollution, etc.

**Capitaine des Douanes
Quentin Achille DIMA**

Chef de Cellule de la Surveillance Douanière



News from Cameroon Insecurity - Homemade bomb explodes in Yaoundé - News from Cameroon

STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES AND CONSTRAINTS OF THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION RELATED TO IEDS,

Police Superintendent. William WANDJI KOUAMOU

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) have long been known as the weapons of choice for terrorists and criminals due to their destructive power, the psychological effect they produce, and the relative ease with which they can be crafted. However, the conduct of judicial investigations with a view to arresting manufacturers, traffickers, and bombers as part of the fight against the proliferation of these devices of death raises a problem based on the issues and inherent strategic and operational constraints inherent to this delicate mission.

A thorough understanding of the IED system is therefore a prerequisite for the development of measures to combat the proliferation of IEDs as well as for the evaluation of their effectiveness. One strategy to consider is to view IED incidents as part of a larger context, because for an attack to be carried out with IEDs, several related activities must also take place, including the preparation that takes place, which takes into account the constitution of the IED itself and the choice of target; the action, that is to say, the use of the explosive; and possibly the claim of the attack.

Also, a generic approach describing the State police response to an IED-related incident must in principle take into account upstream and downstream control measures.



RFI Chad- a female suicide bomber arrested, other suspects wanted

I - MEASURES TO COMBAT THE PROLIFERATION OF IEDs TAKEN UPSTREAM

1. National policy, legislation and regulations

Security is a universal and fundamental right to which all humanity aspires. It is therefore the main responsibility of a government within the framework of its obligations in terms of economic and social development and the well-being of its citizens, in particular. However, IEDs are a weapon that poses a problem in terms of personal protection, instills fear, destabilises and hinders the objectives of sustainable development.

The most effective national IED control strategies all have in common the establishment of a comprehensive policy that defines a “comprehensive government strategy” aimed at preventing and mitigating the effects of the use of IEDs.

The success of judicial investigation actions against IEDs depends on effective governance of the security sector and respect for the rule of law. It is essential that appropriate national legislation be in place to prohibit all activities related to the development or acquisition of components, and the manufacture and use of IEDs. This legislative component upstream of IED control capacities reflects the component relating to the judicial process located downstream. National laws and regulations should further take into account the legitimate use of explosives and precursors of explosives, and include:

- The legitimate activities of acquisition, control, transport, storage, and end-use of explosives by civilian entities (for example, by industries associated with mining, with quarrying, with the exploration and extraction of oil and gas, and through civil engineering and demolition);
- The acquisition, storage, and use of ammunition and explosives by the armed forces and law enforcement agencies;
- Storage and transport of explosives.

2. Strengthening the capacities of forces in the fight against IEDs

National measures to combat IEDs must encompass all the capacities required for the security forces involved in forensic investigation procedures to effectively conduct criminal investigations into the use of IEDs, namely:

- An understanding of the security environment and

the legal framework in which all those who have the capacity to implement an IED response strategy operate;

- The development of a national IED control strategy defining the means that will make it possible to put an end to the IED threat on the basis of existing or planned government structures.
- The provision of military or police groups tasked with neutralising and destroying IEDs, duly trained and equipped with appropriate equipment, in order to neutralise recovered IEDs and ensure the safety of places where IED-related incidents have occurred so that police forces can carry out forensic analysis;
- Appropriate awareness and training of police and military forces likely to operate in an environment where IEDs pose a threat;
- Effective border control and monitoring of imports of potential IED components.

3. Control of IED precursors

Explosives precursors are chemicals which can be used for legitimate purposes, but which are also likely to be used in a roundabout way for the manufacture of homemade explosives. This dual use, which characterises most of the precursors used in the manufacture of IEDs, is a problem facing all States.

The controls applicable to explosive precursors vary from State to State. The approach taken by the European Union, for example, is to classify certain chemicals as «restricted explosive precursors», which means that the public generally does not have access to them and their acquisition is subject to controls and possibly licensing. As for “reportable explosives precursors”, sellers, whether they operate online, offline or in online marketplaces, are required to report suspicious transactions.

4. Regional and international cooperation, information sharing

Given the length and porosity of many international borders, an exclusively national control strategy for explosive precursors and IED components is unlikely to be successful. Faced with the transnational nature of supply chains and IED threats, international law enforcement cooperation is therefore essential. The Watchmaker project of the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) is a good example.

The Watchmaker project developed a regional

model reflecting current IED threats, obtained from actual incident data. At the heart of this project is a database that lists information on known or suspected individuals involved in the acquisition, manufacture, or use of IEDs. Through it, INTERPOL can help the competent authorities of its member countries detect the movements and transnational operations of manufacturers and suppliers of IEDs. INTERPOL can communicate information relating to IEDs to its member countries using a color-coded notice system.

5. Intelligence-based counter-IED operations

Intelligence-based counter-IED operations are an essential component of any State action to combat the use of IEDs by individuals and criminal groups who commit acts of terrorism. However, forensic exploitation of components recovered following IED-related incidents can make it possible to collect a great deal of useful information. Carefully planned and executed preventive operations based on this information can disrupt IED networks and prevent those involved in the supply of IED precursors, as well as the manufacture and supply of

IEDs, from properly carrying out their operations. Intelligence-based operations can take many forms. It can be, in particular:

- Identify supply chains of IED precursors and break them, possibly by cooperating with international partners;
- Identify those involved in the use of IEDs and bring them to justice;
- Adopt anti-radicalisation initiatives aimed at reducing recruitment in organisations that use IEDs;
- Take measures to reduce access to technical knowledge that allows the manufacture and use of IEDs.

The effective technical analysis and operation of IEDs is fundamental to developing future IED countermeasures and determining whether changes in force tactics, techniques, and procedures are required to cope with current and future developments relating to the use of IEDs by criminal organisations or by groups that commit acts of terrorism.



Koaci - The convoy of the sub-divisional officer of the North-West victim of an IED attack

II - MEASURES TO COMBAT THE PROLIFERATION OF IEDS TAKEN DOWNSTREAM

1. Neutralisation

The ability to neutralise IEDs and safely process the discovery of IED components is a fundamental response capability that all States facing IED threats require. In the early stages of an IED campaign, however, it is not uncommon to see this role filled by military personnel who often have received training in the disposal of conventional ammunition. IEDs vary widely in their complexity and design, and while IED manufacturers may have their own signatures, there are no manufacturing standards for IEDs. The diffusion of IED-related technologies is facilitated by the movement of employees between countries where their use is widespread and by the sharing of information on the Internet.

2. Exploitation of the premises

The exploitation of places where IED-related incidents have occurred covers all activities carried out during an IED-related incident after the neutralisation of the IED. It encompasses the activities necessary to preserve the premises and facilitate the collection of forensic evidence. Forensic evidence is physical evidence related to an incident that can be used in a scientific investigation into criminal or civil offenses. This evidence can then be used in criminal proceedings before a court to secure convictions. They can also be used to link groups or individuals to IEDs and help target IED control, as part of a broader national approach to IED control.

The collection of forensic evidence is an essential aspect of criminal investigation operations against IEDs. The quality of the evidence that can be collected at the scene of an incident depends on the training and level of forensic awareness of those leading the IED neutralisation process. In addition, the correct collection, presentation and submission of this evidence is also crucial if the perpetrators are to be prosecuted.



La Croix Africa Dans le diocèse d'Obala, au Cameroun, deux bombes explosent dans la chambre d'un prêtre

The operation of locations where IED incidents have occurred, including those where the IED has been in operation, is used to:

- Collecting evidence: Locations where IED incidents have occurred provide physical evidence, including parts of the IED or explosive residue, from which an assessment of the type of explosive used by the manufacturer can be made.
- Determine the cause of an explosion: Identifying the type of explosive used can help develop targeting strategies for combating IEDs. For example, did the IED consist of a military or home-made explosive?
- Estimate the type and size of the explosive charge: the estimation of the size and type of the main charge of the IED can help in the development of technical countermeasures, armoured protection, and other physical protection measures.
- Evaluate how an IED works: This assessment can provide information about how the IED was manufactured and how it works.

3. Analysis of recovered evidence

In order to determine how the IED works, a thorough forensic analysis of the recovered material is fundamental. Manufactured explosive components, such as main charges and detonators, can be identified by the manufacturer's markings. For electronic components, especially integrated circuits and microprocessors, identification and batch marking can indicate where and when the item was manufactured. Proper identification of IED components is the first step in identifying the IED supply chain.

4. Information management

Information management is the process of collecting, organising, storing, and providing information within an organisation. There are marked similarities between information management and the intelligence cycle, which consists of direction, collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination.

To ensure the effectiveness of an IED control strategy, the following types of information should be gathered:

- Reports and photographs of those involved in the neutralisation of IEDs
- Scientific and forensic analysis reports on exhibits collected during incidents involving IEDs;
- Scientific and forensic evidence and police

interrogation reports collected from those arrested and prosecuted for IED-related offenses; »Intelligence reports from all sources³² regarding IED-related incidents or persons suspected of being involved in IED-related offenses;

5. Technical exploitation of recovered IEDs

The main purpose of the technical exploitation of recovered IEDs is to understand the intentions of those who manufacture and use these devices. Thorough technical exploitation of IEDs can enable a State:

- Identify the source of supply for specific components of the IED;
- Establish links between incidents by performing technical assessment of specific IED manufacturers' signatures and other characteristics;
- To assist in the development of countermeasures;
- To enrich the training of future IED control teams and other members of the security forces.

6. Identification of the perpetrators

By relying on solid police investigations conducted after properly performed forensic exploitation of the recovered IED components, it is possible to identify those involved in the manufacture, supply and placement of IEDs. Identification of the perpetrators can be done:

- From biometric evidence (fingerprints and DNA) collected from IED components;
- Establishing their links with the acquisition of specific lots of IED components (i.e. determining their links with transactions associated with the acquisition of IED-related material);
- By establishing physical links between visible and invisible forensic evidence collected at the scene of the incident (for example, fibres, tool marks and abrasions, and explosive residue);
- Based on recovered evidence that can be used to support the testimonies of other interviewees; this is particularly important in some legal systems.

7. Judicial process

All incidents involving IEDs constitute crime scenes; this is why it is essential that forensic evidence be collected and handled in accordance with the provisions laid down by law. It is preferable that forensic evidence present at the scene of IED incidents be collected by

properly trained and authorised police personnel. However, in many situations, this may not have been possible and other people may have collected evidence for the judicial authorities. In all cases, it is essential to ensure the integrity of the forensic traceability chain so that the recovered elements can be correctly used in the prosecution of the perpetrators.

Most States do not have specific legislative or regulatory measures to deal with IEDs, as the application of procedures for other serious crimes is usually

sufficient. However, there is often a need to develop specialised techniques and procedures for the preservation, collection and analysis of IED material.

By the Superintendent of Police
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www.infoscameroun.com NOSO- several soldiers killed in the explosion of a homemade bomb in Lebialem here are the details

THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS REGIMENT, SECULAR ARM OF THE CAMEROONIAN POLICE AGAINST THE THREAT OF IMPROVED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Commissioner of Police Gatien Eloi PIGUI NGOSSO

Since 2014, Cameroon has faced repeated assaults by terrorists from the Islamist sect Boko Haram in its northern part and, since 2016 the secessionist threat in the North-West and South-West Regions has been added, with an extension of the constant threat of attacks in large cities such as Yaoundé, Douala and Bafoussam. These threats have taken worrying turns with the use of suicide bombers (people psychologically prepared to die and who wear explosive belts to cause maximum damage among the Defence and Security Forces or among the target civilian population) and improvised explosive devices (an explosive devices designed in a homemade way, prepared to be detonated by an involuntary action of the target or mounted to be remote controlled from a distance by the terrorist and with the aim of causing death or to cause important material damages.



GSO, Groupement Special d'Opération

The rise of threats is manifested by the bombings perpetrated in the cities of Yaoundé (Marché Mokolo, Melen, Rond-point Damas, Tsinga Dubai, Eman), Maroua, Kousséri and Douala (Bonabéri, around the SCDP, Bépanda) but also by the trapping of roads in the North-West and South-West regions with the consequences of deaths recorded due to improvised explosive devices within the defence and security forces (we still remember the attack by the Otu Border in the South West Region where a police vehicle carrying men jumped on an IED on the morning of June 15, 2019, causing 05 deaths in its ranks).

Not a day goes by without vehicles transporting troops or carrying out ordered missions undergoing IED-related attacks. Almost all unpaved roads are trapped in crisis areas. Asphalted roads, for their part, are not left out because directed action IEDs called "ARM BURKA" (sawn-off cannon in which explosives and fragments of 10-gauge iron are stuffed) are installed at the edge of the road aimed at the passage of the defence and security forces (the latest news is the attack on a PICK UP of the Police in the locality of Bali using an "ARM BURKA", attack during which 05 elements of the security forces lost their lives). Faced with this threat, the Cameroonian Security, through its elite unit that is the Special Operations Regiment (GSO) is not left out. Created by decree number 89/1989 of February 1, 1989, the

Special Operations Regiment (GSO) is responsible for punch, commando and anti-commando operations against dangerous individuals or organised gangs of criminals; the neutralisation of madmen and actions against any form of mutiny or hostage-taking; the security of certain particularly large convoys requiring the implementation of special technical means; interventions in the event of air piracy; studies, research and tests on the intervention techniques and equipment of the General Delegation for National Security; surveillance of suspected or reported persons and criminal intelligence research; specific training for intervention service personnel, but above all the fight against terrorism or any form of organised crime and the kidnapping, neutralisation or destruction of suspicious packages or improvised explosive devices. It is made up of 03 companies including the Intervention and Protection Company; the Surveillance and Pursuit Company; the Technical Company.

WHAT IS THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE GSO IN THE FIGHT AGAINST THREATS RELATED TO IEDs?

To face all these threats, the GSO places particular emphasis on the continuous training of its men. It is



StopBlaBlaCam Insécurité - le BIR désamorce une bombe artisanale dans le Sud-ouest

in this context that they are made aware of the threat linked to IEDs. They, therefore, learn to recognise the main IEDs as well as their constituent elements (a primary charge, secondary charge, chemical precursors of IED, detonating cord, slow fuse, military explosives, switches, fragments, wires, etc.); assess the risks and know what to do if a suspicious package or an IED is discovered (how to calculate and train the security perimeter, how to evacuate the population and those who are curious, how to handle the denunciation, how to probe the terrain, how to use intelligence and how to report); understand the effects of explosives and know how to protect themselves against them;

Likewise, the GSO provides daily escort and relief missions for police officers deployed in the North-West and South-West regions using its armoured vehicles. The advantage associated with the use of armoured vehicles is the effectiveness in the protection of men. To evolve in these areas, the personnel assigned to the mission generally proceed by surveying the ground, particularly in the obligatory passages (narrow passage, road reduced by a tree trunk, bridge, crossing hills and cliffs, steep areas, etc.) which are areas par excellence where terrorists have IEDs in view of possible attacks.

Likewise, the GSO regularly participates with other defence and security forces in the management of denunciations related to IEDs, particularly in the cities of Yaoundé, Bamenda, Buea and Mamfe. Most of the time, these are cases of discovery of suspicious packages or explosions. The GSO is active in the search for criminal intelligence and has already succeeded in dismantling several sleeper cells of secessionist terrorists and those of Boko Haram in the capital city. In addition, the GSO ensures the security of certain sensitive diplomatic institutions where employees highlight their knowledge in the field of IEDs to avoid any attack related to these devices. Moreover, an intervention unit is on alert 24 hours on 24 at the headquarters of the unit to react in case of the discovery of a suspected parcel or a bomb alert in the city of Yaoundé.

WHAT MEANS DOES THE GSO HAVE TO COUNTER THE THREAT RELATED TO IEDs?

Since the outbreak of the crisis in the northern part of the country in 2014, the public authorities have taken into account the threats linked to IEDs. Thus, since this period, the GSO has been equipped; with LAND ROVER type armoured vehicles and EOD7 type demining suits. Likewise, the unit benefited in 2020 from a new allocation of PANTERA type armoured vehicles.

Complete equipment (flat scan 30, military computer, X-ray generator, GSM shields, water cannon or disruptor, cartridges, blasters, rolls of detonating cord and slow wicks, probes, explosives sniffers, tapes, electric detonator and pyrotechnic, rechargeable batteries, coils of electric wires, slow wicks ignites, sigma toolboxes,

Under the leadership of the Delegate General for National Security and in partnership with the Egyptian Development Agency, GSO executives have benefited from in-depth professional internships in the field of manufacturing, detection and neutralisation of IEDs at the Cairo Police Academy since 2018. In the same vein, the heads of the unit benefit from internships in the field of the fight against international terrorism in several Police Academies of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China.

CAN THE GSO IN COLLABORATION WITH OTHER DEFENCE AND SECURITY FORCES ADDRESS THE THREAT RELATED TO IEDs?

As an elite unit, the GSO is actively involved in the fight against secessionist threats in the North West and South West regions. This very active involvement is manifested by its participation in the "REMIA" joint missions and in other commissioned missions such as « **BAMENDA CLEAN, KUMBO CLEAN...** ».

Thanks to the experience of the GSO men, several police reliefs are now carried out without the support of the army. Lesser and lesser, the Police forces are losing elements due to IED attacks (for example, thanks to their professionalism, the worst was narrowly avoided on June 11, 2021, in the locality of Mbiame where an armoured vehicle of the GSO with the Sub-Divisional Officer of this locality, gendarmes and police on board, jumped on an improvised explosive device, without causing any loss of human life because its elements responded promptly to the assault launched by the attackers after the explosion of the device).

In collaboration with other forces, the GSO will place particular emphasis on the neutralisation of Ambazonian fireworks. Handling IEDs is not commonplace; which can motivate the GSO to be certain about the reduced number of fireworks in its ranks. Thus, to annihilate the threat linked to IEDs, it will be up to it to neutralise the Ambazonian artificers. In addition, several components of IEDs (such as chemical precursors of improvised explosive devices, detonating cords, slow wicks, gunpowder or black powder, iron bars, gas cylinders of dubious origin, electric wires of dubious origin, or even pyrotechnic or electric detonators...) pass in front of the

defence and security forces at the checkpoints without them realising it. Thus, to overcome the threat, the GSO will place particular emphasis on sensitising the men deployed in these areas so that they are able to identify and understand these components.

WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVING GSO INTERVENTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE IED THREAT?

As an elite unit, the GSO needs more logistical, material and financial resources to carry out its missions. Thus, it would be desirable for an anti-terrorist unit connected to the National Security CCTV Centre and to the Centre for the production of identity titles to be built and equipped within it.

Likewise, the connection to the terminals of the National Agency for Information and Communication Technologies would be a capital asset for the optimal functioning of the said unit. All these tools will allow the unit to be at the forefront of the search for predictive intelligence, to anticipate cases of conspiracy linked to terrorism, or to follow in the footsteps of terrorists and to arrest them. In addition, the provision of funds for the search for criminal intelligence will enable the unit to anticipate terrorist acts.

In addition, it would also be desirable for officials from the GSO under the aegis of the Department of Training, to sensitise officials of Public Security units, Mobile Intervention Units and Special Teams of Rapid Intervention, and particularly those whose command spring is based in the regions of the Far North, North, Adamaoua, Centre, Littoral, North-West, West, and

South-West, on the management of denunciations and on the attitude to adopt when faced with the discovery of an improvised explosive device.

WHAT CAN WE CONCLUDE ABOUT THE PLACE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST THREATS RELATED TO IEDs?

From all of the foregoing, it is obvious that the National Security, in its drive for modernisation, can count on the Special Operations Regiment to deal generally with the fight against terrorism on the one hand and, to thwart the IED threat, on the other hand. However, it must be recognised that in the field of the fight against the threats related to IEDs, any explosion is characteristic of a failure because the intelligence makes it possible to anticipate and to better fight effectively against the phenomenon. Thus, aware of the fact that in terms of IED, "the first mistake is the last", the complete equipment for the detection and the neutralization of IEDs which is in the process of acquisition will enable the GSO to be more efficient, faced with this threat and will enable the National Security to fully play its role in the protection of institutions, the safeguard of the national sovereignty, the protection of persons and their goods.

**Commissioner of Gatien Eloi
PIGUI NGOSSO**
Commander of the Special Operations Regiment

MILITARY ENGINEERING: DEFENSIVE WALL AGAINST IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Captain Yves PANYERE

The weapon of choice for terrorist groups and armed groups, Improvised Explosive Devices have entered Central Africa through the gates of Cameroon and Chad with the radicalisation of the terrorist group Boko Haram. In 2019, it was the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic that observed an increase in the number of attacks by improvised explosive devices introduced on their soil by the armed groups ADF (in DRC) and SELEKA (in CAR).

Facing this new threat since its engagement in the bitter fight against Boko Haram, Cameroon has shown efficiency in view of the results recorded so far on the Far North front. Internal tensions in the administrative regions of the North-West and South-West have opened a second front (even in the cities of Yaoundé and Douala) in the fight against IEDs in Cameroon, thus establishing the privileged mode of action of the irredentists.

To cope with these Improvised Explosive Devices «increasingly sophisticated and more widely used to the point where they now have an unprecedented human, operational, political, financial and psychological impact»¹, a comprehensive response remains and will undoubtedly remain the key to success. In addition, a collaborative platform between the structures of the fight against Improvised Explosive Devices, between the different administrations involved, even between the countries of the sub-region is essential. Thus, the definition of bilateral exchange agreements, the establishment of a fight committee and the development of a doctrine against Improvised Explosive Devices constitute the substance of such a platform, be it at the national or sub-regional level. To be effective, the doctrine of the fight against Improvised Explosive Devices must, to a large extent, be based on an operational structure, endowed with key capacities, which can be the basis of any action related to the fight against Improvised Explosive Devices and which would facilitate the planning, the coordination and the control of operations aimed at better attenuating, to eradicate this threat.

To better understand the fight against the threat posed by the use of Improvised Explosive Devices in Central Africa in general and in Cameroon in particular, it would be wise to analyse the Improvised Explosive Devices system (I), then to focus on the strategy to combat Improvised Explosive Devices (II), and, finally, to take stock of the fight against Improvised Explosive Devices in Cameroon (III).

¹ is this a name? Gueguen, "Cope with the threat of improvised explosive devices", Conference, Permanent Representation of France to the United Nations, May 9, 2017. <https://onu.delegfrance.org/Faire-face-a-la-menace-des-dispositifs-explosifs-improvises>.

I - THE SYSTEM OF IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

An Improvised Explosive Device system is made up of people, activities and resources that are connected through the links of supply, planning, execution and exploitation of an attack. The fight should not, therefore, be reduced to defeating the improvised explosive devices of the adversary; it should rather be considered as «*all the activities carried out (...) against this adversary in the sense that Improvised Explosive Devices come under a systemic unit*»². It is then necessary to act on each element of the system, namely the leaders in charge of the planning and the designation of the objectives, the sponsors, the recruiters, the manufacturers of improvised explosive devices, the installers of improvised explosive devices and the improvised explosive devices themselves. This is why it is absolutely necessary «*to strengthen the measures aimed at combating the illicit acquisition of components, explosives and materials which can be used to manufacture improvised explosive devices*»³. Good knowledge of the typology of Improvised Explosive Devices (A) and of the adversary's operating modes (B) facilitates the fight against said Devices.

A. Typology of Improvised Explosive Devices

Depending on their triggering system, there are three types of Improvised Explosive Devices. First of all the improvised remote-controlled explosive devices (COIED⁴), which are triggered by the opponent. Here, the trigger system can be radio controlled, optical, active infrared, a control wire, traction or projectile control. Then, the Improvised Explosive Devices are activated by the victim (VOIED⁵). These are not controlled by the installer but triggered by an involuntary action by the victim by exerting pressure or tension, by releasing pressure or tension, by activating a sensor (barometric, hydrostatic, acoustic, etc.) or by breaking a circuit (voltage drop). Finally, the Improvised Explosive Device is triggered after a given time (TIED⁶). In this case, the triggering system is mechanical delay (movement or clockwork mechanism), chemical delay (chemical

reaction or pyrotechnic delay) and electronic delay (clock, chronometer, watch).

In Cameroon, we meet, on the one hand, the pressure plates IED (PIED), IEDs whose triggering system is a pressure plate, which is implemented, at the same time, by Boko Haram in the Extreme -North and by the irredentists in the North-West and South-West regions; and, on the other hand, TIED (pyrotechnic delay) and COIED (RCIED⁷), implemented by the irredentists. In all cases, the conditioning of the load is in the form of a pipe-bomb, DFFC⁸ or VET⁹.

B. Operating modes

To carry out his attack by improvised explosive devices, the adversary can use three modes. The Improvised Explosive Device can be placed on fixed support or buried in the ground; this is the first mode of operation. Regarding the second, the Improvised Explosive Device will be placed on mobile support, which can be a vehicle, an animal or a person. As for the latter, the adversary will use the Improvised Explosive Device as the trigger for an ambush by targeting, for example, one of the vehicles of a convoy.

In Cameroon, the adversary uses these three operating modes; in the Far North, Boko Haram favours the Fixed Improvised Explosive Device (buried in the ground) and mobile (Person Borne IED¹⁰); while in the North-West and South-West regions, the secessionists opt for fixed Improvised Explosive Devices and ambushes.

II - STRATEGY TO COMBAT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

The strategy for the fight against Improvised Explosive Devices is based on the principles (A) as they are operationalized in most countries and the operational capacities (B) essential to face the threat of these devices.

A. The principles of the fight against Improvised Explosive Devices

Intelligence is the crucible of the strategy to combat Improvised Explosive Devices, which are based on three fundamental and complementary principles, namely: training and practice, defeating the Improvised Explosive

² Joint Doctrine, «the fight against improvised explosive devices », DIA-3.15 (A) _C-EEI (2015) N° 114 / DEF / CICDE / NP of June 22, 2015, P17

³ United Nations Security Council, "Convergence on the Need to Rid the World of the Inhuman Threat of Landmines and Improvised Explosive Devices," press release, 2021, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14490.doc.htm>

⁴ Command operated IED (COIED)

⁵ Victim operated IED (VOIED).

⁶ Time IED (TIED).

⁷ Radio controlled IED.

⁸ Directional Focused Fragmentation Charge (EEI designed to project fragments in a given direction)

⁹ Explosively Formed Projectile (IED designed to act as a piercing charge).

¹⁰ This is a suicide bomber or kamikaze.

Device and attacking the network. Improvised Explosive Devices.

Intelligence is essential for understanding the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) of the adversary. It thus makes it possible to follow the various evolutions of these TTPs and to refine the knowledge of the network of improvised explosive devices of the adversary.

As regards training and practice, they enable the Defence and Security Forces to take better account of the threat because *«it is in training and behaviour that we best protect ourselves from IEDs»*¹¹. The structure responsible for this component is the Military Engineering Corps, which disseminates the teachings at all levels.

With regard to the failure of the Improvised Explosive Device, this concerns an operation aimed at detecting it before processing it; the sole custodian of this expertise being Military Engineering Corps.

Regarding the attack on the Improvised Explosive Device network, this concern all actions aimed at prohibiting the installation of the Improvised Explosive Devices. Several actors, including the military engineers, contribute to it, intelligence being the highly solicited operational function.

B. The operational capacities of the fight against Improvised Explosive Devices

We can distinguish six operational capacities of the fight against Improvised Explosive Devices. First, there is the ability to predict which is essentially based on intelligence (on the adversary, the environment and Improvised Explosive Devices) which must make it possible to determine the adversary's TTPs, the effects he seeks to produce and the technological level of its Improvised Explosive Devices. Then there is the ability to prevent; this aims to cut off the adversary from its resources (complementary and specialised operational search) or from the population (military influence operation). We also have the ability to detect who is centred on the Improvised Explosive Device. All units specialised or not, contribute to it. The detection leaves room for the capacity to treat which makes it possible to put out of harm's way the improvised explosive devices detected; it is reserved for specialists in military engineering. The ability to reduce the effects is in addition to the previous one and consists of the protection of personnel (parked or when traveling), infrastructure and equipment. Military Engineering is the

major actor. Finally, there is the ability to exploit which concerns the collection of improvised explosive devices attack indices (by Engineering specialists and Weapon Intelligence Teams) and their analysis in an Improvised Explosive Device operating laboratory (structure specialised in Military Engineering), in order on the one hand to obtain information on the evolutions of the adversary's TTP, and on the other hand, supply the judicial chain.

It should be noted that only the Military Engineers are illustrated in all these 6 capacities essential to the fight against Improvised Explosive Devices.

II - THE FIGHT AGAINST IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

The Military Engineering Corps is the central actor in the fight against Improvised Explosive Devices in Cameroon. In order to illustrate this, it is advisable to take stock of the combat strategy which is in force (A) and to appreciate the role of military engineers in this fight (B).

A. Level of implementation of the strategy

Although Cameroon was recognised, during a reflection workshop on the fight against Improvised Explosive Devices organised, from July 29 to August 1, 2019, at the Humanitarian Peace Support School of Embakasi in Kenya, by the American Government, as the country of Central Africa which best faces the threat of improvised explosive devices, the fact remains that the Cameroonian strategy comes up against the definition and the implementation of a doctrine to fight against the Improvised explosive devices, which intends to be inter-ministerial.

Indeed, the existence of a manual for the use of capacities for combating Improvised Explosive Devices seems insufficient because it hardly involves the other administrations. In addition, even if with regard to the pillars of the failure of the Improvised Explosive Device and training, Cameroon is illustrated in the sub-region, with the training of ten Nigerian trainees to its credit, efforts must be made on the network attack pillar.

B. The place and role of the military engineering corps

The Military Engineering Corps is the main player in the fight against Improvised Explosive Devices in Cameroon. It intervenes at all levels, whether it is the training and practice of the Forces, which make it

¹¹ Jean-Marc Tanguy, "How France learned to manage IED risk" le mamouth, 2009 <https://lemamouth.blogspot.com/2009/09/comment-la-france-appris-gerer-le.html>

possible to disseminate good practices at all levels. It also works to sensitise other actors (security personnel from Embassies and humanitarian agencies based in Yaoundé). It acts above all in the detection and treatment of Improvised Explosive Devices in the various theatres of operations thanks to the projection of dedicated teams and participates in the safeguard / protection of deployed units. Finally, in the context of legal proceedings, the Military Engineering Corps makes available its expertise to the National Security and the National Gendarmerie in the investigations opened, following an attack of Improvised Explosive Devices.

CONCLUSION

The fight against Improvised Explosive Devices requires specific methods and means of mitigation because it is a complex and constantly evolving threat. It has been carried out in Cameroon since 2014 and its response, although satisfactory, needs to be improved because the implementation of new operational capacities is imperative in order to embrace the conventional principles of the fight against Improvised Explosive Devices, which have already proven their worth in other modern armies. At the heart of this response system, we find the military engineering corps around which should be forged a real national doctrine to fight against improvised explosive devices which would be the global response to this threat. With an inter-ministerial mission, this doctrine will help to better coordinate the activities of different public administrations implicated in this harsh fight which intends to be permanent.

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THE GPIGN IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM AND URBAN AND RURAL CRIME IN THE FAR NORTH OF CAMEROON

Lieutenant-Colonel KOLA

The asymmetric threats that Cameroon has been facing for nearly a decade call for a continual adaptation of its forces engaged in the fight against terrorism, as the enemy's operating methods are so diverse and evolving. In this insecure environment, however, mastered by the Defence and Security Forces, the more and more recurring use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) is now a constant variable in enemy operating methods, both in the Far North where the terrorist sect Boko Haram is rife and in the North-West and South-West regions where secessionist tendencies persist with obvious repercussions on the large metropolises of Douala and Yaoundé. The secessionists plan, in fact, to extend their threats to other regions of the country. In this context of an ardent fight directed against the diverse enemies to the peace and national unity, to the security and territorial integrity, it is voluntarily appropriate to question oneself on the actual participation of the Multipurpose Intervention Unit of the National Gendarmerie (GPIGN).

Specialised training, operational for ministerial reserve, created by presidential decree n ° 95/015 of February 1, 1995 and restructured by presidential decree n ° 2005/440 of October 31, 2005, the GPIGN assumes, with abnegation and professionalism, its full division in the Far North, in synergy with the other Defence and Security Forces. In this regard, it has many registered actions. Active and effective participation in several areas of operation, reinforced by a dynamic of specialisation dearly driven by the High Command.



Journal du Cameroun - Cameroon: 130 soldiers deployed against hostage takers in Adamaoua - Journal du Cameroun

I - A BOLD AND TARGETED MESH...

The effective presence of the GPIGN on the ground can be observed through an adapted network of its units and detachments on the various front lines in the Far North. *In the Far North region*, the GPIGN has been actively engaged in the fight against the terrorist sect Boko Haram since March 2014. After seven years of commitment with will and determination, the operations carried out jointly or in isolation, have helped drastically reduce the threat to its simplest form. Today, in Operation Emergence 4, its action is part of an area control. It, therefore, adopts an appropriate system ordered by the missions entrusted to it. Thus, a reinforced group has been deployed to the locality of *Nguétchéwé* in *Mayo-Tsanaga* since 2015. It controls the access points there, carries out motorised and pedestal patrols, goes on with targeted arrests of *Boko Haram* suspects and supports the local gendarmerie unit by order.

In *Mora* in Sector 1 of the Multinational Joint Task Force of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (S1 / MNJTF / LCBC), the GPIGN also has a detachment made up of a team of demines for demining actions, and an intervention unit, which acts within the framework of a *Task Force* whose vocation is to carry out raids and to reinforce the attacked posts from time to time. Another protection group is deployed to the locality of *Mada* in *Mayo-Sava* to secure the residence of the President of the National Assembly and his family, since the attacks were perpetrated against the family of Assistant Prime Minister AHMADOU ALI in *Kolofata* in June 2015. Finally, the element reserved for the Regional Intervention Squadron n° 4 (**ERIGN4**, a unit derived from the GPIGN in the Fourth Combined Military Region) in *Maroua*, intervenes in tactical actions, escort missions of high personalities and targeted convoys, shutdowns, and raids mutually led by other friendly forces by order.



Photo n°1 : The raid of the GPIGN detachment under the S1 / MNJTF / LCBC banner on a BH camp in Kadélé



Photo n°2 : Offensive motorised reconnaissance of an axis in the vicinity of Bondéri



Photo n°3 : The arrest of BH combatants in the vicinity of Amchidé



Photo n°4 : Close protection of HE, the Ambassador of France in Cameroon



Photo n°5 : The protection of Nigerian refugees in Cameroon

In the North region, the ERIGN3 of Garoua plays a decisive role in the fight against highway robbers and hostage-takers within the framework of Operation ADANO. Several hostage release operations were thus carried out in support of the territorial units (like the Gendarmerie companies of Garoua 2 and 3), with satisfactory results. In addition, a group of GPIGN has been deployed to Mayo-Rey for nearly a decade, as part of Operation "Peace in Bouba Ndjidda". It participates, together with other units, in the fight against poaching and clandestine gold panning maintained by armed bands from Chad and Sudan. It also ensures the security of the GUIDJIBA - TCHOLLIRE - TOUBORO axis.



Photo n°6 : The infiltration of an assault team in preparation for an arrest

In the Adamaoua region, a GPIGN detachment has been engaged since January 2019 to respond to the phenomenon of hostage taking and kidnappings for ransom that the region has known for several years. Today integrated into Operation "ADANO", this platoon is organised into three intervention groups projected respectively to Martap in Vina, Djohong in Mbéré, and Almé in Faro and Déo. Depending on the change in the

threat and on the order of the Commander of the Legion of this area, with whom it is employed, this detachment can spread over the whole of Adamaoua, with possibilities of the junction to the South with the ERIGN6 at Bertoua in particular in the Department of Mbéré. Generally, this detachment carries out flexible actions based on information obtained by sensors in the field and local Gendarmerie units, but also provided by the hierarchy. Their action to date has enabled the neutralisation of several kidnappers, the recovery of some weapons of war, several milking rifles and batches of ammunition, and the arrest of several kidnappers currently in detention at the central prison of Ngaoundéré.



Photo n°7 : Elements of GPIGN and BIR in the vicinity of Bouba Ndjidda



Photo n°8 : Elements of the GPIGN seeking intelligence

Sources : GPIGN compilation

Thus, the GPIGN is very active and involved in the fight against terrorism and crime in the north. The results are broken down into several hundred, even thousands of enemies neutralised or arrested, weapons and ammunition seized, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) defused or destroyed, and also several fellow citizens freed from sectarian and criminal barbarism and their property saved with, in addition, the freedom to come and go. All this would not have been possible without a real dynamic of professionalization or specialisation driven by the High Command.

II - A DYNAMIC OF SPECIALISATION SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE LOGISTICS...

In an appropriate response approach, obeying above all this double requirement of adaptation and specialisation, the very guarantee of its versatility, the GPIGN, thanks to the will of the High Command, undertook to ensure the training of its elements on two major axes: training in demining and hardening in specialised intervention techniques, through fruitful multilateral military cooperation. Subsequently, it became part of its statutory missions of combating terrorism and urban and rural crime, missions of search, Neutralisation and Destruction of Improvised Explosive Equipment (EOD).

Demining capability

Concretely, teams of demines underwent in-depth training provided by explosives experts at a US military base in Jordan, over a period of six months. Combined with the various retraining activities within the country, these teams, fully equipped with demining equipment, have since had a qualification and a level of expertise, which allow them to intervene calmly and efficiently on IEDs.

In the Far North, the “demining” component now includes the organic linkage of ERIGN4. One of these teams has been deployed to S1 / MNJTF / LCBC since 2018. It is an essential actor in the context of operations carried out by friendly forces in an environment where mobility routes are generally polluted. In practice, it performs EOD missions to the satisfaction of the S1 / MNJTF / LCBC command. These missions fall under, among others, the following points:

- The opening and securing of routes taken by friendly forces during operations;
- The neutralisation of ammunition and explosive charges mounted by terrorists;
- Identification and neutralisation of suicide bombers;
- Participation in offensive reconnaissance missions under the banner of the MNJTF / LCBC;
- The instruction of the personnel of the various posts of S1 / MNJTF / LCBC.
- Exchanges and sharing of experience with other teams.



Photo n°9 : A demine during a daily training session
Source : compilation GPIGN

Their results to date are very eloquent and justify the maintenance of this GPIGN element within the S1 / MNJTF / LCBC system which, it should be remembered, regularly has its GENIE COMBAT component.

The second team, in reserve for intervention at PC / ERIGN4, is ready to be hired at short notice in the event of an alert to the IED, both in the city of Maroua and in the peripheral areas, with a particular effort in SALACK where we find the airport and the SCDP gas filling centre. In this order, this team has often been called upon to respond to suicide alerts and other parcel bombs reported in the city. It also has the capacity to support expert trainers in mines and explosives in the context of the training and retraining of deminers from other formations. This was the case in 2018 during the stay at BIR / SALACK during which it actively participated in the recycling of deminers from the said training.

In RMIA3, ERIGN3 in Garoua also has an organic team of deminers. Although called upon for sporadic cases of parcel bomb alerts, this team is nevertheless part of a logic of consolidating training outcomes through continuous instruction and upgrading, to be ready to meet the security challenges related to the imminent organisation of the 2022 TOTAL AFCON.

Hardening in specialised intervention techniques

Essential expertise for any elite unit, the specialised intervention has undergone a real transformation at the rate of the request of the GPIGN in the fight against the current insecurity. Training also helped thereby cooperation with traditional partners such as the French GIGN, and recent ones such as American, German and British instructors. SWAT-type commando platoons were thus trained, including with a view to securing the 2022 TOTAL AFCON. Along with organic specialisation, the fight against current insecurity has led to the need to train other ordinary units of the National Gendarmerie and other public or para-public administrations.

Training for the benefit of other units and administrations

High directives of the hierarchy, this activity has a double objective. On the one hand, the sensitisation or raising awareness of emerging terrorist threats and their main manifestations in order to be able to permanently adopt a posture of vigilance and awakening. It is also a question of making the comrades of the other units aware of their role as first responders in the management of a major terrorist crisis: taking precautionary measures while promoting access to the scene of the incident for specialised units dedicated to the efficient threat handling. On the other hand, it is a question of making them assimilate the behaviour to be followed and the fundamental tactics in the event of an incident of a terrorist nature, in order to be able to protect themselves or a third party. In this direction, it is not superfluous to underline the henceforth constant implication of the GPIGN, in the reinforcement of the Command of the Schools and Instruction Centres of the National Gendarmerie (CECIG), for the conduct specialised in its training base of Mbankomo of the sessions of Operational Conditioning (MCO) for the benefit of all the Gendarmes to be hired as reinforcements to the Legions of the Far North, Adamaoua, the South-West and the North-West. In addition to this preparation for entry into theatres of operations, the GPIGN now provides fundamentals of the fight against terrorism and crime to all diploma courses organized in the aforementioned Centre.

Moreover, the GPIGN, while carrying out its statutory missions in the fight against terrorism and crime, is also working to raise the level of alert and reaction of the other entities concerned by these operations. This activity fits harmoniously into the synergy of actions strongly recommended by the High Hierarchy.

III - A SATISFACTORY AND PALPABLE BALANCE SHEET

After a decade of relentless struggle against terrorism and serious rural and cross-border crime, the actions of GPIGN are quite eloquent and contribute to its influence. As such, some salient facts and statistics deserve to be recalled:

In the Far North / OPS EMERGENCE4:

- On 3 January 2017, a GPIGN raid under the banner of the MNJTF / LCBC in Kadélé in the Nigerian territory made it possible to neutralise about twenty Boko Haram fighters and to recover some weapons of war;
- From 28 January 2017, the GPIGN took part in a sweep in Gulumba Gana 40km inside Nigeria in an offensive by S1 / MNJTF / LCBC at the end of which several Boko Haram posts were destroyed, combatants neutralised and recovered material;
- Since 2014, nearly 520 escorts of diplomats and other high personalities, 09 escorts of sensitive materials and 15 escorts of Nigerian refugees to Nigeria have been carried out. All of these escort missions went off without a hitch.

In the North / OPS ADANO:

- 07 hostage release operations were successfully carried out;
- 65 alleged hostage-takers arrested and made available to justice in the localities of Bibémi, Badarnké, Ngong and Mbaiboum;
- 54 escorts of high personalities were carried out.
- In Adamaoua / OPS ADANO:
- 29 February 2019 in Martap, neutralisation of a hostage taker, a trafficking weapon recovered with a batch of corresponding ammunition;
- Between February 2019 and December 2020, 37 arrests of suspects involved in the hostage-taking phenomenon were carried out. The said arrests were regularly relayed by the departmental units for judicialisation.

It should be noted here that the GPIGN, as a reward for its full permanent commitment to the fight against terrorism and crime, was awarded the medal of valour collectively and to the order of the Army by presidential decree n° 2015/193 of 20 April 2015. The GPIGN squadrons of the Far Nord have very significantly contributed to the award of this high military distinction.



Photo n°10 : An illustrative image of the official ceremony for the presentation of the said medal at the military Headquarters Brigade in Yaoundé.
Source : compilation GPIGN

IV - WHAT PROSPECTS?

In spite of the laudable results and rightly appreciated by the High Command, in this fight against terrorism, the fact remains that the GPIGN must work more to increase its operational capacity to better address the threats which undoubtedly know a permanent evolution of their operative modes. It must therefore always be able to carry out in an autonomous manner (especially logistical autonomy) targeted operations (achievement of targeted objectives with high added value), discreet but not clandestine.

This demand for adaptation undeniably calls for structural reforms, which are in line with the will of the upper military hierarchy to always offer the political authority highly reversible military options, the primary vocation of any intervention unit. In this regard, the pursuit of personnel specialisation, the acquisition of the appropriate equipment that rhymes precisely with this dynamic of specialisation, the strengthening of logistical capacities, the rejuvenation and the personnel

recruitment policy represent some salient points on which the High Command is hard at work to strengthen the operational capacity of this specialised training. Furthermore, reflections are constantly being carried out with the objective of giving the GPIGN command a better management of a crisis, through fruitful cooperation with foreign partners, joint trainings, and an effective sharing of experience with other intervention units, for instance, the BIR, GSO, or the DGRE.

CONCLUSION

The multifaceted threats that Cameroon has faced in recent decades have since aroused an objective and legitimate general mobilisation of the Defence and Security Forces, in order to meet the security challenges linked to the preservation of its territorial integrity. The GPIGN remains an essential link in the current security system, and remains resolute and determined in the fight against terrorism and serious urban and rural crime throughout the national triangle. Its commitment, recognised to be deep and complete, has never been lacking and is infallibly in line with strict respect for human rights as recommended by the High Command. Meanwhile, it has to adopt a position of permanent monitoring and operate prospective thinking without ceasing to adapt to the dynamic and diverse character of the said threats.

Lieutenant-Colonel KOLA

Commander of the Multipurpose Intervention Unit of
the National Gendarmerie (GPIGN)

TACTICAL USE OF DRONES IN THE FIGHT AGAINST IEDS IN CAMEROON

Squadron Leader Rodrigue Boris FOMING

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are the weapon of choice for insurgents and terrorists because their construction requires little skill while giving spectacular and damaging results for a very limited investment of time, money and effort. Devices set up or produced in an improvised manner and containing destructive, lethal, toxic, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals, IEDs are designed with the aim of destroying, neutralising, harassing or distracting¹. Their proliferation on various battlefields and the exponential increase in human losses has led States to develop and then deploy large numbers of surveillance, detection and inhibition equipment for these devices.² Most of this equipment is drones, understood here as unmanned aircraft or robots³ remotely piloted, semi-autonomous or autonomous, capable of carrying different payloads making them capable of performing specific tasks for a determined period of time which may vary according to its capacities.

The tactical use of drones in an African context did not take long to counter the misdeeds of IEDs in the context of the fight against terrorism in Central Africa and more particularly in Cameroon. However, despite these technological innovations and the human resources deployed, the population and certain soldiers involved in the various crises that Cameroon is going through continue to pay a heavy price because of IEDs. In fact, in the context of the fight against IEDs, the tactical use of drones in the Cameroonian context remains confronted with real obstacles both structurally and operationally. This article, therefore, aims to propose the types of drones whose use could contribute to reducing or even eliminating the threats posed by the past or future use of IEDs, in particular by terrorist or insurgent groups. Hence the following question relating to the effectiveness of the tactical use of drones: What types of drones should be used tactically to achieve the desired end (EFR)? To answer this question, it is first necessary to take stock of the tactical use of drones in Cameroon (I); then to evoke some difficulties related to the use of drones in this State (II), and finally, to propose types of drones whose optimal use could enable the achievement of the EFR (III).

¹ See www.mineaction.org, United Nations Mine Action Service New York, NY 10017, United States e-mail: mineaction@un.org, consulted on 29 June 2021. See also the Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on combating the threat posed by IEDs (A / RES / 75/79) and the Resolution of the Security Council mandating PKOs in the event of threat IED.

² Eric Moline and Arnaud Ramey, "terrestrial robotics on the battlefield", Revue des Ingénieurs de l'Armement n° 109, June 2016, p.6263.

³ Which we think of as ground drones.


I - THE STATE OF AFFAIRS ON THE USE OF DRONES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FIGHT AGAINST IED

In principle, the Weapon dedicated to the fight against IEDs is the Genius Weapon. However, the manoeuvres in Cameroonian theatre suggest, on the one hand, the ineffective use of drones by the mainly dedicated Weapons (A), and, on the other hand, an embryonic use by the secondarily dedicated Weapons (B).

A. THE NON-EFFECTIVE USE OF DRONES BY THE MILITARY ENGINEERING CORPS

Even if the use of drones is not effective in the military engineering corps, as part of the overall fight against IEDs in conflict zones and in the capital cities of Cameroon, it has a certain number of equipment that have many advantages. These made it possible to neutralise and destroy several IEDs carried, transported or kept by a person, voluntarily or forcibly by a person, IEDs issued by or concealed in a land vehicle and suicide IEDs «Suicide bombers» encountered in the Centre, Far-North, North-West and South-West Regions of Cameroon.

Despite these achievements, it is regrettable that this Weapon cannot yet integrate the use of drones in its interventions to preserve the personal safety of the interveners. The graphs below, which take stock of some IED events in the Cameroonian regions mentioned above, demonstrate that the use of drones in the theatre of operations helps to protect human lives. Reading the graphs shows that the number of deaths has fallen considerably from 2016 in the fight against Boko Haram and from 2019 as part of the strengthening of order against the secessionists when drones were used in said theatres. In the city of Yaoundé, only a few wounded were registered because the capital of the country is protected by numerous technological surveillance tools, which contribute to limiting the effects of IEDs.



We could then note, to be pleased, that it is thanks to the use of drones by the Multipurpose Intervention Unit of the National Gendarmerie (GPIGN) and the Rapid Intervention Battalions (BIRs) that the deaths tend to decrease. However, it must be said that this job is still embryonic.

B. EMBRYONARY USE OF DRONES BY UNDEDICATED UNITS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST IEDs

The acquisition of drones was made in 2015 through the signing of a partnership with the United States⁴. In this context, Cameroon took the initiative to acquire from the American company *Insitu Inc.* six Scan Eagle brand drones «for its army engaged in the fight against the Islamist sect Boko Haram in the northern regions»⁵. This type of drone, dedicated to surveillance, would not be the only prototype used by the Cameroonian army. According to a drone operator⁶, Cameroon also uses observation drones like the Phantom IV, which are used only for data collection and intelligence.

In the Eastern Region of Cameroon, the BIRs have developed a drone-based intelligence component for

4 See www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/scaneagle-to-be-delivered-to-cameroon-kenya-and-pak-417294/, accessed March 21, 2020.

5 See chateauxnews.com/fr/2015/10/17/cameroon-armee-six-drones-scaneagle-pour-lutter-contre-bokoharam, accessed March 21, 2020.

6 Interview carried out by the author with a non-commissioned officer of the Cameroonian air force in Yaoundé.

their operations against poaching, gold panning and armed transhumance. Their aerial observation group uses the **Orbiter** of Israeli origin as well as American **ScanEagle** machines or commercial multi-rotor drones **DJI Mavic Pro**, **Inspire 2** and **Matrice 600**. These drones are used in distant reconnaissance and close surveillance missions, identifying targets and guiding Cameroonian artillery fire. With its ten drones with a range of 2 to 3 km distributed among the Regional Squadrons of the Multipurpose Intervention Unit of the National Gendarmerie, the National Gendarmerie is responsible for observing, surveying and identifying the presence of IEDs in the Cameroonian theatre zones

However, the deployment of these Units is only effective thanks to the numerous foreign logistical supports in the Sahel since 2013⁷. The stake of these devices being rather to affirm the presence of these superpowers in a space of strategic importance in the fight against terrorism⁸. It can therefore be observed that the use of drones is still embryonic in the targeted field due not only to the disparities in the acquisition and endowments of the said devices to Cameroonian Army units but also to the restriction of its capacities to the observation and not intervention. These are all obstacles that limit the effective fight against IEDs in Cameroon.

II - OBSTACLES TO THE TACTICAL USE OF DRONES IN THE FIGHT AGAINST IEDS IN CENTRAL AFRICA

The tactical use of drones in the fight against IEDs cannot be effective because of the obstacles of a structural (A) and operational (B) nature.

A. STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES

The structural obstacles relate to both geopolitical and geo-economic aspects.

The geopolitical aspect relates to the presence of foreign powers in the African theatre, one of the goals, which is primarily to acquire information to serve their interests. How the information collected by drones is managed⁹ as well as the decision whether or not to grant

access to this information to different actors raises important challenges in terms of confidentiality within operations because most of the drones used are used by foreign powers. Asked through the Westphalian prism, the question of the information collected by drones from foreign military technical assistance can be reformulated in terms of national sovereignty and potential harm to state security, particularly in crises with cross-border implications.¹⁰

Regarding the geo-economic aspect, the structural obstacles to the tactical use of drones in Central Africa arise in terms of challenges related to financial issues. Quality drones with good surveillance capabilities in hard-to-reach areas remain relatively expensive when added to the direct or indirect costs related, among other things, to the training of technicians to pilot the devices, to repairs and maintenance of aircraft and their related equipment, the transfer and storage of the data obtained or the strengthening of the analysis capacities of Intelligence units having to process the high volume of data collected.

B. OPERATIONAL OBSTACLES

Operational barriers arise in terms of logistics, interoperability and privacy. Aerial or ground drones that operate in isolated locations must contend with a limited, intermittent and failing power supply, unreliable telecommunications and limited Internet access. Then, we must recognise that drones are not effective everywhere or at all times. This is the case in a forest area with a canopy so dense that it is difficult or even useless to use drones. In addition, extreme climates, especially heat or strong winds, can accelerate the aging of drones, or even compromise their use.

The issue of interoperability relates to the ability of one group to exchange information or equipment with another group pursuing the same goal. The deployment of drones and the delivery of real-time information require the establishment of separate decision-making processes giving more responsibilities to the Officers in the field. Finally, the ability of drones to observe and record the comings and goings of individuals also raises questions in terms of the right to privacy and could be seen as violating article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that no one will be the object of arbitrary interference with his private life. Therefore, what specific types of drones could allow the EFR to be reached?

7 Whitlock Craig, "Pentagon Set to Open Second Drone Base in Niger as It Expands Operations in Africa," *The Washington Post*, September 1, 2014.

8 Berghazan Georges, "Eradicate Boko Haram: Multiple Actors, Uncertain Outcome", Report of the Peace and Security Research and Information Group (GRIP), 2016.

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9 Sournia Loumtouang Erick (2017), "From a national crisis to a regional crisis: the domino effect of the Boko Haram threat on Cameroon", in *Perspectives on the Boko Haram phenomenon in Cameroon*, AA Gwoda and F. Wassouni (ed.), Yaoundé, Éditions du Schabel, pp. 203-222.

10 In this regard, let us note the fierce opposition of Rwanda, President Paul Kagame fearing that Africa will become «an experimentation laboratory for foreign espionage devices». Read Louis Charbonneau, "Rwanda opposes the use of drones by the UN in eastern Congo", *Reuters*, January 9, 2013.

III - THE DRONES WHO'S OPTIMAL USE COULD ENABLE THE EFR TO BE REACHED

US Army Lieutenant General David Deptula says drones «deploy power without deploying vulnerability»¹¹. Drones turn war into pursuit and military confrontation into stalking¹². From the brief history of the use of drones for the management of explosives within engineering units (A), Cameroon should necessarily embrace «contact robotisation» (B).

A. THE HISTORY OF USING ROBOTS WITHIN ENGINEERING UNITS

Historically, the use of robots in engineering units dates back to 1972 with the entry into service of the *Wheelbarrow* robot,¹³ considered to be the first robot intended for the management of explosives. The next generation of engineering robots is the *Packbot* robot used for the first time in the ruins of the World Trade Centre after the attacks of September 11, 2001¹⁴. The Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams use them to approach an IED as closely and safely as possible, observe it in detail with the camera, and neutralise it with the water cannon. They made it possible to reduce mortality in highly exposed DOE teams.

Nowadays, we also meet AMX30 B2 DT tanks, which can constitute the backbone of heavy demining sections or the DROGEN system (DRONE of the ENGINEERING)¹⁵ with a visual infrared and thermal

detection capability by allowing the detection of traces of laying of IEDs or mines, the recognition of areas before the installation of the force or of physical obstacles (crossing points, search for the avoidance of an impassable runway, etc.), and even the MINIROGEN (MINI Robot of the ENGINEERING), whose use makes it possible to protect the operator from the threat during the phases of clarification of doubt, are essential to the operations currently being carried out. The sappers of the Armies in Central Africa must take advantage of the experience of the aforementioned European powers to embrace the «robotisation of contact»¹⁶.

B. "CONTACT ROBOTISATION": A NECESSITY FOR CAMEROON

The use of robots will contribute to the improvement of military efficiency in missions such as demining, mobility support or the organisation of the field in the use of lasers in order to access the active material, the burn without detonating it and save human lives. For mobility support missions, the opening of axes of progression and the crossing of mined areas, the Cameroonian military engineering corps could equip themselves, on the one hand, with **IRobot Packbot 510**, Tracked vehicles remotely operated up to a distance of 800m with, in particular, at the front and over a width of 2.2 metres, rotating mechanical tillers; and, on the other hand, **AMX30 B2 DT tanks**, which constitute a part or even completely autonomous route opening system. Detection or deception can be quite easily carried out by a heavy land drone acting in tandem with another engineering machine, which, for its part, would be manned and would ensure control of the mission. In the longer term, the intelligent electronic protection systems offered by the company Thales¹⁷ could be considered.

Regarding the organisation of the land, autonomous

mote piloting ground station. The IT 180 weighs 18 kg and has a wingspan of 1.8 m. It flies at a height of 150 m maximum, has a range of 3 km and a range of 30 minutes.

¹⁶ Eric Ozanne, "The robotization of the combined arms battle group" in Danet D., JP Hanon, G. Boisboissel (dir.), Robotized warfare [international day's proceedings, 911 November 2011], Paris, Économica,

¹⁷With its long experience and expertise in electronic counter-measures, Thales offers two major innovative solutions to counter radio-controlled IEDs: ECLIPSE (smart Electronic Protection System for Vehicles) and STORM-H (smart Electronic Protection System for Soldiers). See <https://www.thales-group.com/fr/notice-dinformation>.

¹¹ Gusterson, Hugh 2014 "Toward an Anthropology of Drones: Remaking Space, Time and Valor in Combat", in Matthew Evangelista & Henry Shue, eds, the American Way of Bombing. Changing Ethical and Legal Norms, from Flying Fortresses to Drones. Ithaca-London, Cornell University Press: 191-206.

¹² Chamayou, Grégoire 2013, Theory of the drone. Paris, La Fabrique. Gusterson, Hugh 2016 Drone. Remote Control Warfare. Cambridge, Mit Press.

¹³ It was born when the IED threat was at its highest in Northern Ireland and losses among the British Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) demining teams were very high. This robot entered service with the French Army in 1985, at the same time as the EOD Regional Intervention Groups (GRIN) were created and was used in operation for the first time in Lebanon in 1985-1986.

¹⁴ Some drones used after September 11, 2001: PackBot, MARCbot, TALON, MAARS and SWORDS.

¹⁵ A DROGEN system comprises two IT 180 drones and a re-

work systems could be used, like what happens in the mining sector¹⁸. Finally, the engineering liaison and reconnaissance detachments could see their capacities greatly increased thanks to the rotary wing drone system and vertical take-off (DROGEN or MINIROGEN), which would plead for a strengthening of their role in the field of recognition and, why not, for the creation of detachments solely dedicated to this mission.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, as the primary weapon of the terrorist threat, IEDs continue to drive the global market for dynamic C-IED solutions. Robot equipment **Packbot 510** by iRobot or **AMX30 B2 DT tanks** initially with a view to their tactical use would constitute one of the decisive conditions for reaching the desired end because of the aforementioned capacities¹⁹. In the longer term, the innovative systems of Thales, which are **ECLIPSE** for the protection of vehicles and **STORM-H** for the protection of soldiers, could be considered.

Robotics is a major development that any engineer

weapon should have in the context of military missions against IEDs; it will be installed in the armed forces by 2035-2050. The States of Central Africa, in particular Cameroon, would benefit from acquiring this state-of-the-art C-IED equipment.

The cycle of the «digital robot» revolution already underway will generate the most anticipated progress in autonomy and artificial intelligence, in order to overcome the obstacles, which, for the time being, prevent robots from moving in any terrain and in autonomy. The miniaturisation and networking of several robots (swarm) are also expected technological breakthroughs within the framework of the C-IED fight.

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IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES IN CONFLICT ZONE AND THE FIGHTING MECHANISMS: CASE OF THE FAR NORTH, SOUTH-WEST AND NORTH-WEST REGIONS OF CAMEROON (RETEX)

Divisional Commissioner FOUMENA Frédéric &
Colonel KAOLE ALEOKOL Raymond Serge

Conflicts, whether irredentist or purely terrorist, generally pit the Regular Forces of one or more States against combatants from advocacy groups. The armed face-to-face, which is the option of confrontation, causes victims, above all among the civilian population of which the State, in its sovereign role, has the duty to ensure their protection.

With the twofold concern of guaranteeing the integrity of its territory and ensuring its population's well-being, the State, invested according to the established rules of the "monopoly of legitimate violence", will do everything in its power to reduce to their simple expression those movements which, in turn, by means of violent extremism, will use methods that allow them not only to continue to exist on the physical level but also to strike the spirits in order to attract attention on their cause and sometimes win the hearts of the people.

In one or the other objective pursued by the irredentist or terrorist groups, the frontal military opposition with the Government Defence and Security Forces of one or more States ends up being unfavourable to them to the point where they mount in terror with the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).



Panorama papers Cameroon> Terrorism- Bomb psychosis is spreading in Yaoundé - Panorama papers

Defined as homemade bombs¹ worn by human beings called «suicide bombers» or placed along land or sea routes, IEDs are used by terrorists to increase terror and cause sudden deaths in society.

The sudden, cowardly and improvised nature of IEDs highlights security flaws and contributes to sowing doubt both within the Defence and Security Forces and among the population. Regular forces and the population when they do not suspect each other, live under the stress of a detonation coming either from a human bomb maliciously infiltrated within the population or from an explosive device deposited anywhere, with the objective to kill as many victims as possible.

Understanding the use of IEDs in conflict zones and sketching out the means of combating their eradication will, during this analysis, attempt to reveal the real objective pursued by their users (I) and to suggest avenues for reducing their use. (II), if this is true, to speak of their eradication would be delicate, even lacking in realism.

I - IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, AN ADDITIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHYSICAL THREAT TO ASYMMETRIC WARFARE.

Cameroon since 2014 for the Far North Region and 2016 for the North-West and South-West Regions is totally caught on one side by the terrorists of Boko-Haram and the on the other hand by irredentists grouped together in the virtual republic called «Ambazonia».

State firepower has driven terrorists in these crisis areas to step up in the distillation of terror using IEDs. This desire to spread psychological terror (A) is accompanied by loss of human life and significant material damage (B).

A. Improvised Explosive Devices: a definite asymmetric psychological threat

A military confrontation takes place on a terrain that each of the belligerents tries to master as much as possible, to give themselves an advantage over their adversary. As long as the Defence and Security Forces have the local population as an ally to move, they act to the great happiness of the people. The use of improvised explosive devices in 2016 the first by Boko-Haram in the Far North of Cameroon disrupted the displayed

confidence and created a real psychosis both within the regular forces and among the population. This same psychosis is perceptible in the English-speaking part of Cameroon with the use of the same combat techniques by the irredentists.

Knowing that the terrain on which one could move day and night had become a potential trap in which one could be caught at any time and lose one's life is a very worrying situation for the Forces and their allies.

In the departments of Logone and Chari, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Mayo-Sava in the Far North, the increase in IED-based attacks with the use either of suicide bombers or of devices buried along the routes had reduced considerably the intervention actions of the Defence and Security Forces on the ground. Death lurked everywhere and could arise from the young woman that we saw coming in front of us and who suddenly unleashed an explosive charge in the market, in places of worship, in private homes, etc...

This situation affected the serenity of the men on the ground, especially since they sometimes watched helplessly as their vehicles exploded, or saw the body of one of their comrades crumble, surrounded by mines as it was the case of this young captain in Assighassia in the department of Mayo-Tsanaga in 2016. The population, seeing their protectors too, frequently victims of IEDs, felt abandoned by the Defence and Security Forces who, for their safety prohibited night interventions and limited most of the time to only protecting their various combat posts.

The introduction of IEDs in the war against the State has seriously upset the harmonious relationship between the Defence and Security Forces, the Vigilance Committees and the population. Uncertainty and anxiety have created a nest of suspicion between the allies.

The Defence and Security Forces did not understand how the population and the Vigilance Committees, which are more in control of the terrain, failed to provide information in order to enable them to counter the actions of the terrorists. For their part, the population attacked at night did not understand the impassive attitude of those sent by the State to defend them. Boko-Haram, aware of the harmful psychological effect is produced within the Defence and Security Forces, took the pains before any attack to isolate the targeted area using mines laid along the various routes from where reinforcements could come.

Among the population, the frequency of explosions and the reports produced were likely to produce two attitudes:

On the one hand, the frequent detonations could

¹ <https://www.larousse.fr>

make people believe that BH had strengthened its military potential and could now compete with the regular forces.

On the other hand, the fear produced by IEDs within the population leads the terrorists to send a double message: that of the termination of all collaboration with the Defence and Security Forces at the risk of being targeted and that which is to facilitate the enlistment of young people in rebel groups.

The psychological impact of the use of IEDs is greater in the forest areas in the North-West and in the South-West, all the more so as the Defence and Security Forces, unlike the Far North Region where they can count on the important support of the population, are seen thanks to the various speeches as occupying forces.

B. IEDs, an asymmetric weapon with significant damage

In the field, the use of IEDs causes a great deal of human and material damage. In the absence of exhaustive statistics, we can take as an example the Northwest Region where, between 21 and 24 June 2021, no less than 04 (four) explosions were heard.

On 21 June 2021 at Three Corners Nvech in Menji in Lebiale, the Defence and Security Forces were ambushed by the secessionist elements of the warlord Field Marshall. The elements of the Defence and Security Forces initially walked down the hill when a homemade bomb exploded. A rescue vehicle arriving at the scene was attacked by two IEDs. A total of four devices exploded within a radius of 200 meters.

On 24 June 2004, still in Lebiale, the secessionists once again detonated two devices in an ambush against the Republican forces. The human toll is just as remarkable in the Far North region where Boko-Haram apart from the isolated placements of IEDs, also uses suicide bombers during night attacks in the villages.

We can cite a few dates:

- On 18 January 2016 around 5 a.m., a suicide bombing in a mosque in Nguetchewé resulted in 06 dead including 05 civilians and 01 suicide bomber;
- On 21 June 2017 in Kolofata (Mayo-Sava), there was a suicide bomber attack killing 08 people, including 03 suicide bombers;
- On the night of 1 and 2 December 2019 in Waza (Logone and Chari), a suicide bomber attack registered 09 deaths (06 civilians and 03 Kamikazes);

- On 22 August 2020 in Nguetchewé (Mayo-Tsanaga) a suicide bomber attack left 19 dead (17 civilians and 02 suicide bombers).

These few indicative cases sufficiently show the extent of the damage caused by Improvised Explosive Devices. Terrorists and irredentists use these methods not only to kill but also to loot while making it difficult for the Defence and Security Forces to intervene.

II - ERADICATE IEDs IN CONFLICT ZONES: THE MAN AT THE CENTER OF THE SECURITY SYSTEM

Fighting against an improvised danger, which can at any time cause serious bodily and material damage in society, requires the establishment of strategies to anticipate and neutralise it.

A crossed look at strategies to combat IEDs in the Far North (A) and in the North-West and South-West regions suffice to show that, whatever the technology used, man remains the essential link in any strategy thanks to its adherence to the common cause.

A. The Far North Region of Cameroon: Man as the pivot of the fight against IEDs.

Appearing for the first time in the war that Boko Haram imposed on Cameroon in 2016 even as the thurifarians trumpeted the victory of the sovereign forces on this terrorist front, the IEDs came to balance the psychological influence, which the regular forces seemed to have acquired.

Not a day went by without explosions (suicide bombers and IEDs) being heard. The markets, places of worship, mourning and sometimes inside houses, Boko Haram was heard, harassed the Defence and Security Forces and the population to the point of creating psychosis among the population and the State.

From now on, gatherings are limited, the doors are closed, and places of worship are deserted.

After the surprise effect, it was necessary to redefine the strategies of struggle and the concept of «popular defence» took on its full meaning with the determined commitment of Cameroonians from every side to help the Defence and Security Forces to come to fruition of this enemy. A great mobilisation has been initiated. The capacities of the Vigilance Committees have been strengthened, with community leaders called upon to transmit to the authorities as quickly as possible any matter of interest.

The intelligence chain put in place works wonderfully, the terrorists are lonely. Darkness becomes their ally. The popular and appreciable response. Suicide bombers and IEDs are neutralised. The population has respite despite stealthy actions. If the strategy used in the Far North region is successful, it is undoubtedly the result of the Army-Nation alliance.

The community and the Defence and Security Forces have the same vision on the war: Cameroon is under attack, we have to stand up as one man to face the enemy. The similarities of views and actions have created real trust between republican forces and the population. The language elements used in the Far North region has to date not had the same echo in the North West and South West regions. More elaborate strategies are underway.



Cameroon Security URGENT - Explosion of a homemade bomb in Douala - Cameroon Security

B. The North-West and South-West Regions; the lack of adherence from the population in the strategy of combating IEDs beneficial to the enemy

«Unity is strength». This slogan with proven relevance struggles to take shape in the English-speaking regions of Cameroon. The consequence of this is the great excitement of the Republican forces when they have to act in these forest areas.

In the North-West and Southwest, the sovereign State and a good part of the population do not seem to be on the same wavelength while the slogan of the State stays and remains «A One and Indivisible Cameroon », a good fringe of the population has for the slogan «Ambazonia Must Be free». The division between the different positions provides the basis for the easy use of IEDs.

The success of the Vigilance Committees and the community in the Far North gave way to disenchantment between an army qualified as occupation and a population said to be martyred. No army, however powerful it may be, can succeed on the ground if the people do not help it. The adage which says it is «the ground which commands the manoeuvre» can be paraphrased by: «It is the intelligence which guarantees the success of any action».

In the North-West and in the South-West of Cameroon, we must win peace of hearts to reduce the criminal presence of Improvised Explosive Devices in these regions.

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THE FIGHT AGAINST IEDS IN THE FAR NORTH OF CAMEROON

Pr Saïbou Issa

22 and 26 July 2015. Three suicide attacks carried Boko Haram terrorism to the city of Maroua, the capital of the Far North Region. Three women activate their explosive charges in the central market of Maroua, in a neighbouring district and is a popular leisure area. In addition to deaths and minor injuries, the regional hospital of Maroua receives severe cases of people who will keep the stigmata for life due to the substances and materials used to make the bombs. This hospital will receive many others who have lost a foot, an arm, an eye... The reinforcement of the security watch system was effective, because the attempted attacks were, subsequently, foiled in time, as we will see further. However, fear of terrorist attacks seems to have generated preventive attitudes, which have permanently modified ordinary social behaviour: no frequenting of large markets; reduced attendance at places of worship; non-participation in cultural festivities; absence from baptisms, marriage ceremonies and mourning. Suicide attacks and Covid-19 have thus succeeded each other to erect temporary or lasting social borders in sectors of human integration par excellence. The main challenge posed by the threat of IEDs in cities in areas under terrorist threat is to perpetuate preventive attitudes, terrorism thriving on the soil of usury and collective amnesia.

One day in 2017, in the early hours of a Sunday, market day in Mora, capital of the Department of Mayo Sava. While the first merchants set up their stalls, officials and curious people converge on the courtyard of a school where scattered human remains bear witness to the horror of the explosion of two human bombs, self-victims of their lethal charge. A head here, an arm there, entrails beyond. Two women, one still young and the other similar to all these ageless women, walking witnesses of what Boko Haram has made of these givers of life transformed into haggard murderers. Shadows emerging from the mirage of Daula Musulunci, «the country of the Muslims», this «Caliphate» announced as the “Promised Land” for those who yearned for a new life where everything would be said, acted and built according to the commandments of Allah,

Exchanging with these young Cameroonian and Nigerian mothers released after the disappearance of Abubakar Shekau, one cannot help but wonder how young women with such soft talk, with the maternal, fibre thus displayed, worrying about the future of their very young children and reunification with their husbands, have they gone to extremes. Jacob Zen spoke of the mental formatting that is installed in them with the illusion of post-mortem rebirth, solemn death being their passport to eternal life and reunion with loved ones.¹

¹ Jacob Zen, in Jason Warner and Hilary Matfess, Exploding stereotypes: the unexpected operational and demographic characteristics of Boko Haram's suicide bombers, Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point, August 2017. See also Obi Anyadike, “Coerced or committed? Boko Haram's female suicide bombers”, The New Humanitarian, April 19, 2016.

Military casualties

On 14 February 2016, Operation Alpha and the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) from which it came lost one of these officers with impressive service records, magnified operational skills, fine strategic culture, intellectual curiosity with remarkable functional range, with solid human qualities. Reporting on the circumstances of the disappearance and the qualities of Lieutenant-Colonel Kwene Ekwele Beltus Honoré, Cameroon-info.net writes:

Committed to the conveying of the Nigerian hostages freed in Ngoshe and their handing over to the Nigerian authorities in the neighbouring town of Pulka, Lieutenant-Colonel KWENE EKWELE Beltus Honoré will be seriously injured along with four of his men, after the vehicle carrying them jumped on a mine laid by Boko Haram on the route taken (...) Lieutenant-Colonel KWENE EKWELE Beltus Honoré was a renowned officer, with remarkable strength of character. He was known not only for his bravery and courage but also for his pragmatic sense and his taste for dialogue, pedagogy and communication (...) Lieutenant-Colonel KWENE EKWELE Beltus Honoré was an experienced artillery officer; an experience proven through field operations during which he has always distinguished himself by a great tactical coherence, as evidenced by his engagement in the southern zone of Operation Alpha where he participated in several epic battles and repulsed successful criminal assaults by Boko Haram several times.

Dozens of elements have lost their lives since 2014 within the three forces deployed in the fight against Boko Haram. Many other wounded retain disabling scars. Scouring the lairs of the insurgents, conducting cross-border operations, repelling daring attacks, controlling vehicles or uncertain users, the elements of the Multinational Joint Task Force, Operation Alpha, and Operation Emergence 4 conduct their missions in a risky environment, all the more so to over time, Boko Haram's operating methods subdued the use of local intermediaries for the execution of the tasks constituting its operations. These tasks include the use of IEDs on busy roads.

I - Conflict dynamics and factors conducive to IEDs

At the start of its cross-border attacks in 2014, Boko Haram behaved like a regular army, waging conventional war. On the strength of its success against certain positions of the Nigerian army which enabled it to seize important military equipment, including heavy

weapons and armoured vehicles, Abubakar Shekau's organisation proclaimed its Caliphate the following day after the capture of Gwoza. There have been many attempts at territorial occupation in Cameroon, Niger and Chad. They remained unsuccessful.² However, the echoes of the advances and the hold over a large area of north-eastern Nigeria were sufficient to attract recruits and even families. The effects of the response quickly reduced Boko Haram's operational capacities, in particular for the conduct of frontal operations by large units. Hence, they resort to asymmetric warfare through the use of explosive charge carriers on the one hand and the installation of explosives from their own manufacture.

From the highway robbers of yesterday to the terrorists of today, obligated passengers have always been places where armed gang operations are carried out: ponds for cattle raids; rocky defiles and bifurcations imposing slowing down for ambushes; seasonal camps for community looting... To get from Maroua to Kousseri, from Maltam to Fotokol or from Mora to Banki, economic operators always take the same route. Their movements are therefore predictable. Specific vehicles can be targeted. The state of these roads and others allows the insurgents to bury explosives on arteries strewn with hollows when insecurity no longer allowed them to be maintained. On the National N° 1 between Mora and Kousseri, the stoppage of work after the removal in 2014 of Chinese personnel working on the construction of this road, leaves a platform at the mercy of degradation. In the dry season, it is below the normal axis that sandy tracks are created, easy to dig. It is on these secondary roads, sometimes reduced to tracks for lack of cantonment or reshaping, that civilian and especially military vehicles climb on mines.

If the suicide attacks commonly called suicide bombers target gathering places to produce, among other things, media and psychological effects, IEDs placed on the roads are more intended to impact the mobility of forces. For example, the use of data from the MNJTF and exchanges with its command clearly provides information on the geography of the distribution of IEDs on the axes of deployment. It was on these axes that military vehicles were damaged and soldiers were hit. In addition, MNJTF data show that Boko Haram has been able to translate into cheap but very destructive weapons, residues of military equipment, chemicals and compounds of common use whose arrangement produces explosives of various shapes and dimensions according to needs. Looking at the compounds of IEDs, it becomes clear that one of the

² See Saïbou Issa, "...", Attacks and strikes by Boko Haram in the Far North of Cameroon,

great operational threats facing armies is less than the proliferation of sophisticated weapons and more practical intelligence in the service of evil. Urea nitrate, ordinary small batteries, old FM radios, household gas (propane), empty gas cylinders, used sandals, marbles, junk, shell cases and ammunition, adhesive tape are used by fireworks whose chemical skills and the quality of the training are noticeable.

Military sources from various national and regional operations to fight Boko Haram, as well as exchanges with elements having acted in the IED sector or having worked with them agree that Shekau had first trained his fireworks in the Sahel, then these became formatters in his den of Sambisa. Daesh's expertise seems to have been called upon. The fireworks come from all the countries affected by the crisis, some having visited Cameroon and Nigeria. As part of the surrenders

following Shekau's death, various sources indicate that twenty-one (21) IED specialists, including their leader Amir Abu Darda, surrendered to the Nigerian authorities.³ According to an ex-combatant who assumed command positions, the fireworks were real stars who communicated little. «There were several of them who were missing an eye, a hand or a leg,» he says. Boko Haram had an IED fabrication workshop, which was destroyed in 2018.⁴

Asked about the process of producing human bombs, a fighter in surrender⁵, whose three relatives would have carried out suicide missions, delivers a

3 Vanguard, August 9, 2021. <https://www.vanguardngr.com>

4 <https://counteriedreport.com>, February 7, 2018

5 Interview of August 24, 2021.



Camer.be - Terrorist attacks on IEDs in NOSO

testimony whose content tends to relativize the sophisticated analyses, which have circulated on the subject. In essence, he says, young girls (mostly) are conditioned during compulsory religious education sessions. The common argument would be that the Prophet asked his disciples which of them wanted to be close to him. An opposing force then obstructed the passage of its army in the field. To the one who had come out in favour of this sought-after proximity offer, he would have suggested taking a suicidal action to «open the way». This is a sacrifice that would absolve him from interrogations after death. The preachers would use the translation to incite the amnesty sacrifice, besides “opening the way to Islam gives out interrogations in the tomb”.

Why choose the girls: «they are naive and easy to control». Apart from the desperate girls who have been kidnapped and find themselves without ties, the candidates for suicide attacks come from diverse backgrounds, some being married and mothers. With or without the consent of the husband, as soon as the young girl “candidate” with a leader, she enters the conditioning phase. There is no family opposition, at the risk of suffering reprisals from the leaders. The ex-combatants deny the use of narcotics (banned from sale and consumption). However, security sources indicate that many people apprehended before the commission of the attacks or on the battlefields were in a daze, due to the consumption of hallucinogenic substances, in this case Tramadol. Occasionally, it is the dissipation of the psychotropic which seems to have brought back the those who surrendered themselves to the Defence and Security or to the Vigilante Committees back to sanity, once freed from the stronghold of the passers who led them to the places where the orchestrators have targeted⁶

II - The response of the Defence and Security Forces: the case of the MNJTF

Campaigns against the manufacture and use of anti-personnel mines and the Convention⁷ resulting from this are in the process of eliminating the licit production and use of these weapons, which have caused considerable human and material damage in all regions of the world.⁸It is obvious to remember that armed terrorist groups do not feel bound by international

conventions. Nevertheless, this reminder indicates that the threat in itself persists and is growing with the transfer of techniques between related groups, in this case to Al Qaida and especially to Daesh with regard to the Lake Chad Basin. It was therefore necessary to conceive responses, which can be articulated as follows with regard to the measures taken by the MNJTF:

The empirical assessment of Boko Haram IED technology: The Defence and Security Forces have recovered several explosive belts and other types of IEDs from suicide bombers, at manufacturing and concealment sites. The pooling of information between the forces also provided information on the variety of devices and operating modes. The exploitation of ex-combatants and the fireworks themselves remains a major source of information on the devices and their activation.

The development of an anti-IED brevity: the evaluation of the timing, the places of disposition and the mechanisms of concealment of the IEDs on the roads, led the units to develop a set of attitudes to adopt when they circulate in vehicles or on foot: distribution elements in vehicles and occupancy of seats; use of vehicles more resistant to blast explosives; avoidance of relatively more exposed road compartments; alignment on the route of the leading vehicle of the convoy. To this is added, at the MNJTF, daily IED reconnaissance patrols and squaring of the lanes used by vehicles leaving for operations, particularly in the area of Bonderi, quite targeted by Boko Haram.

Indeed, it proved necessary to hold the road to the outward and return of the units to prevent the artificers from laying mines before their return. These artificers sometimes protect the combatants by laying mines intended to slow down the response or prevent the arrival of reinforcements. True lone wolves, seem to act discreetly, out of sight of combatants kept away from places where explosive charges are laid, more to prevent information leaks than as a security measure.

The anti-IED provisions specific to the Forces engaged against Boko Haram and in the case of this study, those of the MNJTF, are the result of lived experiences. They are therefore continuously improved and taught to soldiers. The pooling of such provisions and their respect will have contributed to reducing the human and material losses due to IEDs.

The manufacture of demining tools: In addition to building the capacity of designated deminers, Sector 1 of the MNJTF has also provided them with an instrument of its own manufacture. In addition, gigantic

⁶ Interviews, Mora, August 24, 2021

⁷ Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, entered into force on 1 March 1999

⁸Speech by Mr. Gilles Carbonnier, Vice-President of the ICRC - November 16, 2020, Geneva, <https://www.icrc.org/fr/document/convention-mines-antipersonnel-beaucoup-reste-faire>

roller skates known here as roller skates are attached to the front of the armoured vehicles. They literally crush the IEDs, their thickness choking the blast of the explosion. Rollerblades have come to mitigate the threat of large IEDs, the explosion which damaged armoured vehicles in Cameroon as well as in Nigeria. Such explosive charges would have considerably increased the losses among the soldiers and the population.

III - On the role of the population

The contribution of the population has so far consisted on the one hand in preventing the access of bomb carriers to their target locations, and on the other hand in alerting the Defence and Security Forces to the risks of the presence of IED.

The Vigilante Committees placed at the entrance to villages and periodic markets have sometimes identified suspects by their attitude, with, in some cases, a justified flair. Using their arrows, they managed to keep them away, forcing them to activate their charges to be the only victims. Sometimes, the Vigilante Committees alerted the Defence and Security Forces who either apprehended the suspects or stopped the progression of suicidal persons before they reached populous places. Some have lost their lives in explosions. The days dedicated to periodic markets are the riskiest. We must search the vehicles, examine the goods, and feel each person, especially those who come from other countries. Women are often associated with this exercise. The task is all the more difficult as the clothing styles of men and women are conducive to the concealment of objects, in particular explosive belts. It is therefore in the facades and the attitude that we perceive the risk in communities where «those whom we do not know around here are easily identifiable».⁹ Some have joined the Vigilante Committees following the death of their relatives, victims of suicide attacks.

Aware of the daily risks they run on the roads, the population of the affected areas have learned to look where to step, the wheel of the bicycle or the motorcycle. Thus, they manage to suspect a clump of grass whose presence detonates, a freshly disturbed earth, a portion of road redeveloped while the rest is strewn with potholes. Their alert was sometimes justified, leading the deminers to withdraw the charges.

In conclusion: perspectives

The lull that we had observed since 2018 in IED attacks is mainly attributable to the efforts of the Defence and Security Forces, which quickly grasped the terrorist

mechanism in this area. Between understanding the operating methods, destroying the manufacturing workshops, operating the fireworks, designing prevention and demining techniques, and synergy with the population, the response has gradually been structured and the nuisance capacity of Boko Haram through IEDs, strongly reduced. In order to maintain this trend of containment or even elimination of the manufacture and use of these devices against civilians, the military and infrastructure, it is important to shift the course of effective reaction to move towards anticipation, even pre-emption. To do this, a few suggestions:

Stimulate IED awareness: the soldiers engaged in the front line of the fight against Boko Haram and the civilians who support them in this fight or who live in the exposed areas, are quite aware of the preventive attitudes to adopt. Paranoia had gripped traders and market users, worshipers in churches and mosques, patients going to hospitals, etc. Many are those who no longer attend collective prayers or meetings of development committees since the risk of attack had installed psychosis. If the threat in itself seems under control, the risk remains. It would therefore be appropriate to share lived experiences and preventive attitudes to broaden the spectrum of collective protection against the resurgence of IEDs;

Prevent technology transfer: We have often seen the hand of graduates in certain sciences behind the design of IEDs used by terrorist organisations around the world. Evidence exists. However, we also know that the fireworks of Boko Haram are not always sophisticated intellectuals, far from it. It is hard to find some who are not illiterate. It is a skilled workforce whose surrender should be accompanied by a more subtle reintegration approach, more supervised at the level of the Lake Chad Basin. The plurality of strategic fields between the Gulf of Guinea and the Sahel, combined with the porosity of borders, is favourable to the circulation of skills in the asymmetric war market in which certain non-State armed groups engage;

Prevent the formation of new fireworks: it is probably Daesh instructors who trained the first fireworks in Sambisa and the Sahel. Fraternisations between Boko Haram and groups in the Sahel affiliated with the Islamic State seem to have taken place since the start of the crisis. The sponsorship of the ISWA consolidated the modalities. At a time when the ISWA and factions loyal to Shekau engage in fratricidal clashes for control of the terrorist franchise in the Lake Chad Basin, there is reason to consider the strengthening of the support of the allies of the ISWA, in particular by training and use of IEDs. The artificers who surrendered were from the branch loyal to Shekau. We have little information on the skills

⁹ Interviews with members of vigilance committees, Mora, Moskota, Dandi (Chad), various dates.

available to the ISWA which, in its targeting of the Defence and Security Forces, will not be limited to conventional warfare,

Strengthen control of access to components:

While it is difficult to limit the possibilities for recovering military equipment residues, this should not be the case for items marketed without restriction. The case of urea is well known. However, it is important to develop a prospective IED to consider the changes that new manufacturing methods and tools would take, as well as potential targets. Beyond the violent organisations currently operating on or near Cameroonian territory, this prospect should integrate the potential changes in infra-state militarisation. The IED prospect should explore the risks of using other types of chemical and material compounds and devote a significant regulatory framework to them.

The fact that the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) targets the Defence and Security Forces above all, calls for more security of the axes of mobility of the units.

Nourished by takfirism practicing the ex-

communication of Muslims opposed to their vision, thereby legitimising all the violence against them as against the systems they condemn, the followers of Shekau who continue to surrender, count among them the same categories of vulnerable people whose management poses ***the second prospective stake: hasten their multifaceted care in the context of DDR and humanitarian interventions to stem the risks of re-recruitment.***

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UNDERSTANDING TO BETTER ANTICIPATE: THE CRITICAL FACTORS OF THE FUTURE OF IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES IN AFRICA

Dr Aimé Raoul SUMO TAYO

The end of the Cold War and the ensuing tidal wave encouraged the emergence of actors carrying new strategic, criminal, or systemic threats, different from those, which prevailed after World War II. These threats manifest themselves in a disparity of war goals, means and ways of acting¹. On these last aspects precisely, the United Nations noted a «growing use of improvised explosive devices by illegal armed groups, terrorists and other unauthorised users»². These are devices placed or made in an improvised way and which contain lethal chemicals. These devices, made up of military or civilian components, are designed to destroy, neutralise, harass or distract the adversary³. Due to the inevitable, linear, irreversible and rapid proliferation of technology on the one hand, and the strategic and tactical effectiveness of this mode of action, on the other hand, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) will remain for a long time again, the «paradigmatic artefact» of the new wars⁴, not because of their novelty but because of their centrality in the modes of action of non-state armed groups, anarchists and criminals⁵. This trend could continue or even strengthen in the coming decades. Moreover, experts from the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organisation (JIEDDO) predicted that IEDs would be used more and more, lethal and sophisticated, the only limit being the ingenuity of the users⁶.

This is why this work focuses on the critical factors that will determine the future of IED use in Africa. The retro-prospective approach of this analysis consists in identifying the critical factors, these exogenous elements and phenomena which could have an influence on the current dynamics and on which the Defence and Security Forces have, at best, only one very weak grip. Among these many factors, this work chooses to retain four: the effectiveness of this mode of action, the increasing capacity improvement of African armies, the availability of human and material resources and the logic of dispute of the State matrix of warlike fact. Each time, it will also be a question of seeing what these factors suggest for the future.

¹ Army, General Tactics, Paris, Economica, 2008 p. 9.

² UN, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on December 7, 2020, Seventy-fifth session Agenda item 103 (ii) General and Complete Disarmament: Addressing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Devices.

³ UNMAS, Improvised explosive devices lexicon, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), New-York, nd.

⁴ J., Revill, Improvised Explosive Devices. The Paradigmatic Weapon of New Wars, p.

⁵ P., Lucat, "The use of homemade bombs (explosives or incendiary) in France: a dangerous development", in Sécurité générale, 2017/1 N° 9, p. 19.

⁶ JIEDDO, quotes in S., Casey-Maslen, "A Need for Greater Restrictions on the Use of Improvised Explosive Devices", ADH Geneva A "Food-for-Thought" Paper. Geneva, 2012.

I - As a retro-prospective diagnosis: the data of the problem

Since the end of the Cold War, improvised explosive devices have become the weapons of choice for insurgents and terrorists⁷. These devices make it possible to bypass the classic mechanisms of arms control. Their use contributes to the civilianisation of armed conflicts and to the indistinctness of the front and the rear. These devices are extremely lethal. In Afghanistan, for example, they are the cause of the highest number of deaths among the soldiers of the international coalition against the Taliban. Their effectiveness is due to both their lethality and the difficulty in detecting and

neutralising them. They are deployed in combat environments and in cities. They can be posed, attached to animals, or attached to humans. In addition, these devices can be triggered by the victim himself or controlled remotely⁸.

The use of these devices generally stems from the systemic vision that the insurgents have of the States they face. Beyond the purely tactical aspects, IEDs terrorise the population to whom they very often inflict complex injuries and prevent them from going about their business. These devices have become the main asset of insurgencies facing modern armies and having a significant and precise fire capacity. They allow

⁷ Eleventh Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, 11 November 2009 Item 12 of the provisional agenda Reports of any subsidiary bodies Improvised explosive devices.

⁸ O., Paillard, «Improvised Explosive Devices (EEL): a real impact for the British army in Afghanistan: 2006-2014», Geostrategia, posted on 21 Jan 2019, <https://www.geostrategia.fr/les-engins-explosifs-improvises-eei-un-veritable-impact-pour-larmee-britannique-en-afghanist-an-2006-2014/> accessed August 15, 2021.



WOMAN-SUICIDE BOOMBERS-OF-BOKO-HARAM-300x200-500x330-c-default (Mondoblog)

insurgents to inflict significant human and material losses on their adversaries⁹. These devices have thus become the main cause of losses in the ranks of Western armies¹⁰.

In the Lake Chad Basin, the pollution of the routes by the installation of Improvised Explosive Devices strongly disrupts the delivery of aid in the context of what the UN Secretary General considers to be «one of the most serious humanitarian crises in the world»¹¹. In Cameroon, in the North-West and South-West regions, as well as in the Far North, suicide attacks and the pollution of routes occupy a prominent place in the repertoires of actions of separatists and jihadists. Between 2015 and 2020, Boko Haram carried out 163 suicide attacks in Cameroon, causing the death of 467 people and injuring 672. The sect also uses Improvised Explosive Devices to pollute the roads, but, in recent years, the collaboration of the population helps mitigate the effects. More and more, the information provided by the Vigilante Committees makes it possible to scan and extract mines buried by the insurgents. On the other hand, the pollution of the routes by the installation of IEDs has become the main mode of action of the English-speaking separatists.

Gradually, IEDs become the main weapon of non-State armed groups and criminals. A body of evidence suggests that these weapons will be more and present in the conflicts of the future. Hence the imperative for States to identify and act on the critical factors which will determine the future of this mode of action, first its effectiveness.

II - The historical effectiveness of this mode of action

One of the factors of the trivialisation of the use of Improvised explosive devices by Non-State armed groups and which will determine the future of this mode of action is its profitability. The model developed by Everett Rogers on the impact of factors such as «relative advantage», «compatibility», «complexity», «testability» and «observability» in the dissemination and adoption of technological innovations makes it possible to account for the reasons for the rise in the use of Improvised

Explosive Devices in contemporary conflicts¹². The choice of this mode of action is thus explained by its reputation in terms of effectiveness: «during the last two decades, the terrorists have observed that this strategy works»¹³. Moreover, several governments have admitted that the suicide attacks had at least accelerated the implementation of concessions at the demands of insurgent groups¹⁴. The implementation of this mode of action against the army and the Israeli population thus enabled Hezbollah to drive the Tsahal out of South Lebanon¹⁵. The Palestinian example shows that «the use of suicide bombings has undoubtedly proved to be positive in terms of cost-effectiveness»¹⁶. The strategic effectiveness of the suicide attacks was also highlighted by the attacks of September 11, 2001, which led to the American invasion of Afghanistan, then of Iraq, as Al Qaeda had wished¹⁷. More recently, in 2004, the attack on the Atocha station (Madrid), which killed 191 people, caused the fall of the Aznar government and precipitated the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Afghanistan.

By resorting to IEDs, non-state armed groups incidentally aim for tactical victories. It is more of a question of «bending the will of the adversary by inflicting symbolically and morally acceptable losses»¹⁸. Because war is a confrontation of wills before being a duel of abilities, the astonishment that arises from suicide attacks and the feeling of helplessness that results from the pollution of routes by the laying of IEDs can affect the morale and the will of fight soldiers. In addition, the use of these devices disrupts the various phases of an operation, in particular intervention, stabilisation, and normalisation. Thus, because of this mode of action, the insurgents quite often succeed in disrupting environmental control actions, including

¹²On the relative advantage, a group uses a mode of action because they believe it would give them an advantage. Complexity relates to the difficulties in perceiving and understanding innovation. This relates to what one incurs during the manufacture of the device, the manufacture is easier than that of a nuclear weapon, for example. Compatibility relates to the availability of resources, to the existence of a sort of waiting for horizon. Observability relates to the perception of this mode of action in other groups and which creates a kind of strategic mimicry. R, Everett M., "Diffusion of Preventive Innovations." *Addictive Behaviours* 27 (6), 2002.

¹³R., A. Pape, *Dying to Win. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, New-York, Random House, 2005, p. 19.

¹⁴For example, the attacks against the American embassy in Beirut on April 18, 1983 (63 dead) and against a barracks of French paratroopers and American sailors on October 23, 1983 (299 dead), had forced Americans and French to leave Lebanon. R.A, Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism", in *American Political Science Review*, vol. 97, n° 3, August 2003, p. 2.

¹⁵P., Migaux, «The roots of radical Islam», in G., Chaliand, A., Blin (dir), *History of terrorism. From Antiquity to Daech*, Paris, Fayard, 2015, p. 375.

¹⁶F., Géré, «Suicide operations: between war and terrorism», in Chaliand, Blin (Dir), *Histoire du terrorisme*, p.514.

¹⁷J., Warner, H., Mattess, «Exploding Stereotypes: The Unexpected Operational and Demographic Characteristics of Boko Haram's Suicide Bombers», Report, Combatting Terrorism Center, West Point, United States Military Academy, August 2017, p. 7.

¹⁸Pierre-Joseph Givre (coll), Nicolas Le Nen (coll), *Enjeux de guerre*, Paris, Economica, 2012, p. 30.

⁹ C., Lafaye, "Example of counterinsurgency: operational excavation in Afghanistan", *Revue Historique des armées*, n° 268, 2012.

¹⁰Giraud (lieutenant-colonel), "The doctrine of the fight against IEDs: a body of doctrines in perpetual evolution", *Doctrine*, no 17, July 2009, p. 20.

¹¹ UN, Report of the Secretary-General "Addressing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Devices", Seventy-fifth session Item 103 (ii) of the provisional agenda General and complete disarmament.

actions to control physical space to ensure safety and freedom of movement, protection of people and goods, as well as actions of influence. This mode of action also disrupts actions to support the population and reconstruction.¹⁹.

On the tactical level, suicide attacks very often make it possible to achieve military objectives that the insurgents would not have destroyed otherwise.²⁰. A priori, this mode of action has a major advantage: «suddenness, surprise, precision, the ability to penetrate the target»²¹. These devices are also used for targeted assassinations and ambushes. IEDs also aim to deprive armies of their freedom of action. It appears, for example, that the pollution of the Maltam-Fotokol route by Boko Haram was aimed at reducing the number of visitors to this axis to leave the way free for smugglers who supplied the jihadists. The pollution of this axis also aimed to isolate Fotokol, which had already been the subject of three unsuccessful occupation attempts after the insurgents took control of the Nigerian town of Gambaru.

The rationale for the use of IEDs by non-state armed groups also relates to the astonishment and disproportionate reaction of affected States. For the former, it is a question of triggering a spiral of violence by the latter, according to the «Guévarist» logic.²². Indeed, the use of Improvised Explosive Devices in the context of suicide attacks or pollution of routes generally arouses fear. However, this obeys the instinct of survival and is at the origin of violent actions very often uncontrolled.²³. Terrorist actions aim, through reprisals, at collateral victims and the missteps of the authorities that they provoke, to undermine the credibility of the State²⁴. Repression, in which the population is said to be the main victim, very often leads to a reversal of roles, the victim becoming the executioner. In such a context, the terrorist actor tries to become the catalyst of a social movement whose vector may be the vocabulary of jihad,

¹⁹ Army, General Tactics, p. 15.

²⁰ M., Bloom, "Dying to Kill: Devising a Theory of Suicide Terror". [Paper for the Harrington workshop on terrorism "A Culture of Death: On the Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism", May 12, 2005, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas], nd, p. 114.

²¹ Managed, «Suicide operations: between war and terrorism», p. 535.

²² E., Tenenbaum, Partisans and Centurions: History of Irregular Warfare in the Twentieth Century. Perrin, 2018, p. 412.

²³ Givre, Le Nen, Enjeux de guerre, p. 17.

²⁴ J., Lynn, "The Ages of Terrorisme", in Cabane, Bruno (Dir), Une histoire de la guerre. From the 19th century to the present day, Paris, Seuil, 2018, p. 228. Indeed, as noted by the American criminologist, David Fromkin, «the specificity of the terrorist strategy lies in the fact that it achieves its goals, not by the effect of its acts but by the response to its acts». Cited in A., Bauer, FB., Huyghe, Terrorists always say what they are going to do: Terrorism and revolution through texts, Paris, PUF, 2010



RFI - Cameroon - reinforced security after a series of deadly attacks in the north-west of the country

for example.²⁵

The effectiveness of the use of IEDs also relates to their psychological effects, which very often and far exceed their real effects. Indeed, terrorist groups are aware that «the media are the place where industrial societies produce our reality»²⁶. Resorts to IEDs are thus both means of communication and weapons of psychological warfare. Anglophone separatists in Cameroon, for example, stage, film and broadcast their exploits in order to affect the morale of Republican troops and public opinion. This is one of the universals of insurgency warfare in which the media is used as a weapon having an effect parallel to the realities of the classic battlefield. On this subject, the former head of Hezbollah, Sheik Nabil Qaou, underlined the effectiveness of this mode of action: «the use of the media as a weapon had an effect parallel to a battle ... By using these films, we were able to control the morale of a large number of Israelis from afar»²⁷.

From this point of view and in many respects, the use of IEDs is an act of communication through staging. This is undoubtedly why Brian Jenkins considers terrorism as a play, with unity of time, unity of place and unity of action. With the explosion, the victims and the cameras, it is the dramatization that prevails. In addition, television has increased the importance of staging, as terrorism needs media publicity to exist. The use of IEDs thus makes it possible to draw attention to the cause defended by the perpetrators. It is this communicational aspect of these devices that brings together the rotary press and the anarchist Ravachol, the direct broadcasting satellite and Abu Niddal, IT and Al Qaeda.²⁸ It is also the use of IEDs which gives terrorism one of its most functional definitions: «the implementation of violence aimed at civilians in an indiscriminate manner, an act of war intended to cause a sensation and therefore to make itself known», where the means to hurt are articulated with the means to scare, that is to say to spread the message»²⁹. This last function is ensured by the media regime, which, in a way, provides the press service for terrorism: «a terrorist without a journalist is an actor without an audience it is a letter without a stamp»³⁰.

Beyond communication, the use of IEDs by the insurgents obliges the Defence and Security Forces to overinvest in the protection force and to sometimes practice, the principle of firm defence to the extreme. It also deprives the forces of freedom of movement and manoeuvre. IEDs mainly prevent the Defence and Security Forces from controlling the population who constitute the centre of gravity³¹ of a counterinsurgency war. This is why, to permanently ensure the legitimisation of its action and ensure freedom of action, to adapt its strength to the local context and ensure the economy of means, to concentrate efforts following the marginalisation of the insurgent³², any force engaged in a counter-insurgency campaign must be in contact with the local population to ensure an operational grid. However, the use of Improvised Explosive Devices tends to complicate the task of the Defence and Security Forces. The «yesterday's power»³³ is thus defeated by «The poor man's weapon». The weapon system mobilised is set up using inexpensive technology³⁴. A suicide bombing, for example, requires a small number of operators to cause damage on a very large scale. In the case of Boko Haram, it takes around \$ 150 to build a bomb. In this context, the massive resort to suicide bombings may be a sign of dwindling resources. In any case, it marks the shift towards a kind of low cost terrorism³⁵.

III - The growing military superiority of African armies

Improving the capability of African armies is another key factor for the future of the use of IEDs by non-state actors on the continent. Indeed, after having been for a long time, rightly or wrongly, negatively labeled for the dramatic state of doctrines, human resources and equipment, as well as the inadequacy of resources for missions, capacities for threats³⁶, today, faced with strong and determined adversaries, the African armed forces «are now conducting war operations and have had to adapt to become employment armies», as

²⁵G., Kepel, *Jihad, expansion and decline of Islamism*, Paris, Gallimard, 2000, p. 18.

²⁶Fanny, Bugnon, «From agitation to terrorism». Stakes of the media coverage of revolutionary violence in France (1973-1986) », in *Lien social et politiques*, n° 68, Radicalités et radicalization, 2012, p. 248.

²⁷Quoted in J., Kifner, «In long fight with Israel, Hezbollah tactics evolved», *The New York Times*, 2000, vol. 19.

²⁸R., Debray, «The passage to Infinity», *Les cahiers de Méthodologie*, 2002/1, n° 13, p. 7.

²⁹R., Debray, «The terrorist as a paradoxical figure of hope», *Communication to the International Symposium Terrorism: Are We at War*, Bastogne: War Museum, 2018.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹The center of gravity is the «source of power, material or immaterial, from which freedom of action, physical strength and the will to fight are drawn». *Army, General Tactics*, p. 51.

³²This is the adaptation of Marshal Foch's three principles to a counterinsurgency context. De Courrèges, Germain, Le Nen, *Principles of counter-insurrection*, p. 20.

³³B., Badie, *The impotence of power. Essay on New International Relations*, Paris, Fayard, 2004.

³⁴M., Neiberg, «Technology is nothing without strategy», in Cabane, Bruno (Dir), *Une Histoire de la Guerre*, p.122.

³⁵Warner, Matfess, «Exploding Stereotypes», p. 7.

³⁶L., Koungou, *Defense and National Security on the Move: Dynamics of Reforms, Institutional Changes in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Paris, Editions L'Harmattan, 2010, p 18.

underlined by Colonel Philippe Susnjara, former Head of the Africa Office of the French Armed Forces and Africa Advisor to the Chief of the Armed Forces³⁷. After the failure of decades of training, knowledge transfer and counselling³⁸ by international partners, African armies are more and more seasoned: "learn to wage war by waging it [...] We start by fighting and then we learn; because fighting is learning"³⁹.

As a consequence of this improvement in the capacity of African armies, more and more non-state armed groups will resort to Improvised Explosive Devices as part of so-called "from the weak to the strong" strategies. Indeed, "When the battlefield becomes almost transparent for one of the two belligerents, it is not the concentration of forces that allows the other to prevail, but the recreation of the "fog of war" by other means"⁴⁰. IEDs are thus compensators for inferiority,⁴¹ which participate in the art of bypassing by one of the protagonists of war. It is about establishing a military balance while affecting the mobility of the opposing forces.⁴² These devices are also strategic in the sense that they participate in psychological warfare and their impact stems from the feeling of helplessness linked to

the difficulty of being detected or neutralised. It is an unconventional weapon, which aims to deprive the Defence and Security Forces deployed on the ground, of freedom of movement and manoeuvre. By way of illustration, in 2015, faced with operational difficulties on the ground, Boko Haram had chosen to install Improvised Explosive Devices on the routes taken by the Cameroonian army. It was not only a question of reducing the mobility and therefore the capacities of projection and mutual reinforcement of the devices of the Cameroonian Army. It was also about disrupting social life by limiting the movement of people and goods and sowing fear among the population. Cameroonian soldiers and police are generally victims of these devices. This was, for example, the case on December 13, 2014, when two soldiers of the 41st Motorised Infantry Battalion (BIM) had blown up on a mine in the Cameroonian locality of Djibrilli, not far from Ashigashia, district of Mayo-Moskoto. They were going, with their comrades, to Gouzda-Vreket, 5 km from Zelevet, where two elements of Boko Haram had been killed two days earlier⁴³. Police officers and soldiers are also victims of this mode of action during patrols, at checkpoints, or during attacks in which their posts are directly targeted, as was the case in Fotokol on 11 July 2015. In the specific case patrolling, area control requires great mobility of forces, but at the same time increases their vulnerability to Improvised Explosive Devices.

Because on the one hand, war is a «duel where each

³⁷Philippe, Susnjara (col), "Revolution in African military affairs", in *Revue Défense Nationale*, 2016/7, n° 792, p. 38.

³⁸A., Leboeuf, "Cooperating with African armies", IFRI study Focus Stratégique, 2017, no 76, p. 23.

³⁹M., Zedong, *Strategic Problems of Revolutionary War in China*, Beijing, Foreign Language Editions, 1960, p. 95.

⁴⁰JY., Le Drian, *Qui est l'ennemi ?*, Paris, Les Editions du Cerf, 2016, p. 52.

⁴¹Managed, "Suicide operations: between war and terrorism", p. 531.

⁴²Paillard, "Improvised Explosive Devices (IED): a real impact for the British army in Afghanistan ..."

⁴³L'Oeil du Sahel, n° 662 of Monday, December 15, 2014.



side determines the quality of the interaction in play»⁴⁴ and, on the other hand, the radicals define their repertoires of action according to new constraints⁴⁵, the growing superiority of the African armies will accentuate the resort to equalising capacities, foremost among which is Improvised Explosive Devices. The same is true of the availability of human and material resources.

IV - The availability of human and material resources

The increasing trivialisation of the use of Improvised Explosive Devices by non-state armed groups in Africa is favoured by the availability of human and material resources.

A. The availability of human resources

As with any military organisation, the choices of insurgent weapons systems depend on the availability of resources⁴⁶. The availability of expertise in the manufacture of IEDs is therefore one of the determining factors of its trivialisation. Historically, the instrumental support of the USA for movements, which they then considered to be «Freedom Fighters» against Soviet evil.⁴⁷ will have been the main vehicle for the dissemination of expertise in the field of IED manufacturing⁴⁸. The Bomb School of Los Fresnos in Texas thus welcomed recruits from several foreign countries as part of the support for the Mujahedin⁴⁹, to the point where Mike Davis describes the Reagan Administration's support for the Mujahedin as «the greatest terrorist technology transfer of all time»⁵⁰. The return of the Mujahedin to their respective regions of origin has promoted the dissemination of knowledge on IEDs. In addition, transfers of skills between terrorist groups have amplified this dynamic. For example, Al Qaeda, despite its doctrinal differences and especially its significant financial resources, went to Hezbollah's school following the resounding success of the Beirut

attacks in 1983⁵¹. In Africa and by way of illustration, Boko Haram acquired IED skills through contact with Al Qaeda in the Sahel⁵². Resorting to this mode of action is therefore indisputably the fruit of cooperation with other jihadist groups, in Africa and elsewhere. It would then be one of the brutal consequences of the globalisation of resentment. Beyond foreign knowledge, the mobilisation of endogenous knowledge has been a factor in the expansion of IEDs for a group like Boko Haram⁵³.

The issue of human resource availability also relates to the compatibility of specific forms of IEDs with the norms and context of different groups. Anthropological and social considerations thus condition the resort to specific forms of IEDs. Thus, a sectarian movement will tend to implement human bombs. Boko Haram, for example, today holds the sad record for the group that most used suicide bombings because by thus ensuring control over the space that produces suicide bombers, the group was able to implement conventional mechanisms through which sects lead their followers to suicide. The ideology, coupled with the social fragility of the local population has favoured the acceptance of this practice, thus confirming the idea that social unrest, a great misery and moreover propaganda greatly orchestrated are the cause of the manifestation of prescribed pulsions in societies, even the so-called civilized once⁵⁴.

Beyond sectarian logic, the implementation of specific forms of Improvised Explosive Devices relates to anthropological considerations, in particular the existence of a waiting horizon, in particular the practice of activities relating to ritual donation, to the gift of oneself for the others. We can thus explain the adoption of suicide attacks by Boko Haram by the existence of ablative rites and protocols among local peoples as demonstrated by anthropologist Guy Nicolas⁵⁵. This horizon of expectation also relates to the existence of forms of social relations favouring «transfer abuse» and the facilities of «psychic enslavement, relational slavery, totalitarian control, denial of autonomy, psychic exploitation of man by man»⁵⁶ by which an adult can ask

⁴⁴Neiberg, "Technology is nothing without strategy," p. 124.

⁴⁵In the case of the Mapuche, Barbut, showed that they defined new modes of action according to the international context and the balance of power. M., Barbut, "Who are the terrorists? Classification struggle around Mapuche radicalism", *Lien Social et Politiques*, n° 68, 2012

⁴⁶MC, Horowitz, "Non State Actors and the diffusion of innovations: The case of suicide terrorism", *International Organization*, 2010, vol. 64, no 1, p. 38.

⁴⁷Kepel, *Jihad, Expansion and Decline of Islamism*, p. 26.

⁴⁸A., Rashid, *Descent into chaos: the US and the failure of nation building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*, Penguin, 2008, p. 39.

⁴⁹The White House, "US Policy, Programs and Strategy in Afghanistan, National Security Directive Number 166", 1985, <http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-166.pdf>

⁵⁰M., Davis, *Buda's Wagon. A Brief History of the Car Bomb*, New York, Verso, 2007.

⁵¹Horowitz, "Non State Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations," p. 34.

⁵²Warner, Matfess, «Exploding Stereotypes», p. 8.

⁵³SG, Jones, Johnston, PB, "The future of insurgency", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 36 (1), 2012.

⁵⁴Cited in S., Audouin-Rouzeau, *Combattre. Une anthropologie historique de la guerre moderne (XIXe-XXIe siècle)*, Paris, Seuil, 2008, pp. 61; 68.

⁵⁵G., Nicolas, *From ritual gift to ritual sacrifice*, Paris, La Découverte / MAUSS, 1996, p. 53.

⁵⁶D., Zagury, «Psychiatric approach to mental hold: the factors of vulnerability or protection», in *Mental hold at the heart of sectarian drift: a threat to democracy? Act of the national conference organized by the Interministerial Mission for Vigilance and the Fight against Sectarian Abuses on*

another adult to kill himself, taking that of the Others. The anthropologist Ronald Cohen has, for example, documented the strong significance of transferential logics in social relations among the Kanuri⁵⁷. In addition, the socio-economic context tends to favour the shift of the population towards the sacred wilderness⁵⁸, as well as the rise of archaisms such as the belief in paradise and the apocalyptic vision that very often accompanies it. For this population, voluntary combatant death is only one modality of the passage from one life to another: to die to live differently.

B. Availability of material resources

The trivialisation of the use of IEDs by non-state armed groups in Africa is also favoured by the availability of materials and precursors of civil or military origin. Indeed, these devices are made from components of daily use from commerce, in particular Ammonium Nitrate, Oxygen Peroxide, and Potassium Chlorate for example. These precursor products have dual use as they can also be used for legitimate activities like agriculture or mining⁵⁹.

Materials and precursors for IEDs also come from

conventional weapons⁶⁰ carried away during the assaults of the insurgents against the posts of the national armies. These weapons also come from the illicit trade⁶¹.

C. Strategic piracy and growing contestation of the State matrix of the fact of war

The trivialisation of the use of Improvised Explosive Devices by contemporary non-state armed groups is part of a global dynamic of contestation of the state matrix of the fact of war. As Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui underlined, faced with the growing superiority of certain great powers, we will witness unprecedented forms of totalisation of war marked by the indistinction between peacetime and wartime, between the front and back and an expiration of contemporary strategic grammar and a modification of the laws of war and current principles of combat⁶². Additionally, a decade ago Colonels Givre and Le Nen successfully predicted that the current wars would be the wars of discouragement⁶³. The use of Improvised Explosive Devices is part of this psychological warfare that can lead to discouragement.

November 23, 2013, p. 45-57, Paris, Miviludes, 2013, p. 46.

⁵⁷ R., Cohen, *The Kanuri of Bornu*, New-York, Rinehart and Winston, 1967, pp. 50-51.

⁵⁸ R., Bastide, *Le sacré sauvage and other essays*, Paris, Gallimard, 1950.

⁵⁹ Revill, *Improvised Explosive Devices*, p. 96.

⁶⁰ C., Seymour, "Countering Improvised Explosive Devices", *Small Arms Survey Research Notes*, n° 46, October 2014, p. 1.

⁶¹ S., de Tésières, "At the crossroads of Sahelian conflicts. Insecurity, terrorism and arms trafficking in Niger", *Small Arms Survey Report*, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, 2020.

⁶² Qiao Liang, Wang Xiangsui, *The War Outside Limits*, Paris, Payot and Rivages, 2003.

⁶³ Givre, Le Nen, *Enjeux de guerre*, p. 29.



Libération - 2 kamikazes aux ceintures très artisanales

In post-industrial wars, there is no battle anymore, at least not in its classic sense. The use of Improvised Explosive Devices is part of the strategy of avoiding insurgents who refuse to concentrate their forces and directly confront conventional armies. Suicide attacks thus participate in the totalisation of the war, in particular in that they put aside the moral, legal and political considerations which govern the use of force in the context of a war.⁶⁴ This trend could be accentuated by the proliferation of religious terrorist groups. Indeed, these groups resort disproportionately to suicide attacks.⁶⁵

CONCLUSION

The use of Improvised Explosive Devices is the most successful expression of the questioning of the State matrix of the fact of war by contemporary insurrectional and criminal movements. It participates in the totalisation and urbanisation of war, as well as the erasure of borders, already very porous, between combatants and non-combatants⁶⁶. Because of their physical, psychological, media effects and especially their growing importance in the insurgent systems, these devices have become the paradigmatic weapons of the new wars.⁶⁷ and those of tomorrow because, as Robert Gates, former director of the CIA and former secretary of defence of the United States, pointed out, asymmetric warfare will be a major facet of the battlefield for the next few years⁶⁸.

The future of the use of Improvised Explosive Devices in the conflicts of the future in Africa will be determined by critical factors such as the recognised effectiveness of this mode of action, the growing military superiority of African armies and its impact on the conflict dynamics of interaction with non-state armed groups, the availability of human and material resources, as well as the growing contestation of the State matrix of warlike fact by contemporary insurgent groups. These critical factors pose several key challenges for the future that must be formalised and the actions intended to respond to them determined.

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⁶⁴JV., Holeindre, "Penser la guerre", in Cabane (dir), Une histoire de la guerre, p. 43.

⁶⁵Warner, Mattess, «Exploding Stereotypes», p. 8.

⁶⁶B., Cabanne, "Opening. A history of war", in Cabane (dir), A history of war, p. 17.

⁶⁷The concept of the New Wars was developed by Mary Kaldor and others, not to denote contemporary forms of organized violence, fundamentally different from the inter-state conflicts of the 19th and 20th centuries. What characterizes them are the actors, the objectives, the forms of financing and the modes of action of these conflicts. M., Kaldor, Mary, "In defense of new wars", Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 2013, vol. 2, no 1.

⁶⁸Quoted in De Courrèges Hervé, Emmanuel Germain, Nicolas Le Nen, Principles of counter-

insurrection, Paris, Economica, 2010.

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