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STRATEGIC AND PROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS BULLETIN



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**Boko Haram, Combating
Terrorism Through a better
Understanding of the Threat**



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Contents	02
EIFORCES Staff.....	04
Editorial	06
EIFORCES in brief	08

News on EIFORCES09 - 14

Final Communique of the 5th Ordinary Session of the Administrative Council of the Eiforces:	09
Back-To-School for the 2014-2015 Academic Year at EIFORCES:	10
Fight Against Boko Haram : Eiforces on the Front	11
Eiforces on a Field Trip	12
The Central African Crisis: at the Heart of Diagnosis	14

Homeland Security15 - 28

Cameroon National Gendarmerie: Towards a Durable Management of Road Insecurity	15
The Conundrum of the Circulation of Heavy Carriers	19
Situation Report on the Fight Against Road Accidents	21
Cameroon Faced with the Threat of the Ebola Epidemic: Strategy and Plans to Counterattack the Threat	25

File : Boko Haram: Combating Terrorism Through a Better Understanding of the Threat ..29 - 93

Sub-Saharan Africa in the Geo-Strategy of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: a Political, Strategic and Operational Challenge for the Armed and Law Enforcement Community	30
Islamist Contamination in the Extreme North of Cameroon: Risks and Limits	39
Boko Haram Expansion, Depopulation of the Border Areas and Influx of Terrorism Refugees in the North of Cameroon	47
The Nomadic/Mobile Koranic Schools And Social Exclusion: the Case of Mahadjirs of the Chad Basin	55
Waterside Demography, Anarchy and Illicit Production in the Lake Chad	67
Transformations of Boko Haram's Polemological Status Facing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Africa: an Integrated Foresight Sketch	73
National Mobilization Against the Boko Haram Sect in Cameroon : an Objectification of the Army-People-Nation Triptych	81
Sub-Regional, Regional and International Mobilisation in the Fight Against Boko Haram	86

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EDITORIAL

Boko haram: Understanding the Threat to Counterattack it

Founded in 2002 by Mohamed Yusuf, the Boko Haram sect limited its activities in the Northern part of Cameroon. The expansion of its activities to other territories sharing boundaries with Nigeria has now become a major issue on the international agenda. Born from a strong crystallisation of resentment against the economic, political and religious and social elites of the North of Nigeria, Boko Haram from the beginning positioned itself as a “social critic” of the established order following the claims of the local population of socio-economic marginalisation, reinforced by an endemic corruption. Chronic clashes between Christian and Muslims as well as friction between the latter and the local authorities led to the radicalization of Boko Haram. Massive reprisals carried out by the local authorities against this group led to the death of Mohamed Yusuf which consequently united the followers of this sect towards a bloody revenge and occupation of some portions of territory in Nigeria.

The growth of Boko Haram, its methods of operation and its ideological discourse-similar to those of its counterparts like AQMI or Al-Qaida, raises several questions, two of which will be handled in this paper.

To begin with, is there a risk of the possibility of a rise of an international jihadist beginning from the Middle East to the area facing north of the Atlantic of Africa? Secondly, how can Boko Haram be sustainably combated?

It is important to in limine litis point out that Boko Haram subscribes under what is known as the “glocal” movement due to the local and global entanglements and dimensions of the problem.



Pr Wullson Mvomo Ela
Head of Research and Documentation Centre
EIFORCES

Moreover, concerning the issue of fundamentalism in Nigeria, this phenomenon can be observed in Christianity as well as in Islam. Jean Francois Bayart confirms this when he adds that the validity of religious facts in Africa attest of its participation in “global times”

Boko Haram seems to express a myth of the golden age, a “return to the sources of the lost empires” By proclaiming his own caliphate and by affirming his will to establish the Sharia, not only in the entire Nigeria but to the rest of the world, Abubakar Shekau identifies himself with Dan Fodio who conquered Northern Nigeria at the beginning of the 19th Century by establishing one of the greatest empires in the history of Africa. It is important to note from this point that radical groups have the tendency of excelling in areas already contested because its

gives Islamists entrepreneurs the possibility to capitalise on the grievances of the local population.

The sympathy expressed by Shekau concerning AL-Baghdadi (Daech) and Al-Zawahiri (Al-Qaida) makes Boko Haram a sui generis case study for at least two reasons. It will also demonstrate the alignment of this phenomenon to the “glocal” tendency;

- Firstly, (**Primio**) concerning its deployment, Boko Haram is a fundamental group whose substance have been squeezed out. It seems we are in the period where arm robbery is exploiting jihadist ideology to give itself some amount of legitimacy.

- Secondly, (**Deuxio**) and as a follow up of the first point, the simultaneous allegiance and belonging expressed by this group to Daech and Al-Qaida seems worrying and illogical when it is well established that these groups are in open competition. It is therefore the quest of Boko Haram

to belong to one of these groups so as to get some dividends in terms of support and credibility.

Today, Boko Haram under its cover of the promoter-coryphée of Islamic fundamentalism is losing its credibility as a result of its several atrocities. Regional (ECCAS, ECOWAS and CGG) and international (on the bilateral and multilateral levels) mobilisation is bearing some fruits with the first victories registered by the countries engaged in the fight against the Islamist sect.

Nevertheless, the activities of this group have greatly affected the countries concerned in the socio-economic domains (health and education) as well as on infrastructures, just to mention a few.

In the end, the activities of Boko Haram are revelatory of the profound dysfunctional nature of the countries affected by the group. First, one can point out the problem of public policies that marginalize several young people and consequently contribute to strengthening the criminal and extremist machinery and mechanisms in these areas. Secondly, the growth of Boko Haram on the field as well as its numerous incursions on foreign territory reveals the underdeveloped nature of the defense and security forces in Nigeria as well as other affected neighbouring countries.

At this level, it is important to attempt hypotheses to the solutions to the Boko Haram threat by taking into consideration the fact that the *casus belli* will neither be religion nor socio-economic marginalisation. The fact that Boko Haram had not spread to the rest of the northern part of Nigerian, though it faces the same economic and political problems and the fact that some major dissent groups in the Borno State (the epicentre of this phenomenon) are dissociating themselves publicly from Boko Haram, raises questions as to the motivations of this group.

It is also important to point out here that the military response to this threat through the regional mobilisation that saw the entry of Chad and Niger into the conflict and the rearrangement of the territorial command structure of the Cameroonian army engaged in this war is quite effective. The fruits are already visible and will without doubt be multiplied

and amplified with the completion of the process of the deployment of Joint Multinational Task Force by the United Nations and the pursuit of cooperation with foreign powers notably through the establishment of intelligence and logistic resources.

Secondly, rapid response measures are being put in place by the government of Cameroon to address the socio-economic malaise in the areas affected by Boko Haram. Amongst the measures adopted by the government is the putting in place of a budget to help develop youth employment and entrepreneurial skills as well as the setting up of structures that will create favourable socio-economic conditions for the growth and development of the northern part of the country.

With these ongoing efforts, it is therefore imperative for the states of this region to work in ways that will liberate all the potentials of development for regional integration on one hand and for the international community to mobilize towards the consolidation of the economies of the state affected by the threat on the other hand. It is also important for the international community to work towards the reconstruction of destabilized states as well as countries under the risk of being destabilized. The answers to the Boko Haram threat should not come out from a universal reflexion taking into consideration its geostrategic and axiological analyses.

On the Geostrategic Level, one can envisage a movement of strategies towards the centre of Arab-Muslim space by American and Allied powers aimed at strengthening the political legitimacy of the democratic paradigm. (rather than an ethno-religious paradigm)

On the Axiological Level, one also can envisage the construction of a philosophical and theological debate in relation with the modernisation of social and political structures. This philosophical debate could articulate in educative programmes, the sensitization of the population with respect to a culture of tolerance and interreligious co-existence. The programme should also sensitize the masses of the political vision of the state so as to silence the siren of fundamentalism.

Community for Sahel-Saharan States
Organization for Islamic Cooperation.

The effects of the last interventions (Iraq, Libya, Syria, Afghanistan) created de-structured political spaces for terrorists groups to flourish and grow.

It includes the idea of *Weltanschauung*, the conception of the world prevailing from a mental plan. Religious facts are deeply rooted in the Arab-Islam world. It is important to point out the place of philosophical debates in the passage of the Western world from the theocracy model founded on dogmas to a secular republican model which came as a result of religious quarrels through political conflicts.

EIFORCES IN BRIEF



EIFORCES	Missions
The EIFORCES is a public institution under Cameroonian law, with legal personality and financial autonomy.	Providing training and facilitating research in the areas of Security and Peace Support.
Localisation	Types de formation
Headquater : Yaounde/Ngousso	Preparation of the Security Forces Staff Diploma (SFSTD) Preparation of Higher Security Forces Studies Certificates (HSFSC).
Institutional Texts	Structure
Decree n°2008/179 of may 2008 laying the basis of the EIFORCES ; Decree n° 2012/307 of june 2012 on the organization and operational modality.	<p>A board of Directors chaired by the Minister of Defence.</p> <p>Members : the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of State in charge of the National Gendarmerie, the Delegate General for National Security, the Representatives of the Présidency of the République, partners countries and international organisations (UN, European Union, African Union, ECCAS, UEMOA...).</p> <p>A General Management.. Headed by a Director General working with an Assistant Director, Technical Advisors, Directors, and Heads of Divisions...</p> <p>And Advisory bodies.</p>

EIFORCES: *«A tool at the service of Peace and Security to the African Continent»*

FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE 5TH ORDINARY SESSION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL OF EIFORCES

On the 31st December 2014, the 5th ordinary session of the administrative council of EIFORCES took place at the Palais de Congrès premises under the auspices of Mr. Mebe Ngo'o Edgard Alain, the Minister Delegate at the Presidency in Charge of defence and who is also President of the above mentioned council.

The acting Director General, Senior Superintendent of Police, Doum-Ndong Patrice reported on the issues highlighted in the agenda. This said session which was essentially on stock taking, equally examined the five elements highlighted in the agenda which included:

- 1: Adoption of the feedback of the 4th session of the accounts ;
- 2: Report of the activities of 2014 amongst which included ;
 - examination and adoption of the Performance report of 30th November 2014 ;
 - report of the Second International Colloquium organized by EIFORCES ;
 - follow up of the Cameroon-France Convention on EIFORCES ;
 - follow up of the Cameroon-Japan Convention on EIFORCES.
- 3: An examination of the adoption of the Performance Project of 2015 ;
- 4: Nominations to positions of responsibilities ;
- 5: Others matters

At the end of a fruitful discussion, the council validated the Performance Project of EIFORCES. It assigned the Director General to build the capacities of its personnel charged with implementing the project.

The Administrative Council approved the budget of the Sub Programme of EIFORCES which in kind (material) and cash stood at 3.361.257.000 FCFA, divided into ;

Two billion seven hundred and fifty-five million (2.755.000.000 FCFA) for investments.

Six hundred and six millions, two hundred and fifty-seven million (606.257.000 FCFA) for the functioning of the institution.

The Administrative Council followed with keen attention the presentation of the Director General on the Performance Report and the Report of the Execution of the Sub Programme at the end of December 2014. From this presentation, new resolutions were deduced to pursue the modernisation and functioning of EIFORCES. The administrators also took note on the project on the nomination to positions of responsibility as well as other specific issues related to the functioning of EIFORCES.

After a succinct prescription to the the Director General on a rigorous strategy on the recovery of resources, it pointed out with satisfaction the efforts and commitments of the Research and Documentation Department of EIFORCES in the quest for sustainable solutions on issues related to Peace and Security in Africa.

Finally, the Administrative Council congratulated the acting Director General for the clarity and quality of the documents presented as well as on the smooth running of the institution. They also praised him for maintaining a climate of professionalism and social cohesion within its premises.

Done in Yaounde, on the 31st December 2014.

The President,

(é) M. MEBE NGO'O Edgard Alain

BACK-TO-SCHOOL FOR THE 2014-2015 ACADEMIC YEAR AT EIFORCES

The official re-opening of the Homeland Security Certificate (HSC) Programme took place on October 14, 2014 at the EIFORCES temporary premises in the Ngousso neighborhood of Yaounde.

Following the proclamation of the results of the entrance examinations held on 15 and 16 September 2014, fifteen candidates were admitted, repartitioned as follows: 06 Cameroonian nationals (03 senior officers from the National Gendarmerie and 03 Police Officers with the rank of Chief Police Commissioners); the other 09 seats were reserved for nationals of six African countries notably: Benin, Congo, Mali, Chad and Nigeria etc.



The Second batches of Brevet d'Etudes Supérieures de Sécurité (BESS) taking lectures at the EIFORCES' temporary campus, Ngousso (Yaoundé)

The Homeland Security Certificate is designed to prepare senior Police and Gendarmes officers for commanding positions within the police component of peace support operations (PSO); senior positions at mission headquarters of the police component, including head of mission.

Expected learning outcomes at the end of the 40 weeks-long training, include ability to prepare, plan and control a police operation in a national and international context.

This Programme gives autonomy to learners to expand their cognitive horizon on variety of stakeholders and co-producers of security. It is also geared towards honing prospective visions on security in Africa and worldwide by integrating the necessary data for their understanding. These Senior Police or Gendarme Officers would also receive a solid training to be credible interlocutors capable of staffing real advisory functions to civil and military authorities.

At the end of the programme, trainees are issued an EIFORCES diploma entitled "Homeland Security Certificate (HSC) and a Masters in International Security.

Security Forces Staff Diploma (SFSD), Session 4

Following the release of the results of the competitive entrance examination for which 64 national candidates postulated (39 National Gendarme Officers and 25 Police officers with the rank of Chief Police Commissioner) for the 20 weeks-long training with a view to obtaining the Security Forces Staff Diploma (SFSD) - Session 4, classes, kicked off on October 21, 2014 and will run through March 25, 2015. This batch constitutes 24 trainees, 08 nationals and 16 foreigners from several African nations, with a minimum qualification of Gendarme Captain or Chief Police Commissioner and a relevant command experience of a unit of the maintenance of order or homeland security.

They are trained for policy making positions at any headquarters during peace or crisis; especially at the headquarters of the "police" component of peace support operations. These trainees equally have the opportunity to widen their scope of knowledge on internal security and peacekeeping operations.

At the end of training, they are issued an EIFORCES Diploma entitled Security Forces Staff Diploma (SFSD).

FIGHT AGAINST BOKO HARAM : EIFORCES ON THE FRONT

From the 21st to the 25th of October 2014, the International School for Defence and Security Forces of Yaounde (EIFORCES), through the head of its Research and Documentation Centre, Pr. Wullson MVOMO ELA, who is also the regional coordinator of the UN strategy against terrorism and widespread of light weapons in West and Central Africa, took part to a joint mission fuled by the UN sub-regional offices for both Central (UNOCA) and West Africa (UNOWA).

This mission, which saw the participation, among others, of the UN regional Commission for Human Rights in Central Africa, aimed at evaluating, through factual sources about the political, social and economic impact of the assaults of Boko Haram in the Far North region, the Cameroonian strategy in terms of prevention, protection, prosecuting and response according to the 2006 UN worldwide doctrine in the scope of fighting terrorism; as far as the challenges deriving from it, and that the Cameroonian state has to face.

In this sense, the UN-EIFORCES delegation met administrative authorities and their Etats-majors, both civilian and military, in Maroua (Far North region) as far as in Mokolo and Mora (respectively in the Mayo-Tsanaga and the Mayo-Sava subdivisions). For example, the meeting with the Governor of the Far North region and his collaborators was the occasion to point out the complex insecurity context due to violent extremism widespread in the region since a few months because of Boko Haram assaults. Measuring the impact of this insecurity, and taking entire consideration of all the determined efforts made by Cameroonian people and government, was also part of the task. The fact is that since then, Cameroon was facing alone the fight for the protection of its territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Those both issues are strongly related to the preservation of peace and stability in central Africa in particular, and in the whole African continent in general.

One illustration of its engagement is the reconfiguration of military and security structures in order to enforce the efficacy of the territorial control, and the implementation of public policies relative to human security, health, or education, which are the most affected sectors at the frontiers.

The meetings with traditional and religious authorities on one hand, and with civil society organizations on the other hand, where most based on examining the destroying impact of terrorism on diverse sectors such as family and social networks, namely on traditional charters,

on pacific coexistence and traditional dialog between the various religious groups in Cameroon, on human rights recognition, considering the diverse humanitarian challenges related to the growing number of refugees and internal movements of the population.

The most relevant observations deriving from those exchanges emerged as follows:

- 1) The central role of administrative authorities in the coordination of the global approach, both civil and military, putted in place to fight against terrorism;
- 2) Necessity of an efficient operational response to the harassment of Boko Haram;
- 3) The relevance of poverty and ignorance, more than religious variables, as determining factors explaining the rapid widespread of jihadist movements and violent extremism;
- 4) The necessity of cross border cooperation in the domain of defence and security between Cameroon and its neighbouring states in order to reduce as far as possible frontier porosity and cross border threats;
- 5) The urgent definition of a global governance strategy and the adequate conditions under which it could be efficiently put in place, in the sense of a multi sector approach against violent extremism;
- 6) The enforcement of defence and security cooperation through a global doctrinal underground, dealing with a collective security approach.

NTIENJOM MBOHOU Leger Félix

EIFORCES ON A FIELD TRIP

The interns of the second batch of the Homeland Security Certificate Programme(HSCP) and the fourth batch of the Security Forces Staff Diploma (SFSD), undertook a field trip in the East Region on Sunday 16th February 2015. This trip which falls within the framework of the study programme of EIFORCES aims at enabling officers on studies of thirteen different African countries to discover the security, political, economic and cultural realities of their host country, Cameroon, and to explore for their benefits.



EIFORCES' Delegation Pose with the Governor of the East and His staff

Under the supervision of the Acting Director General of EIFORCES, Senior Superintendent of Police DOUM-NDONGO Patrice, the Director of Studies, Colonel Engolo Ella Thomas assisted by the Head of Division for Higher Studies, Lt. Colonel BIKELE Pierre Aimé, led the second batch of Homeland Security Certificate Programme(HSCP) and the fourth batch of the Security Forces Staff Diploma (SFSD), to an academic excursion in the East Region of Cameroon.

This powerful delegation, comprised of thirty seven interns (37), three (03) training and follow up staff and five (05) support staff left the premises of EIFORCES on Sunday, 16th February 2015 at 8 : 45 through the N. 10 National Road linking Yaoundé to the East through Akonolinga. The objective of this trip which took the delegation to several civil and military structures, was a pedagogic tool aimed at helping interns to confront the theories acquired during their training with practical realities and challenges.

After about half an hour stop on the way, the delegation arrived Bertoua by 12 : 30 and went straight to the Governor's office where they were received by the Governor, M. Ivaha Diboua Dieudonné, accompanied by his staff, the Secretary General of the Region, Mrs. Nga Zanga who was sitting in for Mr. Ngong Irènèe, and the Sub Divisional Officer of the Lom and Djerem Division.

After his welcome speech and some basic tips to guide their stay, the Governor gave a talk on the role of the administrative authority in crises management in the Cameroonian context. This presentation that dwelled on the role of the administrative authority in coordinating the different forces of defense and security put at its disposal in managing crises, was followed by a lively question and answer session between the interns and the governor.

During this visit, the EIFORCES delegation benefited from diverse presentations made by civil and military authorities in barracks as well as in other strategic sites

in the region. The interns also got to know that the East Region which remains one of the largest of the ten regions in Cameroon is also the first of the four Regional Inter-Army Military Schools existing in Cameroon.

Pursuing its goals and trajectory, the delegation was received by other authorities of the regions in the ranks of the Gendamerie Legion Commander of the East, Colonel Enow Joseph Eyong, the Senior Superintendent of Police, ADAMOU ALIOUM, the Regional Delegate for National Security for the East, Lt Colonel MEZUI ZO'O Elie Romance, Commandant of the 12th Battalion of the Motorized Infantry, Lt. Colonel DEUTOU Etienne André, Commandant of the 2nd Rapid Intervention Battalion, the Battalion Head, MEDJO AYONG Aloys and the 11th Support Battalion. Accompanied by their staff, these high profiled security and law enforcement officers, shared with the EIFORCES delegation their traditional functions and duties, the security threats they face, their daily challenges and the synergy put in place in the pursuit of the security and stability of the area.

During the visit in the Administrative Region of the East, the delegation besides visiting military structures based on the travel trajectory established, also visited four sites including the localities of Letta, Belabo, Lom Pangar and Gado Badjéré between the 18th-21st of February 2015. Each step of this visit was punctuated by insightful talks and friendly dialogues which led to the exchange of symbolic gifts handed by the head of the EIFORCES delegation to the different authorities. Several civilian structures like the Bonis Check-Point, the the Pumping Station of COTCO, the Cameroon Petroleum Depot of Belabo, the ongoing construction project of Lom Pangar Hydro-Electricity Dam, and the Gado Bajéré were briefly visited. The discussions carried there were essentially on

the security issues including coordination and interventions of the different actors called to work together in times of accidents or crisis.

To mark the end of the visit, a dinner was offered by Colonel Enow Joseph Eyong, Gendamerie Legion Commander of the East, in the presence of the Governor of the East. The head of the EIFORCES delegation, Colonel Engolo Ella, used the opportunity to thank both the civilian and military authorities for the warm and generous welcome they received from them. He promised to give the feedback to the Acting Director General on how pleasant and enriching their stay in the East was.

Satisfied with their stay, the interns also witnessed the dynamism of the population of the East, its richness, its cultural diversity and especially the spirit of adaptation exercised by the security forces in this vast portion of territory, in order to counterattack the security challenges which the country is presently facing from the Boko Haram phenomenon.

To believe the testimony of the interns of other countries, a unanimous fact was established, that of the geographic, demographic (in terms of concentration), housing types and the similarities in terms of food habits that exists between Cameroon and several other African countries.

The delegation returned to Yaoundé on the 22nd February 2015 after midday.

C/E ONGOLO Auguste
CDR/EIFORCES



Visit to Sensitive Areas : the interns of the Brevet et du DEMFS visit the COTCO Pumping Station (Pipe-line Tchad – Cameroun) at Belabo. (East Region of Cameroon).

THE CENTRAL AFRICAN CRISIS: AT THE HEART OF DIAGNOSIS

Under the framework of its activities for the 2004 year, the Research and Documentation Centre organised a colloquium from 27th-28th November 2014 under the theme, « What Peace, what security and what durable development for Central Africa Republic ? » This colloquium was presided by the Secretary of State in Charge of the Gendarmerie, Mr. Jean Baptiste Bokom sitting in for the Minister Delegate at the Presidency in Charge of Defence, who is also President of the Administrative Conseil of the International School for Security forces.

In his inaugural lesson, the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations in Central Africa, Professor ABDOULAYE BATHILY presented ; :

- the security situation of Central Africa Republic, characterised by a deeply rooted violence and instability since independence. A situation aggravated by an entrenched economic stagnation and profound social fragmentation of the state.
- the stakes linked to the crisis in Central Africa Republic with the risk of the conflict spreading to the entire region and creating regional instability and despite initiatives taken at the national, sub regional and continental and international levels.
- perspectives that questions the concrete implementation and sustainability of the end of the crisis, articulated around a visionary governance and a common national project, inscribed on a long term basis.

After the inaugural lesson, four panels continued the discussion under the following sub themes;

- the History and the phenomenon of political



insecurity in Central Africa.

- The Impact of the crisis in Central Africa Republic and the stakes of the security of the sub regional space;
- Retrospective analysis of the initiatives of the civilisation of the socio-political and institutional fields.
- Prospective of peace, security and development in Central Africa Republic .

The following recommendations ensued from this conference ;

- The consolidation of the pillars of the state power in Central Africa, with key being the mastery of the essential attributes of the internal and international sovereignty which includes ; the territory, instruments of coercion, resources, infrastructural beaureaucracy of the state etc.

- Strengthening or the effective implementation of the fundamental institutions regulating the state amongst which include transitional justice, an independent justice, a stabilized political law and a reinforced civil society etc.

- A better coordination of all the political and military actors intervening in the field capable of bringing peace, security and the necessary conditions for sustainable development in Central Africa Republic.

The participants of the colloquium expressed their sincere gratitude to the organizers for the initiative to organize such a concertation which expounded on the crisis in Central Africa Republic and brought out concrete action-steps to resolve the crisis and bring about sustainable development in the country.

Dr PASSO SONBANG Elie
Senior Superintendent of Police

CAMEROON NATIONAL GENDARMERIE: TOWARDS A DURABLE MANAGEMENT OF ROAD INSECURITY

In recent years, the National Gendarmerie has made the fight against road accidents, one of its major strategic priorities within the framework of its assigned mandate of protecting people and property. This thrust was adopted following disquieting observation on the frightening frequency of road accidents occasioning catastrophic deaths and the overall ruinous impact of the phenomenon on the economy. Thus, determined to solve the puzzle, the Government and Top Hierarchy dubbed the years 2011-2020 the "Decade of Action for Road Safety."¹ The National Gendarmerie launched a campaign on "control-monitoring-repression" of road traffic breaches, a dynamic strategy inspired by the perpetual quest to improve upon the output of the hired staff in the hope to significantly curb the incidence of road accidents in our country within four years.



Protection of peoples and goods is the top priority

I - Overview of the State of the Art

According to the World Health Organization, nearly 1.3 million people die each year globally in traffic accidents, representing more than 3,000 deaths per day. Twenty to fifty million more people survive accidents with disabling injuries. **90% of road deaths occur in low- and middle-income countries, which have less than half of the world's registered vehicles.** Road accidents ranks amongst the top three causes of death of persons aged 5-44 years. The estimated economic consequence of these accidents is situated between 1% and 3% of the Gross National Product of each country, more than USD 500 billion in total.²

In its 2013 situation report on world road safety, the World Health Organization revealed that Africa records the highest road accident mortality rate in the world (24, 1 per 100,000 people against 18.5 in Southeast Asia and 10.3 in Europe). In Cameroon, between 2007 and 2010, the National Gendarmerie recorded an annual average of 3,500 road traffic accidents, 4700 casualties and about 1200 death³. These statistics further divulge that the causes of these accidents were 70% human (user behavior), 20% material (poor condition of vehicles) and 10% infrastructural (bad roads).

The severity of this phenomenon was also raised by the President of the Republic who, in his swearing-in speech on November 3, 2011, lamented that the **"unacceptable behavior of some irresponsible motorists who cause real carnage on our roads."**

In order to significantly alter the curve of traffic accidents, in line with the recommendations of the Top Hierarchy, the National Gendarmerie has launched an extensive raid against road accidents, known as operation **"control -monitoring-repression"** of traffic offenses

This project is based on three pillars: a targeted and coordinated prevention strategy, reinforced by a strict holistic application of the repressive mechanism, and the commitment of all available resources to the constant search for improvement of effectiveness on the field.

II - A Targeted and Coordinated Prevention Strategy.

The prevention of road accidents primarily depends on the Ministry of Transport. It is thus in agreement with this ministerial department that the actions of the National Gendarmerie are implemented on the ground. First and foremost, a good prevention strategy hinges on a targeted causal analysis of road accidents based on a reliable database. To fill this void, software for automated management of data on road accidents was installed at the Central Services of the National Gendarmerie, within the framework of European Union-Cameroon cooperation⁴. With just a click, this software provides access to all entreated data before routing to relevant administrative departments.

To maximise impact, the launching of the "control-monitoring-repression" campaign in June 2011, was preceded by a period of prevention and sensitization conducted on the Douala-Yaoundé highway. To date, the prospective made by the National Gendarmerie is regularly shared and discussed with users during field trips. On the other hand, in order to spread the word on responsible road usage to all segments of the population and the largest number of people, **these operations are often covered by the media.**

Finally, the National Gendarmerie **encourages and supports many other legal initiatives** (institutional or relating to trade unions and other NGOs⁵), contributing to the reduction in the number of road accidents. This is the case, for example, of the Road Safety on African corridors. An initiative, baptised: "Safe Way, Right Way" (SWRW), set up by some multinationals in partnership with the World Bank, for educational actions and sensitization of road users.

Taking cognisance of the Cameroonian social milieu, it is obvious that all these actions would be vain without coercion - the second pillar of the Gendarmerie's action in this area.

³ Source: Bureau Traffic / National Gendarmerie.

⁴ The computer equipment (software and hardware) was installed at Traffic Bureau of the National Gendarmerie with the support of the Joint Technical Assistance Mission's

Road Programmes, 9th EDF / C2D.

⁵ Non-governmental organizations

III - A Strict Holistic Application of the Repressive Framework.

The "control-monitoring-repression" Campaign is ongoing throughout the national triangle with a greater presence on the Yaoundé-Douala-Bafoussam-Yaounde highways, previously branded as the "death triangle." During this campaign, **immediate repression**, was emphasized, by appropriating certain prerogatives accorded the judicial police in article 606 (and onwards) of law N° 2005/007 of 27/07/2005 on the Code of Criminal Procedure, specifying the direct payment of **fixed fines** versus the issuance of receipts to offenders. The amounts collected are immediately transferred into the nearest state coffers, as opposed to the issuance of a receipt.

The results of this pertinent legal provision and associated actions have been encouraging. Since its start in June 2011 and until its 93rd phase/2nd generation completed on November 24, 2014,

113,396 offenses were recorded for flat fines totaling 1.239.273.960 FCFA deposited in the public treasury.

The most common violations are speeding, prohibited overtaking, worn or defective wheels. Default offenses or failure to wear seat belts, which, at the launching of the operation were worrying, are less observed, reflecting a concomitant behavioural change on the part of many road users, which, hitherto, belied the worsening impact of road accident in terms of loss of life and injury.

However, beyond these flattering figures, it should be understood that **the main objective pursued is not financial sourcing for the state coffers**. Indeed, after the first seven months of the campaign, the average monthly number of accidents moved from 298 causing 159 deaths (during the first half of 2011), to 290 with 114 deaths. In 2011 overall, 3522 accidents with 1,588 deaths were recorded. By 2012, the figures stood at 3327 accidents per 1187 deaths. During the first half of 2014, there was a monthly average of 219



For Safer Roads : the Putting in Place of the Radar Devices is More Than Effective in the Fight Against Excessive Speed which Constitutes One of the Main Human Causes of Road Accidents.

accidents with 85 deaths. These statistics illustrate a substantial reduction in the number of road accidents (25%) and deaths (36%) since the beginning of the campaign. This improvement, combined with popular opinion on necessity of the campaign, brings the satisfaction to the personnel of the National Gendarmerie.

However, much is yet to be perfected. There is need for continued dynamism as mirrored in the concomitant operational strategies, employed since its launch.

IV - The Commitment of all Available Resources Towards a Permanent Improvement of Police Efficiency on the Field.

The "control surveillance and repression" campaign stands out for its high profiled on-the-ground leadership by senior officers, under the personal supervision of the secretary to the Minister of Defense in Charge of the Gendarmerie, assisted by General Officers. Thus personnel from a variety of ranks are engaged.

Given the difficulties encountered and the objectives pursued, the second phase of the campaign was launched on 15 February 2013, under the slogan -"zero tolerance" more for the repression of traffic offenses, than the fight against the deviant behaviours of some Gendarmes. Taking cognizance of some operational limitations, the 3rd phase of the campaign, currently under study, will feature, among others, the introduction of the **mobile road check** by the Police motocyclists. This new approach will herald the advent of a new dimension in the fight against road accidents in Cameroon.

This goes hand-in-hand with the constant quest

for improvement of the operational capacity of the Police, tasked, since the beginning of the operation, with multifaceted support of the hierarchy and Top Hierarchy, as well as the involvement of other partners in the fight against road accidents⁶. It is worth noting that, thanks to the **continued support of the Head of State**, many key equipments have been acquired, notably : motorcycles, newly manufactured radar devices⁷ TRUFLASH adapted for nocturnal speed reading, mobile stations for lighting at night, hundreds of electronic breathalyzers, hundreds of thousands chemical breathalyzers for the fight against driving under the influence of alcohol, etc ... New vehicles specially designed for the campaign are expected in the coming days. However, a sustained momentum, with regards to the acquisition of modern equipment by the Ministry of Defense, remains imperative for a steady improvement of the operational capacity of road.

In conclusion, road accidents are inevitable. Thanks to well-conceived actions, based on the complete adherence to the rules and regulations in force, the National Gendarmerie has succeeded, in less than four years, to: implement a comprehensive "control surveillance -repression" campaign against traffic offenses; and contribute remarkably to the substantial reduction in the number of road accidents and deaths. However, it must be admitted that much remains to be done. **The fight against road accidents is a common concern** which beckons the involvement of all institutional stakeholders and the civil society. The reflexes of responsible driving can only be permanently inscribed in the minds of road users in the country if: **a combination of a focused and concerted prevention; and a strong and proactive enforcement, are constantly pursued in the quest for an improved and efficient Police presence on-the-ground.**

⁶ On May 2, 2012, the Ministry of Transport transferred 16 Yamaha motorcycles (including brand 09 new), breathalyzers and fluorescent bulbs to the National Gendarmerie.

⁷ The latest generation of TRUCAM radar devices currently used by the Gendarmerie.

The Brand UltraLyte radar device, which was previously used, is redundant as it did not enable simultaneously storing data of several vehicles (speed, image films).

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THE CONUNDRUM OF THE CIRCULATION OF HEAVY CARRIERS



Benjamin KWAJEP, Senior superintendent of police
Director of Public Security
at the General Delegation for National Security

The circulation of heavy carrier in urban centers during peak traffic hours causes urban disorder including public road accidents. In your capacity as Director of Public Safety at the General Delegation for National Security, what is your reading of this bleak picture?

Heavy carriers are increasingly becoming a problem in urban centers. Recent tragedies in Biyem-Assi (Yaoundé) and Ndokoti (Douala) are illustrative. This is all due to non-compliance to prescribed administrative procedures by transporters in general, and truck drivers in particular. There is therefore need for a strict enforcement of existing urban transport regulations.

Despite the instructions of the Administrative Authority, trucks, banned from circulating during certain hours, succeed to go through the various checkpoints into urban center. Does that mean that

the police tend to shy from this thorny issue?

One cannot speak of any Police resignation in the face of its noble duty. Quite the contrary. As you know, the enactment of rules is one thing, and their implementation on the ground is another. Underlying these discrepancies is the unbridled pursuit of profit by economic operators. Moreover, the rules regulating the movement of heavy carrier are sometimes subject to certain amendments. This explains why you may notice trucks of brewing companies, HYSACAM, and oil transporters, in urban areas. At the checkpoints, our instructions are strict and the agents are doing everything in their power to execute them, despite pressures from heavy transporters. However, within urban centers, Regional Groupings of Public Roads and Traffic are stepping up to the fluidity and regulation of traffic on public roads in order to combat urban

disorder and curb the risk of traffic accident in our cities.

Faced with the recurrence of road accidents involving this class of locomotives (heavy carriers) whose drivers seem to wave off rules of urban transport, what are the practical steps and measures that have been taken by the General Delegation for National Security to regain control of the situation?

At the General Delegation for National Security robust measures have been taken to ensure scrupulous respect by heavy truck drivers, of Circular No. 037 / LC / MINT / CAB of 16 October 2014 of the Minister of Transport, relating to the circulation of vehicles in urban areas; and its annex No. 0997 / L / MINT / CAB of 23 October 2014. In case of derogation, the author is pulled over; and vehicle driven to the municipal pound. Drivers are also sensitized on speeding, overloading, abusive parking, technical inspection of vehicles, and driving

in a drunk or drowsy state. These constitute risky behaviours that engender accidents and which the Staff of National Security is bent on fighting.

Can you provide some statistics on the recent evolution of the urban accident curve caused by these so-called "crazy trucks"?

The statistics in our possession reveal a significant decrease in the rate of urban accident caused by the large carriers in the last two years. This cutback is justified by the permanent presence of our agents on the field. With the gradual setting up of video surveillances by the Delegate General for National Security in the urban areas, this phenomenon is bound to recede further.

As a final word, what is your message to the heavy truck drivers?

The human and material damage is enormous. Once again, may these drivers respect the rules that regulate their profession. This is a matter of responsibility and civic education.



A HEAVY CARRIER ON ONE OF THE ROADS IN YAOUNDE

SITUATION REPORT ON THE FIGHT AGAINST ROAD ACCIDENTS

Globally, according to the World Health Organization (WHO), road accidents are the cause of 1.3 million deaths, and 20 to 50 million injured annually.

Based on the same source, these accidents have become the second cause of death, after HIV – AIDS, among persons aged 15 to 44 years.

At the national level, between 2000 and 2010, Cameroon recorded an annual average of 7000 accidents, 1200 deaths and nearly 10,000 injured persons on intercity highways, excluding the many unrecorded cases of urban accidents, arising from increased motorcycle taxi transportation.

The economic losses induced nationally are estimated at CFAF 100 billion per year, or about 1% of our Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

It seems clear that the prevalence of the public road accidents constitutes a real threat from the triple dimensions of health, economy and security at large.



The Mobilisation (tous azimuts) on road prevention is more and more characterized with the multiplication with deadly accidents on the quasi totality of.....Here An accident on the No. National Road linking Yaounde-Douala



A Heavy Price : The Hegemony of Heavy Carriers on Roads in Cameroon, Makes Road Violence quasi permanent in Road traffic. On the NO. 10 National Road linking East and Centre Regions, Here backwards , a sample of « Elephants on the Way » loaded with logs for exportation.

1 - The Causes of Accidents

Traditionally, there are three types of classification of the causes of accidents namely:

- Human causes that account for 70% of accidents;
- Material causes (vehicle condition) which represent 20%;
- Infrastructural causes (road conditions) which represent 10%.

Amongst these causes, human causes rank top. This is due, among others, to speeding, driving under the influence of alcohol or psychotropic products, unlicensed driving, failure to comply with road signs, use of vehicles in poor condition, non-use of seat belts or safety helmet, vehicle overloading, misuse of roads lights during the night traffic etc .. These behaviors result from inadequate training, traffic crime, incivility, irresponsibility etc.

This is a question of a real road violence, better still, aggression faced by the local populace and road users.

It is the obligatory mandate of the public authorities to ensure the defense and protection of the assaulted or exposed population from the threats of road safety.

2 - Measures taken to Combat Accidents

Based on the above-mentioned diagnosis, the United Nations declared the period from 2011-2020, "Decade of Action for Road Safety" with a plan of action type based on five pillars relating to:

- management of road safety
- improving infrastructure;
- the safety of vehicles;
- security of users;
- support post – accident

At the African and national levels, action plans framed after the UN model, have been elaborated.

Cameroon disposes a National Strategy for Road Safety plan, whose implementation involves different relevant government departments (MINT, MINTP, MOH, MINEDEF / SED DGNS, etc), the private sector and the civil society.

More specifically, the concrete measures taken can be regrouped into three types

The first type

This includes standardized actions: revamp standard roads and signal equipment; modernize the car park by a rejuvenation policy (advantageous tax for new vehicles); regulate the

age of import and usage of vehicles; subject vehicles to a regular maintenance inspection at the instituted Technical Control Centers.

The second type

These are preventive actions - through sensitisation and mobilisation of all stakeholders. This entails using communication and social marketing techniques to inculcate the culture of adherence to safety, and of awareness of the potential risks of deviant and irresponsible behavior on the road.

In this regard, several media Projects have been elaborated, soliciting tenders for funding from the Road Fund, to undertake aggressive nation-wide, regional or local media (broadcasting, press, cyber) campaigns. Specific radio programs of the Ministry of Transport (Transport magazine), MINDEF (honor and loyalty) and DGNS (Canal police; At the service of each and all) are also contributive.

Proximity campaigns have also been carried out to target groups such as pupils and students, riverine population, heads of travel agencies and freight companies.

The third type

This concerns the control / suppression of road crime. In this respect, the actions of the Gendarmerie, Police and the Special Judicial Police Officers of the Ministry of Transport, combine to reinforce arrest and sanction of unscrupulous drivers and road users.

Particular emphasis is placed on control with the use of radars introduced by the Ministry of Transport and sustained by the Gendarmerie, control of alcohol influence during driving with the breathalyzer, verification of the possession of drivers' licenses corresponding to the category of vehicle driven, compliance with the permitted load; the technical condition of the vehicle through the Certificate of Technical Inspection; brief, the respect of traffic regulations.

The repression campaigns launched by the gendarmerie such as "quinzaine routiere" are a perfect concrete illustration.

In terms of results achieved since 2011, there has been a remarkable yearly reduction in the number of accidents and casualties. This reduction is currently evaluated to about 40% with respect to the number of accidents and 20% with respect to the number of victims.



On the 28th August 2011 at Mahole, on the Douala-Yaounde Highway, A mini Bus Collides face-to-face with a Truck



Furthermore, the ratio of recent accidents involving heavy carriers is down to 1:3 (one is to three accident cases).

This situation is the result of the subtle desire for hegemony by heavy carriers, who, taking advantage of their size, seek to reign as sole master of the roads, thereby undermining road regulations and other users. Thus speed restrictions (40Km / H in town and 60Km /H) are often violated. Trucks are illegally parked or abandoned in the middle of the highway without proper signaling.

To fight against such unlawful behaviour, the Ministry of Transport has developed a programme on the removal of road obstacles. The said program includes an equipment and a removal mechanism component.

With regards to equipment, negotiations are underway, with the financing of the Road Fund (FCFA 1.3 billion) for the purchase of a first set of equipment, consisting of a tow / tug with the capacity of pulling 20 tons; two tow / tugs of 10 tons capacity each; two tow / tugs of 04 tons capacity each, seventeen pickups and five police motorcycles for monitoring.

The towing mechanism involves the creation of parking zones to where the towing equipment will be deployed for operations on highways. It also involves the development of pounds secured by the municipalities along the roads, to where vehicles abandoned on pavements will be towed by the tugs acquired.



Obviously, all this will be at the expense of the vehicle owner, who must bear the cost of towing and impound fees, in addition to the sufficient deterrent regulatory fines.

This mechanism is subject to a set of specifications and partnership agreement currently under conclusion between the government and municipalities. It is therefore a comprehensive government response project, a combat strategy, to wage war on the sources of public road accidents (aggression and violence).

NGOUMBE ZACHARIE
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Expert in road safety
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CAMEROON FACED WITH THE THREAT OF THE EBOLA EPIDEMIC: STRATEGY AND PLANS TO COUNTERATTACK THE THREAT

Since November 2013, an out break of the Ebola virus hit Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The rapid spread of this disease demonstrates the strength of its contagious nature. This explains its classification by the World Health Organisation, as an international public health emergency. Conscious of this, Cameroon government strategized to prevent its importation. Measures were also put in place to detect its first victims and stop its spread in case it got into the country.



Sources : bperrin.com – the Virus : Mode of transmission



Sources : lanouvellechronique.com – Over forty years since Ebola was discovered

Sources : blogs.unicef.org – Symptoms of Ebola

1 - What is it all About?

Discovered in 1976, the Ebola virus, simultaneously diagnosed for the first time in Sudan and former Zaire, is named after a River found in former Zaire, considered the seat of the virus. Between 1976 and 2012, twenty-one outbreaks of the disease have been witnessed in seven different countries namely, the Republic of Congo (5), Congo (4), Gabon (4), Uganda (3), Sudan (3), South Africa and Cote D'Ivoire. This gives a sum total of 2. 299 affected persons with 1540 deaths with a minimum death rate) of about 67% ranging from 25-100% depending on the outbreak.

Till date, fruit-eating bats are the principal source of this virus. They contaminate gorillas and monkeys there by provoking a deadly pandemic. Other animals like porcupines and antelopes are sensitive to the virus.

Man is either contaminated by touching or eating raw or half cooked infected animals.

It is important to note that the virus is propagated in communities through human transmission, following direct contact with injured bodies, mucus, blood, secretions, biological and liquid substances of infected persons. It can also be transmitted through infected environments.

The incubation period, that is, the time between infection and when the first symptoms appear is between 2-21 days.

These symptoms constitute sudden fever, intense weakness, muscular pains, headaches and irritation of the throat. They are followed by vomiting, diarrhea, eruption of skin disease and, in certain cases, external and internal bleeding.




Infected persons develop a severe infectious syndrome which requires an early and symptomatic treatment.

It is not always possible to quickly identify infected patients because the initial symptoms are not always different from other diseases. Its clinical reports are similar to that of other diseases like malaria and typhoid which is common to our environment.

It is therefore important for medical personnel to always take the necessary professional measures of protection and maintain hygienic standards before any patient no matter the diagnostic.

These measures include hygienic behaviours like the washing of hands, respiratory hygiene, the wearing of basic protection equipment, the safety of syringes and the suspension of traditional funeral rites.

The risk of importing the virus to Cameroon is real. It is also possible to have local cases of Ebola in Cameroon given the similarities the country share in terms of flora and fauna with the Republic of Congo and Gabon, countries that have been attacked by the virus. In any case, no case has been detected so far by our systems of surveillance.



2.1.Coordination


A committee for epidemic and emergency health issues has been put in place. Under the supervision of the Ministry of Public Health, it brings together all ministerial departments, partners and non partner institutions. This committee is a framework for concertation to counterattack the virus put in place by the government with the help and support of some bilateral and multilateral partners. It enables all the stakeholders to be updated with the different measures so as to avoid the duplication of efforts and wastage of resources. At the regional and divisional levels, the administrative authorities equally put in place similar structures based on decree no. 98/031 of March 1998 establishing the creation of emergency and assistance plans in times of catastrophe and major risks.

Faced with this virus, with a high propensity to contaminate, it is necessary to detect the first cases early enough and to locate the maximum of those already infected so as to reduce the risks of contamination.

Since 2005, the Integrated Surveillance system to Counter Disease was put in place by the government of Cameroon. It was revised in 2011 to include chronic non transmissible diseases, the “one health” approach and health events within the International Health Regulatory Framework. It came into force in June 15 2007. A good number of free-toll-telephones have been made available in district, regional and the central health structures to improve early warning on the threats. Health personnel have received capacity building training for early detection and rapid risks evaluation. Rapid Intervention and investigation kits have been set up and are available at the different regions. National directives for the surveillance and response to the Ebola threat have been elaborated and diffused. Surveillance over the fauna by forestry officers has also been strengthened. Every case of rumour is treated systematically by the regional teams. The Centre Pasteur Laboratory is capable of making diagnosis and confirming the results with in six hours.

The following protection and prevention measures have been taken by the government amongst which include :

- Closure of air, maritime, river and land borders with Nigeria



2.5. Measures of Handling Eventual Case of the Ebola Virus

These measures are organized in the different Quarantine and Treatment Centres (Q.T.C). Each Q.T.C centres has been envisaged for the different regions. That of Yaoundé is already operational while plans for that of Douala is ongoing

The training process of those to handle these centres had begun. It took into consideration the multidisciplinary nature of the interventions. About 700 health personnel and non personnel have been trained, including those at the airports. Training guides have also been conceived and elaborated. Utilization of the personal protection equipment was one of the major modules of this training. The necessary logical resources have been procured with the aid of different partners

- Forbid the landing of aircrafts coming from countries affected by the Ebola virus. ;
- Systematic control of the temperatures of passengers at the various health units at the airports.
- Forbid the consumption and touching of meat from the forest.

These measures are under criticism by those who rather lay emphasis on their socio-economic impact. However, it is the concern of the government of Cameroon to protect the country from any importation of this virus. It is therefore important to acknowledge the importance of the effectiveness of these measures as our country, till date, is Ebola free.

2.4. Communication

The government of Cameroon has elaborated and put in place a communication plan. The role of the media is crucial in the dissemination of the different protection and prevention messages. Faced with this threat that challenges our lifestyles, especially the application of basic hygienic norms, the media has a great role towards the expected behavioural change. Messages containing the Ebola virus have been conceived and diffused through posters, bills and hand outs. Sensitization campaigns targeting opinion leaders (religious leaders and media practitioners) have been carried out through the different media outlets.

3 - Conclusion

The outbreak of the Ebola virus rekindles memory of the deadly black plague (1347-1353) and the Spanish flu (1918). If we attempt a morbid comparism with armed conflict, one will realize that there is no war that has ruined the human race. Ebola is indeed a war, with the same stakes in terms of human, economic and financial loses. The same stakes in terms of fears, panic and trauma of our psycho-social environment.

War indeed because it involves the same challenges and stakes of multi-sectoral collaboration, cooperation in the mobilization of logistical and material resources and in mobilizing the entire human resources of the state especially health personnel. The medical corps, a major actor in this crusade against Ebola, is symbolic of our courageous soldiers who are keeping the banner of our national flag high in the Extreme North of the country. If the medical corps has often been criticized, despised and hated, may they demonstrate availability, commitment, good faith and priesthood to the eyes of all faced with the threat of the Ebola virus. These are must-have-values necessary to fulfill the noble mission or what I may call the divine mission; to watch over the most precious asset of our country, the good health of Cameroonians!!!

Dr Georges Alain ETOUNDI MBALLA
Director of the Fight against Disease,
Epidemics and Pandemics
Ministry of Public Health.



File

■ Sub-Saharan Africa in the Geo-Strategy of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Political, Strategic And Operational Challenge For The Armed And Law Enforcement Community	66
■ Islamist Contamination In The Extreme North Of Cameroon: Risks And Limits	31
■ Boko Haram Expansion, Depopulation of the Border Areas and Influx of Terrorism Refugees in the North of Cameroon	39
■ The Nomadic/Mobile Koranic Schools And Social Exclusion: the Case of Mahadjirs of the Chad Basin	47
■ Waterside Demography, Anachy and Illicit Production in the Lake Chad	60
■ Transformations of Boko Haram's Polemological Status Facing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Africa: an Integrated Foresight Sketch	75
■ National Mobilization Against the Boko Haram Sect in Cameroon : an Objectification of the Army-People-Nation Triptych	83
■ Sub-Regional, Regional and International Mobilisation in the Fight Against Boko Haram	88

**Boko Haram, Combating
Terrorism Through a better
Understanding of the Threat**

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN THE GEO-STRATEGY OF TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: A POLITICAL, STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGE FOR THE ARMED AND LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITY

Is Sub-Saharan Africa today a relevant region, where the geo-strategy of terrorism and counter-terrorism is being carried out? If so, do the armed and law enforcement forces in the countries concerned have the strategic and the tactical capacity to eradicate a trend, whose traumatic effect in the long run is likely to jeopardize the security and the development of this region endowed with enormous human and natural assets?

These questions are based on the observance of the increase in recent years of terrorist attacks perpetrated in a region, which has been considered since the end of the bipolar era as the haven of intra state conflicts (uprisings, inter-ethnic conflicts...). The African geopolitics of the post-bipolar era is marked by the diffusion of fanatical Islamism and the consolidation of an identity-based radicalization extended in a North-South axis, beyond the Sahelo-Saharan area. Those trends progressively spread to the Gulf of Guinea, which encompasses the Central and Western Africas and concentrates most Western interests in Sub-Saharan Africa.

**Reviewed version of a communication presented on the occasion of an International Colloquium at ESIG, in 2011.*



Source : Le Parisien, 26 March 2015; Damasak (Nigeria), 15th March. Nigerian Soldiers cross over a bridge destroyed by Islamist militants Boko Haram. ABBA ALI KAYA / AFP

After a period of virtual calmness, following the Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania) attacks in 1998, Sub-Saharan Africa experienced the recrudescence of terrorism which worsened the already worrying security climate. For years, the allegiance pleaded to Al Qaeda by the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (SGPC), which became Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the latter's repositioning in the Sahelo-Saharan area (Mali, Niger, Mauritania...), have shown the confluence of terrorist movements seeking to organize themselves in networks.

Moreover, we cannot occult the rapid emergence in the Gulf of Guinea of a movement of jihadist proselytism channeled by the Boko Haram¹ sect (1). This movement is associated with the empowerment of adamant groups in the Niger Delta, especially the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force and the Ijaw movement. These movements are hostile to the Western world as well as to the state, its "accomplice", for political and religious reasons in some cases and for political and economic reasons in other cases.

Clearly, the increase in terrorist attacks shows how difficult it is for the armed and law enforcement forces in Africa to grasp the political, strategic and operational contours of terrorism and to effectively fight it.

Thus, this study seeks to meet three goals, that is to show (I) that Sub-Saharan Africa is a new relevant landscape where terrorist geo-strategy is being carried out; (II) that this new context raises a political, strategic and operational challenge for the different armed and law enforcement players in that region; and (III) that the removal, otherwise the containment, of this threat in accordance with development challenges, requires a doctrinal re-structuring in the defense and the law enforcement sectors falling in line with related reforms on one hand, and with collective security on the other hand.

Sub-Saharan Africa: A Region Relevant to the Geo-strategy of Terrorism and Counter-terrorism

What conceptual and factual reality does the notion of terrorism encompass, given its polemic or polysemic characteristics? How has Sub-Saharan Africa become such a relevant setting? These two questions circumscribe the first part of this study.

The Geo-strategy of Terrorism: a Conceptual and Factual Reality

Notwithstanding the long history of terrorism that goes back to the Antic era, we shall avail ourselves of a limited research framework in order to underscore its praxeological and semiotic outline. Terrorist praxis therefore refers to violence aimed at fear and terror. In other words, terrorism can be characterized by its great psychotic bearing induced by the traumatic effects of various acts derived from this concept.

Originally, terrorist praxis was applied by conquering empires like those of Genghis Khan and Timur Lang, which asserted themselves through terror by undermining the will as well as the resistance of their enemies, and by chastising them for dissuasion purposes.

The reign by way of terror, which makes terrorism a mode of state violence, was then legitimated in France by the Jacobins, following the Revolution in 1789. During his speech at the Convention on February 5, 1794, leader Maximilien de Robespierre declared:

« Il faut étouffer les ennemis intérieurs et extérieurs de la République ou périr avec elle. Or, dans cette situation, la première maxime de votre politique doit être qu'on conduit le peuple par la raison et les ennemis du peuple par la terreur. Si le ressort du gouvernement populaire dans la paix

1 Boko Haram: "Western education is a sin".

2 "We must defeat the Republic's domestic and foreign enemies or die with it. However, in this situation, the first maxim of your politics should be that [a leader] rules [his] people with reason and the public enemy with terror. If the basis of popular government in peacetime is virtue, the basis of popular government during a revolution is both virtue and terror; virtue, without which terror is baneful; terror, without which virtue is

powerless". Cited par Gérard Chaliand et Arnaud Blin (Ed), Histoire du Terrorisme. De l'Antiquité à Al Qaïda, Paris, Bayard, 2004, P.7.


3 "its impact is at first targeted at the minds. In light of that, terrorism is the most violent form of psychological war and exceeds, as we know, its physical effects. Terrorism seeks, from often trivial means, to create power in hopes of achieving from the bottom what we own from the top". Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, op.cit.

est la vertu et la terreur ; la vertu sans laquelle la terreur est funeste ; la terreur sans laquelle la vertu est impuissante »²

Basically, this ideology of rational and legitimate terror structured the communist and conservative dictatorship as it materialized respectively in the socio-communist regimes of the former Eastern bloc headed by the Soviet Union (with North Korea as its last place of resistance), the fascist European and Asian dictatorships of the period in-between WWI and WWII, and the post-colonial Cesarean, South-American and African regimes. In a nutshell, state terrorism, historically,

generated public policies modeled and modulated around the programmatic vision of society, as was conceived by those regimes that used terror as a political tool.

As it may be, the notion of terrorism evolved over time. Among major evolutions was one form of terrorism in the 1960s and the 1970s, which Serge Stepniak Kravtchinski describes as being both “noble” and “terrible”, and whose perpetrator was a “martyr” and a “hero” who indeed “knew he was bound to die ever since he had sworn, from the bottom of his heart, to liberate his people and his fatherland”. From that viewpoint, terrorism bears a sacrificial component



that transcends the instrumental boundary. The hijacking in Rome of an EL AL Israeli aircraft by Yasser Arafat's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which occurred in 1968, paved the way to political terrorism. PFLP's partisans spread all over the world, mostly in Europe where they showed support for the massive protest in May of the same year.

From state violence, namely the violence of the strong on the weak, terrorism became the weapon of the weak against the strong, as Gérard Chaliand underscores. It developed into an asymmetrical threat whose finality was found in media buzz rather than in military victory. Incidentally, such military victory is unachievable.

According to Raymond Aron, "an action of violence is labeled terrorist when its psychological effects are out of all proportion to its purely physical results". In the same vein, Gérard Chaliand sees terrorism as "The weak's quasi unique weapon against the poor". He deems that "son impact vise d'abord les esprits. En ce sens, le terrorisme est la forme la plus violente de la guerre psychologique et dépasse, comme on sait, ses effets physiques. Le terrorisme sert, à partir de moyens souvent dérisoires à créer du pouvoir en espérant atteindre par le bas ce dont on dispose par le haut."³

As should be noted, terrorist activity expanded worldwide at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries to the extent that it developed into a strategic concern. Today Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the main havens of terrorist attacks.

Sub-Saharan Africa: the materialization of the terrorism / counter-terrorism binary relation in the post-modern era

Grasping the conceptual and factual extent of terrorism and counter-terrorism requires that geo-strategy, which is viewed as the military variable of geopolitics, be analyzed mainly at the macro level, as General Pierre Célérier argues.

In this study, the hypothesis is drawn from the spread of terrorism and the anti-terrorist campaign that developed at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries, via two major items: (1) the exponential development of information and communication technologies yielded by exchange flows and technique advancements; and (2) the September 11 Attacks, perceived by General Colin Powell as the period following the post-Cold War.

Beyond their dramatic and emotional effect, those attacks which happen to be the first, ones targeted at the US territory and the most patent symbols of the American hyper-power, thereby undermining the Jominian option of military power (Cf. The Revolution in Military Affairs), compel states to resort to a comprehensive strategic and operational approach to a global threat facilitating network systems dynamics and mechanisms.

From this point on, media and global terrorism is opposed to psychological and global counter-terrorism by combining civil and military approaches. This opposition justifies the states' review of their political and diplomatic agendas.

The increase in recent years in terrorist activities in Sub-Saharan Africa can lead one to wrongly view the region as a new or an additional haven for the geo-strategy of terrorism and counter-terrorism. It is precisely in this region perceived as a target, due to the weakness of the states' political systems as well as to the concentration of the Western powers interests, that the re-surfacing of fanatical terrorism materialized through major attacks perpetrated in Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania) on August 7, 1998. Those attacks occurred after one that was orchestrated in Egypt, on November 17, 1997. They led the US and other Western states to engage in a global war on terror against the Muslim Brothers, SGPC and the emerged Al Qaeda movement, whose leader, Osama Bin Laden, a former partner to the US Authorities, found haven in Sudan under the protection of the Khartoum Authorities.

By pleading allegiance to Bin Laden in January 2007, SGPC became AQIM. Its Emir,

⁴ Created in Cameroon with the intention to assert its international sovereignty, the International War College (ESIG) is integrated in the RECAMP strategy through the partnership in which it became linked to the Center for Military Training (CID), known today as the Paris War College (EdG).

Abdoulmalack Droukdel rose as that movement's leader in Northern Africa. By targeting the Sahelo-Saharan area and founding shelter there, AQIM extended its activities in Sub-Saharan Africa, which were carried out through the captures of hostages, and inspired other radical movements like Boko Haram and the troops in the Delta of Niger. Along with the increase in insecurity, rising identity-based demands generated what some authors label as a "crisis arch". This concept shows that Sub-Saharan Africa in general and the Gulf of Guinea in particular is entrenched in the "geography of anger", as Arjun Appadurai describes it. The Sahelo-Saharan area and the Gulf of Guinea can be viewed by the Islamist movements as the "stake" par excellence of terrorism, given the many strategic interests Western powers have there. This viewpoint can be strengthened by two recent occurrences: (1) the beheading of Al Qaeda marked by the death of its leader Osama Bin Laden; and (2) the decrease in the tensions in the Middle East (Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen...).

In order to curb the spread of terrorism, African states are in collaboration with their multilateral (African Union, European Union, United Nations) and bilateral partners (the US via AFRICOM and France). Having renewed its African doctrine in 1997, France decided that it would no longer resort to direct involvement, given its preference for the RECAMP project approach which consists of the multiplication of regional schools⁴.

As it refers to the French historical and neo-imperialistic vision of a region considered consciously or not as its area of influence, this approach is opposed to the American bilateral approach to security in Africa. While seeking as well to contribute in the spirit of world peace to African defense and law enforcement capacity-building, the American model implemented in 1996 through the African Crisis Response Initiative, which became ACOTA years later, favors bilateral relations and pivotal states insofar as the latter should be of relevance to their respective international radiance (for instance, Nigeria in the Gulf of Guinea). It materializes through the Sahel Initiative Plan (SIP), which was initiated in 2002 by

the US State Department's Counter-Terrorism Office, in the context of a crisis in Mali.

Sub-Saharan Africa is a region that is indeed relevant to the geo-strategy of terrorism and counter-terrorism. So the question is about the strategic and operational capacity which states are faced with in preventing terrorism.

II. A strategic and tactical challenge for the law enforcement community

At creation, during the African states Independence era, in accordance with the Western state-centered model, defense and law enforcement in those states were originally aimed at eliminating inter-state threats, in accordance with the Westphalia vision. However, those states today are faced with asymmetrical threats carried out by national, transnational or non-state actors. This constitutes a strategic and tactical challenge that proves difficult to tackle. The spread of terrorism in the region thus shows the complexity of an anti-terrorist campaign that seems incommensurate with conventional war practices.

1) The denial of recognition

Defined as the dialectics of the intelligence and the will, which is, on its part, construed as a reflection on how to wage war, and while being subject to a theoretical and praxeological appraisal, the concept of strategy finds its significance in the recognition and understanding of one's counterpart. For one person, it entails that – at least – one other person be identified and understood.

As great master of the science and the art of war during China's heroic era, Sun Tzu prescribes that one must "understand the other and not do what [the other] expects [them] to do". Knowing the enemy becomes the main postulate in power relations towards others, be they real or possible, we predetermine ourselves. Any strategy is thus relevant ever since one takes the other into consideration.

⁵ Charles E. Callwell, *Petites Guerres*, Paris, ISC-Economica, Bibliothèque stratégique, 1998, p.77.

⁶ "The old continent seems incapable of identifying today's enemy, what hostility is in 2009. Country by country, Defense Departments administer, govern and react on a case basis. However, Europe lacks a clear doctrine as related to hostility. Either it did not develop one itself, or it was not provided with one that is compelling and practical." Alain Bauer et Xavier Raufer, *La face noire de la mondialisation*, Paris, CNRS Editions, 2009, pp.7-8.

In order to effectively fight terrorism, like other comparable threats, states must study its historicity. The unawareness thereof by states in general and those of Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, explains to some extent the incapacity to conceptualize the phenomenology of terrorism as a threat to peace and security. On one hand, denying its rationality and legitimacy constitutes a barrier to the elaboration of an efficient anti-terrorist strategy. On the other hand, identifying and coping with the threat of terrorism is a difficult task, given the complexity of the stakes attached thereto, especially those of religious and political nature and contours.

The religious component has indeed been recurrent in history. The notion of “sacred terror” is derived from the observance of the violence perpetrated by the Jewish Zealots in the first century of Christianity and by the Ismaili Assassins between the 11th and 13th centuries. So was the case of Catholic Christianity during the crusades. In the end, religious fanaticism cannot be merely reduced to Islamic fundamentalism. They clearly illustrate the entrenchment of violence in the world, in the name of a sacred cause.

As regards political stakes, they are consubstantial to those of power and domination. The objective is to create an Islamic state, as was the case of Iraq and the Levant (Daesh) and of Caliphate (Boko Haram).

Violence becomes a means to a political end. It is precisely used to “crush the will of the adversary by affecting his capacity of resistance”. Just like war, according to Carl Von Clausewitz, is the “continuation of politics through other means”, terrorism is aimed at “leading our enemy to execute our own will”. It therefore appears like an approach, or a war technique, based on indirect strategies such as the “small” or revolutionary war.

The difficulty in identifying and understanding the threat of terrorism intensifies the related debates and compels states to resort to different anti-terrorist approaches. It explains the operational deficiencies and shortcomings in the war on terror as well as the trouble states go through while trying to integrate joint mechanisms, towards the building of a defense and law

enforcement community. Thus, the threat of terrorism for this community constitutes a strategic as well as a tactical challenge.

2) A tactical challenge

It has been established that terrorism generates insecurity. In today’s context, which is characterized by the globalization of threats, this particular one has transcended domestic borders and is now more mobile and momentary. For this reason, it calls the attention of the defense players in charge of national and international security.

Terrorism, like the revolutionary war, can be considered as an alternative and irregular strategy, as opposed to inter-state conventional and regular wars. An asymmetrical conflict therefore presents matched up parties that differ from one another on the basis of their nature and their unbalanced power relations on one hand, and of the nature of their targeted goals and, their respective behaviors while at war on the other hand.

Terrorist groups generally have the lower-hand in power relations with states. So they resort to terror in an attempt to destabilize and undermine those states, not to overwhelm them through military encounters.

All parties engaged in a war try to meet specific objectives. Terrorist groups are in for the echo (i.e., media buzz and psychological impact). Facing the threat of terrorism, states resort to the different instruments of legitimate violence in order to protect their homelands. Embedded in power relations, asymmetrical match-ups materialize in wars of expression from one standpoint, and in wars of self-assertion from another standpoint.

At the end of the 20th century, alternative strategies like terrorism began to put greater emphasis on offensive actions, reminding of what Hervé Couteau-Bégarie called the “vogue of offensiveness”. By the end of the 19th century, they drew attention in Great Britain whereas they were set aside in France. Charles Callwell argued in “Small Wars” that, whereas the army has a tactical advantage, it is disadvantaged on the strategic front⁵. State armies are more organized, equipped

7 Alain Bauer et Xavier Raufer, Op cit.

8 Cf. Intervention de Loïc Garnier (Contrôleur Général de Police), Chef de l’Unité de

and prepared for combat, than terrorist groups. However, their tactical superiority is counterbalanced by the mobility, the rapidity and by the surprise attacks of their adversaries, as the latter disregard the norms prevailing at war (*jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*).

This reality is visible particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa where the states are already undermined by the institutional weakness of their political systems and by their incapacity to make strategic projections and to carry out effective on-the-ground deployment.

African states still depend on foreign assistance. They are unable to promptly react to the attacks targeted at their territories. However, achieving autonomy is precisely the greatest indication that a state has reached maturity, from a sovereignty perspective.

The absence of a conceptual basis of terrorism makes it difficult to develop a doctrine on defense and law enforcement modalities. In fact, the appraisal of this strategic threat and the analysis of its reproduction mechanisms enable states to anticipate the next moves of their enemies and to develop their own tactical mechanisms of defense and security. In the absence of such mechanisms, they can hardly operate efficiently and effectively even after they have integrated collective security groups.

III. Building an African autonomous capacity to fight terrorism

The strategic and tactical challenge that terrorism represents for the armed and law enforcement forces in Sub-Saharan Africa leads one to raise the following questions: **how could these forces be effective and establish credibility in the global war on terror, given that the region has become a haven of terrorist attacks in recent years?** In other words, what would be the requirements for an African strategic initiative that would enable African states to meet the challenge of terrorism? The answer to this question requires a global vision and anticipation capacity. Also

timely is a strategic partnership at the regional level from which Africa, as whole entity, could assert itself in the global war on terror.

1) Global vision and pro-active capacity

An efficient strategy to fight terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa requires a vision as well as a comprehensive approach. It entails that African states ought to avail themselves of an autonomous set of mechanisms, rather than merely assimilating Western models despite the fact that they are references and constitute elements of analysis.

As they analyze Europe, Alain Bauer and Xavier Raufer find that: “le vieux continent semble (...) incapable de dire qui est l’ennemi aujourd’hui, ce qu’est l’hostilité en 2009. Pays par pays, la défense administre, gère et réagit au coup par coup mais l’Europe manque d’une doctrine claire en matière d’hostilité. Soit qu’elle n’en ait pas conçue une elle-même, soit qu’on ne lui en ait pas fourni une convaincante et opérationnelle”⁶.

In their opinion, « this situation is unfortunate » for the following reasons:

1. *The defense of a sovereign state, or a state coalition, normally hinges on the nature of opposing entities; it is not the other way around. The reverse case is embedded in soviet medical practice: [the doctor] treats the patient by relying on the available medication instead of the latter’s sickness. Applied to the sector of defense, this practice consists of modeling the adversary or the fictive threats, to create an enemy of convenience from the available forces and mechanisms.*

2. *The failure of states to avail themselves of their own strategy mechanisms compels states to adopt those of other states. If a state assumes this situation, it undermines itself town a tactical perspective: some states prescribe the doctrine while the others merely abide by it.*

coordination de la lutte anti-terroriste (UCLAT), sur la lutte contre le terrorisme, au 12ème FICA/IHEDN, Paris du 18 au 26 mai 2011 à Paris.

9 “[It] symbolizes, for those who use it, their mobilization, their denial of any compliance

or compromise. It conveys their conviction that drugs, crimes or terrorism cause damages as sizeable as a declared enemy and their willingness to treat as such all those responsible.” Gilles Andréani, « La guerre contre le terrorisme. Le piège des mots », <http://www.diplomatie.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/FDOO...>, p. 102.

3. *The basic research produced by other states can be constrictive, – worse – it can be deceptive or deliberately tricky. Basing one's research on such works is certainly misleading*⁷.

Ultimately, states cannot allude to a strategy without a clear and precise view of the threat of terrorism. The view results from observation and personal research. The state which analyzes terrorism from its historicity is then enabled to develop its own strategy, based on the local and the global stakes (glocalisation).

The appraisal of the threat of terrorism determines the approach to the war on terror. It is derived from two approaches. In the police and judiciary-based approach applied in France, terrorism is defined as a crime and terrorists as criminals. That approach prescribes a civil action that consists of pursuing and investigating terrorists and of bringing them to justice⁸. Applied by the United States, the military approach applied relies on the concepts of "terrorism with a global reach" and "defense against terrorism", while putting emphasis on the offensive and defensive contours of a similar strategic reality.

Adopted by the United States following the 9/11 Attacks, the concept of "war", as per Gilles Andréani, *"symbolise, pour ceux qui l'emploient, leur mobilisation, leur refus de toute complaisance ou de tout compromis. Il exprime leur conviction que la drogue, le crime ou le terrorisme produisent des ravages aussi considérables qu'un ennemi déclaré et leur volonté de traiter comme tel l'ensemble de ceux qui en sont responsables."*⁹

Notwithstanding this statement, an appraisal of the threat of terrorism while taking into account its political, religious and psychological contours, should facilitate the understanding of the environment as well as the generally varying behavior of its perpetrators. That should enable states to anticipate and cope with the threat's contingencies.

An efficient strategy needs to be prospective and pro-active in essence, and the success of its implementation depends on the performance of

state Intelligence services.

Given that today, networks and systems are interconnected (Cf. Theory of the Network Centric Warfare)¹⁰, be it at the local, the domestic or the global level, a community for security should be contemplated, in order to achieve mostly interoperability or "interarméité", that is, cooperation between the divisions of the police forces, and between the armed forces and the police forces in collaboration with the populations. This can be applied at national, the regional and the international levels.

In the end, a civilo-military vision, anticipation and the inter-operability of the armed and law enforcement forces are crucial for an efficient strategy in the fight against terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa. This integrated operational approach is conducive to the development of complementary armed and law enforcement forces. It should be a factor of governance and an incentive for the security secteur reform (SSR)¹¹. The African initiative in the war on terror can therefore be effective only in the context of a regional partnership. Indeed, this is a requirement for Africa to assert itself as a relevant and credible international actor.

2) For a strategic partnership

The global nature of the terrorism threat compels states to resort to a comprehensive security approach, departing from a geographic viewpoint and taking into account the systems and networks interconnection. Applying this approach entails the contemplation of a strategic partnership.

Terrorism is mainly targeted at Western powers and their interests, which are present even in Sub-Saharan Africa. For this reason, they are deeply concerned with the war on terror in all parts of the worlds. France and the United States may well be the greatest examples. In the case of the latter, Saïda Bedar explains that « la stratégie globalisante des Américains implique une extension de l'emprise géostratégique »¹². An

10 Cf. Alain De Neve et Joseph Henrotin, « La Network –Centric Warfare : de son développement à Iraqi Freedom », *Stratégie*, 86-87, mars 2006, pp.53-75.

11 Cf. Presentation by Niagalé Bagayoko, on governance and the security secteur reform (SSR), on the occasion of the 12th FICA/IHEDN, 18-26 May 2011 in Paris.

12 "The Americans' globalizing strategy entails the extension of the geo-strategic influence." Saïda Bedar, « Les nouvelles frontières de l'empire américain », in *Arabies*, Novembre 2001, pp. 23-25.

13 "The United States availed themselves of a global political vision, which consists of

African strategic alliance to fight terrorism therefore does not rule out the involvement of the Western powers. One might even fear that, in view of the dependency on Western forces, African defense and law enforcement initiatives are only tangible in the context a global partnership. Concurrently, Tanguy Struye de Swielande argues that *“les Etats-Unis se sont donnés une vision politique globale, à savoir maintenir l’avantage de leur position hégémonique, afin de garantir leurs intérêts de sécurité et de prospérité nationales et, par voie de conséquence, pensent-ils celle du monde entier. Telle est la nouvelle destinée manifeste.”*¹³

In order to establish their credibility at both the regional and the global levels, armed and law enforcements forces in Sub-Saharan Africa need to stimulate a regional initiative. This initiative should integrate the asymmetrical threats as well as the on-the-ground missions of the African Standby Force (ASF) of the African Union Peace

and Security Council, which is composed of brigades subdivided in accordance with the five sub-regional communities, i.e. ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC and AMU.

In conclusion, armed and law enforcement forces in Sub-Saharan Africa can hardly meet the challenge of asymmetrical threats in general and of the terrorism threat in particular. They need a clear vision, a global strategy and the appropriate operational means. As they join forces at the national, regional and international levels, African states will be enabled to effectively fight terrorism. Taken as a whole, Africa will be able to assert itself as a credible strategic actor. Indeed, training at the International War College (ESIG) and the International School of Security Forces (EIFORCES) in Yaounde, Cameroon, falls in line with that objective. These institutions have been recognized by ECCAS and the African Union for achieving excellence in the training of senior officials in the new defense and security challenges.

sustaining the advantage of their hegemonic position in order to meet their national security and prosperity interests and, subsequently, the position of the whole world. That is the new obvious destiny.” Tanguy Struye de Swielande, « La grande stratégie américaine dans l’après 11 septembre », *Stratégique*, N° 86-87, op. cit. p. 23.

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ISLAMIST CONTAMINATION IN THE EXTREME NORTH OF CAMEROON: RISKS AND LIMITS

The outbreak of Islamist terrorism in Nigeria, orchestrated by the Boko Haram, is source of concern for Cameroon. In 2009, this sect launched a long military fight against the Nigerian government, moderate Muslims, Christians and others. The group diversified its terrorists operation by including suicide bombings and hostage taking. The activities of this Islamic sect have grievous consequences on Nigeria and on the entire sub region as well. This article has two primordial objectives. First, it is to show that the risk of contamination by Islamist groups is important to the Extreme Northern Region of Cameroon. There are several historical and Islamic foundations that reveal that the region is vulnerable to contamination. This is also evident through the lack and instability in which the population of this area lives - an area characterised by a long, porous and often uncontrollable frontier. In addition to the low level of education, the population lives in deplorable conditions which exposes them to ideological indoctrination and recruitment. The second objective of this paper is to demonstrate that despite the challenges and risks raised, the Extreme Northern region of Cameroon can escape from the threats posed by these groups. The country is better placed as it is not under any claim to institute Sharia Laws, as has been the case in Nigeria for over a long time. More to this, sensitization and assistance are presently being carried out by associations within the framework of interreligious dialogue.

Key Words: Boko Haram, contamination, Extreme North, Islam, Limit, Nigeria, risk.



Source : Paris; 15th March, deployment of Boko Haram in the Extreme North of Cameroon

Introduction

Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has constantly experienced several socio-political conflicts and religious crises of great magnitude. Characterised by a plethora of military takeovers, regular socio-political crisis, frequent ethnic and religious conflicts, the country is known as one of the most unstable and uncertain in Africa. Islam plays an important role in the present security crisis in the country. Through it, the country has experienced a solid religious sectarianism which is the foundation of the radicalization of the main sociological composition.

Its evolution dated way back with the jihad of Usman Dan Fodio around the beginning of the 19th century. It saw the multiplication of several congregations making Islamic claims in a totally secular state. The proliferation of Islamic sects, which can be seen as an expression of an internal dynamic within Islam, saw the creation several radical groups with Boko Haram being the most known till date. This sect developed rapidly since its creation in 2002 and has been classified in the rank of international terrorism. Today, the group constitute a major worry not only for the Nigerian government where it is harbored, but also to neighbouring countries especially Cameroon. The goal of this paper is to evaluate the risks of and limits of Islamist propagation in the Extreme North of Cameroon.



For the first time the Cameroonians Soldiers bombed Boko Haram fighters along the boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. [REINNIER KAZE - AFP]

A. On the Risk of Islamic Contamination of the Extreme North

By its proximity to the North East of Nigeria where Islamic ideology is constantly propagated, the Extreme North of Cameroon is vulnerable to the dissemination of these ideologies ensuing from its immediate surrounding. The age old historical links that solidifies and unite the two parties enables one to understand the level of influence Nigeria has on this area. Its common secular history witnessed the establishment of the region under the ideological supremacy and leadership of Nigeria through the revolution of Usman Dan Fodio in the 19th Century.

a) Historical basis of the Risk of Contamination

The first contamination took place during the jihad of Usman Dan Fodio. This revolution permits one to understand how a movement that began in Sokoto and propagated in Cameroon amongst people, some of whom had nothing to do with Islam talk less of the ideas they disseminated, easily indoctrinated the population. From its inception, the jihads of Usman Dan Fodio had as principal objective, the purification of Islam. Today, it can be considered at the same level with the revolution that led to the establishment of a radical Islam similar to that defended by Boko Haram. Besides, analysis shows that there are three credible levels through which these two revolutions can be compared; namely the choice of their targets, their ideological references and through the arguments they develop to justify their actions. To launch his jihads, Dan Fodio criticised the attitudes of the established authority, the Hausa States with respect to their relation with Islam. At that time those states had existed for over four centuries. Mohammed Yusuf at the time of the creation Boko Haram in 2002 had as main target the Nigeria government and the regime in place.

The religious discourse enabled Dan Fodio to mobilize Muslim masses in a holy war which led to the establishment of the Caliphate of Sokoto, a vast religious and political state. At the beginning of the 19th Century, it was the largest political entity in Sub Saharan

1 Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has known seven military regimes notably : those of January-July 1966; August 1966-July 1975; July 1975-February 1976; February

1976-october 1979; December 1983-aout 1985; August 1985-august 1993; November 1993-june 1998.



Source : RTS INFOS 9th March, two towns taken back from Boko Haram in the North of Nigeria.

Africa. It regrouped several states or emirates under a political or religious leader with the title of Amir al Muminine. Islam played a vital role in this movement as it enabled it to mobilize a good number of actors who established the Caliphate that integrated the entire Northern part of Cameroon including the Extreme North Region.

History explains it more and even justifies the fact that Boko Haram has sympathizers and recruits along the borders of Nigeria. The first and main reason comes from the fact the region is a piece of the Caliphate of Sokoto, that is from the Emirate of Peul of the Adamawa on one part, and from Bornu majority of whom are the Kanouri on the other hand. This sect is active in three main states of Nigeria; Adamawa, Bornu and Yobe. The first two states share a common border of about 1000 km with the Extreme North of Cameroon. The main attacks of this sect are carried in the Extreme North and it is in this area that the leader of the sect announced the creation of caliphate. Four years after he launched the jihad in 1808, Dan Fodio founded the Caliphate of Sokoto state which is a theocratic state. For several years now, it is the same main objective Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram is pursuing. This explains why the risks of the Extreme North becoming ideologically contaminated remains worrying. To better understand the evolution of this Islamist threat, it is important to analyze the evolution of Boko Haram, a group that has transformed the military status of Cameroon to a

zone of retreat and passage for its targets.

From its inception, Boko Haram was simply a rebellious group. Its activities were limited to criticism made against the government for not fulfilling its social and religious obligations. To its members, the political failure of the government was equally that of the western model that had groomed and inspired these leaders. To them these leaders were applying western precepts in the management of the political, social and judicial life of the country. They were therefore calling for an establishment of an Islamic regime considered capable of ensuring the best administration for the country. It was later that they got engaged in violent acts. Extending this group, which is its

main method of operation and the sporadic violence acts carried throughout the country, is an expression of the reversal of its initial approach (Danjibo, 2009: 134). The group is extending to the Sahel region thereby making the Northern parts of Nigeria and Cameroon, a breeding ground for insecurity.

Worthy of note is the fact the geographical space on which Boko Haram is most active is situated in the North East of Nigeria especially in the states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. In reality, it is about two famous historical and theocratic entities, that is, the Emirate of Adamwa, one of the branches of the Caliphate of Sokoto and the Bornu Empire. The latter is considered a stronghold of Boko Haram. This state is made up of essentially inhabitants of the Kanuri ethnic group and was one of the principal bases for the recruitment of Boko Haram followers before inhabitants of other communities were later enrolled.

These events finally shaped the status of Cameroon in general and the Extreme North in particular. From the beginning, the area was simply used by the sect as a hideout and a place for retreat. Its members used it to escape from the attacks from the Nigerian army. Later on, the sect saw Extreme North as fertile ground for hostage taking. Today, the multiplication of attacks at the borders may make one think that Boko Haram may have territorial ambitions although at moment, it is not possible to predict their in and outs. Till date, the entire hostage taking carried out by the group in

2 Literally commanders of believers.

Cameroon was in the Extreme North.

Without any doubt, the risk of the Extreme North becoming contaminated by Islamists is real. This area shares a common and long border with the zone where the activities of Boko Haram is strongest- an area that extends from Lake Chad to the North, to River Ine, to the South of Yola, the capital of Adamawa. Being chased from Nigeria, Boko Haram combatants migrate to the Extreme North of Cameroon. This migration is made possible as result of the porous borders, the cultural, linguistic and human similarities that exist between the two countries. (Liolio, 2013, 91). These similarities reinforce the risk of this area becoming contaminated by Islamist ideology given that there is no clear cut sociological difference between the ethno cultural groups living between the frontiers. Those in the area are families living in the two distinct areas who often times do not feel concern of the geopolitical implication of the issue. Most of these inhabitants see themselves as those with dual nationalities. Some of those coming from Nigeria make use of the Cameroon national Identity cards so as to evade the huddles at the borders once they are on Cameroonian territory. The porous nature of the borders also contributes to make the Extreme North of Cameroon subjected to the influence of Nigerian Islamists who contribute to the indoctrination and radicalization of the area.

b) Islamic Bases of the Risk of Contamination

The crisis and conflict that characterized Nigeria during the pre-colonial did not leave Cameroon in general and the Extreme North in particular indifferent. Born in Nigeria, this movement easily got implanted on the Cameroonian soil. Some part of the population did not only buy into the different ideologies of the group but contributed in propagating it alongside the Nigerians. Undoubtedly, the first of this group was the jihads of Dan Fodio. We will not lay more emphasis on Islamist motivations that they established. However a proper analysis on the methods of these wars and their consequences on Cameroon, reveals that they all had great similarities with those in Nigeria. The jihad spread in Cameroon without much difficulty with about forty lamida divided between the present day Adamawa, the North and Extreme North. They constituted the essential elements of what made the Emirate of Adamawa one of the

vassal states through which Dan Fodio exercised his suzerainty at the end of the holy wars. The administration of the caliphate developed political, religious and socio cultural ties between Cameroon and Nigeria that neither the colonization nor independence was capable of breaking. Ever since, all the Islamist revolutions that took place in Nigeria had effects in the Northern part of Cameroon.



Source : LADEPECHE.fr; Chadian Soldiers at Gamboru, during an operation against Boko Haram on the 1st Febrary 2015 in Nigeria.

So it was with mahdism, a messianic movement which considered its founder Muhammed Ahmad a prophet. The movement had a tremendous impact in the area. Born also in Nigeria, the movement was the first Islamic movement to oppose the authority of Sokoto. The movement rapidly moved to the North of Cameroon where its adherents opposed the authority of the Lamida as they accused the former of practicing syncretism, a blend of Islam and paganism (Umar, 1998: 126).

After this, was the Izala movement founded by Cheil Idris and Mahood Gumi in 1967. The same year the movement was founded, it moved to the Extreme North of Cameroon where it propagated a severe discourse which continues to preoccupy the traditional authorities of this area. By proclaiming what they called the purification of Islam, the group attacked the Soufi, Tijjaniya, and Quadriyya congregations which the traditional and religious authorities adhered to. In retaliation, these congregations accused the Izala of developing an impure and traditionalist religion contrary to that taught by the Prophet. The clarity of their messages, the modernization of their methods and their opposition and criticism of the political and religious authorities in place convinced a good number of Muslims of their credibility (Junaida, 1982, 45). A good number of the followers of this movement

still sympathize with him in the Northern part of Cameroon.

Lastly, was the Maitatsine which began in Kano in the 1970s. This movement reinforced Islamic militancy through its radicalism. Their main targets are the established institutions and moderate Muslims. They accused them of introducing impurity in Islam. This group exploited the social frustrations in Nigeria and easily made disciples. This group did not hesitate to take up arms against the Nigerian government to reach their main objective which is to establish an Islamic state where the Sharia law will be in force (Danjibo, 2009: 87). It was later exported to the Extreme North of Cameroon where they got a timid support from the followers of Izala.

The government of Nigeria had to put in place an enormous military strategy which saw the death of thousands of its followers including Muhammadu Marwa its main leader. The Maitatsine movement disappeared in the early 1980s after having destabilized some of the metropolitan towns in Northern Nigeria. Many observers believe that the Maitatsine created favorable conditions for the Boko Haram Islamist sect to get implanted in Cameroon.

c) The Risk of Islamist Contamination due to Uncertain Livelihoods.

The pollution of the population of the Extreme North by Islamists is due to the socio-economic conditions of these people. Poverty in this region is an endemic reality which has been exploited by the some entrepreneurs in Nigeria through their past and present capacity to mobilize. Seduced by some benefits and messages of hope from this group, the population becomes receptive and open to the calls of these radicals. Youth unemployment is another major element that causes young people to respond to the appeals of these jihadists. Consequently in areas where Boko Haram is most active in the Northern part of Nigeria, about 70-80% of the followers are unemployed youths (Gourley, 2012, 2). The low level of education is one the factors that exposes this region to Islamist population. The regions of Extreme North, Adamawa, the North and the East constitute what is termed in Cameroon Priority Education Zones (PDZ). This is an initiative to catch up with the rate of schooling that makes these areas vulnerable to indoctrination. In some ethnic groups in the Extreme Region, there is an urgent need to establish birth certificates to enable pupils enroll into schools. In such conditions, a great part of the illiterate population constitutes an important field for indoctrination and recruitment. Presently, there

is a need to raise awareness amongst the pupils and students found around the frontiers with Nigeria and in the different combat zones. These schools are almost empty as they have been abandoned by both pupils and teachers. Two months after schools reopening, even when the doors of these schools are opened, the turn out is low as most pupils and students have migrated to areas far of from the combat zones. Mohamed Usman captures the conditions through which radical Islam evolved. In his words:

The conditions under which Boko Haram have emerged| share similarities with the socio-economic conditions that have fostered similar movements elsewhere. Since the mid 1980s, living conditions have grown worse; mass poverty, inequality in the educational opportunities, growing unemployment and corruption in high places, the use misuse of resources have become common place, many people are appalled by standards of living. These problems swelled the army of the vulnerable whose disillusionment and impoverishment made them prey in the hands of people who promise to bring change for better(Umar, 2013, 45).

It means the potential risk of Islamist pollution of the adjoining zones of Northern Nigeria is made manifest. It is a product of a historical sedimentation that renews the production of radical Islam in a country which, for over two centuries, witnessed the birth and spread of religious reformers whose activities were carried out through conquest. Added to this structural problem is that of unemployment added to the poor living standards of the population. This makes the population targets for recruiters. Added to this is the problem posed by the porous borders and poverty which offers the exportation of new ideas as radical discourse is always accompanied with some immediate benefits. It is important to highlight that history, sociology and Islamic lifestyle makes its difficult to perceive a compost of endogenous radicalism. The major threat is that of the exploiting and manipulating vulnerabilities, identity and proximity.

B. Limits of Islamist Contamination

For several centuries, Muslims through the different generations have developed an intransigent attitude towards the orientations they wanted for their religion. The multiple claims ended up solidifying this orientation. The claims made for the introduction of Sharia Law marked an important phase in present day Islamic radicalization. Despite its proximity and the ideological influence Nigeria has on the Extreme

North of Cameroon, the area had never fallen prey to the claims of Sharia, a factor that distances it from Islamic radicalization.

a) Sharia Law: A less Preoccupying Concern of Muslims in the Extreme North

In Northern Nigeria, the claims of Sharia law dates as far back as the pre-colonial period. Severally, the Islamic law was instituted and each time it was contested. At the end of the 1990s, this claim increasingly crystallized the attention of the Islamists. The Soufi, Sunnite and Chiite states all buy into these claims. In the end, between 1999 and 2002 twelve states of the Nigerian Federal adopted the Sharia Law (Danfulani, 2012: 208). However, these claims did not affect the Extreme North of Cameroon despite its adoption by the state of Borno.

A bulk of the Muslims in the Extreme North who constituted an integral part of Adamawa remained indifferent to the discourse to restore sharia in Nigeria. To fully understand what has always been a controversy both in Nigeria and Cameroon, it is important to go back into the past. From its inception, the Caliphate of Sokoto was established through Islamic texts and placed under Sharia, the Islamic Law.

During the entire British colonial administration, that is from 1903-1960, this regime was vibrant though it witnessed some moderations in its application. However, since independence there has been some emphasis on the issue of Sharia. Ever since, several radical groups have cropped especially in Northern Nigeria calling for the restoration of Sharia.

With the advent of independence and the introduction of the secular state, the status of Islam greatly changed. It ceased from being a quasi-religion of the state and Northern Nigeria was greatly shaken by new legislation of the state. The Islamic law was finally restored in some of the Northern states in Nigeria in the late 1990s. Its followers saw it as a panacea to the vibrant corruption and other vices that was eating deep into the fabric of the Nigerian society (Ibid, 214). By distancing itself from what is believed to be a source of conflict, the Extreme Northern part of Cameroon also succeeded to limit Islamist

contamination despite the region's historical and geographical ties with Nigeria. It is also necessary to adopt civic attitudes which will completely eradicate religious conflicts that often bring about prejudices at the detriment of the unity and integration of Cameroon.

b) Strengthening Inter-Religious Dialogue

Boko Haram is known for its offences and crimes against the Christian communities in the Northern part of Nigeria. The regular destruction of religious edifices like churches and mosques has not only made cohabitation difficult amongst the ordinary Nigerian but has brought a great religious divide within the country. It is only thanks to the constant dialogue amongst the main religious actors that the Extreme North of Cameroon has not witnessed a similar fate. These religious leaders have to keep communicating and the state must accompany them in the process. There is a plethora of associations, both national and local, which, with success, are promoting pacific co-existence between the different ethno-religious groups divided between the Christians, Muslims and adherents of ancestral veneration. The Council of the Imam and Muslims Dignitary of Cameroon (CIMDC) since its creation in 2008 is also involved in this campaign. Under the coordination of Dr. Moussa Oumarou, the association has been instrumental in interreligious dialogue and the mobilization of Muslim in the promotion of peace in Cameroon. This association does sensitization on the field especially to the Muslim community. It adopted an effective approach which targets religious authorities, Imams, Modibbe, Mallams and traditional rulers in raising awareness of their role and stakes in promoting peace through interreligious dialogue. This has made them major players in the sensitization of the Muslim community against religious extremism and in the promotion of peace.

Since creation, the CIMDC has organized three conferences on peace and pacific co-existence amongst the people of Cameroon. The first which took place in 2009 was duped "Peace in Cameroon, a Culture to Nurture." It was followed by a second in 2010 entitled "Peace in Cameroon, a Culture to Consolidate." The last centred on security issues. These initiatives greatly

3 Twelve states have adopted the charia Law in Northern Nigeria between 1999 and 2002: Borno, Bauchi, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara.

4 After the creation of the Sokoto Calihate in 1808, the sharia Law was instituted all

over the territoty by a new power and the Extreme North was part of based on its integration to the Emirate of Adamawa.

5 Interview with Mr Moussa Oumarou, General Coordinator of CIDIMUC, 6 november, 2014.



Source : Business Insider 13th January 2015, An attack attributed to Boko Haram which left hundred deaths in the North East of Nigeria.

reduced the barriers that had established communal sectarianism amongst the different ethno-religious groups in the Extreme North of Cameroon.

On its part, the Association for Interreligious Dialogue (AID), organized a two day seminar, from the 23-24 April duped "Christians and Muslims together for Peace: Effects, Challenges and Perspectives for Interreligious Dialogue in the Extreme Northern Region of Cameroon." This meeting was peculiar in that it took place in a context and environment of security concerns and challenges within the communities.

AID draws people from all religious background which it intends mobilizing for the promotion of the culture of non violence and peace. By so doing, it fosters and deepens the understanding of the different religions and the realization of a common peaceful vision. The association believes the different religions must be committed to come together in order to reinforce interreligious dialogue. This can be possible through the mutual exchange of the competences of the different religious actors, associations involved in promoting peace in the Extreme North of Cameroon and the different ethno-religious groups concerned.

The Lamido of Maroua, Bakary Bouba believes that this come together should maintain, reinforce and develop the culture of peace and fraternity towards one another. His Lordship, Philippe Stevens, the Bishop of the Diocese of Maroua and Mokolo equally exhorted the religious community towards mutual respect. In a speech his intimates;

My sister, you are a Muslim and I respect you for who you are. You are a Muslim my brother and I respect you. I respect the choices you make. I respect the way you pray and submit to God. I respect your lifestyle which is based on your faith and the religious teachings you have received.

And you my brother and you my sister, you are a Christian, you have chosen to be member of this or that denomination; Evangelical, Baptist, Lutheran; I respect you for this choice you consciously made. I respect you and I pray that God will guide you in His love and on the path you have chosen. I respect you my brother and my sister, you who have chosen to follow another religion or have decided to abide in the traditional religion. I don't despise you in any way. I do not insult you or mock at you. I respect and love you. And I as a Catholic Christian, I do plead that others will respect and love me as I am and I the religious choice I have made.

This demonstrates local and national initiatives made to promote interreligious dialogue in order to reinforce cohabitation between the different religious communities so as to prevent interreligious conflict. These communities will only be free from this web of problems through concrete efforts made to improve on this religious co-habilitation and dialogue. That is why these actors of the civil society are more and more active and engaged to convince the population of a

6 Ibid.

7 CIDIMUC: Resolution of the conference held in Yaoundé from 29 to 31st October 2014. The 3rd conference held under the theme « Peace and Security in Cameroon : Stakes, Challenges and Responsibility of Social Actors ». it saw the participation of administrative authorities and the representative of the Cameroonian Head of State. The discussions rotated on three subthemes: (1) The construction and Consolidation of Peace, (2) the Imams: Actors in PeaceKeeping, (3)the role of Friday Sermons: theories and Practice>

8 fr.allafrica.com/stories/200801170614.html, « Cameroon Association for Interreligious Dialogue » (ACADIR) », Inter-religious Colloquium . Maroua, 23-24 april 2014.

Consulted on 6th november 2014.

9 fr.allafrica.com/stories/200801170614.html, « Cameroon Association for Interreligious Dialogue » (ACADIR) », Inter-religious Colloquium . Maroua, 23-24 april 2014. Consulted on 6th november 2014

10 Ibid. Speech of His Majesty Bakary Bouba, lamido of Maroua. Consulted on 6 november 2014.

11 Ibid. Speech of Mgr Philippe Stevens, Representative of the Community of Catholic Christians. Consulted on 6th November 2014

change of mentality and tolerance by using families in which people of different religions are living together. During their campaigns and sensitizations, they make use of several living examples of those who demonstrate this pacific co-existence. In addition to this, they exchange visits during religious feasts. They also attend the wedding ceremonies of those of other religion. They also support one another during difficult and sad moments. By so doing, they rid the society of certain problems thereby laying foundations towards building a peace and loving community.

Conclusion

For historical and geographical reasons, the Extreme North of Cameroon is not sheltered and protected from the contamination of Islamists from the Nigeria. The region shares a long, difficult to control and porous border with Nigeria. More to this, there is free circulation amongst the population without any major distinction. The porosity of the borders results from the fact that the administrative coverage of this area is weak. This explains why the Islamists first used Cameroon as a hideout base, later as field for hostage taking, before waging a full scale war against the army. The nature of the border also facilitated the

infiltration of combatants into Cameroon where they took refuge in order avoid being attacked and caught by Nigerian armed force.

Worthy to note is the fact the discourse of Islamist is not new in Cameroon. Radical movements like Izala and Maitatsine which began in Nigeria spread to the Extreme North of Cameroon. Boko Haram is on the same path towards a Salafism, which is nothing but a radical arm of Wahhabism.

Through the various identical cultural traits amongst the population, the various contacts and exchanges and the porosity of the borders, it is evident that not only the Northern Region but the nation of Cameroon is exposed to the infiltration of ideologies into the country. If this Islamist threat is not yet felt elsewhere, it is simply because it is strong only in the Muslim community, many of whom in trying to apply their faith integrally (which is both a dogma and social regulation mechanism) are not hostile to the application of the Sharia, a law which constantly influences different areas of their daily lives. From this, there should be no confusion making a terrorist sedimentation. Nevertheless, there is a better supervision to be made to organize such efforts.

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BOKO HARAM EXPANSION, DEPOPULATION OF THE BORDER AREAS AND INFLUX OF TERRORISM REFUGEES IN THE NORTH OF CAMEROON

Overwhelmed by Boko Haram attacks on all fronts and the counter offensives of the Nigerian army, the populations of the Northern Cameroon - Nigeria border have largely abandoned their towns and villages. This forced exodus has orchestrated the influx of Nigerian refugees to Cameroon and internal displacement of many people. The settlement of these displaced people at the Minawaou camp and the perching of others at temporary and precarious sites in the Far North Region poses several humanitarian complications. The territorial expansion of Boko Haram in Nigeria has also increased the number of refugees, especially with the opening of new provisional sites in the North region. Added to the Central African refugees, the internally displaced people and the probability of the influx of new waves of Nigerian refugees in the Adamawa Region, north of Cameroon presents a real security and humanitarian emergency.

This article seeks to show that Boko Haram expansion, through their terror campaigns, provoke massive population exodus from the border regions of Cameroon and Nigeria. From a synthesis of documents, articles and interviews, the study analyses the configuration of the deserted zones, the trajectory, volume and living conditions of the refugees and displaced peoples, as well as the humanitarian risks to which they are exposed.

Key words: Boko haram, depopulation, Refugees, Displaced people, Humanitarian Risks



Source : Le Septentrion Infos –Massive displacement caused by terrorism.

Introduction

In addition to the traditional causes, terrorist violence now constitutes a dominant factor of forced displacement of populations in Africa. The armed insurrection of Boko Haram in the north east of Nigeria, which is illustrative, offers a grid for analysis from triple angles, notably: demographic, social and humanitarian. Since 2011, the shared borders between north east Nigeria and the Extreme North of Cameroon have become the object of repeated Boko Haram assaults and the violent counter offensives of the Nigerian army, provoking massive population exodus.

The objective of this contribution is to show how Boko Haram's violent attacks and the reprisals of the Nigerian army have engendered the depopulation of the frontier zones, the influx of refugees to Cameroon and augmented humanitarian risks in the Far North Region.

A. Terror and depopulation of the frontier zone

The forced displacement of populations at the Nigeria-Cameroon border results from the territorial expansion of Boko Haram in north east Nigeria and the Far north of Cameroon. The rise of Islamist violence in Nigeria in 2003 hardly predicted chaotic prospects in the evolution of disorder in the border areas of the two states. However, the multiplication of terror on the populations has led to massive forced displacement of Nigerians. This displacement has several trajectories.

The first is horizontal and simultaneously extends both internally and externally towards Nigeria and Cameroon respectively. The epicentre of the Boko Haram insurrection, Borno State, appears to be the laboratory for the incubation and expansion of expeditions towards other towns of Nigeria. Next, the States of Adamawa and Yobe suffer the assaults of the Islamist assailants and are integrated into the field of violence. The main conquest strategy of Boko Haram is one of massive killings in a context where the vulnerability of victims averts any possibility of resistance. The escalation of violence between Boko Haram and the Nigerian army has three main consequences: terrorised populations, deserted regions and sanctuarisation.

Terrorism of the populations is seen from the level of violence and abuse inflicted on the victims. Atrocious killings, the abduction of women and youth, and the pillage of goods and animals contribute to a well thought out strategy for victimisation. By inscribing an imagery defeat and death in the minds of the inhabitants of the conflict zones, Boko Haram defines a macabre perspective that leaves only two options: escape or resignation. The perimeter of death was first circumscribed around the town of Maiduguri. It then widened progressively towards the cities of Borno State and the cities and villages of the States of Adamawa and Yobe, obliging the populations to seek greener pastures. In total, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Boko Haram attacks in north east Nigeria have led to the displacement of almost 650 000 people since 2013 (1).

By evacuating or subduing the populations to the Sharia law, Boko Haram insurgents achieve two objectives. The first is the reversal of any public authority, which, according to the Islamists, represents a vector of western civilization, which they reject. Several cities and localities of Borno state have been systematically abandoned by the authorities. Schools, administrative and local services, traditional institutions, churches and, at to a lesser extent, health services have abruptly stopped their activities with the escape of staffs following the invasion of Boko haram insurgents and the consequent application of sharia. With regards to education, several hundreds of schools have closed and about 40 000 pupils no longer attend school in Borno state. Until 2013, "Boko Haram took control of the local governments of Marte, Mobbar, Gubio, Guzamala, Abadam, Kukawa, Kala-Balge and GamboruNgala, in Borno State, chasing out government officials, taking over government buildings and imposing Sharia law"². With two of the three Borno States (Adamawa and Yobe) under a state of emergency in 2013, Boko Haram's incursions succeeded in wiping out state symbols, considered to be a western civilization refinery, in several regions.

The second objective is the sanctuarisation of conquered territories. Before the installation of a state of emergency in the three States of North East, Boko Haram's capacity for chaos was limited to the City of Maiduguri. The deployment of the

1 Jeune Afrique, June 2014

2 F. Owolade, « Boko Haram : how militant Islamist group emerged in Nigeria ? », Bulletin de Gatestone Institute, mars 2014

army obliged the group to adopt a dispersal strategy in the rural areas which materialized with the withdrawal to the Forest Zone of Sambisa (3), the mountains of Mandara, the stretch of the border with Cameroon and the neighbourhoods of Lake Chad (4). By November 2014, Boko Haram had created territorial enclaves in the Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States. This expansion was accompanied by a systematic desertion of several localities. These cities and villages correspond to the Madagali and Mubi localities subdued, in November 2014, in Adamawa, Gamburu Ngala, Dikwa, Gwosa and Marte in the Bornu State; Buni Yadi in the State of Yobe. Reporting on this quagmire, the Nigerian Security Network states that: "If Boko Haram is able to continue seizing territory in Borno, including the state capital, it is likely that almost the entire state will soon fall under the insurgency's control. This will be the realization of Boko Haram's ambition to establish a caliphate in north-east Nigeria (5)." Hardly organised and disintegrated, the territories occupied by Boko Haram, are fragments of a process of creation and consolidation of an Islamic Caliphate along the Nigeria-Cameroon-Chad borders.

The same trend has been observed since 2013, following Boko Haram onslaughts on Cameroon. The population has been forcefully displaced towards the interior. This second horizontal movement from the borders towards the interior of Cameroon is translated by the desertion of the frontal corridors extending vertically from the south of the Far North Region to Lake Chad. These frontal zones fall within the Mayo-Tsanaga, Mayo-Sava and Logone and Chari Divisions. Boko Haram offensives since 2013 and about 20 attacks on the Cameroonian localities between May and September 2014 (6) has resulted in the abandonment of border villages. The localities of Mayo-Tsanaga, Tourou, Gossi, Mozogo, Zelevet and Mogode have recorded a massive exodus of families. The depopulation of the Mayo-Sava Division is disquieting. Marked by recurrent attacks, the localities of Kerawa, Limani, Kourgui and Kolofata have been partially deserted by more

than 1000 families (7). In Logone and Chari, the capture of Gamburu-Ngala accelerated population exodus in the Fotokol, Koumana, Bagaram and Gore-Mahamat localities. The exactions of the insurgents in Lake Chad have also induced the flight of the population of the localities of Blangoua and several islets around Darak. Commercial localities have also been affected by this emigration of frontal zones. Market places like Amchidé, Doublé, Fotokol are progressively emptied of traders, customers and inhabitants of Kolofata, Mora and Waza. In all, the border stretching from Lake Chad to the North-east region is particularly hit by depopulation (fig. 1).




Figure 1 : Mapping the corridor of insecurity and depopulation

Conception: Mbarkoutou Mahama Realisation: Ganota Boniface

The process of Boko Haram expansion in the interior of Nigeria is inextricable from the growing number of refugees flooding Cameroon and deterioration of their management conditions. The annexation of Mubi, a city of 1000 inhabitants in Adamawa, on October 29, 2014, redistributed the cards in the configuration of threats and emergencies in Nigeria as in Cameroon. Also known as the bastion of fugitives from the

3 Dailytrust.info, « Inside Boko Haram's base in Sambisa forest », 11 mars 2014.

4 P. Sadatchy, « Boko Haram: One Year in a State of Emergency », GRIP, Brussels, June 2014, p.5.

5 Nigeria Security Network, "North-East Nigeria on the brink", Special report, September 2014.

6 For more information on attacks in Northern Cameroon, Read Dikalo, N°1574, May

6 2014; L'Éil du Sahel, N°601 of 12 May 2014; L'Éil du Sahel, N°617, July 10 2014; L'Éil du Sahel, N°623, July 31 2014; L'Éil du Sahel, N°622, July 29 2014, L'Éil du Sahel, N°629, July 21 2014, L'Éil du Sahel, N°629, August 21, 2014

7 L'Éil du Sahel, n°628, Monday August 18, 2014.

8 InfoSoir, n°3431, 9 September 2014.



Source : RTS Infos; Nigeria Refugees camped at Maine Soroa, in Niger

neighbourhoods of Michika, Madagali, Gulak, Uba and other already annexed villages (8), the city of Mubi, which came under the Boko Haram control opens new humanitarian cartels. The expansion of Boko Haram controlled territories in Nigeria now affects the cities of Nafada and Ashaka in the state of Gombe whose capital was bombed (9). In Cameroon, new waves of refugees have been recorded in the North and, soon, Adamawa.

B. Refugee Afflux

The question of Boko Haram refugee in the north of Cameroon raises two methodological preoccupations. The first relates to the numbering of refugees because it is difficult to adopt a quantitative approach for the evolution of statistics of Nigerian refugees in Cameroon. The successive arrivals, multiplicity of entry points and temporary refugee camps, as well as the on-going process of population exodus towards Cameroon offers an unreliable analytical perspective. The second is qualitative in that, it poses the question of the quality of Boko Haram refugees. Few studies have attempted to identify roaming refugees suffering from a high sense of insecurity, and forced displacement due to ethno-

religious causes. However, by adopting a descriptive approach, it is possible to analyse the penetration patterns, and the logistical management mechanisms.

According to the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), in June 2014, the number of internally displaced persons stood at 250.000 (10) while, in 2013, millions of refugees fled towards the Cameroon border. In successive waves, the first entered Madagali (Nigeria) – Tourou-Mogode (Cameroon) at the border of Adamawa and the Far North Region. They temporally settled in the villages of Zhelevet in the sub-divisions of Moyo-Moskoto, Gawar and Minawaou in the Moko Sub-division. The second entry route is through the Kerewa locality from where the refugees proceed to settle in Assighassia, Kolofata and Mora in the Moyo Sava Division (11). The first massive wave, estimated at 20.000 people, arrived Bama in Nigeria in August 2013 and sought refuge in Amchide, Kolofata and Mora (12). According the UNHCR, recent arrivals are feared to exceed the Minawaou capacity of 39.000. The UN organ recalled that in 2014, new arrivals fled recurrent attacks over a three week period in the region of Gwoza in the Borno State of Nigeria before their quest for refuge in Cameroon.

Other waves of refugees found shelter in Cameroon through highly insecure routes. In march 2014, several waves, 7.500 refugees, who fled prolonged fighting in the Borno and Yobe states in particular, were said to be in an "emergency situation" (13) in the Moyo Sava division. Faced with the escalation of violence, 4.200 refugees regrouped in Kolofata and Amchide, and 600 in Waza, were registered in 2013. (14) According to the administrative authorities 5.500 refugees arrived Kolofata, 3.000 in Kerewa and 370 in Mora and certain localities in Moyo-Sava of Logone and Chari (15).

9 J-P. Rémy, « The Wave of Boko Haram Shock Conquests », *Le Monde*, November 1st, 2014.

10 P. Guibbaud, « BokoHaram : Northern Cameroon in Torment ? », GRIP, Brussels, june 2014, p.1.

11 M. Meyeme, « Protection of Refugees in Cameroon : Insufficient Means in spite of good will » Association of Social Workers in Cameroon, 5 october 2013.

12 L'œil du Sahel, N°539 of 2 august 2013.

13 Declaration of Patrick Teixeira, Assistant Regional Director of the World Food Programme, Visit to Cameroon, RFI, 13 juillet 2014.

14 Emergency Appeal, "Cameroon: population movement", n°MDRCM015, 3 September 2013, in www.ifrc.org

15 Cameroon Tribune, N°10669/6868 of 9 september 2014

16 L'œil du Sahel, N° 632 of 1st september 2014.

17 Press opinion of UNHCR representative, Melissa Fleming, to Geneva on 23

About 90% of the population of Kerawa in Nigeria and other small villages for instance, took refuge in Cameroon. (16) In Fotokol in Logone and Chari, a temporary camp welcomes approximately 5.000 Nigerian refugees from Gamburu-Ngala, following its capture by Boko Haram. Since then, endless waves of refugees flock and settle in temporary camps, after which they are transferred to the Minawaou Camp near Mokolo. In total, since the beginning of the crisis in Nigeria to October 2014, the Cameroonian local authorities have reported the arrival of 43.720 Nigerian refugees; 26.720 of them have been registered by the UNHCR. According to authorities, the crisis in north eastern Nigeria has displaced about 70.000 persons towards neighbouring Niger; and about 1.600 others towards Chad. Approximately 650.000 persons have been displaced in north eastern Nigeria due to the insurrection. (17) With the expansion of Boko Haram conquered spaces particularly in Mubi, the afflux of refugees towards North Cameroon has gained a new dynamic.

The first effects are felt at the internal level with 17.000 internally displaced persons cramped in the 6 camps. The immediate consequence for Cameroon was the inflow of refugees on its territory. The border towns of Doumo and Mayo Oulo in the Division Moyo Louti in the Northern Region welcomed thousands of refugees. According to different sources, other Nigerian refugees settled at their parents' in Guider, Figuil Baurha et Koza. The social impact of this humanitarian crisis is now felt in the Garoua, Guider,



Source : LADEPECHE.fr; Photo taken at a UN camp at Baga Sola, near Lake Chad, while relieving refugees fleeing from Boko Haram attacks against BagaSiakambou, a Nigerian Village. AFP/Archives

Figuil. In the month of November, the Bourha sub-division of the division of Moyo Sava registered cohorts of refugees fleeing Boko Haram exactions. Approximately 11.000 people, including 250 Nigerian soldiers and police officers, occupy schools, garages and other public and private buildings in this small agglomeration (18). The general enthusiasm that has swept the population has literally paralysed the Nigerian villages of Belel and Saraw, at 50km away from Gashiga, in the villages and divisions of Benoue and Moyo-Louti. Several humanitarian problems are feared in Mayo-Oulo where about 2.000 refugees reside.

Following the logic of « escape to salvation beyond borders », several thousands of refugees have settled in Chad and Niger. As a result of fighting between the Nigerian Army and Boko Haram in July 2014, a thousand Nigerians took refuge in the Chadian part of Lake Chad (19). The situation is worse in Niger. In August 2014, more than 2.000 people sought home in the islands of Lake Chad belonging to Niger. (20) Altogether, since 2013, Niger welcomes more than 50.000 Nigerian refugees, in its south east region (21).

C. Humanitarian and Other Risks

The affluence of refugees to Cameroon obliges the State, already challenged by refugees from the Central African Republic, to create points of convergence, thus the Minawaou Camp of Far north. Opened on July 2, 2013, and 120km away from the Nigerian border, the Minawaou camp is set up to lodge and carter for Nigerian refugees. Many other camps have been set up along the flight tracks of refugees. They serve as relay shelters, points of refugee convergence until they are channeled to the Minawaou Camp. The protection of refugees in the Minawaou camp, 139 hectares large, is assured and coordinated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR). Other UN Agencies and non-governmental organization and associations notably: UNICEF, WHO, Red Cross and Public Concern provide different specific support to the refugees. The activity domain of these

september 2014, «Cameroon : UNHCR Intensifies its efforts towards the transfer of Nigerian refugees away from the risk of crossborder attacks » [online] in <http://www.unhcr.fr/542186d2c.html>, accessed on 30 october 2014

18 Le Jour, n°1801 of 3 october, 2014.

19 Jeuneafrique.com, « One thousand Nigerian refugees in Chad following a Boko Haram Attack » 15 august, 2014.

20 Press Opinion of UNCHR Representative, Adrian Edwards, to Geneva on 2 september 2014, «Recent Attacks in Nigeria : New Refugees arrive Cameroon et Others

continue to Add» [online] in <http://www.unhcr.fr/5405f155c.html>

21 Jeuneafrique.com, « Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Benin : Countries Under Boko Haram Threats », 15 may 2014

22 Septentrion Infos, N°153 du 24 janvier 2014.

23 Cameroon Tribune, N°10582 of 5 may 2014.

24 Interview with Raymond Rokso, District Officer of Mayo-Tsanaga, Mokolo on 6 october 2014.

25 Septentrion Infos, N°126 of 15 september 2013.

organization cover health, education, camp management, reinforcement of solidary and income generation activities. Statistics divulge that the numbers remain high due to an inflation of violence in. January 2014, there were already 2.183 Nigerian refugees (22). By May 2014, the number had risen to 15.281 (23) in the Minawaou Camp (24).

The emergence of distressed migrants hardly ends with flight strategies and the mode of normalization of “wasted” lives. It is clothed in a plethora of vulnerabilities that the rapid increase of the number of refugees appears to nurture. In Minawaou, the Camp degenerates with every new set of arrivals. At the opening of the camp, the first Nigerian refugees lived virtually normal lives. Taking credit for this satisfactory report, Ali Shouek, president of Nigerian refugees said: “we have access to almost everything: food, tents, health services, education for our children...” (25). This good report is justified by the fact that, of the 2.183 first wave of refugees, 800 children were enrolled in French and English nursery and primary schools, supervised by 13 teachers - 3 of which were refugees. Created in September 2013, following the establishment of the camp to address the scholarisation needs of the refugee and internally displaced children, the Minawaou Public school enrolled of 2.417 pupils for the 2014-2015 school year, divided in 14 classrooms and supervised by 11 teachers only (26). The camp also recorded several births. An infirmary and drinking wells reinforce the normal lives of the refugees. The increase in the number of refugees has also attracted the involvement of other humanitarian actors, in particular UNICEF, UNFPA, ICRC in the management and supervision of refugees.

The condition of the refugees in the Minawaou camp is also exposed to the risk of epidemics. According to the humanitarian aid agencies, the living conditions of the refugees are increasingly

unhygienic, exposing them to the risk of measles and other diseases. The cholera epidemic that plagued the camp in July 2014 can be attributed to a local environment that is vulnerable to seasonal diseases. According Kaoussiri Brekmo, coordinator of Disease Control Unit of the Maroua public health Office, “cholera remains a threat to the camp population despite the fact that all cases of cholera have been contained over the last few weeks. The Minawaou Camp recorded 52 cholera cases; including five deaths since July (...) we remain vigilant to cholera, due to inadequate water and sanitation facilities in the camp and the villages.” (27) It must be however be highlighted that the UN delegation in Maroua equally took commendable measures to ameliorate the situation.

In the same vein, the context of vulnerability to disease also contributed to the outbreak of measles. The strain of the disease was detected in children in the Jagala health area, in particular. The health risks extend beyond the cases of epidemics recorded in the Minawaou camp, to the population. With an over 20% rate of defecation in the open air; and the risk of major floods, the Far North Region seems more vulnerable to epidemics of cholera, measles, polio and yellow fever (28) in a context of cohabitation marked by the massive refugee presence.

The vulnerability of refugees to risks may also be analyzed under the prism of malnutrition. Already plagued by widespread malnutrition and chronic malnutrition among children (29), the Far North Region that hosts refugees is even more fragile. In the three northern and eastern regions, about 1.74 million people are threatened by food insecurity due to precarious living conditions aggravated by recurrent climate shocks and poor access to portable water (31). The situation is more pathetic for internally displaced people who forcefully abandoned everything, especially the agricultural and pastoral

26 L'Œil du Sahel, N°636 of 15 september 2014

27 <http://www.irinnews.org/>

28 HCR, « Priority Needs » in Summary of Humanitarian Needs, Office of the Resident Coordinator, p.1

29 it should be noted that malnutrition affects 33% of Children below 5 years in Cameroon. The sharp level of malnutrition among children in the extreme north remains close to emergency.

30 The extreme north regions witnessed the highest rate of food insecurity of 17,8% and 15,3%. Respectively (Nutritional Inquiry, SMART of July-August 2013).

31 Global Analysis on Food Security and Vulnerability, (CFSVA) - PAM, FAO, Gouvernement, 2011.

32 For more information on the impact of refugees on host communities, see the Special edition No 3 of the Kaliao Review; ENS Maroua.

33 A-P. De Montclos, « Refugees : Long-term Escape Strategies », in Refugee, Exodus and Politics, African Politics, N°85, march 2002, p.11

34 <http://www.irinnews.org>.

35 S. Menner, “Boko Haram’s Regional Cross-Border Activities”, in CTC Sentinel, October 2014, Vol. 7, Issue 10, pp. 10-14

activities. This blended context of natural precariousness and the vulnerability of refugees translate to greater pressure on the already inadequate available resources.

The survival of Nigerian refugees in Cameroon does not always derive from refugee camps. Most refugees often end in host families or makeshift camps thereby generating new social dynamics (32). While a few thousands agreed to live in the Minawaou camp, it should be noted that several other thousands refused to do so, preferring the home of a close family or friend. This choice stems from an apprehension of their refugees status in order to escape the "various vicissitudes of confinement in camps (33)." In December 2013, out of about 8,200 Nigerian refugees registered by the Cameroonian authorities, only 1,852 agreed to be transferred to Minawaou camp. The others opted to live with relatives in the border villages (34). According to UNHCR, since the advent of the Nigerian crisis, local Cameroonian authorities have noted the arrival of 43.720 Nigerian refugees, amongst which 26.720 have been registered by the UNHCR. Due to family and social affiliations, (35) the Mogode, Moskota, Mokolo and Maroua localities position themselves as benevolent receptacles of distressed families. Further north, Kolofata, Kerawa, Goulfey, Makari, Waza and Kousseri are also experiencing the same influx of families. To avoid scrutiny, some refugee families and IDPs prefer to settle in makeshift camps, despite the security risks. Along the Maroua - Kousseri highway, dozens of villages have been built, especially around the towns of Waza, Double, Tilde, Dabanga. Precarious huts made of straw and temporary materials also provide shelter to hundreds of families on the road to Kolofata-Mora. A similar situation prevails in the Mayo-Tsanaga department where temporary camps were erected on the roads of the Mogodé, Moskota and Mozogo districts. (37).

Conclusion

Increasingly landlocked by the rapid territorial expansion of Boko Haram, the north-eastern Nigeria, like its border with the region of the Far North of Cameroon, is becoming a human desert. Between 2011 and 2014, terror exerted by the insurgents and reprisals by the Nigerian Army upset the demographic and socio-economic balance. The flight, which sums up the lives of the refugees and internally displaced persons in the two north eastern states of Nigeria, results in the disappearance of public authority, barbarism and sanctuarisation of captured territories. The influx of Nigerian refugees and forced displacement therefore breeds humanitarian risks. Due to lack of education, epidemics, malnutrition and ethno-religious conflicts, the lives of refugees and displaced persons is both a current and future challenge. Beyond the issues that underlie such concerns, the question of refugees and persons displaced by Boko Haram, divulge a pessimistic outlook following the capture, by the insurgents of the city of Mubi in the Adamawa State of Nigeria, and whose immediate effect generate new waves towards the Northern Region and eventually Adamawa. In any case, it is imperative to address urgent questions and to anticipate potential problems. In the short term, the support of refugees and internally displaced persons should no longer accrue solely on non-state organisations. The specificity of terrorist refugees in northern Cameroon requires a grip that prevents the excavation of buried rifts and protects the Cameroonian nationality. Being of national interest, planning of refugee camps in northern Cameroon must factor the potential pressure on scarce resources and prospective security risks that could lead to collision between Nigeria and Central African refugees. In the medium term, Cameroon development policies must take account of the regular destination of population exodus and refugee presence, considering that movement is not always followed by the return of the population to their previous homes. In short, with greater state involvement, the question of refugees and displaced persons must be prioritised in sustainable development agendas.

36 L. Hall, Workshop « Maintaining Law, Order and Community Peace in Refugee Camps : Roles and Responsibilities », in UNHCR, *Refugees in Africa : the Challenge of Protection and Solutions*, Regional Parliamentary Conference on Refugees in Africa, Cotonou, 1-3 June 2004

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37 *Le Jour*, N° 1719 of 8 July 2014

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L'Éil du Sahel, N°622 du 29 juillet 2014

L'Éil du Sahel, N°623 of 31 July 2014

L'Éil du Sahel, N°629 of 21 August 2014

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Mbarkoutou, Eiforces

MBARKOUTOU
Eiforces



THE NOMADIC/MOBILE KORANIC SCHOOLS AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION: THE CASE OF MAHADJIRS OF THE CHAD BASIN

Along the Chad Basin, where Cameroon, Chad and Nigeria share a common border, are located several nomadic Koran schools. Different from the traditional schools found in this region, this school is unique by its dormitory system where thousands of talibes are produced in the name of the Mahadjirs. They were sent by their parents as roving students to this school where they could stay focused on their Islamic studies. If the dormitory system in other learning structures is meant for an ideal environment where students could benefit from confinement and proper follow up, the Mahadjirs of this region is far from reflecting these realities. Vivid analysis of the conditions of living and studies of the Mahadjirs rather qualifies its dormitory system as a structure or regime of vulnerabilities manifested by several indicators of susceptibility constantly on an increase. Without any a justification based on the economic environment, this vulnerability is rather desired by the parents, shared and sustained by the teachers and idealized by the society. This could be an ideal place for the training of children and youths based on the Spartan model of education different from any philosophy of education that inspires the political ideology and education in the three countries. This paper is a contribution which portrays how the persistence of this system of education, based on vulnerability, produces social outcasts. It points to the need for urgent security measures to address the prevailing circumstances and the potential threats that these young citizens, who are hardly inseparable in the modern socio-professional world constitutes.

Key Words: Mahadjirs, Nomad Schools, Vulnerability, Dormitory Education, Chad Basin.



Source : Héritages; Koranic School, Adrar, Algeria


Introduction

The security situation in the Lake Chad Basin has raised concerns for over two years now and places the region in a vulnerable position of contamination from jihadists from the Maghreb who are ready to invade the Sahel region. From the example of Mali where attacks from armed groups who claim links with Al Qaida suddenly put the state out of service, neighbouring countries in a bid to contain this group whose resilience seems indisputable, especially in the Northern parts of Cameroon and Nigeria where a new and armed group called Boko Haram had carried out multiple and diverse attacks, had left a climate of insecurity in the area. In every case of conflicts with an Islamic dimension, the media has not stopped pointing fingers at Koranic schools, usually qualified as the 'Fertilizer of Terrorism'. This gives room for the Boko Haram fighters who, true to the name they have been tagged with, label every academic system other than the Islamic or Koran schools impure or, in other words, every civilisation which is not based on the Islamic model. In this paper, based on the different speculations raised on the link between the actions of these groups and the existence of Koranic Schools, we shall focus on the *Mahadjirs* in trying to answer a fundamental preoccupation: to what extent does the mobile Islamic schools constitute a factor of social exclusion and its dependants or beneficiaries to criminal behaviour and violence? We will begin by

looking at the origin and evolution of this institution before evaluating the presumptions labelled today on the residents of this institution. In order that once the social and security problems linked to the Islamic schools have been analysed, measures can be taken by the countries concerned such that those category of vulnerable young people who have been excluded over time from the official school systems will not constitute a minority and violent social class.

A. Origin, Evolution and Characteristics of the Nomadic Koranic Schools.

To say the mobile Koranic School is an institution sounds paradoxical, based on the nomadic nature of the institution, and semantically incorrect when we understand that one of the fundamental traits of an institution is its sedentary nature. Beyond the school itself, we must understand the socialist practice of the institution if we must grasp what it is all about. This can not be done without revisiting the origin which dates back to when the people of Lake Chad Basin are Islamized. Without dwelling much on that distant past, it is important to note that mobility has been at the heart of Islamic learning. The circumstances through which Islam was introduced in Africa South of the Sahara was such that the new converts lacked proper follow up into the faith as those converted were greater than the capacity



Source : mabellephoto – Koranic School



Source : INTERET-GENERAL.INFO; Students of a Koranic School at Pikine

made available to the villagers to proselytize. Those trained to teach the Koran could barely go beyond the liturgy. Generally, the nomadic witch doctors or the Kanuri traders through which Islam was propagated in the region could only transmit the rudimentary knowledge of the faith which was mainly prayers and other basic religious obligations to be accomplished. With this therefore, the mastery of the Koranic text was low as a result of lack of skilled trainers and based on the fact that the preachers available either had other business ventures to be accomplished, or were more occupied with conquering and winning more people over. The scarcity of Islamic texts and lack of mastery of the Classical Arab in this region also explains why the knowledge of Islam in this area was low. With the prevailing state of affairs, those interested in deepening a prosodic and mnemonics knowledge of Islam were compelled to go in search of it and, generally, it was of their village and rural set ups. In Cameroon, this area which is found in the present day Logone and Shari Subdivision, was known not only for its scarcity of witch doctors but also for the light hearted nature of the traditional rulers in developing a more advanced knowledge of the religion. Whereas in ancient Kanem Bornu, where most of these witch

doctors came from, it was much easier to pursue higher studies in Islam, the highest being the memorization of the entire Koran. Most of the Laureates from these schools became *Mallams*, that is, teachers charged with the responsibility to enable children memorize the noble Koran.

Based on the age of its Islamization, its geographical position within the Trans Saharan trade or simply on the capacity of its leaders to attract these *Mallams*, a village could have one or more Islamic schools where its youths were educated. If most of the Sultans of the

Kotoko states were contented with this type education, it is important to note it was different in the Bornu communities where a spirit of competition linked with a thirst for esoteric experiences and knowledge urged several families to send their children to be taught by reputed teachers especially if these teachers were in a distant countryside. It was therefore common amongst those living in Kanem and Kanuri to send their boys to witch doctors in distant communities for these teacher trainers to teach their pupils on quality Islamic knowledge. It was therefore common for a child of about four or five years to be confided to a Mallam on transit who was to take him during his peregrination, where the boy will be taught along the way, during their stops in the different villagers and this could last for months and at times even a season. The team was therefore made up of the Mallam and his trainee (talibs) - who were almost always on crusade including when on transit in the urban areas. The conditions of living were rustic and difficult because in a context where there were no housewives, household chores were to be carried out by the trainees. It was the duty of the trainees to fetch wood, get daily allowance through begging for food from families and to get money for their daily

¹ Dans son Voyage dans l'intérieur de l'Afrique, l'explorateur Mungo Park sillonnant une région d'Afrique de l'Ouest habitée par les Foulah (Peuls) signalait les écoles coraniques en ces termes : «Ils ont établi dans toutes les villes de petites écoles, où beaucoup d'enfants des païens, comme les enfants des mahométans, apprennent à lire le Koran et sont instruits des préceptes du prophète. Les prêtres mahométans façonnent à leur gré ces jeunes âmes, et les principes qu'elles ont reçus de si bonne heure ne peuvent plus guère ni se changer ni s'altérer. Je vis, pendant mon voyage, beaucoup de

ces écoles ; j'y remarquai, avec plaisir, l'extrême docilité et l'air respectueux des enfants, et je désirai de bon cœur qu'ils eussent de meilleurs instituteurs, et qu'on leur enseignât une plus pure doctrine» (Park, 18..., 76-80). Ces propos de Mungo Park auront des échos chez la plupart des européens qui visiteront le sahel, et les descriptions qu'ils feront de l'école coranique se départissent rarement d'une vision chrétienne et d'une tendance systématique à relever les failles de ce type d'éducation, trop mnémotechnique à leur goût et imperméable à des influences étrangères.

upkeep from the markets. Tasks were divided based on the ages and longevity within the groups. The youngest were charged to fetch wood and food while the younger ones could stay within the camp to memorize the text on their boards. Generally, the environment within the camps was far from comfortable and though the conditions were not imposed, it was appreciated and welcomed.

It is therefore important to understand the status of a Mahadjir and the conditions in which he grew up. It is also worth noting that deprivations constituted an indicator of success in the eyes of a teacher at the time. Though we pointed earlier that lack of trained teachers was the reason why these nomadic schools were established, the mobility option and sending a child to a distant place to learn was however considered a place, par excellence, for a child to study. It was held that a child could not study well within the family set up or in the community. It was also held that for a child to stay focused on studies, he had to be confined and sent to a distant environment where he will be deprived from maternal and paternal comfort and where he will be trained to be tough. That explains why they were sent far from the village and with a stranger who will have little compassion during the tests and challenges they had to encounter during their training. These Islamic schools were not only seen from the religious perspective because they were integrated in the learning process. Other skills and learners were subjected to an intensive learning process and difficult lifestyle meant to make the learner strong and manly based on the deprivations he had undergone. From this perspective, the nomadic Islamic schools, especially amongst those who patronized them like the Kanem Bornu, were seen as substitutes for initiation within the pagan communities.



Source : LERLU.com - Modernisation of Koranic Teachings

At the end of the learning process, the child, having been moulded, was then sent back to his community of origin where he will be married to a wife from the neighbourhood. He was then required to continue with his father's profession while serving as an Islamic teacher. If there was no urgent need, he could return to his teachers where he could specialize in esoteric sciences and become an expert in the field. In any case, they were highly esteemed not only because they could read, write and recite the Koran easily, but the process through which they got these competences and skills proved that they were accomplished and tough men, capable of handling any difficulty they could encounter in the future. The Nomadic Islamic schools with its Spartan model appeared to be preferred by the Muslim community along the Lake Chad Rivers for its physical and moral upbringing for their young men. Having followed this method and philosophy for over two to three centuries, some of these characteristics did not die even when some of the institutions were shaken with the advent of the European colonizers in the 19th Century. Could we therefore say the colonial period had no major impact on this institution? How can we explain the fact that over time and even in this postcolonial period, new teachers appear in these institutions rendering them dangerous and making them threats to the new established order?

² Dans leur dictionnaire (2002), Christian Seignobos et Henri Tournoux citent une définition du terme «goni» donnée par Podlewski : «C'est un homme dont la fonction est de connaître le Koran par cœur. Il semble être celui qui fait dominer la lettre sur

l'esprit dans une société où l'écriture, souvent incertaine, est rare. Il se trouve généralement dans les centres assez importants et est souvent de race bornouane» (Seignobos et Tournoux, 2002, 121).

B. The Mahadjirs; Their Vulnerability and Exposure to Deviant Behaviour

Islamic schools have lagged behind the official education that was developed in the countries of the Lake Chad Basin. Jealous of their independence and, more and more worried of growing in silence due to the indifference with which the postcolonial government had treated them, these schools multiplied in areas where the schooling level was weak and especially where government's efforts to enroll pupils was either weak or non-existent. Welcoming the children from Kanem Bornu and Shawa Arabs over the years, they trained a cream of learned Muslims capable of reading and writing Islamic texts as well as teaching and diffusing their teachings. The towns ended up attracting these *Mahadjirs* who had finished their studies. With the Chadian civil war that greatly affected the socio-economic life of the citizens, most of the *Mahadjirs* from Kanem Bornu could not and did not want to return to their respective villages.

Many of them renewed the nomadic traditions of their parents and got established in the towns of the region where they invested in crafts, trade, seasonal agriculture and, evidently, on the teaching of the Koran. The growing population of the towns resulting from an influx of migrants and refugees created new economic and educational needs and gaps which the dexterity of the inhabitants of Kanem Bornu and Kanuri did not take long to meet and fill.

For example, one could observe at the heart of Kousserri as from 1979, an increase of teenagers and youths roaming the streets, who before the Chadian Civil war resided in the rural areas sharing borders with Nigeria. These nominal *Mahadjirs* were engaged in lucrative activities for survival. It was no longer a matter of the adults depending on the inhabitants as its capacity of solidarity had been put to test by the influx of refugees that the Chadian Civil war had brought to the towns. In this period of crisis, the communal sense of

the Kamenbou was precious to them and played a determinant role in the reconversion of the *Mahadjirs*. But most important was the fact that a good number of these young refugees and immigrant had undergone through the hardship of Nomad Islamic schools and were therefore stronger and well prepared to handle the disfavoured conditions that they were living in. The initial solidarity nature, linked with the endurance they acquired during their studies in these Islamic schools, enabled them to stay focus and to prosper even in a strange environment.

The sedentary lifestyles of the *Mahadjirs* rendered possible by the success of their commercial, agricultural and education activities will not however immunize the logic that preceded the Islamic schools. One could observe young people sitting around the elderly, the promiscuity in which they were living, their extravagant nature, and the obstinate nature in which they pursued their objectives. Having witnessed these lifestyles, the Kanem Bornu and Kanuri communities perpetuated them and rather than losing its value or replaced by Western schools like amongst the Kotokos. These Islamic schools were rather rehabilitated and held as structures par excellence that could educate young people. With no worry to integrate western education, most of the inhabitants of Kanem Bornu and Kanuri, and generally most rebellious parents, continue to send their children to be taught away from their homes, arguing that the latter had never worked in the public service or in western private structures where a mastery of one of the official languages is required.



Source : A blog on education in the South of the Country-Koranic Schools in Senegal.



Source : BeezGlean 3rd April 2014, Street Children.

It is therefore not easy to make hasty conclusions and to consider the options of these parents in terms of marginalization. Certainly by the design and choices of these parents, they deprived the *Mahadjirs* from the trajectory of qualification through which the state trains its citizens and role models. But the marginalization of the *Mahadjirs* from its initial stages was a choice made by parents who decided to orient their male progenitors towards an Islamic cultural model and especially economic “traditional” activities; transnational trade, petty trading, petty craft works, artisanal, the teaching of Islam, the practice of witch doctors in all its forms. With the lucrative nature of these activities and with the possibilities it provided them to prosper in the towns, one would not blame them for limiting their children to these opportunities and consequently by choosing the appropriate ways to get there. Certainly, it is not about assimilating these schools into commercial schools. However, the context in which these schools operate have favoured the *Mahadjirs* who by their incessant peregrinations, mastery of the frontiers and the goods they exchange, their reflex and the social networks they have developed overtime, enable them to excel in illicit import and export trade. One can therefore say that the privileged entrance of these nomad schools gives room to illicit trade and all its attendants: buying of goods from Nigeria, packaging, transportation, corruption of state agents, stocking, distribution etc.

Being the heart of regional trade with goods coming from North Nigeria and South Cameroon, Kousseri town continually offers jobs in the above mentioned

fields. With the porous nature of the tertiary sector of most towns, business men easily recruit a good number of the graduated *Mahadjirs* as well interrupt the studies of those who are still studying in Islamic schools in the urban areas. The latter are employed to serve on part time basis and paid for various tasks linked to transportation and packaging of goods. Though these activities involved children, it is not considered as illegal. On the contrary, it is perceived as what the pupil have to bring as part of his contribution to the witch doctor for his studies. This is an old practice that dates way back before the advent of the colonial masters where pupils had to pay the witchdoctors with cowries at least once a year.

However, nowadays it had been systematized by the new witch doctors and the weekly contributions have now been changed to daily imposed especially on the very young ones. To the latter, they are obliged to bring at least a hundred franc which had to be earned from little errands or payment gotten from the markets. This amount is small compared to the services to be offered to the witch doctor. Many of these youngsters willingly give this money to the witch doctor given that they can still keep the surplus to themselves. However, when they fail to bring this contribution, they are at times beaten or the fear of being beaten will push them to begging on the streets so as to escape the whip of the witchdoctor. In his dissertation entitled “Islamic Schools and Begging in the Town of Kousseri” Younous Moussa, based on data from the field intimates that:

Their job is to beg wherever they can find people in the towns; in front of Mosques, shops and bars. To get the required due, some are obliged to carry out petty trades like peddling on the streets, serve as sales aides for the most serious while others play the role of guides to blind beggars and at the end of the day they are given a percentage of the booty.(Younous, 2004, p.42)

Though these acts carried on children are exploitative before the law, most of them close their eyes to it given that parents, traders and the population see nothing wrong with it. This lukewarm nature of local officials is understood given that they are often not equipped with the necessary mean to act given that

³ Par ce néologisme il faut entendre les pratiques de kabbale ou de magie auxquelles se livrent de nombreux marabouts et vers lesquelles aspirent de nombreux Mahadjirs. Les populations étant très superstitieuses et convaincues qu’une entreprise réussie le doit tout autant aux moyens matériels qu’aux démarches mystiques, les Mahadjirs ont trouvé

dans le bassin tchadien une clientèle de choix, demandeuse de potions magiques, de talismans protecteurs et de sortilèges divers (reconquérir un époux peu attentionné, éliminer un rival, évincer un adversaire politique, freiner un concurrent au marché, etc.)

their budget is the most insignificant in the public service. These state agents along the line, finally bought the idea that they are helpless in the face of this phenomenon and therefore play the role of spectators. On the contrary, the forces of law and order have a more stringent perspective with respect to these children. From experience, they know that the *Mahadjirs* are hardly trustworthy children. Their presence on highways and other centres permit them to see the involvement of the *Mahadjirs* in illicit activities like drugs and smuggling where they help traders and Chadian fraudsters to smuggle illicit drugs. Though these youngsters are not doing badly in this trade, they are often arrested by custom officials and handed over to the police (ibid. p. 42).

It is again child exploitation, but not an exploitation limited to child domestic labour. In the case of smuggling and traffic of drugs mentioned above, the activities of the *Mahadjirs* go against those of the forces of the police. Based on the standpoint that no one pays attention to the *Mahadjirs*, which is but true, business men, vicious or not make use of these children to transport their goods from one part of the frontier to another and by so doing avoid the checks imposed by forces of law and order. Items that are usually smuggled amongst others include; hydrocarbons, spare parts, fake medication and diverse drugs. The abundance of these products in Kousseri reveals the importance of this trade and one can evaluate the role played by the *Mahadjirs* in the exchanges.

Once the products are in the market, they have are distributed and again, the *Mahadjirs* serve as agents through which the items are dispatched by the wholesalers. Based on a moral or financial caution, they can borrow goods from these wholesalers and parade the markets and neighbourhoods trying to sell. Amongst these mobile traders are the Chokot Doctors, name given to mobile pharmacists who sell unauthorized drugs from Nigeria, China, or from South East Asian countries. The impact of the activities of these doctors is easily perceivable it now has a negative impact especially on the youths who addicted to Tramol, a psychotropic drug that has a negative effect on the health of those living in this region. This drug is consumed even by adults and women believe it gives a strong desire for sexual activities.

Due to the ignorance and indifference of the local population, the *Mahadjirs* and some of their instructors have exploited this to their gain. Based on this, a new trade in charity is being

developed in the towns of the region with the *Mahadjirs* highly involved. It is difficult to decipher if this trade is the creation of dishonest Islamic teachers or a product of the *Mahadjirs* themselves. This practice stems from the habit of a pigeon where the local population uses groundnuts to give alms to nature. A family head could therefore buy groundnuts to give alms with most of the beneficiaries being the *Mahadjirs* in the neighbourhoods, those sitting in front of the mosques and in the markets. With a handful, he distributes the groundnuts and the beneficiaries are required to eat. With this, some of the *Mahadjirs* and their masters have put in place a more lucrative scheme. They have a wheelbarrow full with groundnuts being pushed around the market by a young man or a teenager followed by a group of *Mahadjirs* in rags. Once someone buys a cup of this groundnut, he distributes it to the *Mahadjirs* in the form of alms. Once he leaves, all the *Mahadjirs* return the groundnut into the wheelbarrow and start looking for another person who will buy and distribute again all over. This scenario, which repeats itself over a dozen of times enables the *Mahadjir* to receive money while preserving the capital of the groundnuts. This practice, which is dishonest and exploitative from a religious standpoint, is increasing with more sophisticated strategies being developed.

In a nutshell, once the out of school, after their studies or during holidays break, several *Mahadjirs* regroup themselves to survive in a society that sustains them in uncertainty and lack. It is therefore difficult to talk of any form marginalization, but rather a pedagogical deprivation developed by the Muslim community in the Lake Chad Basin where thousands of children are excluded from the official structures of the state and therefore grow up to have limited socio-professional opportunities. This phenomenon, which is a product of the educational policy of the community,



Source : sdesouche.wordpress.com – Radical Muslims want to open a school to teach Islam to Children between 4-6 years.



Source : Journal on Women; At an Islamic School.

results in social exclusion. If there is therefore any exclusion, it is not “social” because the traditional societies concerned do not perceive *Mahadjirs* as a product of malice or accident. They were rather conceived by an ancient educational model that aimed at producing tough and vibrant young men capable of transmitting traditional values and activities like trade, agriculture and teaching. Once their deviant behaviours are not checked even morally by the local population, it is therefore the responsibility of the government of the Lake Chad Basin to take measures to address the growing criminality that these children are exposed to.

C. Security Challenges and the Way Forward to the Mahadjir Problem

The “wait and see” attitude developed by the governments of Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon after independence vis-à-vis these nomadic Islamic schools and the *Mahadjirs* reveal two things: the incapacity of the state to take strong measures to either shut down or normalize these schools, and the belief that the Western education will end up succeeding over these traditional schools. On one hand, the use of force to enroll children, as the preceding colonial governments did, had very little impact and risked putting these governments at logger head with the population of the northern parts of their respective states. In order to reduce the risk of poisoning the social climate, these government reduced eagerness with which western education was

introduced in the area. On the other hand, the governments underestimated the capacity of the local population for emerging out of the state model of development. At the end of half a century, instead of disappearing, this institution is very much alive and constitutes serious challenges that go beyond education. The Mahadjir problem is fast becoming a security threat in the Lake Chad Basin.

The persistence and resilience of these mobile Islamic schools in Nigeria had pushed the Federal authorities in Nigeria to investigate the role played by some of these inspired leaders in the 1970s. The Boko Haram jihadist is a product of that Islamic wave with many of

its leaders products of Islamic schools. Feeling excluded where western lifestyle prevailed, they developed hatred against the western culture and civilisation which they believe was responsible for their marginalization. The same phenomenon prevailed in Chad where Islamic militants joined the FROLINAT Movement, a northern insurrection movement that fought against the regime of Tombalbaye calling for the integration of the Northerners in the political and economic life of the country.

Cameroon being the only country that did not witness this phenomenon during that period, is currently in a security dilemma with growing suspicion from the government vis-à-vis Islamic schools in general and the dormitory schools in particular. Before it ever got to this precarious level with members of this sect, waging a full blown war against the army of the state, external partners had earlier pointed to the government that these Islamic schools and their followers constitute a potential terrorist threat. During an Islamic workshop in Yaoundé, organized to address this issue, Dr. Doubla Avaly announced that the government of Cameroon, through the Ministry of Basic education, was to take over these schools. However, the enthusiasm that the announcement brought caused him to say that it was not taking over fully but that it was about the creation of a follow up unit charge to oversee the activities of these schools in order that they do not become training grounds for potential terrorists. He ended up his speech by saying that this new initiative falls in line with the prescriptions

of the American government to Sub-Saharan African countries to counter terrorism globally.

It is therefore evident that the suspicion, with respect to these Islamic schools, has existed for over a decade and it falls within the period during which Islamic schools and other Pakistani groups were seen as official training grounds for future jihadists. From that time, the Cameroon government developed a particular interest in the Islamic schools that were springing up along its Nigerian border. According to the participants of the workshop, this interest was developed based on financial benefits that will ensue from it with Uncle Sam being refuted for being generous in his fight against Al Qaida.

However, one cannot say with exactitude, what became of the project to watch over the Islamic schools as nothing concrete was done on the field. The situation rather worsened as some of these *Mahadjirs* found in Chad took refuge in Logone and Shari (Cameroon) when they were chased by the Chadian government. The government never took measures against the influx of these new *Mahadjirs* as they, as their custom demands, got integrated within their ethnic communities in the subdivision and even opened up new schools.

It needed the first bloody incursions of the Boko Haram sect for the Cameroon government to wake up. Confronted with this new phenomenon, the media raised awareness amongst its listeners and readers by tracing the historicity of Boko Haram. By doing, this based on some game of speculation fueled by rumours, it was therefore impossible not to link Boko Haram to the *Mahadjirs*. To who ever wanted to hear, they were reminded that Talibes was synonymous to Taliban and that according to them this link was necessary so as to raise awareness. Beyond this etymological link, the *Mahadjirs* through their self marginalization behaved similarly like those who say "boko haram" that is "western education is impure." As symbolic allies, some of the *Mahadjirs* ended up becoming members.

As a matter of fact, several young people ended up being recruited into the ranks of this sect. Others offered their services while living in their respective communities. The latter, who play the roles of spies, are perceived as the most dangerous. After systematic attacks carried on those who had openly expressed their reservation with respect to Boko Haram, it was then that the local population of Logone and Shari realized that they had been carefully infiltrated. This

created an atmosphere of mutual mistrust especially during public meetings or on discussions concerning the crimes of Boko Haram. Frightened by this, the press avoided stories concerning this group. Efforts taken by the government through the traditional authorities calling on them to renounce members suspected to belong to this group bore little fruits. Confronted by this invisible but ever present enemy, the authorities resorted to more restrictive measures. Having been chased from Chad in great number, the few that remained were seriously under surveillance. The watchdogs of the neighbourhoods were therefore charged to report on any stranger who gets into the community whoever he is. This task given to family heads made it difficult for any stranger to get into the community unnoticed talk less of the *Mahadjirs*. The draconian measures taken by the Nigeria government pushed some of these *Mahadjirs* to refuge and dwell in villages along the Cameroon borders. They became *Mahadjirs* twice since some of them who became refugees and displaced persons found themselves in the towns along the frontiers.

For example in September 2014, following an encounter between the Cameroon soldiers and Boko Haram fighters, several villages were deserted by the population who moved to Kousserri. Amongst them were the *Mahadjirs* some of whom return to their families. Others like the refugees are treated with suspicion by the authorities. In that same month, the government was in search of a group of refugees who, impatient from waiting for the services of the agents HCR, came to meet them in the outskirts of Kousserri. After being confined, they later got into the town and disappeared in the population. According to some of our informants, the eagerness with which the forces of law and order were in pursuit of these refugees indicates that amongst these refugees were spies of the Boko Haram sect as already highlighted by Pauline Guibbaud;

Beyond the economic and humanitarian consequences of the arrival of a huge number of refugees, there is also an important security challenge. The government of Cameroon is concerned by the infiltration of Boko Haram members amongst the migrants to get to the territory of the country. (Guibbaud, 2014,2).

The *Mahadjirs* appear in this case to be the first suspects. It is however wrong to consider only those who form part of the refugees and displaced persons.

As a matter of fact, data from the field and from

other vital sources reveal that suspicion, more than poverty, affects most of the youths and that unemployment exposes youth people to recruitment by these jihadist groups. From information gathered by Thierry Ndong from wounded soldiers and survivors of the fight against Boko Haram, these young people are ready to go to any length.

The sect members recruit essentially young people and brainwash them through training in Islam in Nigeria. When they return to their homes they proclaim that God is great (Allahou Akbar). Their first victims are adults who oppose fundamentalism and Islamic extremism. They kill without fear or respect of their parents and local religious dignitaries. They are always on drugs during combat and have little or no knowledge on war strategy. Consequently they are killed like flies (Ngong, 2014).

According to this testimony, the training on Islam in these Islamic schools, suspected of harboring potential terrorists or sympathizers to the Boko Haram cause, has been substituted by new schools. These schools, which are more military and ideological in their approach, have been established for the rapid training of new recruits. Fully aware of the fact that this sect no longer needed to bring these young men to their base to be trained and indoctrinated, the forces of law and order started tracking down the videos disseminated by this sect and watched by these young men on their mobile phones. Whatever the case, be they those who are transported to be indoctrinated or those who carry out their acts on the spot, it is important to highlight that a non negligible part of the young men have been seduced by the speeches and doctrine of Boko Haram and by the deviant attitude of its leader. It is therefore difficult for the authorities to make a clear cut distinction between the *Mahadjirs* who are pro-jihadists and the rest of the youths.

The linguistic test, which is used to track some members of this sect, indicates that the presumed criminal is unable to speak neither French nor Fulfulde. This is however a handicap especially as the *Mahadjirs* from Chad and Nigeria that fled from combat zones and some from Maya Sava and Logone and Chari areas are unable to speak these languages.

In a nutshell, the rise of insecurity along the frontiers and the influx of refugees and displaced persons that this has generated, especially in some of the urban centres in the Chadian Basin, have led to a humanitarian crisis. Though the humanitarian challenges are being taken care of, it risks bringing some negative effects to certain categories of people



Source : Blog.univ-anger.fr –Youths in a School

in these areas. It seems as though with the experiences of the Boko Haram crisis, the government will not fail to put in place long lasting measures that will check the activities of this group in the future. From this perspective, the *Mahadjirs* will be a top priority in the reform of the Islamic education system. Less than the individuals, the institution itself risk being stigmatized and kept under permanent observation. Whatever reforms that will be put in place, it will be necessary to have less security and more of a social approach because these measures risk creating other problems.

Such measures should not also lose sight of the fact the *Mahadjirs* are a minority group and if nothing is done to their isolation, some entrepreneur of violence can instrumentalize and exploit it. From reflections and research carried out over a decade now, it seems as though these Islamic schools (dormitory or not) are only centres for moral and religious training (Mimche et al, 2009, 118). Even though this meets the expectations of the parents, once the studies are over, these young people are unable to secure good jobs apart from the petty commercial activities and teaching jobs which are not only uncertain but hardly well paid. The fact that these young men have never had any formal and official education puts them in a less comfortable situation given that their deficiency in the official languages deprive them of the information it takes to make citizens conscious of their rights. The states in the Lake Chad Basin can assure the *Mahadjirs* of their frustrations by putting in place measures that will have great impact and wider dimension. In a practical manner, it will be necessary to close down the mobile Islamic schools and promote education through other institutions to be created or rehabilitated. It

means shutting down the so called “Franco Arabe” schools and creating schools whose medium of transmission of religious and secular knowledge will be carried out either in Arab and through the official languages. Such projects should, in a short term, lead to the creation of this type of school in each community. These schools should also be handled by trained or to-be trained personnel, capable of demonstrating to the rebellious communities that in this western type of education, Islam can be learned and memorized alongside knowledge in classical Arab and other useful skills. Such schools were introduced in the 1970s in Nigeria but the fear that their initiators created caused the authorities to suffocate the project. In Chad, some of these religious men succeeded in producing a blend of Arab and French education-Arabophones where they studied the Koran in a shorter time in modern pedagogic conditions. In Cameroon and precisely in the Logone and Shari area, the persistence of the traditional method of education makes it invisible to see some initiatives that led to the same results.

Given that the Logone and Shari area has become a sanctuary for the *Mahadjirs* driven from Chad and for those who fled due to the insecurity in Nigeria, the government of Cameroon is well placed to take measures aimed at reforming the Islamic education system. It will serve the country if they put in place the recommendations from the research carried out in partnership with UNICEF. That is, setting up a repertory of Islamic schools that want to operate within the legal framework, reform the Islamic educational system, the contribution of the state to train teachers so as to make them effective, the putting in place of Islamic schools in informal educational centres, revamp the services charge with private primary education in order to make them ore open, to be active and competent in matters relating to the harmonization of teaching programmes in Islamic schools, construction of infrastructures adapted to national norms to gather them, the development of new curricula and the reorientation of some of the Islamic teachers (Mimche et al,2009,120-121). The reports ended by underlining the necessity of the “support of government of Cameroon, international cooperation bodies and the civil society and territorial collectivities” (Mimche et al, 2009, 122). If this clarion could be made during peacetime, then it will be more useful in a post conflict context where there is a need to put in place new educational structures adapted to the sociology of those in the rural areas concerned. It is important to highlight that it will be unnecessary to count on the ethnic

communities from where these *Mahadjirs* come from. This is because, for over a century, with the exception of some few cases, these communities benefiting from the weakness and indifference of the state have shown that they are determined to preserve this method of teaching the Koran. Only convincing results from the pilot phases may cause them change their views.

Conclusion

At the end of this study, it seems as though the *Mahadjirs* and the mobile Islamic schools that train them are the oldest and the most privileged institution in the Chad Basin. These structures developed a learning system based on Islam and ethnicity. This system defines learning and the memorization of Islam as a goal which should be reached under Spartan conditions. These conditions are believed to be capable of providing effective learning, rehabilitating a deviant child or preparing young people to face the vicissitudes of live. However, it would appear that the rebellious spirit of some parents, strengthened by the insufficiency of official educational structures and the reservation of the state in using coercion in enrolling children into formal educational set ups, led to the creation of a breed children and students living in lack and misery. These youths are exposed to all sorts of deviant behaviour and criminality and deprived of the professional opportunities that their peers in the formal educational structures have. The prevailing security environment has therefore revealed the vulnerability of these young people to the ideology of the Boko Haram sect. Today already categorized, they risk being stigmatized as hundreds of them are found amongst the refugees and internally displaced persons. More than ever before, the situation of the *Mahadjirs* and other graduates



Source : Mali-Djenné; 23rd January 2015, Koranic tablets



from the Islamic states calls for a wise and long lasting intervention by the state. It will be to its advantage if the state was to invest in reforming the Islamic educational system rather than giving room to those

who have been excluded from the Western educational system to fight against it or envisage, alongside the Islamist, a state where their competences will not be a handicap.

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WATERSIDE DEMOGRAPHY, ANACHY AND ILLICIT PRODUCTION IN THE LAKE CHAD

The present study concerns the curious relationship that Boko Haram retains with Lake Chad. The lake is used as a rear base a refuge a supply, commercial exchange and platform for economic production. This study falls within the dynamics of the interactions of humans with their space, from an ecological anthropology viewpoint as expounded by Blandin (2007) and Mairet (2012) which maintains that; today, under the combined effects of globalization, ecological upheavals have facilitated the emergence of new forms of resources allocation, involving the modification of the environment, the cultures of different groups and the relationships between individuals and communities.

The long demographic history of Lake Chad, the politics of riverine countries at the dawn of independence, the makeover from Lake Chad to « Small Chad » in 1973, belies the current identity configuration of Lake Chad and largely informs the activities and attitudes of Boko Haram in this area. The political, economic and institutional anarchy that characterizes Lake Chad is a window of opportunity that inspires the recruitment, actions and movement of Boko Haram members. The latter have succeeded (in the Lake) to construct patterns of social representations and actions which allows them to distinguish between perception and interpretation of the environment which forms the platform of their actions. Cross border multi-nationality and multi-ethnicity, which is characteristic of Lake Chad, appear to be an additional fortress for Boko Haram.

Key Words: Lake Chad, Resources, trans-nationality, State



Source : carouyer.com – Village of Fishers – Lake Chad

Introduction

The Boko Haram phenomenon has a purely Nigerian identity with a (foetal) implant in the Bornu State (Andrew Walker). It however has been nurtured and upheld by different cultural waves and cultural models named depending on their base of action and inspiration which is spread across the world. In the meantime, Boko Haram stretches its tentacles beyond the Nigerian space with considerable repercussions within and around Lake Chad. Here, Boko Haram members find refuge, a rear base and socio-economic opportunity. This social phenomenon is constructed and nourished by the fear it arouses or reveals to the populations as seen from their easy displacement in Lake Chad, and the economic constraints imposed by their intimidations which obscures the business climate of the residents.

This paper centres on the factors that explain the ease with which members of the Nigerian Boko Haram Sect are deployed within and around Lake Chad with an audacity characterised by anarchy. It elaborates the impact of the absence or total absence of joint management of Lake Chad by the riverine states, as the principal trigger of anarchy in this area occupied by Boko Haram and other trans-border armed groups. We insist that social exclusion, resulting from the dwindling of fishing resources, is capital in the deployment of Boko Haram in the Lake. This lack of harmonisation of institutions in charge of human and resource management in the Lake, translated by state erosion, creates institutional chaos where "survival of the fittest" and "all means are good, provided they are effective", becomes the golden rules for the riverine and other entrepreneurs. In the light of their *modus operandi*, Boko Haram members are not ignorant of this. From a theoretical approach of the dynamics of human relations with their space (Blandin, 2007; Mairé, 2012) we maintain, within the framework of our study, based on our observations and televised interviews on the combined effects of globalization, the ecological upheavals that have favoured the emergence of new forms of resources allocation involving environmental changes, group cultures and the link between individuals and communities. These effects breed criminality as a response to social injustice and other forms of exclusions prompted by shrinking resources. According to Philippe Descola (2008), man is an extension of nature: the change in one makes the other. In this case, he adds that the relationship between man and his environment should be understood in plural: "to each person, their ecology." The pertinence of this space-time-culture dynamic in Lake Chad, characterized by their recurrent environmental changes

and demographic implosion, leaves no shadow of doubt in the light on the actions of Boko Haram. The scientific interest resides at the level of spatial representations of Boko Haram in Lake Chad, and the difference it makes in the perception and interpretation of this environment. In this paper, we used several areas as case studies amongst which include, the islands of Kofia (Cameroon), Kinassero (Chad), Daban-Massara (Nigeria) and Birnigoni (Chad and Cameroon) by virtue of the recurrence of extremist sects and their strategic position in the swampy zones on the southern curve of Lake Chad, which is virtually almost always flooded and densely populated. These zones particularly attract large populations, from different places, seeking refuge and economic security due to severe surrounding pressures, especially on resources.

Factors determining the installation of Boko Haram Members in Chad

For ages, Lake Chad has been a base for sub-regional economic exchanges. The current identity of Lake Chad takes after its long demographic and economic history; and the constant changing politics of the riverine states. The riverine populations have continuously maintained social relations on both sides of the frontier with their peers trapped by the colonial partitioning of Africa. This legendary colonial heritage of refuge, attributed to Lake Chad, has suddenly been exploited by highway bandits, and presently, by members of the Boko Haram Islamist sect: a stronghold, economic opportunity for arm trafficking and base for the recruitment of members (fishermen, increasingly impoverished in a context of declining fishery).

Lake Chad is a zone of demographic polarization. Geometrically located at the centre of the pre-colonial kingdom of Kanem-Bornu, Lake Chad has a cosmopolitan riverine population of diversified origins: the heirs of an ancient occupation of Kanem-Bornu, Principalities of Koyoko and of the Empire of Sokoto. These populations are the Kanuri, the Kanembou, the Buduma, the Fellata, the Mobbers, the Haoussa, the Kotoko, the Shoas Arabs, etc.; and many migrants mainly from West Africa and riverine states (the Malians, the Senegalese, the Ghanaians, the Burkinabé, the Sara from the south of Chad, the Massa, the Mousgoum, the Margui, the Djoukoun, etc. These populations, situated both sides of the borders of countries at the banks of the lake, have filial relations ensured by matrimonial exchanges. This creates dense and complex social networks based on cultural diffusion and exchange: religion, morals and matrimonial customs. On both sides of the borders of the lake, lies families (grandparents, parents, brothers, cousins, etc.) and

La secte islamiste a pour la première fois attaqué au Niger vendredi 6 février.

Bosso et Diffa *Vendredi 6 février*
109 islamistes, 4 militaires et 1 civil tués selon le ministère nigérien de la Défense.

Diffa *Dimanche 8 février*
Au moins 1 mort dans l'explosion d'une bombe ou d'un obus sur le marché, alors que les combats se poursuivent autour de la ville entre l'armée nigérienne et Boko Haram.

Maiduguri *Dimanche 1^{er} février*
Offensive ratée de Boko Haram.

Gamboru *Mardi 3 février*
L'armée tchadienne venue de Fotokol a repris Gamboru à Boko Haram.

Fotokol *Mercredi 4 février*
Contre-attaque de Boko Haram. Environ 16 soldats camerounais et tchadiens, 80 civils et 50 à 100 islamistes tués.

N'Djamena-Douala
Débouche maritime du Tchad, menacé.

Population majoritairement :
● Musulmane
● Chrétienne

Rufawa, Borno et Yobe : États d'urgence

200 km

50 km

Sources : Stratfor, Reuters, France Presse, Google Maps

to a mainly uncontrollable milieu, alternates with the great interest for the potential of its resources. For Cameroon and Niger, it represents an extreme periphery, located at thousands of kilometers from the national capitals. On this account, it remained on the fringes of national development projects for a long time. As for Chad and Nigeria, it was perceived as a pioneer space, important at the national or regional scale. However, during the years 1980-2000, political crisis and disappointments with major projects based on structural adjustments, brought investments to a halt (CBLT, 2014). To date, this “strategic choice” of States (more concerned with the lake’s resources than by the wellbeing of its residents) has repercussions on the management of the lake’s space: it is easier for

The opening of Lake Chad to Cameroon, Nigeria, Niger and Chad gives it the position of an oasis-state without any "frontiers". In addition to being a privileged

criminals to move within the Cameroon south basin and the Nigerian north basin. It is within these spaces that the criminals operate through incidents and abuse committed. This relative negligence of the riverine States towards Lake Chad, as shown by weak presence of public services and abridged coordination of the security framework, accentuates chaos and various entrepreneurs prey over the situation.

Previously, it was the Bogo-Bogo or the defected army soldiers and other criminals known by their French name as "coupeurs de route" (highway robbers) who controlled the lake during and after the different Chadian civil wars. These conflicts favoured the flourishing and spread of armed trafficking at the Lake. The end of the conflicts in Chad did not mark an end to armed trafficking carried out by deeply entrenched networks, reputed for being a labyrinth only mastered by its architects. For example, these social actors have always fuelled cross-border conflicts between Cameroon and Chad at the Birnigoni, Kofia and Kinasserom Islands.

The Bogo-bogo generally disguise as soldiers of the riverine states serving at the lake. Their methods consist of intimidating the fishermen and obliging them to hand over their 75kW engines and large fishing nets in exchange for huge sums of money. These methods cause confusion among the military on patrol. The most prominent case is the fire exchange that occurred between five Chadian soldiers and three soldiers of the Cameroonian navy in the Birnigoni waters on 21 March 2013. At the end of this altercation, two Cameroonian sailors were seriously wounded and two Chadian soldiers died. Similar incidents are countless on Lake Chad based on the disarray of the residents who witness the chaotic system on daily basis. Today, the Boko Haram are circulating and unsettling the military mobilised by the States to ensure security at the lake. The will to protect the population and secure the lake comes up against the already complex context where it is difficult to put a face to Boko Haram and where the security mechanism totters despite the effort of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) to guarantee security at the lake :

During the 1980s, the riverine States created an embryonic joint security force in the form of a mixed international patrol under the guidance of the LCBC (Patmint). This structure aimed at combating illegal activities carried out within this amphibious space, where state control efforts get exhausted. During the years 1990 to 2000, this initiative was reinforced by a mixed multinational security force for the Lake

Chad basin, whose operationalization, however, clashes with adjournments by the States. The contemporary context (2008-2013) yet again favours the intensification of cooperation as regards security, particularly around Lake Chad (CBLT, 2014:33).

This context is a stroke of luck for the Boko Haram members. The choice of the islands and the banks of Lake Chad as a refuge ground for the members of the sect could be explained by the absence of harmonized cross-border control. Cases of abuse perpetrated around Baga Kawa, a town situated on the banks of Lake Chad and in Gamburu opposite Fotokol are illustrative. Baga Kawa is a strategic wharf for the trade of fish and other traffic on the lake. It is the convergent point for all legal and illegal lake activities. It is virtually impossible to circumvent it if one would like to maintain commercial relations with the State of Borno. Boko Haram supporters also make use of other strategic means of transport on the Lake. The permanent wharf on the Cameroon side include: Kofia, Blangoua and Darak. In Chad, we have Guitté, Kinasserom, Koulfoua, Bol, Baga Sola. In Nigeria they are Tétéwa, Baga Kawa; while Doro Lélewa, Gadira, Boula Tougour are located in Niger. Tracks and other roads (more usable in the dry season) linking Lake Chad to the large metropolis are taken, permitting them to slip through the heavy biomass that serves as a shield. Controlling these spaces entails checking the entrances and exits in the State of Borno, and ensuring their stock and economy at the lake. Many have found refuge in the villages and islands surrounding the lake which are hard to access and with little or no supervision.

The social Fractures of the lake an opportunity for economic production and recruitment

The period of transition of Lake Chad from Moyen to Petit Chad in 1973 was marked by miraculous catches that quickly orchestrated a fishing deficit resulting in an almost total decline in the "old" resources. Several studies (Vivien, 1991; PRODEBALT, 2012) carried out in the fishing zones of the lake pointed to the disappearance or excessive decline of certain fish, the reduction in the fish sizes as well as the quantity of fish caught. The reasons include demographic growth dependent on massive migration of fishers from different zones, dryness - which is changing the lake from nearly a sea into a vast swamp and the use of "prohibited" fishing engines.

1. The old tracks for commerce are used for the traffic of all sorts of contraband goods: for example, arms and drugs are constantly circulating here.

The diminishing of resources has brought about important social cleavages. Note that the increase in the use of prohibited engines is justified by the decline in fishing resources which drives the impoverished fishers to do everything to make a profit. Insofar as it is becoming more difficult for the small fishers without competitive fishing engines (large canoes of 75kW, and large fishing nets) to access fish-rich waters and carry out their main source of income, the drastic drop in the lake's resources disfavours the poor and low-performance fishers, reinforcing their instability and vulnerability. The reckless ones move towards the swamps and set up new fishing techniques and methods (the Malian traps, capture rooms and fishing by aquatic herbs which exterminate and do not comply with the rules in force.

The increase in pressure on the environment and its resources therefore intensifies. Tensions grow due to drought (main factor for the decline in resources), the intensification of the migratory flux, as well as the cross-border circulation of armed groups (Saibou, 2010; CBLT, 2014). The members of Boko Haram, reputed for the financial power, exploit this situation together with civil servants and other dishonest big traders, to supply the fishers with capture equipment and transporter canoes and engines, hence increasing the dependence and instability of the riverine residents. Generally, these fishers

employ other smaller fishers who depend on them and with whom they work to maximize their catch and profit. This approach could be understood as a strategy for existence (recruitment) and subsistence of Boko Haram at the lake. The refusal of some fishers drove them to change their methods: seize nets and engines in order to compel these fishers to work for them or follow them if they would like to improve upon their standards of living. Thus, the situation has gone from "voluntary" recruitment to forced recruitment of the residents.

Does Boko Haram presence at the lake, by their methods of abuse, play a particular role in sourcing funds and human resources in the long chain that makes up the structure of the group? Does the ecosystem of Lake Chad predispose them to act in this manner in view of the appeal that the old and new resources of the lake has for the States, the residents and several other actors? Lake Chad is firstly a milieu of economic production, supplying and recruitment of supporters as seen from the increasing number of victims of its ecological vulnerability, other than the role of refuge that it offers to Boko Haram. This hypothesis seems plausible in view of the global manifestation of the Boko Haram phenomenon at the lake. The direct consequence of the economic confiscation of the lake by Boko Haram through their involvement in the fishing circuit impoverishes the actors.

2. Before the present turn of events and the Boko Haram phenomenon engaged in 2011, presupposed members of Boko Haram organized preaching at mosques in Kofia and

elsewhere around lake Chad and offered alms to deprived resident families.



Conclusion : The impoverishment of the riverine residents

The rise of Boko Haram at Lake Chad is hardly surprising. They walk in the footsteps of cross border armed gangs whose members had found refuge in this specific ecosystem. Is there a recycling? This could not be rightly stated based on the current available data. Nonetheless, the question is worth asking. Obviously, "criminal enterprising" flourishes at Lake Chad. The free circulation of criminals demonstrates the deficiency in Sates' presence on the lake which remains a haven for illegality. It is urgent for the riverine States establish a harmonized policy for the security of the borders, the management and control of resources. To do this, it is important to first of all, master the demography of the lake before any action is taken, to discern between trans-nationality which bears the dynamics of interregional integration and economic development on the one hand, and the cross border nature fueling illegal mobility within a poorly controlled space.

One is confronted with a diversity of actors with

divergent interests and representations at Lake Chad. This is crucial. Apparently, the residents are the only victims of this chaos as attested by increased impoverishment of the fishers and farmers at the Lake. On a daily basis, they lose the autonomy and identity linked to their activity in order to serve the interests of those who have taken them hostage at different times during the last decades: environmental changes, dishonest traders, greedy civil servants, bandits, rebels and terrorists. These "businessmen" or opportunistic employers offer new chances of survival in an environment that is characterised by social exclusion inherited from the colonial age. The consequence is that, communitarism (Kanuri, Kanembou, Haoussa, Kotoko, Arabe Shoas, Djoukoun, Massa, Mousgoum, Maliens sénégalais, Burkinabé etc.) is reinforced in the form of total mistrust of the other. The physical borders and the nations vanish and are rebuilt by more exclusive individual interactions. This reinforces the insecurity and vulnerability of the residents to surrender to any ideology and action that could afford them power and importance.

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TRANSFORMATIONS OF BOKO HARAM'S POLEMOLOGICAL STATUS FACING THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY IN CENTRAL AFRICA: AN INTEGRATED FORESIGHT SKETCH

In view of recent successes and setbacks on both sides, the fight against Boko Haram (BH) has not reached the decisive battle yet. The concept itself has little relevance in 'new wars' that do not end on one localized battle field after the mort has been sounded, the final blow dealt, and the enemy compelled to sign his surrender. In the face of this unprecedented threat for central Africa in the post-colonial era, the sub-region and its partners are still at the phase of identification and first evaluation.

In this sense, the challenge of "understanding the threat to better fight it" falls within the operational clarification. To meet the challenge concurrently with the evaluation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (UNGCTS) that provides the framework for country-specific strategies and regional coordination is methodologically sound before considering the next steps. Accordingly, a third useful exercise is foresight. It entails considering the possible evolution of BH in the face of a reinforced and coordinated implementation of the UNGCTS and related UN Security Council resolutions, in particular Resolution 1373 (2001) on preventing and combating terrorism, and Resolution 2178 (2014) on the prevention and elimination of travel and support for foreigners fighting for terrorist groups.



The numerous political variables and strategic uncertainties must not discourage forecasting. Even for a mere sketch like this one, combining and confronting forecasts and their tools increases the probability of accuracy¹, or at least effectively guides robust decision making². Amongst those tools, a systematic study must certainly adopt a scenarios-based hypothesis-inductive method³ and combine it with prospective military strategy to attempt answers to three key questions related to exploration and preparation for action. 1) What are the possible (future) scenario in this war? 2) What are the desirable scenarios and the goals assigned to the general military strategy of Central Africa, its countries and partners at the prospective horizon? 3) What are the ways and means that can ensure the fulfillment of those goals?⁴

As the UNGCTS is not solely military and BH's polemological status as well as the threat it represents are largely determined by its territorial control, it is important to frame strategic forecasting within a geopolitical matrix in order to account for power and influence conflicts and their multiple causes within territories. Three components of the resulting geostrategic forecast are articulated here in two parts. First, a structural analysis of trends produced over time highlights how Boko Haram's polemological status has evolved during its rise. Then, the analysis of game players leading to future scenarios helps clarify the requisites of effectiveness and probable trajectories of the threat's reversal under the implementation of the UNGCTS. With reference to the integrated approach that studies terrorism and counter-terrorism together rather than in isolation⁵, it appears important to reinforce and better take into account the Regional Coordination of the United Nations Strategy against Terrorism and Light Weapons Trafficking in Central Africa.

I. Confronting the institutional strategic deficit: Boko haram's rise and the evolution of its polemological status

Through the lens of an integrated approach, BH's rise results as much from the group's successes as from insufficient implementation of the UN's

global approach. Whereas the Nigerian internal conflict has been internationalized, war declared and extreme violence has become common on the battlefield, allied forces are still in preparation. One country, Cameroon, still assumes the bulk of international effort, with a cost estimated at a billion Euros for the year 2014 alone⁶. Whereas the enemy shows perfect knowledge of the terrain, having recruited intensively on Cameroon's far North border with Nigeria, field experts such as Professor Saïbou Issa remind us of the persisting difficulty to fathom BH's objectives, and thus to satisfy the first imperative of warfare taught by the good old Sun Tzu: "know thy enemy!" it then becomes imperative to compensate the conceptual advantage taken in this regard by the asymmetric adversary, i.e., also locate him in order to better plan the counter-bypass.

What then is this enemy? We know for certain that it is Islamist and extremely violent. But the asymmetric system that it represents is less unambiguous. Is it a predatory system that has succeeded through violent entrepreneurship, of which high-profile hostage-taking for ransom is simply the best known? Is it a, more or less, reticulated small-group structured subversive system, that is, a terrorist group or sect as understood in the current nomenclature used both in popular discourse and by decision makers? Is it not instead a claim-based system with paramilitary structure, that is, an Islamist insurgency or irredentism waging the proclaimed resistance warfare against westernization which it considers corrupting? Would it rather be an asymmetric mix that remains to be defined, or something else entirely?⁷ The distinction is not simply theoretical; it is essential to analysis and decision at both strategic and operational levels. Thus, to determine BH's polemological status, four elements of its evolution must be analyzed: capabilities, goals, allies, and methods.

Capabilities

Depending on estimates, Boko Haram has a membership of 8, 000 to 30, 000 in late 2014.⁸ Weaponry ranges from knives and swords to heavy artillery and tanks, having gradually included explosives for improvised devices and kamikaze belts, pistols and assault rifles, as well as RPGs. Mobility is achieved with

Scott Armstrong, « Combining Forecasts » et « Evaluating Forecasting Methods », in Scott Armstrong (Ed.), *Principles of Forecasting*, New York: Springer Science+Media, LLC, 2001, pp. 417-439 and 443-47.

See Rand Corporation, « Making Good Decisions Without Predictions: Robust Decision Making for Planning Under Deep Uncertainty », RB-9701 (2013), www.rand.org; Robert J. Lempert and Myles T. Collins, « Managing the Risk of Uncertain Threshold Responses: Comparison of Robust, Optimum, and Precautionary Approaches », *Risk*

Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 4, August 2007, pp. 1009-1026.

See amongst others, George Wright and Georges Cairns, *Scenario Thinking*, New York, 2011 ; Michel Godet, *Manuel de prospective stratégique*, Vol. 1 : Une indiscipline intellectuelle and Vol. 2 : L'art et la méthode, Paris, Dunod, 1998.

Général Lucien Poirier, *Essais de stratégie théorique*, Paris, FEDN, 1983.

motorbikes and pick-up truck, some of which have mounted machine-guns; navigation and control and command, with ultramodern communications technology. Sources of the considerable financial resources are still being studied, although two facts are already known: the flow may be slowing due to the institutional response, and funding comes in part from criminal activities and a network of more or less distant Jihadist allies.

Allies and goals

Boko Haram is served by the long duration relationship between geography and politics in the Sahel, from which derives a structural conflict between recent states with secular and democratic vocation, and quasi-millenary societies with strong theocratic orientation. Configured by medieval Islamic conquests and conversions, the way of life here structures allegiances such that 91% of Nigerian Muslims consider that their Muslim identity is more important than those of Africans, Black people, or even Nigerian citizens⁹. This unequivocal figure shows a rising trend deriving from a lack of alternatives due itself to persistently low penetration of state-building and state control processes which in turn are compromised in the long term by BH's stand and influence.

Affinities draw popular support among northern Nigerian states enforcing Sharia law, and success reinforces both BH's conscription capabilities and prestige as a leading Jihadist organization. Objective allies of BH are all the groups of the second front in the *global Islamist insurgency*¹⁰ – the Trans-Saharan area – and even of the first – the Middle-East. Explicit and opportunistic alliances suggest the enforcement of unifying views with great significance for the distinction between the strategic objectives and the political goals of war, following Clausewitz's instrumental perspective. In this light, Abubakar Shekau's erratic leadership, in which the only constant seems to be blood-thirsty extremism, appears to operate paradoxically as a strategic and tactical asset that enables him to maneuver beyond rivalries that emerge between major jihadists. Growing in complexity after Mohamed Yusuf who started with Salafist influences related to SGPC's methods spread in the Western Trans-Saharan zone by such agents as Mokhtar Belmokhtar who controls a set of smuggling routes in the area, BH under Shekau

skillfully multiplies and maximizes strategic alliances, in particular through the practice of bay'ah (pledge of allegiance).

With the events in Libya increasing AQIM's firepower, territorial span and influence, shekau pledges allegiance in 2011 to the organization founded by Osama Bin Laden. In the same vein, after proclaiming his own caliphate in 2014, and despite rivalries between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS), BH enters the trend initiated in early 2014 by several extremist groups in Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. On March 7, 2015, BH renounced its independence and proclaimed the supreme authority of the strongest rising terrorist group of the moment, IS and its self-proclaimed Caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

It would be a mistake to take literally the Nigerian government position that this bay'ah signals BH's defeat or even weakness. This evolution can best be understood strategically in relation to the ultimate universal goal shared by all global Islamist insurgents. It is no less than the reunification of the Umma (the community of believers) and the reconstitution of the Caliphate (necessarily dear to both Abu Bakrs, named after the first Caliph) through the triumph of original Islam, the return to the purity of the religion as taught by the Prophet. This return is proclaimed as the only solution to decay in the Muslim world, of which those putatively responsible, according to BH's denomination, are Western democracies. In this view, African states are no more than local relays sully the lands of Islam with their democratic and secular perversion. Another point of interest in understanding specific alliances is the correlated variation in BH's combat and operation methods – Salafist abduction and prison attack techniques, Al-Qaeda style sophisticated bombing, IS style consolidation of territorial control-exploitation. They decisively shed light on the evolution of the asymmetric system.

Methods

From basic attacks with improvised explosive devices, to the opening of a front with the objective of expanding a sanctuarized territory now 20 000 km² or more through lucrative abductions, BH evolved from non conventional to quasi conventional methods. However, the evolution is cumulative, as

Thomas Plümper and Eric Neumayer, « Terrorism and Counterterrorism: An Integrated Approach and Future Research Agenda », *International Interactions*, No 40 (2014), pp. 579–589.

« Sur les traces de Boko Haram : Cameroun, la terreur aux frontières », <http://webdoc.rfi.fr/cameroun-boko-haram-nigeria-terreur-frontieres-jihadistes/index.html>, visited March 19, 2015.

This typology of asymmetric systems is borrowed from Bruno Tertrais (Ed.), *Atlas*

militaire et stratégique : menaces, conflits et forces armées dans le monde, Paris, Autrement, 2008.

These figures are respectively provided by a Chatham House report: « Nigeria's Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis », september 2014, and Mathieu Guidère, « Boko Haram: la mobilisation médiatique est-elle efficace ou contre-productive? », *Le Figaro*, 13 may 2014.

According to a 2006 survey by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life.



Source : La Libre.be du 13th January 2015

recently shown by suicide attacks involving women and children simultaneously with conventional engagement on the frontlines. Such hybrid warfare may be disorienting but attention to progression makes it clear that, with its small-group structure, violent rhetoric and sporadic attacks method, BH clearly is at first a classic Islamist terrorist group. Its predatory activities sustain but do not define the asymmetric system that is therefore subversive.

Having acquired more resources and experience, in particular due to sustained contacts with allies and partners from the two fronts, BH takes it to the next step. By assuming control of the entire Nigerian Borno state, BH inaugurates the very *modus operandi* that the international community made a point of honor to prevent since the September 11, 2001 attacks: the capture and control of territory by terrorist groups. Thus, subsequent successes such as those of the Tuaregs in Northern Mali in 2012-2013 and of IS in Northwestern Iraq and Southeastern Syria emulate BH which benefits from their consideration and collaboration.

More important in view of BH's transformation trend toward a paramilitary rebellion is the fact that it

is reminiscent of the three phases of revolutionary warfare theorized by Mao Zedong¹². 1) Skirmishes and sporadic attacks against government forces and symbols in order to launch the insurrection, train in combat, weaken the adversary, recruit and prepare the next steps. 2) Establishment of insurgency bases, expansion of zones loyal to the rebels, opening of one or more fronts simultaneously with the continuation of first-step style operations. 3) At the appropriate time, taking advantage of the insurgency's rise and the weakening and delegitimization of established authority, launch massive attacks to defeat the authorities militarily and proclaim a new government or even a new sociopolitical system. With similar trends and known goals, BH clearly is spearheading the push to join jihadist forces of North and West Africa with those of East Africa and achieve complete territorial continuity in the two arcs of crisis where Jihadism thrives: the Sahelo-Saharan that runs from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red sea and the Indian ocean and from Libya to central Africa, and the Middle-Eastern. This intermediate objective must facilitate the goal which is to overrun both areas and put into place the Caliphate on all the "lands of Islam", from Senegal to the Philippines through

¹² The expression is by David Kilcullen, « Countering Global Insurgency », in Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo (Eds.), *Strategic Studies: A Reader*, New York, Routledge, 2008, pp. 326–341.

Bonaventure Cakpo Guedegbe, « Boko Haram : bras armé du terrorisme international, déstabilisation du Nigeria et reconfiguration géopolitique de la zone sahélienne », IRIS, February 2015.

Eastern Europe, Caucasia and the Asian Turkestan.

In this light, BH's indiscriminate targeting of Infidels and Muslims, the United Nations, Westerners and Africans, Nigerians, Chadians, Cameroonians must also cease to be puzzling. Historically, Jihad in heterogeneous societies including Muslims and non Muslims is almost always a set of double holy wars waged against both infidels and "bad Muslims" who, because they live in peace with non-Muslims, become agents of religious, moral and political corruption, according to Jihadists. Considering its current polemological status, Boko Haram is a territorialized and sanctuarized movement of irredentist pan-Islamism with a fierce will to conquest and expansion justified by the idea of a purifying reconstruction of the Sokoto caliphate as a province of the global Caliphate to come. However, success is highly improbable, as the overwhelming majority of Muslims does not adhere to violent extremism. The question then is how a new implementation of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy can enable institutional actors to modify to their advantage the adversary's status.

II. Perspectives on a reinforced and coordinated implementation of the Global Counter-terrorism Strategy in Central Africa: requisites and trajectories for Boko Haram's polemological involution

Boko Haram reached the peak of its power and expansion in mid-2014, at the time when war was declared on the group by the President of the Republic of Cameroon. A rise to the extremes follows which, although costly, also signals a turn, or at least a new trend in the war whereby BH struggles to stay on the offensive whereas the group relents and is increasingly pushed on the defensive. It follows that reinforcing the UNGCTS at the adequate scale would cause a reverse evolution of the group, and make possible a strategic victory for the states it has attacked or destabilized. The reference scenario is the eradication of Boko Haram, and the foresight horizon is the medium term (about 5 years). The mobilization of Central African states to bring this scenario into being would gain from building on achievements and reinforcing the regional Coordination in the orientation of the global Strategy's implementation efforts through the appropriation of its four pillars.

Pillar No 1: Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism

Their aim is to understand, transform and eliminate the political, socio-economic and cultural conditions that can lead to the spread of BH terrorism in Central Africa. In addition to the criminalization of both terrorist acts and the incitation to commit them, to socio-economic measures that can reduce the vulnerability of the poor to recruitment as well as their real or perceived marginalization and disenfranchisement, the UNGCTS prescribes the reinforcement of peace culture, the respect of all religions and interreligious dialogue which, together, are crucial to the peaceful coexistence of all religions. However, with the exception of the Seleka-Anti-Balaka strife in the Central African Republic (CAR), interreligious violence is scarce and not very likely to support the spread of BH in central Africa. Simultaneously to interreligious peace, it would be adequate to reinforce counter-radicalization through the internal consolidation of tolerance within Muslim communities. The founding principle of such measures would be Boko Halal, a notion that directly counters the extremist ideology inscribed in Boko Haram's programmatic denomination. By the same token, such refutation of that distorted narrative brings a more holistic cultural perspective to bear on and reinforce the otherwise inaccessible (legal) criminalization of the incitation to commit terrorist acts.

Coordination for the implementation of such measures will involve Central African states, ECCAS, International Organizations (IO) such as Alliance of Civilizations, UNESCO or CERDOTOLA which has the needed expertise in the languages and cultures of those communities – in particular the Fulani-Hausa-Kanuri continuum that is most devastated by BH –, civil society organizations (more importantly Muslim), and local development committees. Venues for implementation should include public instruction and educational settings, socio-economic and cultural development initiatives, aid distribution, and communication regarding economic and public (and private) investment programs, which would highlight their potential for political inclusion and socio-economic insertion, especially of youths.

In collaboration with the UNDP, UNHCR and other relevant IOs, pilot programs could be tested in BH's favorite zones of recruitment in central Africa: Cameroon's far North, Southern Chad and, in the case of CAR, in parallel with interreligious dialogue. The results would then be fine tuned, and the experience

Among others, see his Red Book, in particular Chapter VIII on "Popular Warfare".
« Plan of Action, Implications and Thematic Objectives of the Fight against Terrorism

and Arms Trafficking in the Central African Sub-Region », p. 8.
James Q. Roberts, « Building a National Counterterrorism Capability: A Primer for

made available to all ECCAS countries having Muslim communities, as well as countries of the Lake Chad Basin Community (LCBC), and even ECOWAS, as the effectiveness of coordination will only be maximum if it includes West Africa.

At the same time, it is imperative to coordinate and harmonize legislation against terrorism, namely by ensuring its conformity with global and Pan-African instruments, namely the OAU 1999 Convention on the Prevention and Fight Against Terrorism and the AU's 2004 Protocol to the AU Convention. In short, in support of coordination, Central African decision makers will have to "consider creating regular consultation mechanisms between governmental and non-governmental actors to exchange views on the evolving threat and on possible strategies for confronting it, including by addressing conditions conducive to it."¹³ Reinforcing the first pillar in this way is likely to considerably reduce the potential for violent radicalization and prevent BH recruitment half-way to the foresight horizon. In addition to depriving BH of the ability to increase, renew or simply maintain its numbers, this would also disrupt its intelligence activities behind Cameroonian and Chadian lines, as well as those of the Pan-African troops that will have been deployed by then, thus reinforcing the second pillar.

Pillar No 2: Measures to prevent and combat terrorism

As soon as the 10 000 troops Force authorized by the AU is deployed with adequate funding and logistics, the second pillar will be consolidated around strategic reinforcement and coordination geared toward reclaiming the upper hand on the field of military confrontation. The threat posed by BH will most likely be turned into an asset for building and testing what James Q. Roberts, Principal Director of Special Operations Capabilities at the Pentagon calls the "benchmark for a competent counterterrorism capability"¹⁴. It is the ability to defeat terrorists in direct confrontation and more importantly to successfully rescue hostages from terrorists, a goal that so completely escapes African Forces that have so far faced BH that it has never been considered. Instead, ransoms have apparently been repeatedly paid and, when that was not possible, the option became the abandonment of hundreds of girls abducted in Chibok, despite the fact that international mobilization for their rescue involved no less than the First Lady of the USA.

The counter-terrorist (CT) competence depends on another type of coordination: it will be reached when there is a perfect alignment between the three components the "Iron Triangle" of CT decision making at the strategic, operational even tactical levels. First the "eyes" or specialized intelligence and investigative components establish the conditions for a successful rescue. Second the "brains" or political level of decision authorizes the operation. Third, the "hammer" or specialized rescue forces execute¹⁵. Functional requirements in this iron triangle include specialized selection, training and thresholds of necessary skills, equipment, rotation rates, etc.

In facing BH, coordination will most certainly result in adequate strategic deployment of superior Force on the different fronts: those of Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad, with rules of engagement capable of putting an end to the stalemate BH have been able to impose here and there on the frontline. For example, they have been camping for months, with their flag in the wind, on the Nigerian shore of the Komadougou Yobe river facing the locality of Bosso on Niger's side, defying the Bosso detachment of Niger's army from a mere 600 meters.

This is a remake of BH's position in Gambaru (Yobe state, Nigeria) from August 2014 to February 2015, in front of elite forces of the Cameroonian army (The rapid Intervention Battalion) posted in Fotokol and immobilized by the lack of a right to pursue BH fighters into Nigerian territory, thus compelled to wait and watch the bridge over the El Beid connecting the two cities. BH was even able to afford a spectacular counter-offensive on February 4 when, having been chased from Gambaru the previous day by Chadian forces that have the right of pursuit, the insurgents took advantage of a lapse in security around Fotokol to maneuver between the lines at night and commit in Fotokol the worst slaughter of civilians to date in the war. The experience of permanent alert gained by Chadian and Cameroonian soldiers on this occasion will certainly be capitalized in the formulation of a doctrine for the coordinated use of force. It is imperative that the approach includes modalities to make safe the sites that will be taken from BH during the group's retreat that will probably be gradual.

It is due to the strategic core of a reinforced second pillar that BH will be repelled and defeated. The most probable scenario is a gradual, reverse evolution of its

Operators and Policymakers Alike », in Christopher C. Harmon, Andrew N. Pratt, and Sebastian Gorka (Eds.), *Toward a Grand Strategy against Terrorism*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 2010, p. 127.
Ibid., pp. 128-129.

Samuel O. Oyewole, « Subsidising Boko Haram Terrorism? Stakeholders' Discordance and The Trial of the Ongoing Counter Terrorism in Nigeria », Samuel O. Oyewole, « Subsidising Boko Haram Terrorism? Stakeholders' Discordance and The Trial of the Ongoing Counter Terrorism in Nigeria », *Afro Asian Journal of Social Sciences*, Volume

polemological relevance which will result in its eradication or perhaps the entry of its less radical wing – most likely Yusuf’s partisans who disapprove of Shekau’s excessive warmongering – into the political process. At this level, the decisive element in the internal game of institutional actors will be delivered or not by the Nigerian government’s ability to not only reduce corruption within its Defense and Security Forces, but also to adopt an inclusive mode of political life, with the goal of overturning the structure of power and interest of Northern elites who still subsidize BH, at least politically¹⁶.

Complementary measures are thus necessary to enhance the strategic core. They include diplomacy that reinforces the international consensus against BH. Also, well targeted international cooperation and the diversification of partners will also help secure the diverse forms of support: financial, logistic and electronic from the partners of LCBC countries. They also include the fight against the funding BH which is related to Resolution 2178 and the last two pillars.

Pillar No3: Capacity building and institutional development against terrorism in collaboration with the UN, and Pillar 4: Human Rights for all and the rule of law in the fight against terrorism

Central African countries will inevitably be confronted to the challenge, faced in all parts of the world, of tactical or psychological advantages likely to be derived from using undemocratic or extrajudicial measures to seize opportunities and take the advantage against terrorists. Tempting both civilians and members of the Armed Forces, the desire for vengeance, reprisal and summary justice will manifest its ambiguity: to do away at once with an enemy they have managed to have at their mercy, even by committing atrocity or being savagely violent, can weaken the adversary and his will to fight; but it can also be counterproductive and further radicalize the adversary and simultaneously allow him to gather empowering sympathies.

Given the imperative to reinforce and coordinate national and sub-regional capabilities in terms of legal

4, No. 4.1 Quarter I, 2013, pp. 1-22. Afro Asian Journal of Social Sciences, Volume 4, No. 4.1 Quarter I, 2013, pp. 1-22.



Source : Tchadinfos.com – The Security Council of the UNO condemned the attacks of Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Lake Chad.

protection and bringing terrorists to justice, misconduct or accidents – such as the ones that led to the death in detention of Mohamed Yusuf in Nigeria or more recently that of two dozen BH members detained near the theater of operations in Cameroon – will be reduced in time, and with the development of adequate legal institutions. The prosecution of terrorists will become common, and so will pressures from victims support groups. States jurisprudence and case laws will grow, along with political experience and capabilities for the protection of minorities and other vulnerable groups, most likely with national and sub-regional crisis management frameworks. However, all these will only reach maximum effectiveness when better capabilities to win the battle and lead to peace are achieved.

Conclusion

Following Clausewitz's law of reciprocal actions, the importance of BH's polemological status and the level of implementation of the UNGCTS will evolve in inversely proportional manner. This inversion will prompt the losing belligerent into fierce and repetitive counterattack and other maneuvers that will lead to peaks of violence in combat until one side is overwhelmed by offensives, strikes or attrition. This is more likely for BH, although the term (probably medium, less probably short) is largely determined by the behavior of game players on the institutional side, in particular Nigerian leadership and Forces.

The most probable scenario is definitely a reverse modification of BH's polemological status: from an irredentist, territorialized and sanctuarized group in transnational expansion to an internal rebellion in Nigeria; then, from a rebellion capable of controlling territory and holding a front to a terrorist group with a multiple group structure; and finally from a classical terrorist group to a series of scattered, more or less connected tactical teams easy to eliminate in case they are localized and encircled. In the outlined involution process, BH falls back to its successive growth phases till the initial one where it will either consider converting into politics or face obliteration. This process would be accelerated, and its linearity subverted, in case the counterterrorist competence enables the decapitation of BH's through the elimination of its leadership.

However, as BH loses its ability to hold a front, there will be an escalating probability of retaliatory bomb attacks by the group, including in major cities in central African countries. States will be facing the challenges of

annihilation wars in which the ultimate goals are not political but strategic: maximizing destruction and devastation. Given the hazards of an exclusively strategic approach and the wrong application of useful force in new wars¹⁷, it is essential to prevent a resurgence of BH following its eradication through the reinforcement of the second pillar. This challenge will be met through sustainable consolidation of, and coordination around, the first, third and fourth pillars of the Global Strategy and their adaptation to the central African context and environment. This entails adequate socioeconomic and cultural policies that can help with many structural objectives: prevent the vulnerabilities that enable the expansion into the sub-region of external terrorist groups and the recruitment of youths; build or reinforce effective states cooperating with the United Nations system and global partners while avoiding the pitfalls of attrition induced by cooperation itself, which is characteristic of the geostrategy of aid and interference, including in matters of overly strategic counter-terrorism; and finally, firmly establish the supremacy of State order and the rule of law.

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See Vincent Desportes, *La Guerre probable: penser autrement*, Paris, Economica, 2008.

NATIONAL MOBILIZATION AGAINST THE BOKO HARAM SECT IN CAMEROON : AN OBJECTIFICATION OF THE ARMY-PEOPLE-NATION TRIPTYCH

Between June 2014 - May 2015 and beyond, the Cameroonian territory was marked by a series of activities, packaged in media and political discourses as “national mobilisation against the Boko Haram Sect.” These activities included raids carried out by a sect named Boko Haram¹ on the civilian population and military objectives in Northern Cameroon; and the defensive and reprisal actions organised by the Cameroonian military force.

In the past, the local inhabitants of northern Cameroon have endured successive painful experiences imposed by natural and man-made causes². However, in spite of the individual emotions expressed and the resources deployed, none of these calamities have provoked such nationwide popular reaction.

In the light of the multiplicity of actors, the actions and treatises emanating from this threat, it is important to interrogate the socio-discursive mechanisms of interpretation that have been set in motion within the framework of these operations. This interrogation authenticates the need for a retrospective insight on the significance that this mobilisation has gained in Cameroon; the manner in which it influences the appraisal of the Boko Haram phenomenon and ultimately an enhanced projections of policy on similar threats.

¹ An armed group based on Islamic ideology which claims it is fighting against Western cultures, Western education being perceived as the the armed wing of Western expansionism. Besides military attacks, the activities of Boko Haram consists of rapes, assassinations, looting and hostage taking.

² The national memory is still fresh with natural calamities like the explosion of Lake Nyos and Monoun and the industrial gas explosion like the gaz explosion in Nzam. At the military level, the conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria over the contested Bakassi peninsular is still very much alive in the minds of Cameroonians.



Source : La Dépeche.fr; Cameroonians take part at an anti-Boko Haram Manifestation in Yaoundé. ReinnierKaze / AFP

Policy semiotics beckons research interest on mechanisms through which subjects make meaning of the actors and political actions³. Operations that are purely psychological in a sense are understood here as interacting with the socio-cultural and political context, which play a significant part in the construction of meaning by the subjects.

It becomes necessary, at the end of this socio-semiotic study on "national mobilization against Boko Haram," to illustrate how, the fractal construction of collective action in an inter-actionist approach, has led to a centripetal construction, historically situated in the "Nation," while bringing out parallel centrifugal expressions to question the nationalist vision of this operation.

1 - Mobilization Against Boko Haram or a Fractal Construction of a Collective Action.

What has been retrospectively branded in politico-media parlance as "national mobilisation against Boko Haram," derives from diverse individual and institutional initiatives undertaken by heterogeneous actors and speakers, in different places and times; hence it is important to note the discrepancies.

Considering the form and nature of the abundant diversity of activities that may be bundled in the so-called "national mobilization against Boko Haram," any classification attempt will boil down to three broad categories: political rallies, cults and religious offices, and fundraising and donations⁴.

Daily media reports of these different activities highlight a diversity of institutional actors, both initiators and participants, which distinguishes on the one hand, administrative authorities and actors, and political institutions; and, on the other hand, organisations and secular and religious civilian personalities⁵.

Rallies and "political marches" have paved the way for the rise of opportunistic civilian organisations whose birth and existence rely entirely on the Boko

Haram cause⁶. Fundraising and donations in particular, but also rallies and political marches, and religious services provide an opportunity for non-institutional actors and ordinary citizens, to express their loyalty to the collective movement⁷.

The themes that underpin the various activities undertaken tend to confirm the fundamentally heterogeneous nature of this movement. An overview of the corpus of messages delivered during such occasions reveal a permanent cohabitation of constructive and dissenting thematics notably: popular support for the government, political institutions and armed forces; calls for peace and prayers for peace and security; calls to sacrifice for safeguarding national interests and the defense of vulnerable populations; expression of solidarity and compassion, prayers for the affected populations; denunciation of the visible enemy at the forefront of the terrorist threat and the hidden enemy within the nation⁸.

The referential alterations that characterise one speech to another underline many secondary explanations attributed to the Boko Haram phenomenon. Thus, this phenomenon continues to be perceived and interpreted either as a political, ideological or social menace; or as a moral deviant, which is not the case.

Moreover, the different repositories of activities on «national mobilization against the Boko Haram Sect;» are characterized by a strong affirmation of the identities of the actors. This affirmation is portrayed, among others, by ostentatious signs of allegiance notably: maximum display and visibility of the name, trademark and insignia of the organizations and institutions involved, including through clothing, announcements, public and media reclamations of actions posed etc.

Fund raising and donation activities, and, to a lesser extent, marches and political rallies have all been characterized by a subtle competition and race for figures (large sums of money) amongst different administrative units (Regions, Divisions, Subdivisions)

3 "In the political space of confrontations, actions are not only thought out from the perspective of their effectiveness or impact, they are not inscribed only on their logic of their causality. Political actions are perceived as from a semiotic manner in the elucidation of their meaning", P. 353, in *Fréquence Sud*, N° 19, January 2008.

4 The dramatization of gifts as demonstrated by these operations integrated the six constitutive dimensions which include: place, time, actor, action and the object of the speech - the initial mediatization which led to the collect of gifts and prolonged the possibility to apprehend these operations from the communicational point of view of the science of information and communication. The meetings and religious services on their part comes from a screen writing which integrates them in the study of communication and event management.

5 This distinction brings the partition of the political and civil society

6 The most popular manifestation which drew the highest level of media was organized by a group named "collective Unis pour le Cameroun" created in Yaoundé on the 28th February 2015 for this cause. This match was said to be "to support the armed forces and the population in the Extreme North." affected by the attacks from Boko Haram.

7 On the 30th April 2015, the special support fund created by the interministerial committee to manage the gifts published an amount of 1 Billion and 29 million according to the president of the committee.

8 The irredentist nature of this latter claim stemmed from its opposition not from the classical established authority of what the state is but from the emergent "authority" which is terrorism and which dispute the state's monopoly of "legitimate violence."



Source : over-blog.com; Youth day festivities - Cameroon

or organizations (especially political parties).

It is therefore necessary to interrogate the very nature of this "collective action" which, from a critical perspective, presents the formula for a hodgepodge of individual actions and, possibly, competition.

2 - Mobilization against Boko Haram: A Landmark in the Objectification of the National Fiction.

In fact, it seems conceivable, from a political standpoint, that these heterogeneous speeches echo the nature of power exercised at the national level, while claiming democratic principles; and from a communicational viewpoint, the nature of the events by its added value to the multiplicity of sources, channels, actors and messages.

However, beyond the different connotations,

(diverging first impressions and possible competitions), there seem to be a unique sense of meaning arising from the unique socio-historical context and specific discussions at the time⁹.

First of all, the emotional context -marked by media clips and the stories of witnesses from the war "front-" summon emotion by describing the "atrocities" committed by the assailants and the human agony inflicted on the civilian population and military victims. From this viewpoint, the televised diffusion of photographs of young fallen soldiers and the images of the bereaved families during the removal of corpse at the Yaounde military headquarters, was able to harness a sense of identification from a large segment of the population, nationwide.

At the meso social level, the context of public and popular manifestations is known since Gustave Lebon, as a melting pot for generating « crowd » emotions, which then tend to be driven by common sentiments.

⁹ The meaning of connotation is a supplementary sense which superposes itself in the first sense, the denotation overtones without altering.

¹⁰ The take home message from the public conference organized by the Cameroon section of l'Union de la Presse Francophone (UPF) in Ebolowa on the occasion of

the International Day of Freedom of the Press is that "the civic behavior of the journalist in war as well as at all-time requires that he has as the unique motivation of his social and professional actions, the general interest of the country" Cf feedback of this activity on page 20 of Cameroon Tribune N° 10839/7038 du 12 May 2015.

Collective actions in the framework of the mobilization against Boko Haram could arouse sentiments common to those involved. At the aesthetic level, this double emotional context - meso and macro justifies the idea to consider this mobilization as a production work of Cameroonian nationality.

From one side of the debate, the indicated context is characterized by a political and media unanimity, based on a quasi-integral principle of non-contradiction, with an unspoken code of "sacred union."¹⁰ The current politico-media discourse aim, with strength and constancy, at a common threat posed by the Boko Haram sect, characterized by behaviors considered politically and humanly reprehensible and morally unacceptable. The idea of a Western conspiracy to destabilize Cameroon through Boko Haram has also filtered through more discrete, but no less effective, networks of opinion sharing.

This unique cognitive and emotional discussion context seems to assign a unifying nationalist connotation to all the actions and discourse produced in relation to the Boko Haram phenomenon, beyond the actors, forms, channels and sub-themes to which it subscribes. These actions and speeches are thus interpreted as a set of nation-building interactions, the latter being defined as "the result of a free and voluntary agreement between people who want to unite their destinies in the pursuit of a common project. Therefore, the nation cannot be thought of as an entity imposed on an individual by virtue of the circumstances of their birth, skin colour or language; but on the contrary, as a result of the construction of a voluntary consensus, the fruit of a an agreement which is daily affirmed by the individual citizens uprooted of their racial, ethnic, linguistic and cultural determinisms."¹¹

In summary, the acts and discourses on mobilization against the Boko Haram formed the contours a centripetal action and historically situated the construction of the "nation." From this perspective, these activities should be understood as a landmark in the objectification of the national fiction.

3 - "National mobilisation against the Boko Haram Sect:" a representation of the People-Army Couple.

From the lens of representative democracy, it is

appropriate to emphasize the concurring manner in which representative bodies of the people, in their various forms, have been involved in this action, from the highest levels -the president of the republic- to lower locally elected representatives like senators and deputies.

Having featured as the most decisive symbolic action -the declaration of war on Boko Haram- the real and figurative involvement of the Head of State of Cameroon manifests in the form of policy guidelines, symbolic motivations¹² and allocation of resources to the troops , and assistance to victims of war.

The parliament of Cameroon, gained a foothold in the mobilization against Boko Haram through the words of encouragements and gratitude expressed by the parliamentarians in the press and public speeches, in the Parliament and beyond, but also through a systematic involvement by each of the deputies and senators to fund raising endeavours and the delivery of gifts to the armed forces and affected population.

Beyond their implication in collective mobilisation at the local and departmental levels, the Mayors undertook certain individual initiatives. "On February 4, 2015, Régine Amougou Noma, mayor of the Yaounde 4 Community, was welcomed at the Maroua Salak International Airport, by the Governor of the Extreme North Region. The people's elect was transporting a donation worth about 7 million fcfa, essentially constituted of food supplies: bags of rice, cassava, cocoyams, corn, ground nuts, plantains, bobolo, cartoons of sugar, sardines, mineral water... The ceremony for the handing over of these modest donations had already been preceded by a march of support in Yaounde."¹³

Political parties, political institutions representing the people, also featured at the forefront of this mobilization. On February 15, 2015, the Camer News Website reported that 11 political parties, of all leanings, took active part in the symbolic mobilization of national forces against Boko Haram. The broad range of political parties involved is a sufficient representation of the social and ideological diversity of the people, momentarily mobilized for a common cause.¹⁴

Stepping over the limits of representative democracy, "national mobilization against the Boko Haram sect" has led to the exercise of direct

11 D. Alcaud et L. Bouvet, Dictionary of Political and Social Sciences, Paris,p. 224 .

12 Distinctive awards of honour would thus be given to soldiers and officers who would recognised for the bravery at thewar front and the level of their sacrifice for the nation.

13 David Nouwou, La Nouvelle Expression of 07 february 2015.

14 Both managing and protesting parties are all on this list.

democracy. This was the case with the popular marches which were organized in most cities in Cameroon, as well as the rites and religious services, and fundraising and donations, which gave the opportunity for every citizen to pledge individual allegiance in the said cause .

It is also imperative, to note how the linguistic elements (choice of words) coined by the various speech makers further opens up an illustrative space for the People - Army couple. The "Great Patriotic March" at the 20th May Boulevard in Yaounde was presented as a "march of support to armed forces and the people of the Far North." The Trust account opened by the Minister of Finance is packaged in the official government statement as intended to "trace the financial contributions of the different layers of the population under their support for our defense and security forces engaged on the war front against the Boko Haram terrorist organization." This trust account is christened: "contribution of the people - fight against Boko Haram," while the fundraising and donations is called " war effort."

The people - army adage, as postulated on discussion platforms is legitimated in a discourse on realism, translated by a student from the city of Douala as thus : "The support marches inevitably have some psychological impact on the forces at the war front. However, we must go further, because the military will not triumph solely by morale [moral support]. The reality of war terrain imposes more concrete actions."

Strong symbolisms have been conceived to consolidate this People's Army – couple metaphor. On the occasion of the 49th National Youth Day, the youth suggested enlisting volunteers to assume the many civilian tasks that war imposes in the background of the actual war front. The MRC party proposed a blood donation operation, so that the blood of the people could compensate the blood loss of soldiers.

In sum, the "national mobilization against Boko Haram" has recaptured the People-Army-Nation triptych, while reproducing the concept of "nation" in the image of the "family". In a mythological figure inscribed in the depths of the collective subconscious, the structure of this operation reconstructs the army in the role of protective father and the people in that of the mother – nurturer; with the later nourishing former at the heart of national security efforts.

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SUB-REGIONAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MOBILISATION IN THE FIGHT AGAINST BOKO HARAM

Africa is the most affected continent with conflict and several initiatives of development. The fight against poverty hypothetically opposes to the perpetual socio-political, military violence. To this is added other transnational threats (piracy, maritime, terrorism, narcotics, human trafficking, poaching, and other transnational organized criminality.)

These new types of conflicts; insidious and envisaged sources of insecurity preceded the traditional conflicts and civil wars and are susceptible to further destabilize the stability of African states.


At the international level, the most active of these groups are AQMI, the MUJAO, EL SHEBAB, the Islamic state and Boko Haram.

Concerning Boko Haram, its rise to power in Nigeria has had impact on other neighbouring countries including Cameroon which has carried out a national action against this nebulous threat with diverse results.

Faced with the regionalization of this transversal and asymmetric threat, the construction of an adapted response, which will give more importance to coordination, harmonization, coherence of policies and actions, is very necessary.

From this perspective, countries sharing boundary with Nigeria, members of the Commission of the Lake Chad Basin (LCBC) comprised of Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, Chad and the just added Benin after Summit of Elysee of May 17 2014, triggered a process by elaborating a strategy to combat Boko Haram. This initiative was supported by the Economic Community of Central African States to which Cameroon and Chad belong and later by the African Union and the United Nations Organization.

This paper will dwell on the sub-regional, continental and international mobilization towards the fight against Boko Haram terrorist group beginning from the Elysee Summit of 17th May 2014 in Paris (France) .



Commitments and Actions Taken by Member Countries of the Chad Commission against Boko Haram.

Context and Genesis

Basing their arguments and claims on religious proselytism, notably the propagation of tradition (SUNNA) and of the jihad, they got implanted in the predominantly Muslim northern part of Nigeria, where followers of the Boko Haram sect began attacking churches, religious edifices, before taking their actions towards the United Nations buildings and finally waging a full scale guerrilla attack against the symbols of the Nigerian State.

Based on a Human Rights Watch report, this violence and confrontation with the Nigeria army has so far led to about 3000 deaths and thousands of displaced people.

The expansion of this group beyond the borders of Nigeria was first marked by the events at Waza (Cameroon) with the kidnapping of a French family, Moulin Fournier (07 members in total), on the 19th February 2013. They were later liberated on the 19th April 2013 through the initiatives of the President Paul Biya, Head of State of Cameroon in synergy with Nigeria and France. Following this event, hostage-taking exercises increased the area.

The atrocities of Boko Haram increased in scale in 2014 in Nigeria and Cameroon. To this effect and based on the demands of President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigerian, an emergency Summit was convened under the auspices of His Excellency Francois Holland, bringing together the member countries of the Chad Basin in the presence of the representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, Great Britain, International Organizations and financial institutions.

From this summit, a strategy was put in place and measures were established to combat Boko Haram. Some of the resolutions included :

- strengthening regional cooperation between Nigeria and its neighbours to fight against threat Boko Haram threat demonstrated through several attacks including the kidnapping of more than 270 high school girls at Chibok.
- the establishment of a bilateral base of a coordinated patrol aimed to combat Boko Haram and the search for measures-dispositions for an information sharing system which will enable and support this operational action.
- Information sharing mechanisms on arms trafficking and the reinforcement of measures to secure stockpiling.

Border surveillance system;

On the multilateral level, initiatives which will enable the putting in place of a joint intelligence unit and a dedicated team to elaborate a regional strategy in the fight against terrorism in the framework of the Lake Chad Basin have been elaborated.

To ensure the implementation of these resolutions, a follow up ministerial meetings were held in London (12 June 2014) in Washington (03 August 2014) in Abuja (23 September 2014) and Niamey on the 20th of January 2014.

While these meetings were ongoing, the Ministers of Defense of the Lake Chad Basin Commission held meetings in Yaoundé, (17-18 March 2014), Niamey (17-18 March 2014) at Abuja (24-25 November). More to this, an extraordinary summit of heads of states and governments of the LCBC and Benin took place on the 7th of October 2014 in Niamey followed by a joint meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and defense ministers of the LCBC.

These different meetings, which had as main objective "to analyse the security situation and to put in place concrete measures in the fight against terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin", concluded by pointing on the necessity of the different states to harmonise their efforts in order to bring a common and coordinated solution to the security challenges orchestrated by the Boko Haram threats in the Lake Chad region and beyond.

The mode of operation and coordination for an optimal synergy for the deployment of the Mixed Multinational Forces established by the Heads of States of the LCBC whose renewal into force was prescribed by the Heads of States during the summit held in N'Djamena on the 30th of April 2012.

The Extra Ordinary Summit of the Head of States of LCBC and Benin Held in Benin on the 7th October 2014

At the end of their deliberations during the extraordinary summit of the Heads of States and Government of LCBC and Benin held on the 07th October 2014, the heads of states :

- demonstrated their commitments to strengthen the operational capacity and intelligence as well as the coordination of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF); of Security of the Lake Chad Basin.
- instructed experts to put in place at the shortest time possible, a strategy to fight against Boko Haram.
- decided to finalize the establishment of headquarters of the MJTF in a secured zone by the 20th November 2014

- decided to complete the implementation of the contingents promised by the Heads of States of LCBC under the MJTF along national frontiers on November 1st 2014. Benin also promised the deployment of 700 men along the border with Nigeria.
- instructed the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of LCBC member countries and Benin to have an urgent sitting, latest 14th October 2014, in order to prepare proposed resolutions to submit to the Security Council of the United Nations and the Union in view of putting in place a legal framework in the fight against Boko Haram.

The Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense of LCBC and Benin

Held on the 13th October 2014 in Abuja, this meeting helped in drawing a proposed resolution on the basis of Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 of the United Nations. This proposed resolution sent a strong message to the international community on the commitment and determination of the countries concerned to combat Boko Haram.

This proposed resolution had to be sent to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union by Niger, who is also member, and to the Security Council of the United Nations by Nigeria and Chad, both non permanent members of the said council.

The goal targeted was to mobilize the international community and obtain the necessary bilateral and or multilateral support needed by members in the region to combat Boko Haram.

Informed by the Ambassadors of the Permanent Representatives of member countries of the LCBC in New York, the Security Council admonished previous recommendations of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union that had to adjust this proposed resolution based on international standards, while respecting the channels of the protection of human rights, to elaborate a concept of operation and rules of engagement and the necessary logistical support.

The Cameroon-Chad Coalition

Following the appeal for international mobilization made by the President of the Republic of Cameroon on the 8th January during the presentation of New Year wishes by the diplomatic corps to fight against Boko Haram, His Excellency Idriss Deby Itno of the Republic of Chad acted favourably by sending several Chadian forces to fight alongside the Cameroonian soldiers.

The Chadian soldiers were also deployed in Nigeria to fight against Boko Haram and to take back the Baga Kawa community earlier captured by this group. The

President of Chad and current President of ECCAS amongst others exhorted member countries to demonstrate solidarity.

Added to the heroic deeds demonstrated by the Cameroonian army in protecting the territorial integrity of Cameroon for over nine months, is Cameroon-Chad bilateral arrangement which is also adding more momentum.

The Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Defense of the LCBC and of Benin held on the 20th January 2015 in Niamey

Organised under the framework of the Paris process of 17th May 2014 and that of the LCBC in the presence of the French, the Americans, the Chinese, representatives of the non permanent members of the Security Council and other International organizations (ONU, UE, OIC, CENED), the meeting served as a trigger to the mobilization of resources needed to fight Boko Haram.

The following decisions were arrived at;

At the Security Level :

- Installation of the Headquarters of the Multinational Joint Task Force of the LCBC in N'Djamena (Chad),
- definition of a commitment with more strategic partners in the fight against Boko Haram,
- the strengthening of information sharing mechanisms and completion within the best deadline possible of the installation of the coordination and liaison unit in N'Djamena through officers of countries of the region and through the members of the P3,
- the elaboration of the concept of operation of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF); and the putting in place of the army staff,
- the putting in place of civil-military framework aimed at bringing closer the defense and security forces to the civilian population.

At the African/Continental and International Level

- the demand made to the President of the African Union Commission to submit a report on the regional and international efforts for the fight against Boko Haram in order to permit the Peace and Security Council to authorize the deployment and supervision of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF);
- the demands made to the President of the Commission of the African Union to organise an

expert meeting in collaboration with the Commission of the Lake Chad Basin, ECOWAS, ECCAS, CSSS, OCI and other international partners during the first week of February 2015, to complete the concept of operation, the concept of logistical support, the rules of engagement and other important documents necessary for the integral functioning of the MJTF;

- it underlined that the concept of operation ought to be flexible to enable rapid support to the MJTF through bilateral or tripartite arrangements like the one between Cameroon and Chad;
- the transmission of the Concept of Operation and the announcement to the Security Council of the United Nations for the adoption of a UN resolution authorizing the deployment of the MJTF and the putting in place of a Special Affection Fund;
- the convening of a donor conference to mobilize the necessary resources for the MJTF;
- the creation of a support group around the member states of the LCBC and an appeal for strategic partners to support and strengthen the strategy established by the LCBC;
- to strengthen urgent international humanitarian action to help internally displaced persons in Nigeria, refugees in Niger, Cameroon and Chad;
- request for the International Criminal Court to hasten the on going process on crimes against humanity committed by Boko Haram.

Mobilisation by african union

Under the impulsion of the member states of LCBC and Benin, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union adopted a communiqué on the 25th November 2014 through which it congratulated the member states of the LCBC and committed itself to propose to the ordinary session of the Heads of States and Government, the adoption of a declaration of support to the said countries, and to request the AU in collaboration with LCBC member states, to undertake necessary and appropriate measures in order to evaluate the various needs to enable them effectively combat Boko Haram.

In a declaration on 14th January 2015, the President of the African Union Commission condemned the atrocities of Boko Haram and committed to accelerate the resolution of the PSC of 25th November 2014.

Issues relating to the fight against Boko Haram and international solidarity dominated the

discussions of the 24th session of the Conference of Heads of States and Governments that took place from the 26th -31st January 2015.

On the one hand, Niger which held the Presidency of the LCBC introduced in the agenda of the working session of the Council, call for the need for international solidarity to combat Boko Haram while on the other hand, the Peace and Security Council held a meeting comprised of Heads of States on the 29th January 2015.

The Meeting of the Executive Council of the African Union

In examining the case raised by Niger concerning the crimes, atrocities and attacks of Boko Haram, member states of African Union jointly condemned these terrorists' acts and recommended diverse supports to countries involved in the fight against Boko Haram in the region. Member countries in the region suffering from the pains of the war caused by Boko Haram, appealed for an international mobilization to fight against this threat.

The Conference of the Heads of States dwelled on security issues in this area and supported the efforts made by member countries in LCBC, by implementing the decision of the Peace and Security Council with respect to the deployment of the MJTF for an initial period of twelve months and setting up of the Special Funds by the Secretary General for the logistical and financial support necessary for the MJTF.

The 489th Session of Heads of States of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.

It took place on the 29th January 2015 in Addis-Abeba (Ethiopia) in the event of the 24th Ordinary session of the conference of African Union.

The following decisions were taken;

- a meeting of experts to be held in Yaoundé from the 5th-7th April with the participation of all stakeholders to finalize the concept of operation of the MJTF, including other documents relating to command and control, the concept of logistical support, the rules of engagement as well as the directives for the protection of civilians taking into consideration of the do no harm principles of human rights of the United Nations.
- to take into consideration the demands made during the ministerial meeting held in Niamey on the 20th January 2015 to submit a flexible concept of operation, which can facilitate within

the framework MJTF, the necessary means for bilateral and trilateral arrangements.

- the authorization for the deployment of a MJTF for a period of 12 months renewable. The force will comprised of a man-power size of up to 7500 military personnel, with a precised and determined mandate and with specific tasks to ensure the security of the region and humanitarian activities.
- a donor conference to be organized by the Commission with the support of the United Nations to facilitate the mobilization of the necessary resources.
- the deployment of health sub-committees within the permanent structures of the African Union in the LCBC, so as to enable the evaluation of the situation and make recommendations on the best means possible on how to mobilize support at the continental level, to add to that already made available by international partners.
- add more efforts to improve on the living conditions of the population of the affected regions; education, job creation and the protection of the human rights including the rights of young girls in order to fight against alienation and marginalization. This is aimed at creating favourable conditions for the emergence of LCBC.
- a call was made to mobilize the necessary resources for the technical and financial support of this strategy.
- A call was made again to the committee in charge of sanctions against Al-Qaida of the Security Council, to inscribe Boko Haram on the list of individuals and entities subjected to financial sanctions. This is to eliminate the group and to cut off the sources through which its criminal and terrorists activities are financed.
- the transmission of these decisions to the Security Council of the United Nations and to other partners of African Union by the President of the Commission, to get their support and action as need arises.

The President of the Commission has as duty to inform the council once a month of the implementation of the decisions of the 29th January 2015 communiqué. In the framework of the implementation of the decisions of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, a meeting of Experts charged with the elaboration of the Concept of Operation and the Rules of Engagement of the MJTF was held in Yaoundé on the 5th -7th of February 2015.

With the completion of the Concept of Operation

project in N'Djamena, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union during its preparatory meeting of 23rd -27th February adopted it and it was finally validated during its 489th meeting on the 3rd of March 2015. The Council increased the personnel of the MJTF from its initial number of 7.500 to 10.000 military personnel and others to be furnished by the member states.

This Concept of Operation project as well as the Communiqué of the 489th session of the Peace and Security Council will be transmitted to the Security Council of the United Nations Organization for an adoption of a resolution hoped to be in accordance with the wishes of the African Union.

Mobilization and Actions Carried Out By Member States of the Economic Community Of Central African States

The Meeting of Heads of States and Governments of ECCAS

This meeting, that brought together Heads of States and Governments and presided by His Excellency, Idriss Deby Itno, President of the Republic of Chad and acting president of the ECCAS, took place on the 31st January 2015 in the event of the 24th Conference of the African Union. The two main issues on the agenda of the meeting were; the situation in Central Africa Republic and the Boko Haram threat.

Concerning the Boko Haram threat, the Heads of States expressed their solidarity with respect to their brother, the President of the Republic of Cameroon. They also congratulated the defense forces of Cameroon for their bravery and patriotism in defending the fatherland. Gratitude was equally expressed to the President of the Republic of Chad for the support that he and the people of Chad gave and are giving to Cameroon through the deployment of a contingent of their soldiers to fight Boko Haram.

An extra ordinary session of the Conference of Heads of States was schedule for the 16th February 2015 in Yaoundé, to be followed by a Ministerial Council and a meeting of the Commission of Defense Forces.

The Heads of States and Governments decided to activate the appropriate mechanisms within the region, notably the Mutual Assistance Pact within the member states of ECCAS and the important clauses of the Protocol on Peace and Security Council of Central Africa (COPAX for its French acronym). This was to put in place a Sub regional strategy to support Cameroon and Chad in the fight against Boko Haram which is threatening the stability of the sub-region.

The Extraordinary Conference of the Heads of States and Government of Peace and Security Council of ECCAS

It took place in Yaounde, on the 16th of February 2015 as agreed in Addis-Abeba. During this extraordinary conference of Member states of the Peace and Security Council of Central Africa, the Heads of State by sub-regional affiliation and solidarity decided to give concrete and diverse support to help Cameroon and Chad whose troops are on the battle field in the war against Boko Haram. They also decided to trigger the mechanism provided by the Peace and Security Council of Central Africa (, namely; the Mutual and Assistance Pact of the Protocol on Peace and Security Council for Central Africa) which assist countries when a member state is facing aggression or a threat. Consequently, an emergency fund of 50 (fifty) billion FCFA was decided to be made available as well as the creation of multidimensional support fund.

This support could equally be made in military aid, man power support, expertise, health support, in diverse military equipments and aerial support.

ECCAS's strategy in fighting Boko Haram will also be in harmony with other initiatives and particularly the process of implementing and setting up the MJTF in the LCBC. The countries of ECCAS have decided to work in synergy with those of ECOWAS in order to eliminate Boko Haram.

To this effect, the Presidents of Congo and Equatorial Guinea were charged to explore the possibilities of holding a bi-party ECCAS-ECOWAS Summit as well as strengthening cooperation with Nigeria in this area.

A meeting of experts from ECCAS and ECOWAS took place on the 12th March in Brazzaville and an ECCAS-ECOWAS Summit was scheduled for 25th March 2015.

The Mobilisation of the international Community and the Expected actions of the UN Security Council

On the 11th January 2015, the Secretary General of the UNO condemned the use of children as suicide bombers for deadly attacks by Boko Haram. Consequently, a Declaration of the President of the



Source : unoca.unmissions.org; Extra Ordinary Summit of COPAX, Febraury 2015, Ydé

Security Council was adopted. This reaction came after preceding actions carried out by members of the UN family. He pointed out that the situation in Nigeria stood out as priority. His Excellency, Ban Ki Moon underlined the will and commitment of the UN to help the government of Nigeria and neighbouring countries affected by the threat to put an end to violence and reduce the suffering of the civilian population by all means possible.

The Declaration of the Consultative Council of the United Nations on the Fight against Boko Haram

During the 39th Ministerial Meeting of the Permanent Consultative Committee of the United Nations charged with security in Central Africa, that took place from the 1st-5th December 2015 in Bujumbura, a declaration was adopted.

By this Declaration, member states expressed their worries faced with the atrocities and crimes of Boko Haram. They also congratulated and encouraged the Presidents of Cameroon and Chad in their fight against the Boko Haram sect. They exhorted the international community to increase their support in the fight against this terrorist group and called on the Head of the United Nations Regional Bureau for Central Africa to submit this operation to the Security Council of the United Nations for examination.

It is important to note that United Nations Regional for Central Africa sent a delegation to the area in October 2014 to evaluate this situation which brought similar results.

The Actions of the Head of United Nations Regional for Central Africa

On the 10th December 2014, the Head of United Nations Regional Bureau for Central Africa called the attention of the Security Council of the UNO on the critical situation on the ground using amongst others the findings from the mission of the areas affected by the threat. He used the occasion to point out that beyond the impact on human rights as well as on the political, security, humanitarian domains, the recurrent attacks of Boko Haram have psychological and socio-economic consequences which are worrying.

He strongly pointed out the importance of cooperation and the need to attack from its roots, that is, those sources through which Boko Haram receives its finances as well as the other phenomena that facilitates its rise.

In conformity with the Declaration published by the President of Security Council ensued from the debates

of 10th December 2014, United Nations Regional Bureau for Central Africa committed itself to continue collaborating with United Nations Office for West Africa in order to help member states of the region of Lake Chad to remedy the effects of the Boko Haram threat.

Based on the availability of the United Nations Organisation for Central Africa to work concretely with the countries affected and our government, practical corridors of cooperation should be envisaged to get the Security Council and consequently the international community involve in this fight.

Support Declared by Western Powers

French President, Francois Hollande declared he had decided to help the countries of the sub region in the fight against Boko Haram. It is important to highlight that France will play a key role when she assume presidency in the Security Council during the month of March 2015. She had already undertaken some steps to negotiate the donor conference with other partners and to bring her contribution to the conference after the resolution of the Security Council.

Russia, China and the United States of America have also committed themselves to support the fight against Boko Haram.

The Security Council of the UN would examine this issue latest end of March 2015 in view of an authorization for the deployment of the force in the beginning of April 2015.

The Permanent Ambassadors representing member counties of the LCBC and Benin as well as Angola have already begun negotiations with the permanent and non permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations.

In the end, the Security Council of the United Nations issued a Presidential Declaration on 12th January which, amongst others, called for an increase in the international support to reinforce the operational capacity of the MJTF.

Following the approval of the Strategic Concept of Operation of the MJTF, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on the 3rd of March 2015 exhorted the Security Council of the United Nations to, as a matter of urgency, adopt a resolution in accordance with the Chapter VII of the United Nations which will;

- ratify the deployment of the MJTF;
- put in place modalities of a lasting and flexible support in favour of the MJTF F through an innovative and support mechanism. Such modalities should be inspired by lessons drawn from operations carried by the African. It is also

important to take into consideration that the UN support to the AU in issues relating to peacekeeping and international security are integral part of collective security as prescribed by the Charter of the United Nations.

- An appeal should be made on free will on additional bilateral and multilateral support to the MJTF. Other relating efforts should be made in this respect including, rapid impact projects, the rehabilitation of affected communities and zones, rapid recovery, socio-economic development and consolidation of peace.

An appeal was also made to member states of African Union and other members of the international community to provide the necessary support to the MJTF including financial and logistical assistance, equipments as well as support in the area of updating intelligence in order to facilitate the integral functioning and diligence of the MJTF.

In other words, the Peace and Security Council of African Union requested that the commission accelerate consultations with the European Union so as to mobilize financial support through this facility for peace in Africa.

Already, the 9th annual consultative meeting took place on the 12th March 2015 in Addis-Abeba with members of the Security Council of the United Nations. The meeting was aimed at discussing with leaders of the United Nation on the necessity and urgency of adopting a resolution ratifying the deployment of the MJTF and the putting in place of the necessary mechanisms to support.

On the other hand the Commission of the Africa Union with the support of the United Nations have undertaken steps to prepare for the donor conference in April 2015 which was initially schedule for mid March 2015.

The President of the Commission has officially

transferred the Strategic Concept of Operation, during the 489th Communiqué of the Peace and Security Council held on the 3rd of March 2015 to the Secretary General of the United Nations.

Conclusion and observations

The impetus of the Heads of States of member countries of LCBC and Benin, their strong political will, their commitment and engagement to fight against Boko Haram as well as their initial deployment of troops, brought in a positive reaction from the international community both from the bilateral and multilateral levels.

These positive echoes and the mobilization realized so far should be concretized within the shortest time possible in order to eradicate this threat and secure the stabilization and reconstruction of the economies of these countries which are already paying a great price from this war imposed by the Boko Haram terrorist group.

The assistance of ECCAS is a complementary testimony of a sub regional and continental solidarity.

The international community in all its facets and component should mobilize and be committed in the fight against terrorism and adapt counter measures to this new international threats whose mode of operation is based on asymmetric or hybrid war.

Based on this, the cooperation and harmonization of the efforts of UE, AU and UNO should be reinforced. This is true for the strengthening of the AU-UNO cooperation on the strategic basis of responsibility sharing. This will include and require a consultative process of decision making where the African Union will be involved as a major player in the UNO processes of elaborating new strategies for peacekeeping adapted to meet new threats and asymmetric and or hybrid wars.

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